

A HISTORY OF ROME

TO THE DEATH OF CÆSAR

BY

W. W. HOW, M.A.

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD

AND

H. D. LEIGH, M.A.

LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD



CONTORNIAE. URBS ROMA, AND WOLF WITH TWINS

NEW IMPRESSION

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA

1912

All rights reserved

PREFACE

IN writing this short history of Rome the authors have endeavoured to meet the requirements of the upper forms in schools and of the pass examinations at the Universities. With this object in view they have dwelt at some length on the more important and eventful wars, and on the history of the Roman army. Literature, which never at Rome reached the heart of the people, they have designedly omitted. A mere outline, which is all that space would allow, would have been worse than useless, since it might have led to the neglect of the separate histories of the subject. On the other hand they have attempted to describe clearly, if briefly, the development of a constitution, interesting to Englishmen both from its likeness and its unlikeness to that of their own country. In so doing they have derived assistance from the researches of many scholars, both at home and abroad; but their deepest debt is due to the master of all modern historians of Rome, Professor Mommsen. On constitutional and antiquarian questions they have bowed to his paramount authority, and even from his somewhat sweeping judgments of parties and persons they have never dissented without hesitation. Like other Oxford students they owe much to the lectures and articles of Professor Pelham; they have also drawn upon Mr. Warde Fowler's works, and Mr. Strachan Davidson's Cicero and Polybius. From the latter, through the kindness of the Clarendon Press, they have been allowed

to take a plan of Cannæ; for other maps and plans they are indebted to Kraner's "Cæsar," to Mr. R. Bosworth Smith, and to Mr. R. F. Horton, who has been good enough to permit them to revise the useful series appended to his History of the Romans. It is needless to say that they are intended not to supersede but only to supplement the classical atlas.

For the insertion of numerous illustrations the authors have to thank Messrs. Longmans; for their selection they are indebted to Mr. Cecil Smith of the British Museum. They are in all cases derived from authentic archæological sources, and have been taken, so far as possible, from well-known and accessible collections, above all from the British Museum. In the list which follows references have been given to standard works. The authors are not without hope that even scholars and teachers not primarily interested in history may welcome the appearance of trustworthy copies from many among the coins and inscriptions which illustrate the art, language, and writing of the Romans in the days of the Republic.

The authors have as a rule adopted modern improvements in the spelling of Latin, but in accordance with English custom they have retained the familiar forms of well-known names, such as Pompey and Catiline, and in the Index they have sacrificed scientific accuracy to convenience of reference.

OXFORD,
April 1896.

CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
I. THE LAND OF ITALY	I
II. PEOPLES OF ITALY	II
III. THE LEGENDS OF THE KINGS	20
IV. THE REGAL PERIOD	34
V. THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC	47
✓ VI. THE FIRST STRUGGLES OF THE PLEBEIANS	52
VII. EARLY WARS AND ALLIANCES OF THE REPUBLIC	58
VIII. THE DECEMVIRATE	65
✓ IX. PROGRESS OF THE PLEBEIANS	72
X. WARS FROM THE DECEMVIRATE TO THE FALL OF VEII	77
XI. THE GAULS	84
✓ XII. THE LICINIAN LAWS AND THE EQUALISATION OF THE ORDERS	91
XIII. THE SUBJUGATION OF LATIUM AND CAMPANIA	97
XIV. THE SECOND SAMNITE WAR	105
XV. THE CONQUEST OF THE ITALIANS	114
XVI. THE WAR WITH TARENTUM AND PYRRHUS	120
XVII. THE POSITION AND RESOURCES OF ROME AND CARTHAGE	131
XVIII. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR	149
XIX. THE EXTENSION OF ITALY TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES	162
XX. HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL	169
XXI. THE SECOND PUNIC WAR UP TO THE BATTLE OF CANNÆ	174
XXII. THE SECOND PUNIC WAR FROM CANNÆ TO ZAMA	199
XXIII. FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST—THE WARS IN THE WEST	234
• XXIV. FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST—AFRICA	245
XXV. FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST—THE EASTERN STATES AND THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR	253
XXVI. FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST—THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS	265
XXVII. FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST—THE FALL OF MACEDON AND GREECE	273

CHAP.	PAGE
XXVIII. INTERNAL HISTORY (266-146 B.C.)—RELIGIOUS AND CONSTITUTIONAL	287
XXIX. INTERNAL HISTORY (266-146 B.C.)—POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION	302
XXX. INTERNAL HISTORY (266-146 B.C.)—SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS	316
XXXI. CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC	322
XXXII. FOREIGN AND PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS (146-129 B.C.)	326
XXXIII. INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS (133 B.C.)	331
XXXIV. GAIVS GRACCHUS	343
XXXV. THE RESTORED OLIGARCHY AND THE WAR WITH JUGURTHA	357
XXXVI. THE WARS IN THE NORTH	371
XXXVII. SATURNINUS, MARIUS, AND THEIR TIMES	384
XXXVIII. THE LAWS OF DRUSUS	394
XXXIX. THE SOCIAL WAR	399
XL. SULPICIUS, MARIUS, AND SULLA (88 B.C.)	412
XLI. THE FIRST MITHRADATIC WAR	419
XLII. THE CINNAN REVOLUTION AND THE CIVIL WAR	434
XLIII. THE PROSCRIPTIONS AND THE NEW DICTATORSHIP	445
XLIV. THE CONSTITUTION OF SULLA	449
XLV. THE RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION	460
XLVI. THE WARS WITH THE PIRATES AND MITHRADATES—POMPEY IN THE EAST	471
XLVII. CICERO AND CATILINE	484
XLVIII. THE FORMATION OF THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE	496
XLIX. THE CONQUEST OF GAUL	503
L. THE RULE OF THE TRIUMVIRATE AND ITS DISSOLUTION	516
LI. THE CIVIL WAR	526
LII. THE RULE OF CÆSAR	539
APPENDIX I.—ASSEMBLIES AT ROME	553
APPENDIX II.—LIST OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ROMAN ROADS OF REPUBLICAN TIMES	555
INDEX	557

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	PAGE
Etruscan Temple and Altar, restored (Semper, <i>Der Stil</i> , plate xiii.)	10
<i>Frontispiece</i>	
Contorniate—Urbs Roma, and Wolf with Twins (Sabatier, plate 14A)	13
<i>Title-page</i>	
View of the Campagna, with Aqueduct	14
Model of a Primitive Etruscan House (Baumeister, fig. 146)	14
Wall and Gateway of Perugia, showing Etruscan Work	14
Contorniate. Æneas leaving Troy—Head of Trajan (Sabatier, plate 14. 10)	21
Wolf with Romulus and Remus. Bronze in the Palace of the Conservatori at Rome	22
Denarius of First Century B.C.—Titus Tatius and the Rape of the Sabines (Babelon, ii. 496, 7)	23
Wall of Servius Tullius (Baumeister, fig. 1591)	27
Roman Coin after 268 B.C.—Head of Rome; Castor and Pollux (Head, Coins of the Ancients, plate 44. 2)	34
Ficus Ruminalis, with Picus and Parra; Urbs Roma; and Wolf suckling Twins (Röm. Mitth., i. plate 1, 1886)	36
Wall on the Aventine (Parker, <i>Historical Photographs of Rome</i>) . .	39
Cloaca Maxima	41
Ground-Plan and Elevation of the Temple of Vesta, restored (Jordan, <i>Tempel der Vesta</i> , plate 4)	43
Sella Curulis and Fasces (Menard, <i>La Vie Privée des Anciens</i> , i. 482) .	49
Etruscan Helmet (Dennis, <i>Etruria</i> , vol. ii. p. 103)	63
Šuovetaurilia. Sacrifice after the Numbering of the People (P. Bouillon, <i>Musée des Antiques</i> , tom. ii. 98)	75
Etruscan Helmet dedicated by Hiero I. after his Victory in 474 B.C. (British Museum, Etruscan Saloon, c. 93)	78
Etruscan Terra-Cotta Sarcophagus from Clusium (British Museum) .	83
Faliscan Vase in the British Museum, 4 feet 3 inches in height . .	89
The Libral As (Æs Grave). From a Cast in the British Museum .	93

	PAGE
Romano-Campanian Coin, 338-317 B.C. (Head, op. cit., plate 33. 5)	105
Chimæra. Etruscan Bronze in the Archaeological Museum at Florence	113
Tomb of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus, now in the Vatican (Baumeister, fig. 1621)	117
Faliscan Vase in the British Museum	121
Tetradrachm of Pyrrhus struck in Italy—Head of Zeus of Dodona, and the Goddess Dione (Head, op. cit., plate 46. 27)	127
King in Chariot. Terra-Cotta of Punic Workmanship (Heuzey, <i>Les Figurines Antiques de Terre Cuite du Musée de Louvre</i> ; plate v.)	132
Plan of Roman Camp (Seyffert-Sandys, 117)	140
The Smaller Cisterns at Carthage (Bosworth Smith, <i>Carthage</i>) . .	144
Siculo-Punic Tetradrachm—Head of Persephone, with Dolphins, copied from Syracuse (Head, op. cit., plate 35. 38)	145
Siculo-Punic Tetradrachm—Head of Persephone, with Dolphins, copied from Syracuse (Head, op. cit., plate 35. 37)	147
Siculo-Punic Tetradrachm—Head of Herakles (Melkarth), copied from Alexander's Coins (Head, op. cit., plate 35. 36)	149
The Columna Rostrata, restored (Fougère, fig. 608)	153
Epitaph of Lucius Scipio (Ritschl, plate 38)	154
Denarius struck circa 133 B.C., to commemorate Victory of Panormus (Babelon, i. 263)	158
Milestone of P. Claudius Pulcher and of C. Furius, <i>Abiles</i> (C. I. L., x. 6838, and <i>Röm. Mitth.</i> , iv. 84, 1889)	159
Remains of the Town of Eryx (Duruy, i. 490)	161
Coin struck at Carthage—Head of Persephone (Head, op. cit., plate 35. 35)	163
Denarius of circa 45 B.C.—Marcellus and Spolia Opina (Babelon, i. 352)	168
Roman in Toga (Statue in the British Museum)	173
Tombstone of Roman Horse-Soldier from Hexham (by kind permission of the Society of Antiquaries of Newcastle-on-Tyne, from Bruce's <i>Roman Wall</i> , handbook, p. 78)	184
The Aufidus near Cannæ	195
Carthaginian Helmet found at Cannæ (British Museum)	198
Coin of Hiero II. of Syracuse (Head, op. cit., plate 46. 31)	205
Bust of Scipio Africanus, in the Capitoline Museum at Rome (Bernoulli, <i>Röm. Ikon.</i> , vol. i. plate 1)	216
Panoramic View of the Peninsula of Carthage	227
Carthaginian Dodecadrachm—Head of Persephone (Head, op. cit., 47. 42)	234

	PAGE
Decree of L. Æmilius Paullus, Prætor of Further Spain, regulating the Position of a Spanish Client-Community, 189 B.C. (C. I. L., ii. 5041)	241
Remains of Ancient Harbours at Carthage (Bosworth Smith)	246
Trilingual Inscription on an Altar dedicated to the God Eshmûn, by Cleon, an Officer of the Salt-Revenue, circ. 150 B.C. (Cast in the British Museum)	252
Tetradrachm of Philip V.—Athena Alkis hurling Fulmen (Head, op. cit., 41. 8)	259
Gold Octadrachm of Antiochus III.—Apollo seated on Omphalos (Head, op. cit., 38. 19)	266
Cippus of a Roman Marine of late date (Schreiber-Anderson, xliii. 20)	269
Tetradrachm of Perseus (Head, op. cit., 54. 10)	275
Temple and Acropolis, Corinth	284
Dedicatory Inscription of L. Mummius (Ritschl, 51A)	286
A Roman sacrificing (Baumeister, fig. 1304)	289
Letter of the Consuls to Local Magistrates, containing the Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus (Ritschl, plate 18)	292
Extispicia (Schreiber-Anderson, plate 17. 3)	293
Epitaph of P. Cornelius Scipio, Flamen Dialis, (?) Son of Africanus, who died young (Ritschl, plate 39F)	301
Roman in Toga (Baumeister, fig. 1917)	307
Roman Soldiers with Scutum, of a late period (Schreiber-Anderson, 42. 8)	314
Lamp with Circus Scene (British Museum, Terra-Cotta Room, Case C.)	319
Gladiators. From a Pompeian Wall-Painting (Les Ruines de Pompeii, F. Mazois, vol. iv. plate 48)	321
Milestone set up by P. Popillius Læuas, in Lucania, as Consul, 132 B.C. (C. I. L., i. 551, Ritschl, plate 51B)	339
Termini set up by the Land Commission in the Land of the Hirpini, 130-129 B.C. (Ritschl, plate 55C.D.)	344
Ruins of Aqueduct, Carthage	348
A Camillus, or Attendant at Sacrifice (Baumeister, fig. 1305)	355
View of Cirta (Delamare, Expédition Scientifique d'Algérie)	363
Plan and Section of the Mamertine Prison. (Middleton, Ancient Rome)	370
Roman Soldier (Lindenschmidt, Tracht und Bewaffnung, plate 1. 6)	376
Combat of Gladiators: the vanquished Combatant appealing to the Audience. From a Pompeian Painting (Baumeister, fig. 2347)	380
Denarius struck 101 B.C.—Triumph of Marius the Goddess, Rome (Babelon, i. 515)	383

	PAGE
Part of a Statue of a Vestal (Museo alle Terme, Rome)	386
Denarius of the Confederates—Taking the Oath ; and Head of Italia (Head, op. cit., plate 68. 14)	400
Denarius of Mutilus—Samnite Bull goring Wolf ; Head of Bac- chante (Head, op. cit., plate 68. 15)	404
Sling-Bullets from Asculum (Duruy, ii. 570)	409
Temple of Fortuna (?) at Rome (so-called Fortuna Virilis)	415
Tetradrachm of Mithradates VI. (Head, op. cit., plate 60. 2)	421
Tetradrachm struck by Sulla in Athens—Athena and the Owl (British Museum)	430
Etruscan Arch at Volaterra	444
Head of Pompey on a Coin struck circ. 38–36 B.C. (Babelon, s. v. Nasidius, ii. 251, 2)	463
Gladiators—Combats of Secutor and Retiarius (Baumeister, fig. 2352)	467
Helmet of a Gladiator (Baumeister, fig. 2346)	469
Coin of Tigranes struck in Syria before 69 B.C.—(1) Head of Tigranes ; (2) Antioch seated on a Rock (Head, op. cit., 61. 13)	473
Gold Stater of Mithradates VI. (Head, op. cit., 60. 1)	474
Tombs of the Kings of Pontus (Perrot, Exploration Arch. de la Galatie)	481
Golden Gate of Temple at Jerusalem (Duruy, ii. 831)	483
Bust of Cicero (Bernouilli, Röm. Ikon., i. plate 11), in the Vatican	489
Sacrarium in a House at Pompeii (Overbeck, Pompeii, p. 299)	498
Bust of Julius Caesar (Naples Museum)	501
Stater of Philip I. of Macedon—(1) Head of Apollo ; (2) Charioteer (Head, op. cit., plate 22. 17)	505
Galic Imitation of Stater of Philip (Head, op. cit., plate 57. 1)	505
Figure-head of Roman Ship (Torr, Ancient Ships, plate 8)	509
Roman Arch at S. Rémy (France)	515
Head of Cleopatra (British Museum)	537
Denarius struck 44 B.C.—(1) Head of Caesar ; (2) Venus with Victory (Babelon, ii. 20. 21)	539
Bust of C. Octavius, afterwards Augustus (in the Vatican)	543
Bust of Brutus (in the Capitoline Museum at Rome)	549
Parody of a Scene in School (Röm. Mitth., v. plate 1. 1890)	551

The Illustrations and Plans engraved by Messrs. Walker and Boutall.

MAPS AND PLANS

I. MAPS LITHOGRAPHED

Italia before the Roman Conquest	<i>Before page</i>	I
Urbs Roma, Republic (Horton, Hist. of the Romans)	} <i>Between pages</i>	38 and 39
Italia, showing the Colonies (Horton, Hist. of the Romans)		
Sicily (Bosworth Smith, Carthage)		<i>To face page</i> 150
The Carthaginian Empire (Bosworth Smith, Carthage)	} <i>Between pages</i>	174 and 175
Carthage and her Neighbourhood (Bosworth Smith, Carthage)		
Rome and her Neighbours (Horton)		<i>Between pages</i> 402 and 403
Gallia (after Kiepert, in Kraner's Caesar)	„	506 and 507
The Roman Empire	„	552 and 553

II. PLANS AND MAPS IN TEXT

	PAGE
Battle of Ecnomus (Bosworth Smith)	155
Battle of Lake Trasimene	189
Battle of Cannæ (from Strachan Davidson, Polybius)	197
Campania	208
The Harbours at Carthage (Bosworth Smith)	250
The East when Rome began to interfere	256
Greece	274
The East, temp. Mithradates and Tigranes	423
Alesia (Kraner)	513
Ilerda (Kraner)	530
Macedonia and Greece (Kraner)	532
Battles near Dyrrhachium (Kraner)	533

ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA

Page 37, line 8 from the bottom, "Roma Quadrata." The meaning of this term is disputed. Lanciani, *Ruins of Ancient Rome*, p. 60, denies its application to the Palatine city.

Page 44, line 3 from bottom. The original meaning and derivation of the word "*tribus*" is far from certain.

Pages 159, 160, *for* "Calatinus" the Fasti *read* "Caiatinus," and similarly Mommsen prefers "Caiatia" to "Calatia" on page 114, line 3.

HISTORY OF ROME

CHAPTER I

THE LAND OF ITALY

Rome and Italy.—The history of Rome is the history of Italy. It has been much more ; it has never been much less. Her early efforts aimed at predominance in Italy ; she wielded the strength of Italy in her wars of defence and aggression, and if in her selfish and centralising policy she merged the land in the city, and sacrificed its population and prosperity to her own interests, she made Italy mistress of the world, and stood to the end as the head and representative of the Italian land. In her beginnings, and indeed constitutionally throughout, she was but a city-state of the sole type recognised by Pericles or Aristotle, as distinct and individual as ancient Athens or mediæval Florence : she became in later days an imperial power, stamping the civilised world with the unity of the Roman name. But the Rome of Augustus is, equally with the Rome of the Fabii, Italian in sentiment, interests, and policy. Her youth was singularly free from non-Italian influences ; and, however much her maturer age received and diffused an alien cultivation, she remained rooted and grounded in Italy, as Italy was in that West to which its face is turned. The struggle of Octavian and Antony, of East and West, is typical of her history from first to last. Hence to understand the place of Rome in history, we must understand the place of Rome in Italy, and the place of Italy in the Mediterranean basin. To comprehend the special character of her own laws and institutions, and of the ideas and civilisation which she implanted, we must comprehend the relation of Rome to Italian peoples, and of the Italian country to its immediate neighbours.

Historically, only those features of a country are important which affect the power of a nation for offence or defence, which

determine its sphere of action and the nature of its resources, or which influence its national character and type of life.

The work of Rome in history was twofold,—first and foremost to create Italian unity, and then, with the power so gained, to solve the problem her rivals could not solve, the maintenance of peace and order in the Mediterranean, the civilisation of the ruder races round its coasts, and the defence of that civilisation against the barbarians of the East and North. The place of Rome in Italy partly explains the union of Italy under Roman supremacy; the place of Italy in the Mediterranean is a still larger factor in the extension of that supremacy over the civilised world.

Marked Features.—Italy, the central peninsula of the three masses of land projecting into the southern sea, with the islands that essentially belong to her, enjoys a position favourable to independent development, and, in the hands of a strong people with adequate sea-power, admirably adapted for the control of the Mediterranean. Apart from the untrustworthy barriers of the Alps and Po, her great depth and narrow front were a powerful aid to her defences on the north; by her central position she severed the East from the West, and holding the inner lines, could meet with security the combinations of Hannibal or Pompey.

She lay back to back with Greece, her more accessible coast turned to the lands and waters of the West. The tip of her toe touches Sicily, the meeting-place of Hellene, Phœnician, Sicel, and Latin, and, through Sicily, touches upon the hump of Africa which projects Carthage upon the Sicilian shores. To her front lay Spain, the Eldorado of antiquity, blocked as yet by Phœnician cruisers. To the north the Celtic and Germanic tribes swarmed round and through the mountain-passes. In addition to these points in her position which materially influenced the destinies of Italy and Rome, the most striking features of the land are the projecting boot-like shape, the peculiar mountain-system which is its cause, the double length of coast which is its effect, and which exposes both flanks to naval attack as much as it opens them to friendly intercourse, and finally the marked contrast between the northern plain of the Po and the central and southern hill-country.

Contrast with Greece and Spain.—Not only in position, but in form and character, Italy stands intermediate between the striking contrasts of Greece and Spain. Greece has no single definite mountain-barrier; Spain is abruptly severed from Europe by the frowning lines of the Pyrenees; the Alps partially protect, but do not isolate, Italy. Italy, diversified by sweeping bays and fertile

coast-lands, by northern plain and southern slopes, remains one land, the land of the Apennines; Spain surrounds her vast and single plateau with a regular and little-broken coast; Greece is split by winding chains and deep indented gulfs into geographical and political atoms. Greece, facing eastwards, expanded eastwards, and early assimilated Oriental culture; Spain, till Columbus the western limit of the world, remained for centuries a barbarous country fringed by factories; Italy, expanding to the west, passed on to Spain what she had received from Greece, and returned with increased power to absorb the sources of her own culture.

Size.—The land of Italy lies roughly between parallels 37° and 46° of north latitude. Its greatest length, from N.W. to S.E., is a little over 700 miles; its average breadth hardly exceeds 100, though from the western Alps to the head of the Adriatic it extends to 340 miles. The total area may be put at 90,000 square miles. In size, therefore, though not in shape, Italy bears some resemblance to Great Britain.

Mountains.—The frontier of the peninsula to the north is formed by the wavering line of the Alps, which, stretching for 700 miles, with abundant passes, forms a rampart more striking than formidable, and one that has never sufficed to shelter the sunny south from the inroads of the covetous north. Rising precipitously enough from the Lombard plain, the Alps slope less steeply to the north. A short march brings the enemy who has climbed the less difficult ascent down at one swoop upon the plain. But the Alps are not Italian as a matter of geography or history. For centuries they remained beyond the sphere of Italian life. Not till Augustus were their robber-tribes thoroughly tamed and their passes paved with roads; scarcely then did they cease to the true Roman mind to be a dubious defence, a commercial barrier, and a limit of Italian land and life.

The Apennines, on the contrary, are the backbone of the country. Breaking off from the Maritime Alps above Savona, they stretch away E. and S.E. from coast to coast, severing the great triangle of Cisalpine Gaul from the true soil of Roman Italy. Above Genoa the range reaches but a moderate height (3000–4000 feet); rising rapidly to cover Etruria, it thrusts up higher peaks (5000–7000 feet) both here and in northern Umbria, where it turns definitely S.E. After a slight break in Lower Umbria comes the massive quadrilateral of the Abruzzi, a group of lofty summits (9000 feet), cleft by torrents into deep ravines, and breaking down to pleasant upland vales. Such, too, but of lesser height, is the

mountain girdle of Samnium. Henceforth the main mass changes direction to the south, runs down to form the projecting toe, and jumping the narrow rift at Rhegium, spreads itself out into the three corners of Sicily. Apart from their natural beauties, the Apennines have exercised a decisive influence on the history of the land and the character of its people. This single and continuous backbone has given to Italy the regular conformation, which contrasts so markedly with the complexity of outline stamped upon Greece by its chaos of mountains. The difference, too, between its eastern and western slopes determines the different character of the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian coasts. From the steep eastern side run down short spurs and swift torrents, which seam the narrow seaward strip with deep ravines. Scant room is left for cultivation; and until the mountains leave the coast and we reach the good harbours of Brindisi and Otranto (Brundisium and Hydruntum), in the Apulian plain, there is no natural harbour of refuge from the Adriatic storms, except the open roadstead of Ancona, and the useless lagoons beneath Mount Garganus. The western side presents a marked contrast; fertile plains are watered by ample streams, good and spacious ports formed at the river-mouths, or flanked and fronted by jutting headlands and sheltering islands, foster navigation and commerce on the tideless waters of the Tyrrhene sea. Italy, in fact, if we except Apulia in the extreme south-east and the lower valley of the Po in the extreme north, which maintained some connection with Greece and Illyria, turns her face westward, and found in the civilisation of the west her most important work. This decisive fact in her history is due to the Apennine range.

Again, the mountains of Greece divide; the Apennines may be even said to unite. A dividing line between peoples they have never been. Even in the most rugged region of the Abruzzi, the easy intersecting passes, the table-lands, and upland valleys fit them for the labour and habitation of men. When the grass of the lower country is parched, the flocks and herds are driven up from the plain of Apulia to the mountain-pastures of Samnium. This happy combination is a special characteristic of Italy. In early times, indeed, the freebooters of the highlands, the Rob Roys of those days, harried and blackmailed the rich dwellers on the sunny coasts. The struggle of highland and lowland, and the final victory of civilisation under the leadership of Rome, achieving their natural union, is another marked feature which Italian history owes to the Apennines.

Volcanic forces have been largely at work in the formation of Italy. Apart from the active craters of *Ætna*, *Stromboli*, and *Vesuvius*, the Campanian plain owes to its volcanic origin its peculiar beauty and richness; while in the Roman land itself, stretching from *Clusium* to the Alban hills, and from the Apennines to the sea, lovely lakes fill the extinct craters, and from their pre-historic lava-streams and dust-showers come the tufa and the famous concrete of which Rome was built.

Rivers.—The river-system of a country usually exercises an influence on its history only second to its general position and its relation to the sea. In Roman history it has played a lesser part. For centuries the largest river of Italy flowed unregarded through an alien territory. Gradually the Roman outposts were pushed up to *Arretium* and *Ariminum*, and thence to *Placentia* and *Aquileia*; but in *Cæsar's* time the Cisalpine plain was still a province, and Roman Italy ended at the *Rubicon*. The contrast of the two regions is marked and obvious. The rivers of the peninsula proper are naturally small in size, and, however famous in story, geographically far less important. Upper Italy forms the basin of a single large stream, the *Padus* (*Po*), or, as *Virgil* calls it, *Eridanus*, king of rivers, a great central artery whose network of veins stretches on either hand to the Alps and the Apennines. Springing from its sources in *Monte Viso* (*Mons Vesulus*), it rushes to its junction with the *Ticino*, swollen by the torrents of the two *Doras* (*Duria*), the *Sesia*, and the *Tanaro*. But in its long and winding lower course its sluggish stream needs the impulse of swifter tributaries, the *Ticino*, the *Adda*, and the *Mincio*, which act as outlets for the large northern lakes, and draw through them the waters of the Alps. Of the smaller feeders from the southern ridges the most famous is the *Trebia*; the largest are the *Taro* and *Secchia*. About its mouths the *Po* forms a vast system of marshes and lagoons. In this work it is aided by the *Adige* (*Athesis*), which descends from the Tyrol, affording an important issue to the north, and enters the Lombard plain at *Verona*, and by the *Reno*, from the Apennines, which reaches the lowlands near *Bologna* (*Bononia*). The ever-growing deposit and the constant floods have made this district an Italian Netherlands, a labyrinth of streams and canals, of lagoons and sandbanks, of reedy swamps and grassy meadows, noisy with frogs, and plagued by low fevers and mosquitos. Venice, by diverting the *Brenta*, keeps her waters intact, but *Ravenna*, the naval harbour of *Augustus*, is now six miles from the sea, and the same fate, yet earlier, befell both *Atria* and *Spina*.

Many of the southern tributaries of the Po are in summer nothing more than wide, dry water-courses, but the main stream, though its unhealthy swamps prevented towns from clustering on its banks, as on the Rhine or Rhone, was yet the highway of internal commerce, and with its numerous branches and canals irrigated and fertilised the entire plain, whose extraordinary productiveness is recorded by Polybius. At the same time there is constant danger of flood from the melting snows in May and from the autumnal rains. To meet this danger, the lower courses of the larger rivers are lined with double rows of massive dykes. But the disease grows by the remedy. The mud, unable to escape, chokes the channel and raises the river-bed above the level of the land. There comes a time when the ever-rising bank fails to bear the pressure of the confined waters, which burst the barriers in a raging torrent.¹

Of the rivers of the peninsula proper, the Arno and the Tiber are the largest, and furnish the key to the formation of central Italy. Separated at their sources by less than thirty miles, their lower courses widely diverge. The Arno (160 miles) at first flows southward, but turns abruptly to the north-west at Arezzo (Arretium), and thence past Florence westward to the sea. Its marshes formed a line of defence which almost baffled Hannibal; otherwise its place in Roman history is but slight. The Tiber, running nearly due south, receives as its main tributaries, on the right bank the Chiana (Clanis), and on the left the Nera (Nar) and Teverone (Anio). Of these the Chiana, whose upper waters have recently been diverted into the Arno, rising above Chiusi (Clusium), comes in below Orvieto; the Nar has carried the waters of the Sabine highlands since Manius Curius cut the rocks that hem the Veline lake and formed the falls of Terni (Interamna); while the Anio, issuing from the Æquian hills, makes Tivoli (Tibur) beautiful with its waterfalls, and enters the main stream above the city, below which the Tiber turns westward to Ostia and the sea. The tawny mud (*flavus Tiberis*) has now partially silted up the river-bed, but in ancient days, though it was more usual to unload at Ostia, ships of burthen could make their way to Rome. The wine, corn, and timber of the inland districts were floated down in barges from the upper waters to the quays of the capital. It was this river-commerce which first made Rome the trading centre of middle Italy; but her position, if favourable to trade, exposed her then, as now, to the ravages of floods, which wasted the swarming slums in the valleys (not then filled in with rubbish or levelled

¹ Cf. Verg. Georg., i. 481, iv. 372; Lucan, Phars., vi. 272.

by the engineer), and called for constant regulation and careful embankment.

The next considerable stream, the Liris (Garigliano), rises near Lacus Fucinus, and flowing S.E. by S., edges gradually westward between the Volscian and the central range, then turning sharply beyond Interamna, falls into the Mediterranean at Minturnæ. Beneath Fregellæ it is joined by its chief feeder, the Trerus (Sacco), along whose valley ran the great Latin road from Latium to the Hernican country, and thence by the bridge of Fregellæ to Casinum and Capua. From its junction with the Trerus the Liris ceases to be fordable, and serves as a defensive line to the south for the coast-land of Latium.

The Volturnus from the north and the Calor from the south drain the mountain-valleys of Samnium; their united stream, turning to the west, leaves Capua on the left, and passing the *tête-de-pont* of Casilinum, where the Appian and Latin roads converge, forms the natural highway from the hill-country to the sea, and an equally natural bone of contention in the long and keen struggle of Romans and Samnites for the mastery of Italy. The Silarus (Sele), the last considerable western stream, rises in the Lucanian Apennines, and enters the sea near Pæstum. Henceforward the closeness of the watershed to the sea admits but of short, swift torrents. From the less abrupt slopes that skirt the instep of the boot there flow into the Gulf of Tarentum four streams of moderate size, Siris and Aciris, Bradanus and Casuentus.

One stream of mark alone threads the poorly watered levels of Apulia, Horace's loud-roaring Aufidus (Ofanto), which, rushing rapidly down from the mountain angle of Samnium and Lucania, winds gently through the plain past Canusium and the fated field of Cannæ. North of Mount Garganus, again, which juts like a misplaced spur above the heel, the one large stream among innumerable rivulets and swift-falling torrents is the Aternus (Pescara). Its valley served as a natural link between the hills and the small emporium at the river's mouth, Aternum, and gave an obvious route for the Via Claudia Valeria, the direct road from Rome to the Adriatic. Corfinium, at the sharp angle of the stream where it turns on itself to the north and east, the most central point in the widest part of the valley, became, in the last struggle of the Marsic highlanders with Rome, the headquarters and formal capital of the insurgent tribes. The roll of Italian rivers may well close with the historic name of Metaurus in the Gallic march of Umbria.

Lakes.—The lakes of Italy deserve a passing mention for their


geological interest and marvellous beauty. Here once more appears the contrast of north and south. The great lakes of northern Italy, natural reservoirs, which store and regulate the waters of the Alpine feeders of the Po, Maggiore (Verbanus) on the Ticino, Como (Larius) on the Adda, and Garda (Benacus) on the smooth-sliding Mincius, rich with the praise of poets from Catullus to our own Tennyson, are chasms carved, it may be, in some age of ice, and filled at a later time, like fjords in Norway, by the sea which once rolled its waves to wash the feet of the Alps. The lakes of the peninsula are inferior in size and depth. Some, like the pools of Greece, are shallow meres with no outlet, due to accumulation of water in upland valleys. Such was Lacus Fucinus in the Marsic hills, which, like Lake Copais in Bœotia, has recently (1875) been drained, by an extension of the "emissarium" of Claudius; such still are the famous mere of "reedy Trasimene," threatened with a like fate, and the smaller lake of Clusium, both in Etruria. Others again are found thickly scattered in the volcanic districts of central Italy. The Alban lakes and the Ciminian pool fill deep cup-shaped craters of extinct volcanoes; the basins of the "great Volsinian mere" and the Lacus Sabatinus may have been formed by subsidence and erosion. The two latter are linked by small rivers to the sea; in other cases the water, as in Greece, pierces a subterranean passage, or is carried off in artificial channels often of remote antiquity.

Climate and Products.—Taken as a whole, Italy is a healthy country. The summer's heat is tempered by the mountain breezes, the winter's cold by the nearness of the sea. Yet differences of latitude and the natural configuration of the land cause a considerable variety in climate. In the basin of the Po the conditions are continental rather than Mediterranean. In winter bitter winds blow from the Alps, snow lies even on the plain, and the olive barely survives the keenness of the frost; the rains of summer save the land from all danger of drought. The southern seaboard, with its sub-tropical climate, presents a direct antithesis. Campania, the coasts of the Tarentine gulf, and the Italian islands are seldom shrouded in snow; their winter is pleasant as a genial spring. Both regions were early occupied by strangers, the north by the roving Gaul, the coasts and islands by the adventurous Greek. The land of the native Italians, which falls between the two extremes, is itself far from uniform in character, the chief contrast being between the seaward fringe and the central hills. The Tuscan and Apulian plains under adequate irrigation are

still of great fertility, for all the ruin wrought by slavery, by war, and by the heavy hand of Sulla. The lower slopes of the hills, especially on the western side, bear the most characteristic products of Italy, the vine and the olive, as well as corn. The higher hills, now bleak and bare, were once partly clothed with beeches and chestnuts, or gave a summer pasture to flocks and herds. In winter snow covers the Samnite and Sabine highlands.

A rich variety of products corresponds to this marked diversity of climate. It is true that the lemons and oranges of the south, the rice and maize of the north, with the mulberry-tree and the silk-worm, have been introduced in modern times. The plain of Lombardy, the market-garden of more than Italy, was, in the days of Polybius, studded with oak-coppices, where herds of swine fattened on acorns. But wheat, the olive, and the vine were from an early age common, if not indigenous, in the land. In the production of olive-oil Italy early took, and still holds, the foremost place in Europe; her wines from the Massic hill and the Falernian fields stood high with the connoisseurs of the early empire, if they yield to-day before the rival vintages of France and Spain. These staple products were partially protected by the policy of the Senate from foreign competition. Corn-growing soon became unprofitable, and failed to hold its own against imported wheat, sheep-farming, and market-gardening, whose economic effects were exaggerated by bad legislation and capitalism resting on slave-labour. Of manufactures Italy had little to boast, though the wool industry must have attained a great development. Essentially an agricultural land, with the decline of field industries, and the growth of foreign speculation, militarism, and luxury, the balance of commerce must have gone increasingly against her, and the drain in payment for the food-stuffs, the art-products, the wines and luxuries of the East, only came back in the dangerous shape of tribute, of extorted interest and official plunder.

But with all its advantages of climate, Italy suffers from one deadly scourge, the fever-laden air (*malaria*). The western plains, the southern coast, the margins of the islands, above all the Maremma and the Campagna of Rome, studded once with prosperous cities, thronged with hurrying feet, crowned with towers and beautified with temples, lie waste and desolate. Even in the first century of our era the Tuscan coast was becoming dangerous, and more than one Punic army had long since melted away by the marshes of Syracuse. Far wider tracts have been smitten with the curse in the Middle Ages and in modern times.



Land in Etruria and Latium now given up to the frog and the buffalo was in antiquity well drained and well tilled. The people were kept warm by the woollen clothing and blazing hearths dear to the Romans, and dwelt in cities whose great walls, as the Sardinians still find, helped to keep out the deadly mist. Even now the malaria retires before the advancing plough, and crops of corn wave once more by the abandoned temples of Pæstum.

CHAPTER II

PEOPLES OF ITALY

THE variety of races within the peninsula was no less marked than the variety of its products and of its climate. The causes are not far to seek. Waves of wandering barbarians, pushed by pressure from the north and east, or tempted by the famed fertility and beauty of the land, stormed one after another through the undefended passes, while its long coasts lay open to every bark of adventurous mariners from Hellas or the Punic settlements. Moreover, though Italy enjoys a unity denied to Greece, yet the frequent intersection of the peninsula by mountains favoured the division of the soil among a number of tribes, whose differences were naturally accentuated by the divergences of local conditions.

Races of North Italy.—The Apennines of the north-west and the shores of the gulf of Genoa were the home of the Ligurians. Into these mountain-fastnesses stronger races had driven them from their once wide territory, which had stretched northwards over the valley of the Po, westward to the Rhone, and southward to the Arno. The men, a small dark race, wild as their own land, hunters, cragsmen, and robbers, fought stoutly for their huts and caves with Gauls, Etruscans, and Romans alike. To the legions, which they long harassed with guerrilla warfare, they contributed later an admirable light infantry.

The Gauls or Celts, who gave their name to the Cisalpine district, the latest wave of immigrants, descended the Alps, and pushing before them their Etruscan predecessors, seized the upper valley of the Po as far as the Mincio. Wandering bands penetrated deep into the peninsula, but the genuine settlements of the Celts were closed by the Apennines and the *Æsis*. To the Roman,

as to the Greek, the Gaul is the type of the northern barbarian, a name indiscriminately applied to the Celt and the Teuton. The steadfast courage of disciplined troops prevailed at length over the impulsive valour and impetuous charges of the chivalrous but unstable northerners. But the terror of a Gallic tumult brought Italy as one man to the aid of Rome, and the memory of the terrible day on the Allia survived in Roman minds to give additional lustre to the victories of Cæsar. By the end of the Hannibalic war the corn-lands of Cisalpine Gaul were won, and became the most prosperous in Italy. In the time of Polybius the Celts were largely merged or extinct, and Roman life and culture pressed steadily up to the Alps.

The province of Venetia still recalls the name of its most ancient inhabitants, the Veneti, an Illyrian stock, who held the land at the head of the Adriatic as far inland as the Mincio against the intruding Gauls. In the fifth century B.C. they were partially civilised by the Greek colony of Atria founded on their coast, and in later days acted with Rome against their more barbarous neighbours.


The Etruscans.—Beyond the Apennines, from the Macra to the Tiber, dwelt the mysterious people of the Rasenna known to the Romans as Etruscans, to the Greeks as Tyrrhenians, the standing riddle of Italian history. Neither language nor customs enable us to connect them assuredly with any known nation. They¹ entered Italy almost certainly by land over the Alps, and before the coming of the Gauls ruled on both sides the Po. Atria, Melpum, and Maritua were once Etruscan cities, and Felsina (Bononia) proudly styled herself head of Etruria. For a time, too, they held Campania and an Etruscan dynasty lorded it in Rome itself, but their permanent home lay in the district called Etruria, where the twelve great cities long outlived the sister-leagues of Campania and Gaul. To the north they had a double line of defence in the Apennines and the marshes of the Arno; to the south they were severed from the Italian races by the Tiber, and sheltered from the rising power of Rome behind the barrier of the Ciminian forest, a line unbroken till the famous march of Fabius.

The Rasenna were to the Romans a foreign nation speaking an unknown tongue. In contrast with the slender Italians, their monuments represent them as a sturdy, thick-set, large-headed race; their

¹ The Ræti, in Switzerland, spoke Etruscan, and have left behind them inscriptions in that language near Lugano and in the Valtellina. The Lydian origin of the Etruscans is an hypothesis due to confusion of names (Herod., i. 94).

religion was apparently a gloomy mysticism, which readily degenerated into superstition. Their cities, which in earlier times were governed by monarchs, and afterwards by close and long-lived aristocracies, were formed into three loosely-knit leagues of twelve cities, one in the Po valley, one in Campania, and one in Etruria itself. Each league recognised a federal metropolis at least for religious purposes, but there was little concerted action even in time of war.

At first the Etruscans showed vigour on water as on land. Their galleys infested the sea, which took from them its name, "Tyrrhenian," and joined the Carthaginians in their effort to keep the Greeks from gaining a foothold in Sardinia and Corsica. Not




MODEL OF A PRIMITIVE ETRUSCAN HOUSE.

till Hiero I. of Syracuse defeated the allied powers off Cumæ (474 B.C.) were the Etruscan Corsairs driven from the seas.

To fasten their grip upon the land, they crowned the steepest and most isolated hills with fortress-cities, whose mighty walls, arched gates, and huge drains still testify to the skill and power of their builders; witness the city-gate of Perugia, the frowning hold of Volaterræ, or Cortona's "diadem of towers." But in historical times the vigour of the race is on the wane. The Greeks destroy their navy; the Gauls overrun their country. Campania is lost to the Samnites (450 B.C.). Etruria, south of the Ciminian hills, submits to Rome. Hard-pressed and inwardly decayed, the Rasenna yielded, after a few faint struggles, to their most resolute

enemy. The causes of this feeble resistance lay partly in the disunion of the cities, partly in the deep discontent of the oppressed masses, but more than all in the enervating effects of luxury. Gross materialism, that found its expression in feasting and drunkenness, in tasteless display and the cruel sports of the amphitheatre, is the leading characteristic of the later Etruscans. Their influence was deeply felt in the early art and architecture, in the religious ideas, the soothsaying and divination, as well as in the gladiatorial shows and the later agricultural villeinage of Rome.



WALL AND GATEWAY OF PERUGIA.

Italian Stocks.—The genuine Italian race may be divided into four branches, the Umbrians of the north, the Oscans in the south, and in Central Italy, the men of the plain (Latium), and the hill-tribes, who, claiming descent from the Sabines, may be styled Sabellian.

The Umbrians, reputed the most ancient race in Italy, who had once held the country on either side the mountains from the Adriatic to the Tyrrhene Sea, were early expelled from Etruria

by the invading Rasenna, and lost their eastern coast to the Senones, the latest immigrants from Gaul. In historical times they were confined within the district which still bears their name between the Tiber and the Apennines.

In the struggle with the Etruscans the petty divisions of their numerous communities were fatal to a common defence, and, to purchase revenge on their ancient enemy, they sacrificed their independence later to Rome. The great Flaminian road, secured by the fortresses of Narnia and Spolegium, riveted their allegiance to their new mistress.

Central Italy.—The small people of the Sabines, who dwelt in the hills and dales east of Tiber, from the Nar to the Anio, a folk of primitive virtues and proverbial simplicity, were held to be the parent stock whence sprang the hill-tribes of Central and Southern Italy. Tradition tells how, during a war with the Umbrians, the pious folk vowed to the gods a sacred spring (*ver sacrum*), and sent in due time their sons and daughters born in the next year to seek new homes wheresoever the gods should please. From two such bands which journeyed to the south was formed the nation of the Samnites (Sabinites); whereof one commemorated the ox of Mars, their guide, in the name of their city, Bovianum; the other called itself "the tribe of the wolf" that led them on their way (Hirpini, from *hirpus*). The clans of the centre were even more closely related to the Sabines. The Picentines of the coast took their name from another emblem of Mars, the wood-pecker (*picus*); while the Marsi, grouped round the Fucine lake, arrogated to themselves, as bravest of the brave, the name of the war-god himself. Near akin to these latter tribes were the other peoples of the Abruzzi, such as the Marrucini, the Vestini, and Paeligni, between whom and the Oscan races of Samnium and Apulia lay the Frentani, a people of mixed blood. In the long wars of Rome and Samnium, all these Sabellian tribes, closely connected as they were in origin and history, adhered generally to the Latin power; and although in the Social War, the last struggle for independence, the Marsi took the lead, the contest was fought out to the bitter end by Samnites and Lucanians alone. In their customs and institutions, again, there is great similarity. The mountains which split them into fractions were at once a bar to intercourse and a strong protection. Content with their scattered hamlets, nestling in secluded valleys, they never developed an urban civilisation, and, like the Arcadians in Greece, formed not organised states but loose confederacies of cantons.

The Æqui, Hernici, and Volsci.—South-east of the Sabines lived the kindred tribe of the Æqui, fierce enemies of rising Rome, but curbed later by the fortresses of Alba Fucens and Carsioli. On the rocky hills of the Trerus valley were perched the strongholds of the Hernici, Anagnia, Ferentinum, and Frusino. The hostility of this tribe to the Æqui and Volsci, between whom its land is sandwiched, explains its persistent and most useful loyalty to Rome. The Volsci, whose more level territory included the coast from Antium to the Pomptine marshes and the lower valley of the Liris, were a nation of obscure origin, equally opposed to Roman and Samnite. In early times the chief enemies of Rome and Latium, pushing their conquests to the southern slopes of the Alban hills, they fell at length before the combined attacks of Samnites and Romans, and left their land as a prize for "the fell, incensed opposites" to wrangle over.

Latins.—The Roman Campagna, now a type of picturesque desolation, was once thickly peopled by Rome's nearest kinsmen and closest friends—the Latins. Their league of thirty cities filled the plain from the Tiber and the Anio to the Volscian hills, from the sea-shore to the western spurs of the Apennines. On these spurs stood two of their strongest and most famous cities, Tibur and Præneste (Palestrina), but the centre and capital of the confederacy was the ancient town of Alba Longa, raised on an isolated ridge of volcanic hills, which stands out boldly above the surrounding plain. On the Alban mount was held the Latin festival, when all Latin towns joined in annual sacrifices to Jupiter Latiaris. With the religious festival was connected a meeting of deputies from the several communities, which formed a federal court of justice and arbitration. In both assemblies Alba presided, but it is unlikely that this titular leadership implied a real political supremacy. Each city retained its independence, but the possession of a common centre and the habit of common action quickened in the Latin race the sense of national unity.

Oscans.—As the Apennines grow more regular and uniform the tribal divisions become larger and less marked. There are but three branches of the great Oscan race which spread itself over the highlands of South Italy. Of these, by far the most important are the Samnites, the Lucanians and Brutians being impure and inferior representatives of the same stock.

The Samnite mountains were the refuge of the Oscans when Greeks and Iapygians occupied their coasts, and the stronghold from which they swooped down later to reclaim their ancient

heritage. Their wandering bands of warlike adventurers seized for themselves large tracts of the Apulian and Campanian plains, but neither here nor there could they cope with the masterly and resolute policy of Rome. The league of the four cantons,¹ firm for defence, was ill organised for aggression. Their random conquests were achieved in pursuance of no definite policy and supported without concentrated purpose. They founded no town like Rome, to be their leader in war and peace. The long struggle of Rome and Samnium is the struggle of lowland and urban civilisation against a people of highlanders, husbandmen and freebooters, content with the old-fashioned village life and tribal ties. Samnium fought to the death; and even after superior policy and the forces of civilisation had prevailed, their undying love of liberty and restless valour broke out in bloody revolts from the days of Pyrrhus and Hannibal till Sulla destroyed the nation root and branch.

The population of Campania was made up of many elements. The older Oscan inhabitants were conquered and civilised partly by Greeks and partly by Etruscans. Some centuries later (450 B.C.) new streams of Oscans poured down on the bright and pleasant coast-lands, and turned the tables on the foreign colonists. About the same time the Samnites, spreading southward, formed the new nation of Lucanians, whose weight pressed heavily on the Greek cities of the south, and hastened their decline.

From the Lucanians, a century later, broke off the Brutians, rude robber-herdsmen who lived in the deep forests and inaccessible granite mountains of the toe of Italy. Always subject to foreign lords, these savage tribesmen remained under the Romans little better than slaves.

Iapygians.—Sharply distinguished from the Oscan races are the Iapygian clans—Daunians, Peucetians, Messapians, who parcelled out among themselves the heel and spur of Italy. Connected doubtless with the Illyrians of the opposite coast, they must have crossed thence to Apulia by sea. Their natural affinity to the Greeks is proved by their ready adoption of Greek writing and civilisation, and by the similarity of local and tribal names. But the persistence of the primitive authority of the chieftain in the clan dates their settlement in Italy ages before the era of the Greek colonies. After resisting for centuries the attempts of Tarentum to enslave them, they were forced by the aggression of the Samnites to welcome the intervention of Rome.

Greeks.—The coast of Southern Italy from Cumæ to Tarentum

¹ In order from north to south, Caraceni, Pentri, Caudini, Hirpini.

was so studded with Greek settlements as to earn for the district the name of *Magna Græcia*. The description of the colonies of Italy and Sicily belongs properly to Hellenic history. But a certain number play an important part in the history of Rome.

The Ionian colony of Cumæ, on the Campanian coast, the earliest and boldest of these great adventures, was the first centre of Greek culture and influence in Italy. Dorian Tarentum, the queen of the south, the first of Italian cities in manufactures and commerce, with its sheltered harbour, its purple-fisheries, and its wool, led the Italiot Greeks in their struggle with Rome. Messana and Rhegium commanded the passage of the straits, a point of vital importance in the Punic wars. In those wars Neapolis and the Greek sea-ports manned with their sailors the young fleet that won the sovereignty of the seas. Syracuse, long preserved from subjection by the wise policy of Hiero II., who held the balance between Rome and Carthage, became the capital of a rich province. Wealthy and luxurious Sybaris, it is true, had perished and left its place desolate; Acragas, the most western stronghold of Hellenism, ceased to be a Greek city; and Croton, the home of philosophy, athleticism, and medicine, fell to the Brutians; but the persistence of the Greek language in Italy and Sicily forces us to recognise this foreign element in the population.

Sicily.—Sicily is an Italian island, but it is no mere appendage of Italy. Largest and most fertile of Mediterranean islands, it lies in the centre of the sea, at once parting and uniting its eastern and western halves. It offered many attractions to the great colonists of antiquity, the Phœnicians and the Greeks. There are, indeed, no navigable rivers, and the central districts are obstructed by mountains, but a long series of harbours welcomes the sailor everywhere but on the dangerous southern coast, and the plains and valleys of the isle, known later as "the granary of Rome," grew rich crops of corn and pastured a famous breed of horses. Thus Sicily became the meeting-place of the nations, the battle-ground of East and West. The native races, Sicels and Sicans, Italian perhaps in origin, became by adoption Greek in speech and manners, and the story of Sicily was henceforth the story of the struggle of the Carthaginian and the Greek, till Rome, the successor of the Syracusan tyrants and of Pyrrhus the Epirot, as champion of Europe against Asia, and Hellene against Semite, drove the Punic ships from the seas, and their garrisons from the great fortresses of the western coast. Greek civilisation was saved, but independence was lost, and Sicily became the earliest province of

Rome, to whose destinies her own were united for nearly seven hundred years.

Sicily owed its early civilisation to its central position on the main trade-route of the ancient world ; Corsica and Sardinia remained in a backward state not so much from natural poverty as from the exclusive policy of Carthage, and the fact that they lay out of the beaten path of commerce. The Punic settlers who tilled the plains and worked the mines of Sardinia, and the Etruscans who held the fringe of Corsica, failed themselves to introduce even the elements of civilisation, and, from selfish fear of Greek competition, combined to expel the Phocæans from Alalia. Under Roman rule, Sardinia, malarial as it was, rivalled Sicily in her output of corn, and Corsican forests supplied excellent timber to the dockyards.

Position of Rome.—Such being the geographical conditions of Italy, and such and so many its tribes and states, what were the special advantages and qualifications of Rome for welding these divided elements into a coherent whole? In the first place, she was allowed to develop without interference on Italian lines. The policy of Carthage was content with the monopoly of commerce and navigation, and aimed only at the reduction of her Greek rivals. The Greeks, absorbed in their intestine struggles and with minds turned to the East, had no eyes for the growth of Rome. The ambitious projects of Athens were shattered in the harbour of Syracuse. The Etruscan power was on the wane, and the casual incursions of marauding Gauls served only to unite Italy round its strongest state. In herself she was fitted for her mission not only by the excellence of her military system, the steady courage of her soldiers, and the tenacious policy of her statesmen, but also by her geographical situation. The eternal city lies in the very centre of Italy, on the one navigable river of the peninsula. The seven hills, flanked by the great outwork of Janiculum, are the most defensible position on the lower Tiber. Near enough to the sea for purposes of commerce,—and Rome was ever a commercial city,—it was far enough from it to be safe from pirates. Rome, in fact, was the predestined capital of Latium and the mart of Central Italy. The leader of Latium became the champion of the plains against the highland clans. During the long contest for the supremacy of Italy, her masterly diplomacy was powerfully aided by her central position in the task of isolating her foes and beating them in detail. Her legions, moving on inner lines, struck with concentrated force against her scattered enemies. She bestrid the narrow peninsula and severed the north from the

south. Acknowledged mistress of Italy, it became her duty to provide for its defence and to wrest from its Semitic foes the control of its seas and islands. The inevitable conflict with the Punic sea-power, and the equally inevitable extension of the Italian frontier to the Alps, launched Rome on a career of victory which ended only with the subjugation of the world.

CHAPTER III

THE LEGENDS OF THE KINGS

TRADITIONAL DATES

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Romulus	753-717	1-37
Numa Pompilius	715-673	39-81
Tullus Hostilius	673-642	81-112
Ancus Marcius	642-617	112-137
L. Tarquinius Priscus	616-579	138-175
Servius Tullius	578-535	176-219
L. Tarquinius Superbus	535-510	219-244

IT is as hopeless to retell as it is impossible to omit the legendary stories of the birth and growth of Rome. Shadowy as are the personages, and unhistorical as are their achievements, the genius of poets and painters and the unquestioning faith of a people has thrown a halo of consecration around them. They may have no foundation in fact, they remain a part of history.

The Founding of Rome.—When Troy was taken by the Greeks, the hero Æneas fled, bearing with him his father, Anchises, and his household gods. Led by the star of his mother, Venus, at length he reached his fated home on the far-off western shore. The king of the land, Latinus, welcomed the stranger, and would have given his daughter, Lavinia, to be his bride. But the king's people and the new folk quarrelled, and by-and-by Latinus was slain and his city taken. Then Æneas married Lavinia, and built a city and called its name Lavinium; and the peoples became one, and were called Latins after the old king. But Turnus, king of the Rutulians, took to him Mezentius, king of Etruscan Cere, and fought with Æneas at the river Numicius, and was slain. And Æneas vanished away, but was worshipped of his people as a god. And Ascanius, his son, who was also called Iulus, reigned in his stead. Ascanius slew Mezentius in battle, and built a city on a high hill, and called it Alba Longa. There he reigned, he and his children, for three hundred years.

But when the appointed times were fulfilled the king Numitor was reigning in Alba, and his younger brother, Amulius, rose up against him. He took his kingdom and slew his sons, and his daughter, Rhea Silvia, he set to watch the sacred fire of Vesta that she might be a virgin and not marry. But the god Mars loved the maiden, and she bore him twins. And Amulius cast the babes into the Tiber to drown them; but the river had overflowed, and the floods floated the basket in which the twins were to the foot of the Palatine hill by the sacred fig-tree; and they were thrown out on land, and a she-wolf from the cave of Lupercus suckled them. Then Faustulus, the king's herdsman, found the twins and brought them up as his own sons, and called them Romulus and Remus. But when they were grown men, it chanced, out of a




CONTORNIAE. AENEAS LEAVING TROY—HEAD OF TRAJAN.

certain quarrel of the herdsmen, that they were made known to their grandfather, and, when they had slain the tyrant, they set Numitor again on his throne. And from Alba they went forth to build a new city on the banks of the Tiber where they had been saved; and a question arose between them who should be its founder, and they sought answer of the gods by the flight of birds, watching the heavens all night. At sunrise Remus beheld from the Aventine hill six vultures, but Romulus from the Palatine saw twelve. So he built the city there and called it by his own name, and when Remus leaped the unfinished wall and scorned the work, he smote him that he died, and said, "So be it with any who dare cross this wall." And the city was called Rome.

Romulus.—To fill his new town with men, King Romulus made an asylum or place of refuge on the Capitol for the bloodguilty

and the exile. And to win wives for the outcasts he devised a festival and games, to which the men of the country-side and, above all, the Sabines brought their wives and daughters. But in the midst of the shows armed men, at a sign from the king, bore off the women to be their wives. This was the "Rape of the Sabines," which brought many wars upon Rome. But Romulus slew Acron, king of Cærina, with his own hand and dedicated his arms to Jupiter (*spolia opima*), and drove back the men of Crustumerium and Antemnæ. Then came the Sabines with



WOLF WITH ROMULUS AND REMUS.

(*Bronze in the Palace of the Conservatori at Rome.*)

Titus Tatius, their king, and made their camp on the Quirinal hill. And they took the Capitol by treachery and gave treason its meed. For Tarpeia, daughter of the captain of the citadel, for the promise of the bright things they wore on their left arms,—their golden rings and armlets,—opened to them the gate; but they cast their shields on her that she died. Then the Sabines fought with the Romans in the valley between the Capitol and the Palatine, and drove them back to the very gate of their city, till Romulus vowed a temple to Jupiter, "the Stayer of Flight." So the flight was stayed, but as the battle raged anew the Sabine wives

of the Romans rushed in between their husbands and their kinsmen, and made them at peace with one another. So they became one people, and the two kings Romulus and Tatius ruled over them.

But after Tatius had been killed by the men of Laurentum, Romulus reigned alone and made laws for his people. He parted them into three tribes, the Ramnians, Titians, and Luceres, and in each tribe he made ten divisions called *curiæ*. From each *curia* he chose one hundred men to fight on foot and ten on horseback, so that the number of the legion was 3000 footmen, and of the horsemen, called *celeræ*, three hundred. And when the burgesses met together at the summons of the king, they voted by *curiæ*,—that is, the voice of each *curia* went by the majority of votes in that *curia*, and that of the whole people by the majority of *curiæ*. Then from the heads of houses Romulus chose his Senate or council of elders, that they might advise him for the



DENARIUS OF FIRST CENTURY B.C.—TITUS TATIUS AND THE RAPE
OF THE SABINES.

common weal. But in private each burgess father of a family ruled his household with power of life and death; and he was bound to protect his dependents (*clientes*) from wrong, while they must do him loyal and faithful service.

Now when Romulus had ruled for nearly forty years, there was one day an assembly in the Field of Mars; and a great storm befell, with thunder and lightning, so that the people were scattered. And when the storm passed Romulus was not. But as one Julius Proculus came from Alba, he appeared to him on the way, and bade the Romans be of good cheer, for Rome should rule the earth; and, so saying, departed heavenward. So he became a god, and they worshipped him as Quirinus, "the Lord of Spears."

Numa Pompilius.—But the senators would choose no one to be king after him, but ruled in turn each man five days. And there was strife among the people for a year between Roman and Sabine. At last they so devised that the Romans should choose a king

from among the Sabines. So they chose Numa Pompilius, for he was wise and holy ; and he took the kingdom when he had inquired of the gods by the flight of birds and the *curiæ* had consented to him. Now King Numa was a man of peace, and cared most for the worship of the gods and the ways of husbandry. And he learned wisdom of his wife, the nymph Egeria, who met him by night in her sacred grove. So he set up the holy brotherhoods, the Pontifices, who ordered the rites of the gods, and the Augurs, to divine their will, and the Flamines to minister to the great gods, Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus, and the Salii to worship them with song and dance and to keep the shield that fell from heaven. And he made the Vestal Virgins to watch the fire on the holy hearth of the city. Moreover, he divided the lands that Romulus had won, and set up landmarks sacred to Terminus, laying a curse on any who should move the same. Also he parted the craftsmen by their callings into nine guilds, and built a temple of Faith. So in his days there was peace in the land and the gates of Janus were closed. And he died at a good old age, and was buried under the hill Janiculum, and the books of his ordinances by him ; and Tullus Hostilius was chosen in his place.

Tullus Hostilius.—In the days of Tullus there was war between Alba and Rome. For when a quarrel arose upon the border, each sent heralds to the other and would have satisfaction for the wrong. But Tullus kept the men of Alba without answer till word came that their city had denied justice, and that the Roman Fetiales had declared war, so that the reproach might lie with Alba. Then Cluilius led the Albans against Rome, and the trench of his camp is called to this day “the ditch of Cluilius,” and it lies within five miles of the city. And when he died Mettus Fufetius was made dictator in his room. But, ere the armies met, the chiefs agreed together and chose champions to decide the quarrel, for each side three brothers born at a birth—the Horatii for the Romans, and for the Albans the Curiatii. So they fought before the hosts, and two Romans were slain, and the Alban three were wounded. Then the last Horatius made show of flight that he might separate his enemies as they pursued, and so turned and slew each as he came up, for they were hindered by their wounds. But as the Romans returned in triumph, with Horatius at their head bearing his triple spoils, his sister, who was betrothed to one of the dead, came forth to meet him by the gate ; and when she saw the cloak her own hands had broidered for her lover on her brother’s shoulders, she cried out and wept. And Horatius, angered, stabbed her to the

heart, with bitter words, because she wept for her country's foe. For this thing the two judges of blood sentenced him to death. But he made appeal to the people with the king's will; and the people remembered the deeds he had done for them, and gave ear to his father's prayer. So he was set free from the guilt, after he had passed beneath the yoke and made offering to the spirit of the dead. And the yoke was called thereafter "the sister's beam" (*sororium tigillum*), but the spoils were hung on a pillar in the Forum—the *pila Horatia*—to be a memorial in later days.

But when Tullus bade the Albans aid him, according to their bond, in battle with the men of Veii and Fidenæ, Mettus came with his host, but stood aloof waiting on the end. So Tullus, after he had won the battle, called the Albans together unarmed, as the custom was, for a speech, and placed armed Romans round that they might neither fight nor flee. Then he took the traitor and bound him to two chariots and drave them different ways, so that he was torn asunder. And he sent horsemen to destroy Alba, but the people he set to live on Mons Cælius in Rome. But when he had prevailed in war against the Etruscans and Sabines, his heart was puffed up and he forgot the service of the gods. And after that he had reigned thirty-two years, Jupiter smote him with lightning and consumed him and his house.

Ancus Marcius.—Now the next king was the grandson of Numa, and he brought back his ordinances and set them up in the Forum on wooden tablets for all to see. Ancus loved peace, but, when the Latins plundered his lands, he took their cities by the sword, and set their people on the Aventine hill. So he made the city larger, and dug a great trench across the valleys to strengthen it without, and for evil-doers within he built a prison under the citadel hard by the Forum. He also fortified the hill Janiculum and joined it to the city by a wooden bridge, and at the mouth of the Tiber he built the harbour of Ostia and made a colony there. So Ancus ruled honourably for three-and-twenty years, and went down to the grave in peace.

Lucius Tarquinius Priscus.—In the days of Ancus Martius came one Lucumo to Rome from Tarquinii in Etruria, whither his father, the noble Demaratus, had fled from Corinth. Lucumo left Tarquinii by counsel of his wife, Tanaquil, for there he was denied advancement, because his father was a stranger, though his mother was a noble Etruscan. Now at Rome she hoped he would win honour and worship by reason of a sign; for, as they drew near in their chariot, an eagle bore off his cap on high, and wheeling

replaced it on his head. And the Romans called him, after the name of his city, Lucius Tarquinius, and he served King Ancus well in council and in war. So the king made him guardian of his sons ; but Tarquin persuaded the people to choose him to reign over them, for the kingship went by choice. And he overcame the nations round about and took their cities, so that the Etruscans sent him the golden crown and the sceptre, the ivory chair, the purple robe, and the twelve axes in the bundles of rods (*fascis*), which were the emblems of royalty among them.


Then Tarquin built the great temple on the Capitol which he had vowed in war to Jupiter, and built huge drains to carry off the water from the valleys between the hills, and levelled the market-place or Forum, surrounding it with booths and a covered walk. Moreover, he made a circus or racecourse for horses and chariots, after the manner of the Etruscans. But when he purposed to make new tribes, and centuries of horsemen, the augur Attus Navius forbade it. Then the king mocked at him, and asked, "Can the thought of my mind be fulfilled?" and the augur answered by the birds that it might. So the king said, "Cut me, then, this whetstone with this knife;" and he did so, and the omen of the birds was made true. And from that time forth the king obeyed his voice. Yet did he double the number of noble houses in each tribe, and so did he with the centuries of the knights and the Senate also.

Now there was a certain slave of the king named Servius Tullius, and men said he was the child of the hearth-god, for one day, as he slept, a flame played round his head and did him no hurt. So Tanaquil made him free, and he served the king faithfully and was in favour with all men. But when the sons of Ancus heard that the king had wedded him to his daughter and would make him heir, they plotted to slay Tarquin and strike for the crown. And they smote the king by the hands of hirelings, as he sat to give judgment, but got no profit of their treason; for Tanaquil shut the gates of the palace and gave out that the king was not dead, but had appointed Servius to rule till he should be healed of his wound. And even when men knew that the king was dead indeed, Servius kept his state and ruled the land without consent of Senate or people.

Servius Tullius.—This Servius won the goodwill of the commons, for he divided among them the conquered lands, and upheld the cause of the poor, so that in later ages men still loved the memory of "good King Servius." He subdued the Etruscans under

him, but made alliance with the Latins and built a temple to Diana on the Aventine, where Latins and Romans might make common sacrifice. And he brought the Quirinal and Viminal and the Esquiline hills within the city, and all the seven hills he compassed about with a great ditch and rampart, which is known to this day as the wall and the mound of Servius.

Moreover, he divided the city in four parts—the Suburan, Esquiline, Colline, and Palatine—and the land without into twenty-six, and the parts he called “Tribus.” The tribes were made up of men who dwelt together in one place, and they had common



WALL OF SERVIUS TULLIUS.

sanctuaries and common feasts and head-men over them. And he arranged the assembly of the people so that men should vote according to their wealth in land and cattle, and to the order of the army in the field. For he divided the whole people into five classes, and in each class he parted the elder and the younger, the younger from seventeen to forty-five years for service in the field, the elder men for the defence of the town. And the ordering of the classes was this:—Each man's place in the assembly was as his place in the ranks of battle, and his place in the ranks was as his power to clothe himself with armour and bear the burdens of war; so his place went by his estate, by his acres of land, and by

his sheep and oxen. Moreover, he divided the classes into hundreds or centuries for service, and to each century he gave one vote in the assembly; yet he left not the classes equal, but gave the chief power to the richer men who served the state on horseback or on foot in full armour. For to the first class he assigned eighty centuries, forty of the older and forty of the younger men; to the fifth class he gave thirty centuries, divided in like manner; but to each of the other three he gave but twenty. Of the trumpeters, the armourers, and carpenters he made four centuries; but the other craftsmen and men who had less than a certain sum he suffered not to serve in the army, but made of them a separate century, that of the Proletarians. Lastly, he made of the horsemen eighteen centuries, adding to the six old twelve new ones formed of the richest and noblest citizens; and they received a horse from the state, so long as they served, and were called "Knights of the Public Horse."¹

¹ TABLE OF CLASSES AND CENTURIES.

EXERCITUS.			
	Number.	Census.	Arms.
EQUITES.			
	18 centuries	100,000 asses	{ Cavalry equipment and equus publicus.
PEDITES.			
1st Class	80 centuries	100,000 asses	{ Helmet, shield (<i>clipeus</i>), greaves, breastplate, lance, and sword.
	2 centuries of smiths and carpenters.		
2nd "	20 centuries	75,000 "	{ Helmet, shield (<i>scutum</i>), greaves, lance, and sword.
3rd "	20 "	50,000 "	{ Helmet, shield, lance, and sword.
4th "	20 "	25,000 "	Lance and javelin.
5th "	30 "	11,000 "	Darts and slings.
	2 centuries of trumpeters.		
	1 century of proletarii.		

N.B.—The term class, as applied to the four lower grades, is an anticipation of later usage (*vide* pp. 46 and 296). Similarly, the rates given are the late money-equivalents of original assessments by land and cattle.

So the king gave votes to the poorest and lowest, but no power in the state. Nor were there many poor nor many rich in those days, for the holdings of land were small, and trade was but simple as yet. The stout farmers had the chief voice, and though the younger were more in number than the elder, yet Servius gave equal weight to the centuries of the seniors, that age might have its say. Thus was made the great assembly of the centuries, that suffered change, but was not done away till the people lost their freedom.

King Servius had no son, but two daughters, and them he had wedded to the two sons of King Tarquin. Now the sweeter maid he gave of set purpose to the haughty Lucius ; to Aruns, the good-natured, he gave the proud and cruel Tullia. But the thing fell out otherwise. For those evil ones, when they had rid them of their gentler mates, came together, as their souls desired, to work wickedness. Now Tarquinius feared the purpose of the king to do away with the kingship and set the people free, and made a conspiracy against him with the young nobles, who hated him for his goodness to the common folk. So when the appointed day came he seized the king's throne, and sat thereon. And when the king came and rebuked him, young Lucius claimed it for his father's son, and took the old man and cast him down the steps of the senate-house, and sent armed men who slew him as he fled. And Tullia, his wife, drove furiously to the Forum to greet her lord as king, and as she went back her father's body lay bleeding in the way. But she turned not aside from her driving, so her chariot and dress were splashed with her father's blood. Wherefore men called that street "the street of crime" (*vicus sceleratus*).

Tarquinius Superbus.—So by bloodshed and violence came the proud Tarquin to the throne, and so by violence he kept it, till they made an end of him and his house. He reigned as a tyrant, neither regarded he justice and judgment, but he spoiled the rich and oppressed the poor. Moreover, he joined himself to Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum, and set up his power over Latium. And when Herdonius of Aricia spake against him in the federal meeting he compassed his death by false witness, and that easily, for all men feared him. But the men of Gabii stood out against him, till Sextus, his son, betrayed them into his hands by craft. For he fled to Gabii for refuge from his father's wrath. And the men of the city received him gladly, and by degrees they moved him to the chief place, for the young man prospered in all he undertook, the Romans ever fleeing before him, as the king bade them. Then

he sent a messenger to know his father's will. Now Tarquin walked with the messenger in a garden and said no word, but smote down the tallest poppies with his stick. And Sextus understood the thing, and by false charges brought the chief men of Gabii to death, and then gave up the town into the hands of Tarquin.

The king finished the great works which his father had begun. He built the great temple on the Capitol, and removed from the site many shrines of the gods of the Sabines; but the shrines of Terminus and of Youth would not be moved, so he enclosed them within his temple. Moreover, as they dug for foundations, they lighted on a human head. Now these things were signs that Rome should be head of the earth, and that its youth should not fade nor its bounds go back. And he dedicated the temple to the great Etruscan three, to Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva.

And on a certain time there came a strange woman to the king, who would have him buy at a price nine books of the prophecies of the Sibyl of Cumæ; and when he refused, she burnt three and offered the rest at the same price. But he mocked at her for a mad woman. And she came yet again with but three left and asked the same price: so the king was astonished, and took counsel of the augurs and bought the books. These were the Sibylline books that were kept in a stone chest beneath the Capitol, and two men were set to keep them and consult them in the hour of need. And on another time a snake came out of the altar in the king's house and ate the offering on the altar. So Tarquin sent his sons Titus and Aruns even to Delphi to inquire of the oracle of the Greeks, and with them their cousin Lucius Junius, whom men called Brutus, the dullard, because he feigned to be witless for fear of the tyrant. And his offering was like to himself, for he gave a simple staff, but within it was filled with pure gold. Now when the young men had inquired for the king, they asked Apollo which of them should reign at Rome. So the voice said, "Whichever of you shall first kiss his mother." Then Titus and Aruns drew lots for this, but Brutus, as they left the temple, fell down as by chance, and kissed our common mother Earth.

But the end of the Tarquins came on this wise. When the host was besieging Ardea of the Rutulians, and the king's sons were supping with their cousin, Tarquinius of Collatia, they disputed of their wives which was worthiest. So they rode to Rome to see. There found they the wives of Aruns and Titus and

Sextus making merry ; but when they came to Collatia at dead of night, they found Lucretia, Collatinus' wife, working with her hand-maids at the loom. So they judged her worthiest, and rode back to camp. But Sextus was smitten with an unholy passion for Lucrece, and he came alone to Collatia, and was welcomed as a near kinsman. But he paid back good with evil, and wrought his wicked will by foul threats. Then good Lucretia sent for her father, Lucretius, and her husband, and they came with their trusty friends, Publius Valerius and Junius Brutus. And when she had told them her tale and bidden them avenge her of her shame, she drove a knife into her heart. Then Brutus drew out the knife from the wound, and swore to visit her blood on Tarquin and upon all his race, and that no man should henceforth be king in Rome. And they took her body to the market-place that men might see the deeds of the Tarquins. Moreover, Brutus, the captain of the horse (*tribunus celerum*), assembled the people, and won them to depose the tyrant and banish his whole house. And he went down to the camp and drove out the king's sons, for Tarquin had gone to Rome to quell the tumult. But he found the gates shut in his face, and he fled with his sons to Cære in Etruria. And this was the end of kings in Rome.

The First Consuls.—Then the people gathered in their centuries in the Field of Mars, and were minded to choose year by year two men to share the royal power, to be called consuls. So they chose Brutus, and with him at the first Collatinus. But the people feared Collatinus for his name's sake, because he was a Tarquin, and they prayed him to depart from Rome. And in his room they chose Publius Valerius. And the consuls filled up the places in the Senate which the king had left empty, and each ruled for a month at a time, and had the lictors then to bear the fasces before him.

Then came men from the banished king to claim his goods, and they made a plot with many of the young nobles to bring the king back, and among these were the two sons of Brutus. But the consuls were warned, and had the young men seized. And Brutus sat on the judgment-seat, and bade scourge and behead them all, nor spared his two sons, nor turned his face from the sight, for he loved his country more than his own flesh and blood. And the goods of the Tarquins they gave for a prey to the commons, to break all thought of peace between the princes and the people of Rome.

Then Tarquin stirred up the men of Veii and Tarquinii, in

Etruria, to make war on Rome. And ere the battle was joined, Aruns spurred hotly upon Brutus, when he saw him in royal array marshalling the horse; and each ran upon the other with the spear that they died. Then the hosts fought stubbornly till evening. But in the night the Etruscans went home, hearkening to a divine voice. And the Romans bore Brutus back to the city and buried him; and the matrons mourned for him a full year because he had avenged Lucrece.

Valerius now ruled alone, and built a great house on the hill Velia, above the Forum, and men feared that he would make himself king, and use the hill as a hold for his guards. Therefore he assembled the people and came with lowered fasces for a sign of submission, and pulled down his house and rebuilt it at the foot of the hill. Then he passed two laws to protect the people. The first declared that man accursed and worthy of death who should seek to become king; the second allowed a citizen condemned to death to appeal from the magistrate to the general assembly. So Valerius was hailed the People's Friend (*Publicola*). And in Brutus' place the people chose Spurius Lucretius, and when he died, Marcus Horatius. Now both Valerius and Horatius wished to dedicate the temple on the Capitol which Tarquin had built, but the lot fell on Horatius, to the great displeasure of the friends of Valerius. So he dedicated the temple, but even as he was praying with his hand on the door-post, one told him that his son was dead. But he said simply, "Then let them bury him," and made no lament of evil omen, because he honoured the gods above his son.

Lars Porsenna.—And by-and-by came Lars Porsenna, king of Clusium and head of Etruria, with a great host to bring back Tarquin, and took the fortress on the hill Janiculum, and drove the Romans back over the Tiber-bridge. Now the bridge was of wood, and as the rest fled, three brave men turned in the narrow way, and faced the Etruscan army, even Horatius Coclès, Spurius Lartius, and Titus Herminius. These three made good their post till the bridge was cut down behind them. As the last supports gave way Lartius and Herminius ran back, but still Horatius stood alone on the farther bank. And when the bridge had fallen, he prayed to Father Tiber and gave his life and his arms into his keeping, and so swam back to the city he had saved, sore spent, but unhurt by flood or foe. And for this deed the Romans set up his statue in the Comitium, and gave him as much of the common land as he could plough in a day. •

But Rome was hard beset by siege and famine. So Caius Mucius, a young noble, went forth to slay Porsenna and make an end. He found entrance to the camp ; and when he saw a man in a purple robe sitting on a throne and giving pay to the soldiers, he went up into the crowd, and stabbed him for the king ; yet was it but the king's scribe. So they dragged him before the king. But when they threatened torture if he revealed not the whole matter, he thrust his hand into the fire that was on an altar, crying that pain was a small thing compared with glory. But Porsenna marvelled, and bade him go in peace. So Mucius was won by kindness to tell the king what no torture could wring from him, how three hundred noble Romans had sworn to take Porsenna's life, and would follow the first adventure, each in his turn. Thus won Mucius his name of *Scævola*, the left-handed. But Porsenna made peace with the Romans, taking from them all the land of *Veii*, and for hostages ten youths and ten maidens. And when *Clælia* taught her fellows to escape, and they swam across the *Tiber* to the city, the Romans kept faith and sent the maidens back. Then Porsenna marvelled again both at the courage and the good faith of the Romans, and he set *Clælia* free. And the land and the other hostages he gave back later, because the Romans entreated his beaten armies kindly, what time they fled before the Latins to the gates of Rome.

Battle of Lake Regillus.—So Tarquin, foiled once more, went to *Tusculum*, unto his son-in-law, *Octavius Mamilius*, the chief of all the Latins. Then the Romans, fearing the power of the great League, named a single leader to rule the people as king for six months, lest with two chiefs their counsels should be divided. So *Titus Lartius* was the first Dictator, and two years after, they chose *Aulus Postumius*, who made *Titus Æbutius* his Master of the Horse. Then the Latins came with the house of Tarquin and the Roman exiles, and fought with the Romans by the Lake *Regillus*, in the land of *Tusculum*. In the centre the banished king charged the Dictator, but fell wounded, and was borne out of the throng. But on the left *Mamilius* ran *Æbutius* through the arm, and pressing on for all his wounds, restored the fight. And the battle swayed this way and that : here fell *M. Valerius* ; there *Herminius* smote *Mamilius* down, but fell himself ere he could spoil him of his armour. At last *Postumius* vowed a temple to the twin brethren, *Castor* and *Pollux*, if they would give him the victory. And, as he spake, two youths on horses white as snow rode in the Roman front, and pressed the Latins back, and drove them to their

camp. And when men sought them, they found no trace of them save a hoof-mark on the rock, that no earthly horse had made. But as the old men sat in Rome waiting for news, behold two horsemen young and beautiful on white horses bathed with the foam of battle, who washed their horses in the pool by Vesta's House, and told the people of Rome's victory. And when they had done this they rode away and were seen no more. So the Romans built a rich temple, as Aulus had vowed, to Castor and Pollux on the spot where they washed their horses ; and its pillars stand in Rome to this day. But King Tarquin went to Aristodemus, the Greek tyrant of Cumæ, alone, for all his sons had fallen in the wars. So evil met its reward, and Rome was delivered from the rule of kings.



HEAD OF ROME. CASTOR AND POLLUX.

CHAPTER IV

THE REGAL PERIOD

The Legends are Unhistorical.—The legends told by Roman chroniclers about the founding and the early history of the city cannot be regarded as sober narratives of real events. They rest on the insecure basis of oral tradition alone, for the written records perished at the sack of Rome by the Gauls in 390 B.C. Nor are the traditions in themselves so probable as to inspire belief. They give us, indeed, admirable pictures of old Roman ideals and institutions, but the personages and events portrayed in them are shadowy and unreal. Romulus and Numa, for instance, simply personify the two great elements of ancient law, the secular and the religious, which find a later and weaker embodiment in the slightly different figures of Tullus Hostilius and Ancus Marcius. But formal criti-


cism is not now needed to prove that we have here to do with myth, not history.

Euhemerism.—What then is the origin of these myths, and to what causes may their growth be ascribed? The first and most obvious source is to be found in Euhemerism,¹ which turned into plain history the tales told of the gods. The method was introduced at Rome by Ennius, and was readily followed by the Augustan writers, who rationalised the legends by the omission of the supernatural and the conversion of Italian gods into primitive kings. It suited the more prosaic and literal mind of the Roman, and harmonised with his view of things spiritual. The vivid imagination of the Greeks peopled the hills and streams with Naiads and Oreads, and saw in the motion of the cloud the hand of Zeus, the bounty of Demeter in the produce of the earth. The art of their sculptors fashioned ideal forms in the likeness of men and women, whose sayings and doings made an ever-growing story full of human interest, enriched and fixed by the genius of their great poets. The Italians, on the other hand, worshipped with deeper but more distant reverence shadowy beings, rarely embodied in wood or stone, whose name, attributes, and cult alone were saved from oblivion. And so the very reverence of the Italian mind, together with its literalness, as scepticism advanced, made the historical explanation a natural and popular method. To take examples from the legend of Romulus: the twin-brothers are the two Lares or guardian-deities of the city; in the story they are born of a Vestal, because their worship was closely connected with that of the Hearth-goddess; their names are derived from that of the town, for Remus is but a variant of Romulus. So, again, Titus Tatius is the eponymous hero of the religious brotherhood, the *Sodales Titii*, and of the ancient tribe of the *Titii*. Quirinus is the old Italian god of war, identified by Dionysius of Halicarnassus with Mars; hence even the legend, which deifies Romulus as Quirinus, represents him as the son of Mars.

Ætiological Legends.—In the story of a founder we naturally look for the mythical element; elsewhere other influences are more marked. Setting deliberate fiction aside, the most potent factor in the making of traditional history is the desire to explain obsolete usages and half-forgotten institutions, and to give some account of the origin of public buildings and ancient monuments. In the wedding-ceremony of the Romans are observed traces of

¹ Euhemerus was a Greek (circ. 300 B.C.) who first systematically explained myths as history, treating the gods as heroes worshipped for their valour.

the primitive system of marriage by capture, relics without doubt from an earlier stage of society. The feigned violence with which the bride was snatched from her mother's arms and her hair parted with a spear is found in the marriage-ritual of savage tribes throughout the world. The Romans explained this by a legend, "the Rape of the Sabines," and expressed its antiquity by telling the story of the founder himself. So, too, the legend of Remus symbolises the inviolability of the city-wall.



FICUS RUMINALIS, WITH PICUS AND PARRA; URBS ROMA; AND WOLF SUCKLING TWINS.

Again, legends tend to gather about places of worship and memorials of a forgotten past. The story of the infancy of Romulus and Remus centres round the sacred fig-tree (*Ficus Ruminalis*) and the worship of Faunus Lupercus in the cave hard by. Faunus, the god who keeps the flock, is transformed into Faustulus, the shepherd who scares the wolf from the twins. The temple of Jupiter Stator may have suggested the legend of the rally of

the Romans there, while the details at least of the tale of the Horatii may well have been invented to account for a group of monuments¹ which stood together near the Carinæ.

Greek Fiction.—The remaining source of tradition is deliberate fiction, probably due to Greek influence. The connection of Æneas with Egesta (*Æn.* v.) and Cumæ can be traced back to the Sicilian poet Stesichorus, and to the tradition of the colonisation of the Italian from the Æolic Cyme. The fable that Numa was a pupil of Pythagoras was invented by some ingenious Greek so ignorant of Roman chronology that he ante-dated the philosopher by two centuries.

Especially deep is the debt of the Greek historical novelists to their father Herodotus. Not to speak of the marked resemblances between the tales of the childhood of Cyrus and of Romulus, the stratagem of Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii, and the story of the poppy-heads are taken straight from Herodotus' narrative of the capture of Babylon (iii. 154), and of the strange behaviour of the tyrant Thrasybulus (v. 92). With equal certainty we may ascribe the embassy to Delphi to the lively fancy of some patriotic Greek.


The Truth in the Legends.—Such being the main sources of error in the traditional history, it remains to discover and piece together the scattered fragments of truth preserved in the legends, like flies in amber. In this task we gain great help from two sources. The researches of archæologists into the early buildings of ancient Rome reveal some glimpses of the city's material growth, while the study of the laws and customs of a later day, with the aid of the science of comparative law, sheds some rays of light on the original institutions of the Roman state. To deal first with the growth and history of regal Rome.

The Original Settlements.—The germ of the eternal city lay in that square town (*Roma Quadrata*), whose well-built tufa walls may still be traced on the slopes of the Palatine. Here stood the relics of Romulus, the sacred fig-tree and the thatched hut; round it ran the Pomerium traced by the founder's plough; by one of its gates was the shrine of Jupiter Stator. An extension of this square city of the Palatine is found in the Septimontium—the original seven hills—which included the Palatine mount with its two outlying ridges (the Cermalus overhanging the swampy Velabrum, and the

¹ These were the altar of Janus Curvatus, near the sororium Tigillum (*cf.* p. 25), and that of Juno sororia at which the Horatii sacrificed, and the Pila Horatia in the Forum.

Velia running towards the Esquiline), together with the three peaks of the latter hill, Fagutal, Oppius, and Cispius, and the fortress built to protect the low valley of the Subura. But this settlement of the Septimontium was not the only city enclosed in the circuit of the later walls. On the Quirinal and Viminal, opposite, stood a town perhaps Sabine, perhaps merely Latin, in origin, distinct certainly from the Palatine city and probably hostile. Of the existence of this separate settlement there are many proofs. Distinctive names survived to later days. There were duplicate worships of Mars and double colleges of Salii and Luperci, while the legends of the double kingship and the twofold door of the double-headed Janus may point to the same conclusion. Hence the hypothesis that there were originally two rival towns, divided at first, united afterwards, the settlement of the Montani on the Palatine mounts, and of the Collini on the Quirinal hills.

The Unification of the City.—In the next period of development, the age of the Tarquins, the names and remains of Roman buildings serve more fully to confirm the substance of the traditional account. The legends themselves show that no great extension of Roman territory took place under the first four kings. Fidenæ remains Etruscan, the Anio is the boundary towards the Sabines, and in all probability the fossa Cluilia, but five miles from Rome, served to mark the frontier towards Latium. Only along the Tiber towards the sea does Rome extend her boundaries, securing command of the river by the fortification of Janiculum and the foundation of Ostia. But with the advent of the Tarquins, Rome becomes an important state, mistress of Latium and Southern Etruria—a position she again loses on the expulsion of the kings. To the same monarchs are ascribed the buildings which first made Rome a great city. Round the scattered settlements, already noticed, Servius Tullius built a wall, whose colossal size may be estimated from the remains still existing on the Aventine, and the rampart (*agger*) recently destroyed in part, to make room for a railway station. Within this wall was included the whole of Republican Rome, as well the older towns on the Palatine and Esquiline, the Quirinal and Viminal, as three more hills now first brought within the bounds of the city, the Cælian, the Aventine, and the Capitol. On this last, the most famous of the seven hills, was built the citadel, with the well-house (Tullianum) and prison, the treasury, and the great temple of Jupiter, the chief monument of the Tarquins. To the Tarquins, too, are attributed the great drains (*cloacæ*), which turned the marsh-lands of the Subura,



the Forum, and Velabrum into firm ground. On the land thus reclaimed was the Comitium, or place of assembly, and the Forum, or market-place of the united Roman people. Near the north-west corner of this oblong stood the Curia, or senate-house, and on the south-east the buildings that typified the unity



WALL ON THE AVENTINE.

of the new city, the temple of Vesta, the city hearth, and the house of the king (*regia*).

The Etruscan Kings of Rome.—It is hard to resist the impression that all these great undertakings are the handiwork of the master-builders of Italy, the Etruscans. The massive walls, the


arched drains, and the Capitoline temple, with its three shrines of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva set side by side, and its long, low front, resting on but six pillars, are all eminently characteristic of Etruscan architects ; and when we find that great nation spreading in early times from the Alps to the Bay of Naples, we cannot but suppose that Rome and Latium came beneath its sway. Nor are there wanting traditions of their rule in this district. In the *Æneid*, Turnus (Turrhenus or Tuscan) of Ardea is closely allied with Mezentius, the Etruscan tyrant of Cære. Cato declares the Volsci were once subject to Etruscan rule, and his statement is borne out by the name of one of their cities, Tarracina (= city of Tarchon), and the Etruscan remains found at Velitræ. Roman legends assert the Etruscan origin of the Tarquins, whose name (Tarchon or Tarchnas) means lord or prince ; Tuscan tradition, preserved to us by the Emperor Claudius and a tomb at Volci, makes Servius Tullius an Etruscan prince, Mastarna, the friend of Cæles Vibenna. The legend of Porsenna is but another attempt to conceal the fact of an Etruscan conquest of Rome. Hence we infer that the monarchy of the Tarquins represents the rule of Etruscan princes over a conquered Latin race, and their expulsion a rising of the natives of the land against their foreign rulers.

The Institutions of Rome:—The Familia.—Yet, though there may have been a Sabine settlement on one of the Roman hills, and though Etruscan princes once were lords of the city, primitive Rome is essentially a Latin town, Latin in its character, its customs, and its institutions. The foreign elements were absorbed or thrown off ; they modified, may even have profoundly affected, but never controlled its true development.

The unit of the Roman state was the family, built up of father and mother, sons and daughters, slaves and clients. In law the household was governed absolutely by the *paterfamilias* ; to its master each member was subject, wife and child as much as slave and dependent. He is absolute owner of all property possessed or acquired by its members ; he disposes of their persons and their goods at pleasure. By custom, however, though not by law, the house-father acts as representative rather than despot ; he is controlled by the *mos maiorum*, by public opinion, and by the council of the near relations. He, too, is priest of the household, and maintains the worship of the ancestors and the household gods. By his side within the gates stood the mistress, high in reverence and dignity, who kept the house and ruled the maids working at the distaff. When the father died the sons or nearest males

inherited his goods and his authority ; the daughters remained as children or as wives in the hand of their male protectors.

The Gens and the Clients.—From the family develops the house or clan (*gens*). All descendants in the male line of a single ancestor, whether by blood or adoption, regarded themselves as members of one house. Bound to the house by ties of dependence were the clients, enfranchised slaves, or refugees who placed themselves under the protection of some Roman chief, and handed down the



CLOACA MAXIMA.



relation to their children. In strict law their persons and property were wholly at the disposal of the head of the house ; by custom they enjoyed almost complete freedom. The patronus, indeed, was morally bound to protect the person and advance the interests of his client in return for the services rendered by the client to his protectors.

The Plebs.—From these dependents in the first instance arose a new class in the community, the "plebs" or common people. Men who for years had enjoyed this practical freedom gradually

emancipated themselves from the legal bonds of clientship, and gained a right to the protection of the state against their ancient masters. The number and importance of this protected population grew apace, as Rome became a power in Central Italy. Commerce drew within her strong walls merchants from less favoured towns, who lived as settlers under the king's guardianship. And to these elements of the new body must be added the inhabitants of conquered cities brought to Rome, as tradition tells us, and settled there as clients of the community, that is, of the king.

The King.—The Roman state sprang from the union of clans and families. Its institutions grew naturally from those of the smaller associations, and upon their model. At the head of the united community was the father and ruler of the state, the rex or king. The Roman kingship is compounded of three elements. From one point of view, the king is the hereditary and patriarchal chief of the people, as the father is of the household; from another, the chief priest of the nation, as the father is of the family; but most distinctively, differing herein from the father of the family, he is the elected representative and magistrate of a free state. The compromise on which the monarchy rested is best seen in the traditional method of election. On the death of the king the supreme power reverted to the assembled "fathers" (*patres*), the representatives of the old houses (*gentes*). This council of elders appoints an inter-*rex*, who holds office for five days, and then nominates another elder to take his place; eventually, by some inter-*rex* so nominated, the new king is, with the advice of the elders, chosen. Next the inter-*rex* proposes to the assembled people the election of the king thus designated. Finally, the vote of the people is ratified by the approval of the gods, as given in the solemn ceremony of inauguration, and by the assent of the fathers, the guardians of the religion of Rome. Thus the king is nominated by his predecessor, chosen by the Senate, elected by the people, who bestow on him the sovereign power (*imperium*), and confirmed in his office by the assent of Heaven.

He is, during his life, the sole magistrate of the state, the guardian of the city hearth and high priest of its religion, the leader of his people in war, and the supreme judge in peace. His orders and his judgments are not fettered by written statutes; all officials, whether religious or secular, derive their authority from him and are but his assistants or deputies; he alone can convene the Senate or people, and has the right to propose new laws to the people, and to address them publicly in their assemblies. Yet the



GROUND-PLAN AND ELEVATION OF THE TEMPLE OF VESTA (*restored*).

authority of the king is limited, not absolute, for he is the minister, not the maker, of the law. His plenary power is given him by the assembled burgesses, whose allegiance is due to the law-abiding ruler, not the lawless lord, of the state. When the kings transgressed the ancient customs (*mos maiorum*) of the land, they forfeited their claim on the allegiance of the people.

The Senate.—By the side of the monarch stands the Senate, the council of the “fathers” or heads of the great houses of Rome. Originally, no doubt, the elders had been chieftains of the separate clans from whose union the Roman people was formed. Thus in one aspect the Senate is a representative council of chiefs, whose ancient independence is proved by their lifelong tenure of office, and whose claim to be the ultimate source of authority, civil and religious, is shown by the appointment of the inter-rex, and by its right to confirm or annul all resolutions of the people (*patrum auctoritas*), including the election of the king. But when the allied clans became one people, under one chief magistrate, the Senate lost its ancient supremacy. Nor is there any relic left in historical times of its representative character. The king, as head of the united state, nominates whom he will to fill up its ranks, and may at his pleasure refuse to consult his council, or reject the advice it has tendered.

The Comitia Curiata.—The earliest assembly of the Roman people was that in which the free men voted by curies (*comitia curiata*). The whole Roman people, plebeian as well as patrician, were members of the thirty curies, and were summoned to the assemblies in the Comitium. Originally, however, the plebeians were purely passive members of the assembly, and only acquired the right to vote at a later period. Each curia comprised several gentes, knit together by participation in common rites and festivals, by the possession of a common chapel, hall, and hearth, and the tradition of a common ancestry. The curies were, in the earliest days which history records, the only important division of the Roman people. Their number, it is true, reminds us of the shadowy triple division of the people into Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres, and the traditional number of the Senate, three hundred. A comparison of the figures with the ordinary number in colonies—ten curies and a hundred decurions or senators—taken in conjunction with the derivation of the old Roman name for a division of the people (*tribus*=a third), confirms the suggestion that the city was formed by the aggregation of three distinct settlements.

But these three obsolete tribes and the ancient houses were no longer effective political divisions ; for such purposes the curia is the only unit recognised by the primitive constitution. In the assembly the vote of each curia was decided by the majority of individual voters ; that of the whole people by the majority of curies. The assembly, however, only met when summoned by the king or inter-*rex*, and in the earliest times had but few opportunities of exercising its powers. Its right to elect magistrates is limited to the acceptance or rejection of a new king ; the necessity for its concurrence in all important innovations is exemplified only perhaps in the case of the rupture of an existing treaty with a foreign power, in the grant of the franchise to a non-citizen, or the transference of a citizen from one family to another by the ceremony of adoption. But the assembly was also called together to witness the most solemn acts of a private or religious character, the making of wills, the inauguration of flamens, and the proclamation of festivals.

Of the three powers in the Roman state, the king, the Senate, and the people, the first alone is constantly active ; yet for all great changes the concurrence of the people and the sanction of the Senate are requisite, so that the monarchy is limited on all sides by the rights of the burgesses. But to these rights is attached the corresponding duty of the defence of the state in war, for on the burgesses fell the burden of personal service in the legion and of building the city walls.

The Reforms of Servius Tullius.—The first great constitutional reform, the foundation of the *comitia centuriata*, is ascribed to one of the Etruscan kings of Rome, Servius Tullius. But it is probable that the changes made by these princes were in the first instance financial and military. The royal army had been composed of 1000 footmen and 100 horse from each of the old three tribes. Tarquinius Priscus meant, we are told, to create three new tribes and centuries of horsemen, but, daunted by the opposition of the augurs, left the old forms unchanged, while he accomplished his purpose by doubling the strength of each division. Servius Tullius undertook a more thorough reform, by reorganising the army on a new basis, that of property. Though the old six centuries of horsemen were left untouched, twelve fresh squadrons were formed of the richest citizens ; and in the ranks of the footmen were included the rest of the freeholders, patricians and plebeians alike, arranged according to the value of their landed estate. The unit adopted in the new organisation

was the existing century or company of a hundred men ; these companies were grouped in grades, and drawn up in phalanx. The richest citizens, in complete armour, formed the four front ranks of the phalanx (*classis*). Behind them stood the less perfectly armed spearmen of the second and third grades, while the fourth and fifth grades served as light-armed skirmishers, all four inferior grades counting technically as *infra classem*. The whole force is divided into two equal parts, the field army, composed of the younger men (*juniores*), and the army of reserve of older men (*seniores*), each part containing eighty-five centuries and forming most probably two legions (*cf.* pp. 28 and 296).

Traces of the Military Origin of the Comitia Centuriata.—That the original purpose of the Servian reform was military is sufficiently proved by the forms retained in the later assembly. The people in the comitia centuriata is called the army (*exercitus*), and organised for war, not peace. Its divisions are the century or company of horse or foot, the “*classis*” representing an original distinction by armament, the corps of juniors and seniors. The president, who is of necessity invested with full military power (*imperium*), summons the burghers to meet him outside the walls, in the field of Mars, by the sounding of the war-trumpet and the hoisting of the standard. In the earliest times the citizens assembled in arms, and were arrayed under their standards in order of battle, and even in later days the companies of smiths and trumpeters maintained their separate existence in the assembly. The original purpose of the Servian reform was the imposition of military service and the war-tax (*tributum*) on all freeholders (*assidui*), but the duty of defending the state could not long be separated from the right of deciding its policy. The natural consequence was, that the Servian army was converted into the comitia centuriata, which, at least from the establishment of the Republic, ranked as the chief assembly of the Roman people.

The Local Tribes.—Another institution ascribed to King Servius underwent a similar transformation. To facilitate the levying of troops, Servius divided the city and its territory into four local districts, the Palatine, Esquiline, Suburan, and Colline tribes. Each tribe at first included not only a district of the city, but also a portion of the country outside the walls. In later days the four original tribes were confined to the city, while the country was portioned out in new tribes. Throughout history the tribe is a local district, marked off for administrative purposes ; but just as the Servian classification was originally military, and only later

political, so the tribe, at first intended to serve as the basis for the levying of troops, became in its turn the most important political division in the Roman people.

It would therefore appear that the memory of good King Servius has been preserved rather by the consequences which followed in the course of years from his reforms than by their original purpose. Yet we cannot doubt that those reforms were conceived by a master-mind. They have not the air of being a compromise reached by hard conflict between two hostile parties, but bear the stamp of a great legislator. Rome would seem to owe to Servius the debt which Athens acknowledges to Solon and England to Alfred.

CHAPTER V

THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC

The Consulate.—The traditional account of the expulsion of the kings is no doubt an historical romance, but it is a romance founded on fact. The bitter and abiding hatred of the very name of king at Rome proves the truth of the tradition that the monarchy became a tyranny and was abolished by a revolution. But it is characteristic of the Roman people to retain as far as possible existing institutions. Hence, even in abolishing the monarchy, they retained the title of king for a priestly functionary (*rex sacrorum*) debarred from holding any other office.

A more important legacy left by the monarchy to the new Republic is the conception of sovereign power (*imperium*). This power, it is true, is no longer held for life by a single individual, but entrusted to two colleagues, the consuls, for the term of a single year. Yet the consuls, though only annual magistrates, are true successors of the king, and joint-inheritors of his authority. For if in practice there must have been from the first a division of functions, the law recognised no such distinction. A consul had in all cases the right to forbid what his colleague had enjoined, and by his intercession to annul the force of the command. By this peculiar institution of co-ordinate magistrates the Romans contrived to maintain the sovereign power intact, and yet to provide against its abuse by individual self-will.

With the same purpose, the tenure of office was limited to a

single year ; and though in law the official acts of a consul were valid, even if he refused to resign his magistracy at the end of the appointed term, in practice the consuls seldom dared to disregard in this way the spirit of the new constitution. Hence, whereas the king had been practically irresponsible because his authority ceased only with his life, the consul, on his retirement from office, was responsible for the use he had made of his power.

The two great differences which distinguished the position of a consul from that of a king were the existence of a colleague and the annual tenure of office ; but others of the old royal prerogatives were also lost in the change of the constitution. By the Valerian law the consul was compelled to allow an appeal to the people against a sentence which affected the life or status (*caput*) of a citizen. This measure, though it prescribed no penalty but infamy for its transgression, and needed repeated re-enactment, was for centuries the Habeas Corpus Act of Rome and the keystone of her citizens' liberties.

Another royal prerogative much limited at this time was the right to delegate powers. The two lieutenants of the king for peace and war, the guardian of the city (*præfectus urbi*) and the master of the horse (*magister equitum*) play no part under the Republic. The præfectship becomes a mere form, and the mastership of the horse is called to life only when a serious emergency demands the temporary restoration of monarchy in the shape of the dictatorship. The consuls may delegate their military functions, but they cannot name at pleasure deputies to represent them as judges or magistrates. Their assistants in these departments attain the rank of standing officials with definite functions. The quæstores parricidii, if they existed at all under the kings, were mere deputies ; they are now regularly entrusted with criminal jurisdiction and the care of the state chest. Till the year 447 B.C. these officials were appointed by the consuls, but the annual tenure and the clearly marked duties of their office made them in a measure independent of the superior magistrate. Again, though the consul, like the king, had the right of naming his successor, yet his prerogative was limited by the people's claim to designate the man on whom the nomination should fall. He was, it is true, no mere returning officer at a Roman election. He might, and did, reject particular candidates, either refusing to record votes tendered for them or recalling to the poll centuries who had given them their suffrages. But, though at a crisis the consul might reassert the old right of a supreme magistrate to name his

successor, as a rule he bowed to the expressed will of the people. Lastly, the appointment of the priests was withdrawn from the consuls. The priestly colleges obtained the right of filling up their ranks by co-optation, while the Vestals were nominated by the chief college, that of the pontifices. In this way a separation is made between civil and religious authority.

Imperium Domi and Imperium Militiæ.—Another distinction of greater significance in history first appears at this time, that between civil and military authority. In war the consul retains



SELLA CURULIS AND FASCES.

absolute power of life and death, in token of which the lictors bear the axes before him, but in peace his authority is subject to the right of appeal to the sovereign people, in deference to whom, within the city, the axe is laid aside by the lictors. Thus there is a clear distinction between the absolute power of the general over his army in the field (*imperium militiæ*) and the constitutional authority of the magistrate over the people at home (*imperium domi*).

Dictatorship.—This limitation and division of the powers of the magistrates secured in ordinary times the liberties of the people,

but in time of war the divided command was a source of serious danger. To meet such emergencies the Romans retained the monarchical principle in the dictatorship. After consulting the Senate, either consul had the right of nominating whom he would as dictator, or master of the people. The dictator possessed the old royal powers untrammelled and unlimited ; he disposed at will of the treasure of the state and the lives of the citizens. From his sentence there was no appeal, and all magistrates were subordinate to him. In fine, he was a temporary monarch, and as such named his second in command, the master of the horse ; and was accompanied by four-and-twenty lictors bearing axes in the fasces. But in no case might the dictator retain office for more than six months, nor name a successor to take his place. Broadly speaking, then, though kingship was abolished, royal power was retained, and that power might be revived at a crisis in all its ancient fulness and entrusted to a single man ; yet the essence of the new constitution was the limitation of the old regal authority by the collegiate character and annual tenure of the magistracy, and by the explicit recognition of the sovereignty of the people.

The Senate.—The abolition of the monarchy left the legal position of the Senate unaltered. The consuls called the Senate together, presided over its debates, and enforced its resolutions just as the king had done in the past. The Senate cannot legally give commands to the magistrate, but may only offer advice. Yet in practice the permanence of the Senate gave it a decisive influence over a shifting and divided magistracy, and enabled it to dictate the policy of Rome. It is probable that plebeians were at this period first admitted into the ranks of the Senate, but this infusion of new blood did not alter the character of the council, which remained the chief bulwark of the old patrician aristocracy. One most important privilege, the right to ratify or reject all proceedings of the centuries, the election of magistrates, as well as the passing of laws, was reserved for its patrician members. By withholding their sanction (*patrum auctoritas*) the heads of the old burgess houses could make the decisions of the assembly void, and so keep the commons in subjection to the will of the patricians.

Assembly.—By the expulsion of the kings the people had acquired the important rights of annually electing its rulers and of acting as a court of appeal in capital cases. The sovereign people to whom these rights belonged was the army of freeholders (*comitia centuriata*) created by Servius Tullius, not the old curiate assembly, which was now gradually confined to mere formalities, such as the

confirmation of the magistrates, already chosen by the assembly of the centuries, in their authority (*lex curiata de imperio*). All the chief prerogatives of the sovereign people, the right of legislation and the power of peace and war, as well as the election of magistrates and the decision of criminal appeals, passed to the new comitia centuriata. In this assembly the plebeians doubtless formed the large mass of the voters, but since it was a majority of centuries, not of individual votes, that determined the decision of the people, their numerical superiority was of little service to them. For the centuries of the knights and of the first class, which mainly consisted of old burgesses, outnumbered those of the lower classes; and, further, the six patrician centuries of knights possessed the valuable privilege of voting first (*prærogativa*). Thus, while the comitia centuriata formally secured the liberties of the commons, it left the substance of power in the hands of the upper classes (*cf.* Table, p. 28).

Patrician Government.—Nobles and commons had united to throw off the galling yoke of despotic monarchs, but, now that this overshadowing authority was gone, there begins a long and fierce struggle between the orders for the fruits of victory. The lion's share fell in the first instance to the patricians. The plebeians had indeed gained the clear recognition of their rights as citizens of Rome; they had won the right to vote in the assembly of freeholders, and the right to appeal from the sentence of the patrician magistrate to the verdict of that assembly. Nevertheless, while the plebeians won the shadow of liberty, the old burgesses, now become a patrician nobility, retained the substance of power. In the comitia centuriata their vote and influence could as a rule secure them a safe majority; but even had it been otherwise, that body had too little independence of action seriously to contest their supremacy. Resolutions in the comitia were introduced by patrician magistrates after consultation with an aristocratic Senate, and subsequently required the sanction of the patrician members of the Senate (*patrum auctoritas*). In elections the voters could only choose patrician candidates nominated by patrician magistrates, and subject to the approval of the curies, in which patrician influence preponderated, and to that of the patrician senators. The useful machinery of the omens and the working of the calendar was controlled by patrician priests. Thus the legal supremacy of the people in their assembly was at every turn hedged in and crippled by the powers of a patrician magistracy and Senate.

The first effect of the Revolution was the transference of power

from an individual king to a close corporation, represented by its special organ, the Senate, and working through the magistrates. The ensuing period of constitutional history is naturally filled with the long struggles by which the plebeian masses wrung from the patricians those cherished privileges which secured them the monopoly of office and authority. The ruling corporation was far more influenced by aristocratic prejudice than the monarch, who, standing on a height above all his subjects, was more likely to be a just judge between different classes and different orders. The king might, and probably did, lean on the support of the masses against the power of the aristocracy, but the annual republican magistrate had neither time nor inclination to shake himself free from the fetters of patrician prejudice. Even if there arose a man bold enough to defy his order, his actions could be thwarted by the opposition of his colleague or the gloomy predictions of patrician priests, and, in the last resort, his power suspended by the appointment of a dictator. Thus at first sight it would appear as if the commons of Rome had escaped the tyranny of a single monarch only to place on their necks the harder yoke of a narrow aristocracy. Yet the privileges gained, the clear recognition of their claims as individuals to citizenship, and of the full sovereignty of the whole people assembled in their centuries, though at the time rendered nugatory by the powers entrusted to the patricians, were an earnest of their future victory in the struggle between the orders, and of the complete equality between patrician and plebeian which crowned that victory.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST STRUGGLES OF THE PLEBEIANS

TRADITIONAL DATES

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Secession of the Plebs	494	260
Spurius Cassius' Agrarian Law	486	268
Publilian Law	472	282

Grievances of the Plebeians.—The plebeians were not slow to discover the real meaning of the late changes. To them the new oligarchy was as oppressive, at the least, as the old monarchy. It was, indeed, the natural and obvious policy of the patriciate to thwart the rising ambition and depress the social status of their discarded

allies. Class feeling and political interest alike urged them to exclude the rich plebeian from the charmed circle of the official order, and, by robbing the poor farmer of his hard-won liberties, to re-establish the client system in full force for their own benefit.

Political and social inequalities, however, formed a small part of the burden which afflicted the lower classes, whose sufferings from direct oppression were further aggravated by the losses sustained by Rome in the wars which followed the fall of the monarchy. Material distress, in the first instance, precipitated the inevitable conflict, and, like true Romans, the plebeians attacked first, not the rule of the aristocracy in the abstract, but the practical oppressions of the patrician magistrates and Senate. The most glaring examples of cruelty and misgovernment were the savage law of debtor and creditor, the arbitrary action of the executive magistrates, and the exclusive use and shameful maladministration of the public lands. As regards the last, the magistrates and Senate had leagued themselves together to exclude the plebeians from all use of the common pastures and all share in the arable domains, the enjoyment of which was confined to the privileged class. At the same time they failed to exact the legal dues for the usufruct of the land, and thus robbed the treasury of present revenue and gave the occupant a claim to the equitable forbearance of the state in future. With a decreasing territory allotments to the poor were out of the question. Thus the public domain was monopolised by the old burgesses to the detriment alike of the poor and the public. Against this monopoly the plebeians were to fight many a weary battle, but their first efforts were aimed against the arbitrary sentences imposed by patrician magistrates, and the stern cruelty of the old Roman law of debt. The horrible injustice perpetrated in the name of law moved the masses, not so much to diminish the power of the magistrates, as to provide themselves with a refuge from its abuse.

The First Secession.—If we may trust Livy and Dionysius, it was the law of debt which first caused an open revolt of the poor against the government. The small farmer was called away from home by continual wars, and often returned only to find his homestead a heap of ashes. In his distress he fell into the hands of some patrician money-lender, and finally found his way into a private prison, there to be loaded with chains and torn with stripes. Driven to despair at length, the plebeians refused to serve in a war against the Volscians, and only enrolled themselves in the legions after the consul Servilius had freed the

debtors from prison and promised them his protection for the future. But when the troops returned victorious from the field, the other consul, Appius Claudius, enforced the law of debt with merciless severity. So, on the renewal of the war, the plebeians again refused to serve, till Manius Valerius, of the "house that loved the people well," was made dictator. Victory again crowned the Roman arms; but when the dictator proposed reform in the Senate, he was met by a selfish and obstinate opposition. At length the patience of the army waiting before the gates gave way; they deserted their general, and marched in full array to the "Sacred Mount" between the Anio and the Tiber. Here the leaders of the secession threatened to found a new plebeian city, a rival to the old Rome of the burgesses and their clients. But at this point the Senate yielded, and authorised Valerius to treat with the plebeians. The seceding party, too, had the sense to see the community of interest which bound them to the other half of Rome, and recognised in the old fable of the belly and the members, told them by Menenius Agrippa, the moral that union is strength. They stipulated, however, that the misery of the lower classes should be relieved by the foundation of colonies for poor farmers on the public land.

Tribunes of the Plebs.—But the kernel of the covenant between the orders lay in the provision for the appointment of two tribunes of the plebs, to be chosen annually by the plebeians from their own body, who received power to protect the commons from the high-handed injustice of patrician magistrates, and whose personal security (*sacro sanctum*) was guaranteed for ever by the solemn oath of the people. The tribunate thus created was henceforward the representative of the plebeian body, its constant safeguard and sanctuary, and the instrument of its political victories. The first duty of the tribune was to succour the oppressed, his chief function to cancel any command of a consul which infringed the liberties of a citizen. But his "intercession" was in no case valid against the "imperium" of a dictator, or even of the ordinary magistrate a mile beyond the walls. His power was confined to the city, and his protest, limited to the acts of executive magistrates, must be made in person. Hence he must always sleep in his own house at Rome, with his door open night and day, that none might seek his aid in vain. This right of interference with special acts was at first used simply for the protection of an aggrieved individual, but was gradually stretched till the tribune could forbid almost any administrative act.

The Judicial Powers of the Tribune.—The judicial powers of the tribunes were large and undefined. They claimed the right to arrest even the consul, to imprison him, and eventually to condemn him to death. In minor cases, where the penalty was but a fine, they were assisted by the plebeian ædiles, and probably by a board of ten judges (*decemviri litibus iudicandis*). It may be questioned whether the power, claimed by the tribunes, of condemning and executing offenders against the rights of the commons was ever strictly legal, or fully recognised by the Senate, but their jurisdiction in minor cases was authorised and regulated by later laws.

Concilia Plebis Tributa.—The most momentous consequence of the tribunes' judicial position was the formation of a new assembly to serve as a court of appeal from their sentences. This is the assembly of plebeians in which they voted by tribes, or local districts. These tribes included, in all, four urban and seventeen country wards; and in this mode of voting the influence of birth and wealth was entirely ignored. The right of the tribunes to hold assemblies of the plebeians was guaranteed by the Icilian law, which forbade any magistrate to disperse such assemblies, or to interrupt a tribune's speech to them. This law, or rather "resolution of the commons" (*plebiscitum*), was itself but an instance of the growing custom of taking the votes of the commons on legislative proposals. Such resolutions were binding on the plebeians who passed them, but not as yet on the whole Roman people.

The final step in this organisation of the plebeians as a separate corporation was an alteration in the mode of election of the tribunes. At first, it would seem, they were elected by the plebeians, voting by curies, but after the plebiscitum of Publilius Volero (472 B.C.) the plebeians adopted for elections, as well as for other purposes, the division by tribes. The gradual increase in the number of tribunes, from two to ten, no doubt secured more efficiently the primary aim of the institution, the protection of the oppressed.

Value of the Tribune.—On a general review of the effects of this formation of a new plebeian state within the pale of the Roman people, with officers at its head, whose permanent duty it was to oppose the magistrates of the whole community, the anomalies and inconveniences of such a system are more obvious and prominent than its merits. The tribune, resting on the personal inviolability accorded him by the solemn law and covenant (*lex*

sacra) of the people, was strong for resistance but weak for reform. He could obstruct the action and restrain the injustice of the patrician magistrate by the exercise of his right of intercession, but he could not, without a new revolution, get the unjust laws, which the consul enforced, repealed; nor could he cure the worst diseases of the state, the occupation of the domain land and the other economic evils which impoverished the plebeians. Yet, though the tribunate, in early days, rather legalised than remedied the duality of the Roman state and the dissensions of its two parts, nevertheless before the Punic wars it had served to secure the equality of the orders, and thus to promote and maintain the unity of the people. When this object was attained it became an anachronism. The tribune of later Rome is an officer of a markedly different character from the old protector of the unprivileged plebs.

The Public Land.—The other chief grievance of the plebeians, the occupation of the public land by the patricians, needs further explanation. The common land (*publicus ager*) of Rome, mainly derived from conquest, had formed the royal domain of the monarchs. The minute size of the traditional Roman farm (2 jugera = $1\frac{1}{4}$ acres) makes it certain that the citizen from the first had licence to pasture sheep and cattle, to cut wood, and perhaps even to grow corn on the common-land. When the government passed from the king to the nobles, the latter seem to have claimed and secured, as a right and privilege of their order, the exclusive management of this public property. There were two methods of dealing with the soil which were peculiarly advantageous to the rich and powerful. Firstly, the state might allow its citizens to take over and cultivate the arable land without conferring absolute ownership. Thus, by means of their clients, the patricians occupied (*occupare*) and enclosed large tracts, for which, whether legally or not, they paid the state no rent. This system of tenure, called possession, which made the domains a monopoly of the ruling class, was a deep and lasting injury to the smaller farmers. Secondly, the effect of this was aggravated by the exclusion of the yeomanry from the public pastures. As stock-raising grew in importance the right to use the common pastures, formerly granted to all on payment of a tax (*scriptura*), was confined more and more to the upper classes, from whom the magistrates neglected to exact the fees due to the state. This double privilege of patrician landholders was a twofold injustice to the yeoman-farmer.

Agrarian Laws.—As might be expected, the tribunes were constantly protesting against this misuse of the public land, and proposing "agrarian laws" designed to distribute some portion of the soil among the Roman poor. Before dealing with particulars, it is necessary to restate the truism, that agrarian laws at Rome never confiscated private land, but dealt simply and solely with the state's domains won in war by the sword of her soldiers. Their object was to rescue public land from the stock-farmers and squatters (*possessores*) who absorbed it, and distribute it in small allotments to the poor. Sometimes a group of three hundred or more citizens were planted—in later years far larger numbers—together on the land in a single settlement or "colony," which, like an Athenian cleruchy, served indeed as an outlet for surplus population and a means of relieving the necessities of the poor, but mainly as a centre of Roman influence in peace and a well-garrisoned fortress in war.¹ Sometimes particular portions of land were assigned to individuals (*assignatio virilim*). But, in either case, to make the landless man a peasant proprietor was to bestow on him not only a livelihood, but also political rights, which were, in early times, confined to freeholders, who alone could be enrolled in a tribe. Thus both the political and social interests of the plebeians were bound up with the distribution of the public land by agrarian laws. Tradition has associated the name of Spurius Cassius, the author of the league with the Latins and Hernicans, with the first agrarian law. But of its provisions we can learn nothing from the confused and contradictory statements of Livy and Dionysius. Patrician obstruction appears, legally or illegally, to have thwarted the operation of the law; patrician vengeance fell upon the man who had dared to come forward as the friend of the poor. Spurius Cassius was accused of aiming at absolute power, and sentenced to death by the assembly, or, according to another account, by his own father, in virtue of the tremendous powers entrusted by Roman law to the head of a family. Here, as in two later cases, the patricians turned the hatred felt by all true Romans towards the very name of king to good account, in discrediting the champions of the lower orders.

Yet the agitation begun by the proposals of Cassius was not ended by his death. Again and again the tribunes demanded the

¹ The colonies founded by Rome were either (1) burgess-colonies, or (2), after 384 B.C., also Latin colonies, *i.e.*, communities whose members, of whatever origin, received Latin rights, *v. infra* pp. 134, 135. Previous Latin colonies were joint foundations of Rome and the Latin League.

execution of his measure, or at least some distribution of lands to the poor. Nor were they intimidated by the assassination of one of the most energetic among them, Cn. Genucius. At length their efforts were crowned with partial success; for in 467 B.C., by the foundation of a Latin colony at Antium, a number of the poorer Romans were provided with lands, and in 456 B.C. the Aventine was portioned out in building-lots for the lower classes. In the last case, if not in both, it would appear that the tribunes compelled the consuls to bring the petition of the plebeians before the Senate. Then the consuls, with the assent of the Senate, carried the measure through the assembly of the whole people in their centuries.

This interesting innovation closes for a while the agrarian question, and leads us back to the constitutional and legal reforms demanded at this time by the plebeians.

NOTE.—Mommson holds that the agrarian law of Sp. Cassius is a late invention. He grants that his consulships and alliance with the Latins rest on good evidence, and believes that the record of his condemnation on the charge of treason was to be found in the earliest chronicles. But he points out how unlikely it is that such documents contained an account of a law which was never carried, and dwells upon the confusions and contradictions in the account of its contents, and of the trial of its author. He concludes that the agrarian law of Cassius and his championship of the Latins are fictions of the age of Sulla, founded upon the real proposals of the Gracchi and Livius Drusus. (*Röm. Forsch.*, ii. 153 ff.)

CHAPTER VII

EARLY WARS AND ALLIANCES OF THE REPUBLIC

TRADITIONAL DATES

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Alliance with Latins and Capture of Corioli	493	261
Disaster at the Cremera	477	277
Cincinnatus Dictator	458	296

The new Republic hard pressed on all sides.—With the fall of the monarchy came a great loss of power and territory for the Roman state. While the later kings had gained a miniature empire over the neighbouring tribes, in the early days of the Republic Rome has to fight for her very existence. The beautiful legends, which tell us of the patriotic self-devotion of Horatius

Cocles and of Scævola, must not blind us to the fact that Rome had failed to maintain her hold on Southern Etruria, nor the glamour of the heroic combats of Lake Regillus conceal the loss of her suzerainty in Latium. In fine, for sixty years after the foundation of the Republic the Roman armies fought for the most part in defence of their homes, almost within sight of the city. Often was the flag on Janiculum struck, and the burgher summoned from the assembly in the field of Mars, to repel the raids of the Veientine on the north, or the more serious assaults of the Æquian and Volscian on the south. The Sabines pressed across the Anio, the Æquians settled like a thunder-cloud on Mount Algidus, while the Volscians overran the coast-land as far as Antium, and even gained a footing at Velitræ and Corioli, on the southern slopes of the Alban hills.

Legendary Victories. — Throughout the period the Roman annals tell us of many splendid triumphs, but as we hear nothing of the fruits of victory, we may safely ascribe their glories to the imagination of patriotic orators and chroniclers. Each of the great houses had its own fabled exploits, extolled in the orations delivered at the funerals of its chief members, and afterwards incorporated in the family chronicles. From this source Fabius Pictor (circ. 200 B.C.) and the later annalists drew those stirring narratives of adventure, and graphic portraits of individuals, preserved for us by Livy and Plutarch. But we can put no trust in these legends, which owe their life and colour to the imagination of the chroniclers. The official records in early times contained little more than lists of names; the annals of the priests noticed only subjects of religious interest. Even these scanty documents perished in the sack of Rome by the Gauls (390 B.C.), and were but imperfectly restored, from memory or by conjecture. Yet these meagre outlines are the only historical evidence we possess. In the legends we must not hope to find truth, yet they remain a part of history, for belief in them has influenced later generations more than many facts. As typical instances we may take the stories of Coriolanus, of Cincinnatus, and of the Fabii.

Legend of Coriolanus.—Gnæus Marcius was a noble of the race of King Ancus, brought up by his mother, Veturia,¹ in the strict old Roman ways. And when the Romans were besieging Corioli, the men of the city broke forth, and drove them back even to their camp. But Marcius rallied the runaways and turned the

¹ The names in Shakespeare's play are derived from a slightly different version given by Plutarch.

pursuers to flight ; and, as they fled through the gates of the town, Marcius entered with them, and by his single might vanquished the enemy and took the city. So men called him Coriolanus because he had "fluttered the Volscians in Corioli."

And afterward there was a famine in Rome, and the commons were sore distressed. But when the king of Syracuse sent corn to the Senate, Coriolanus counselled it not to sell the commons bread, unless they would give up their tribunes. For which cause the people was much angered, and the tribunes summoned him to appear before the assembly of the commons. Then Coriolanus stayed not for a trial, in which he looked for neither justice nor mercy, but fled to the Volscians ; and Attius Tullius, their chief, received him kindly ; but he could not persuade the Volscians to make war with Rome, for they were afraid.

Now at that time Jupiter had bidden the Romans to celebrate the great games anew, and many of the Volscians went up to see the sight. But Attius Tullius, going by stealth to the consuls, bade them remember the mischief wrought in Rome by a tumult of the Sabines, and counselled them to prevent the Volscians doing the like. And when the consuls told this to the Senate, they made proclamation that before sunset every Volscian should be gone from Rome. So they went homewards full of wrath at the dishonour done to them. And as they passed by the spring of Ferentina, in the Alban hills, Attius met them and stirred them up to make war with the Romans, who had thus put them to shame. So the Volscians gathered a great host, and over it they set Attius and Cn. Marcius, the banished Roman. Then the two generals took all the towns of the Latins, and encamped at length by the Cluilian dyke. And the Romans went not out to meet the foe, for within the city the strife between burghers and commons waxed fierce. But the poorer sort cried to the Senate to send an embassy to the Volscians. And five of the chief senators were sent to sue for peace ; but Marcius would give them no peace which Romans could accept. Next the Senate sent the priests and augurs clothed in their sacred robes ; yet would not Marcius hearken to them, but drove them back to the city. But when all men's hearts failed them for fear, Rome was delivered by the help of the gods. For Jupiter put it into the mind of the noble Lady Valeria to bid Veturia, the mother of Coriolanus, and Volumnia, his wife, to come with her and the other women of Rome to pray for mercy. So the whole train of matrons came to the camp of Coriolanus. And when he saw his mother, and his wife leading

his two boys by the hand, he would have kissed them. But his mother stopped him and asked whether he was her son or an enemy, and she his mother or a prisoner. And when he could not answer she cried out, "Had I never borne a son, Rome should never have been besieged! Had I remained childless, I might have died free! But I am too old to bear for long thy shame or my misery. Look rather at thy wife and children, whom thou doomest to an untimely death or a lifelong slavery." And Marcius quailed at his mother's words, and melted at his wife's and children's kisses. So he cried out in an agony, "Mother, thine is the victory; thou hast saved Rome, but destroyed thy son."

So Coriolanus led away the Volscian army, and troubled Rome no more, but lived many years among the Volscians, and in his lonely old age felt the full bitterness of exile. And the Romans built a temple to Woman's Fortune, to do honour to the noble matrons by whose prayer the city was saved, and made Valeria its first priestess.

Legend of Cincinnatus.—There was peace between Rome and the Æquians, but Gracchus Clœlius, their chief, pitched his camp on Mount Algidus, and plundered the lands of Tusculum. And when the Romans sent ambassadors to complain of the wrong, Gracchus mocked them, and bade them tell their message to the oak above his tent. So the Romans took the sacred oak to witness that Gracchus had treacherously broken the peace, and made them ready for war. But Lucius Minucius, the consul, led his army into a narrow valley near Mount Algidus, and there was he compassed about on all sides by the Æquians. Nevertheless five horsemen broke through the enemy, and carried the sad news to Rome. And the Senate agreed that there was but one man who could deliver the army, Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, so he was named dictator.

This L. Quinctius, called for his crisp curling locks (*cincinni*) Cincinnatus, tilled his own little farm beyond the Tiber. The deputies of the Senate came thither early in the morning, and found him digging in his field. And when he had sent to fetch his toga, and was now in fit guise to hear the message of the Senate, they hailed him dictator, and told him in what peril the consul and his army lay. So he went with four-and-twenty lictors before him to his house in Rome, and chose L. Tarquinius, a brave man but poor, to be master of the horse. On that day the dictator made all business to cease in the Forum, and summoned all who could bear arms to meet in the Field of Mars before sunset,

ordering each man to bring with him victuals for five days and twelve wooden stakes. So at nightfall, when everything was in readiness, the dictator marched with all speed to Mount Algidus. And after that he had discovered where the enemy lay, he made his soldiers surround them on every side. When this was done they raised a great shout, and began digging a trench and driving in their stakes right round the Æquian camp. Then the consul's army, that was in the valley, heard the Roman war-cry, and attacked the foe from behind so fiercely that he could not hinder the work of the dictator's men. And in the morning the Æquians saw that there was no escape, for they were hemmed in by a ditch and palisade, and prayed for mercy. Then Cincinnatus answered that they must deliver over to him Gracchus and their other chiefs bound, and yield up all their goods, even their arms and cloaks. And he set up two spears, and bound a third across them at the top, and made the Æquians pass beneath the yoke, and sent them away full of shame. Thus did Cincinnatus deliver the consul and his army. One evening he marched out to Mount Algidus; the next he returned victorious. And the Senate decreed that the dictator should enter the city in triumph riding in his chariot, while his prisoners were led bound before him, and his soldiers with their spoil followed behind him. But afterward he went home quietly to his wife and farm.

Legend of the Fabii.—The Etruscans had not, since the days of King Porsenna, pressed the Romans so hard as the Æquians and the Volscians. But the men of Veii, though they dared not meet the Romans in battle, harried the land up to the Tiber, while the consuls were fighting with the Æquians and Volscians, and there was none to hinder them. Wherefore the men of the great Fabian house took counsel together, and bade Kæso Fabius tell the Senate that the family of the Fabii would take upon itself the war with the men of Veii. And when they had gained the consent of the Senate, all the Fabii, to the number of three hundred and six warriors, gathered together at the house of Kæso on the Quirinal Hill, and marched out of the city by the right-hand passage of the gate Carmentalis. And they made them a stronghold in the country of the Veientes, by the river Cremera, and for a whole year spoiled the men of Veii of their cattle and goods. But there was a certain day on which the house of the Fabii were accustomed to meet together for a sacrifice at the home of their fathers on the Quirinal. And as they went joyfully towards Rome, thinking that none would attack men bound on a sacred errand, the Veientes

laid an ambush before them, and pursued with a great host behind them. So the Fabii were compassed about, and set upon on all sides, and fell beneath a shower of darts and arrows, for none of the Etruscans dared come within the reach of their spears and swords. So the whole house of the Fabii was cut off, for there was not one full-grown man left, but only a boy, who, on account of his youth, had been left behind in Rome. Him the gods preserved, that in after-ages his children might do good service to



ETRUSCAN HELMET.

the commonwealth, mindful of the glories of their forefathers. And there was peace between Rome and Veii for forty years.

The Leagues with the Latins and Hernici.—It was not, however, the real or fabled exploits of the noble houses that saved Rome from the assaults of the Sabellian tribes, but the masterly policy of a far-sighted statesman. If we may believe an inscription, cited both by Cicero and Livy, within ten years of the battle of Lake Regillus, Sp. Cassius, the consul (493 B.C.), formed that great and lasting league with the cities of Latium which proved Rome's best defence in the days of adversity, and the sure foundation of her future prosperity. For, whatever be the exact terms

or origin of the league, this much may be regarded as certain. It was at first an equal alliance between the two powers of the lowlands, to defend their borders against the incursions of the hill-tribes, and to stay the rising tide of Æquian and Volscian aggression. At the same time Rome had the inestimable advantage of comparative immunity from invasion. The Latin cities stood like a bulwark between her territories and the Sabellian hill-tribes, securing her safety at the cost of their own. If the fortune of war was adverse, Latin towns fell into the hands of the Æquians and Volscians; if favourable, Rome claimed her share of the fruits of victory. Thus the brunt of the battle fell always on the Latins, while Rome grew strong behind the barrier formed by her allies. In this way the old equal league paved the way for the dominion of Rome over Latium. Scarcely less important was the adhesion of the Hernici to the league. These mountaineers held the rocky fastnesses of the valley of the Trerus, bordered on one side by the Æquians, on the other by the Volscians. Roman historians, misled by national pride, tell us that the treaty with the Hernici (486 B.C.), concluded, like the league with Latium, by Sp. Cassius, was preceded by their conquest. But no doubt the Romans and Latins were glad to admit them into their alliance on equal terms, for their position midway between the Æquians and Volscians rendered their aid most valuable in any attack on those tribes. This triple league served for fifty years to protect Rome against assaults from the south, while the Etruscans were too hard pressed by the Celts on their northern frontiers to regain their dominion on the left bank of the Tiber. So the new Republic, though unable to maintain the position won by the later kings, succeeded in preserving the Campagna from the domination of Sabellians and Etruscans.

NOTE.—It may be well to take the tale of Coriolanus as an example, and, by analysing its composition, to prove the untrustworthiness of similar legends which space forbids us to treat in full. Mommsen has shown that, in all probability, it is a late insertion in the Roman annals. Evidently the name of the hero was not to be found in the official lists of magistrates; on no occasion is he at the head of the home government, or of the regular army in the field. In its original form the story was entirely free from fixed dates. The consuls play no part either in the distribution of the corn, or at the trial of Coriolanus, or in opposing the Volscian march on Rome. The assertion that Cominius (consul 493 B.C.) commanded the army that took Corioli is, as Livy naïvely confesses, a mere inference from the absence of his name on the brazen pillar which recorded the treaty

made with the Latins by his colleague, Sp. Cassius. With more flagrant disregard of chronology, the old tradition made Dionysius of Syracuse (circ. 400 B.C.) the benefactor who relieved the famine at Rome (circ. 490); nor was the error corrected till a Greek antiquary substituted the name of Gelo for that of the later tyrant. Consistency was as little respected as chronology. Elsewhere in the chronicles Corioli is a Latin, and not a Volscian town, just as the spring of Ferentina is the Latin, not the Volscian, place of assembly. A trial before the tribes is impossible at so early a date, for, before the Publilian law, the plebeians voted by curies. Indeed, quite apart from errors of detail, the whole tone and character of the legend is utterly opposed to the dry, official character of the earliest chronicles of Rome. The picture of the hero, forced by the ingratitude of his countrymen to seek refuge with his bitterest enemy, who yet in the hour of his triumph foregoes his revenge at the bidding of his mother, is one which even Greek imagination never equalled. The moral of the tale, that Rome was saved in the hour of need by the patriotism of her women, is alien from the spirit of primitive times, when the mission of woman was confined to the family. In fine, the legend is a romance intended to glorify the great plebeian houses, the Marcii, the Veturii, and the Volumnii, by connecting them with the old patriciate, and, in the account of the trial, attempts to justify the claim of the plebeian assembly to rule the state. Its origin may be found in the century after the Licinian laws, when the new nobility had established its position.

The legend of Cincinnatus bears on its face the stamp of a popular tale, and is proved, by its frequent repetition at different dates, to have had no place in the earliest chronicles. In the story of the Fabii, Mommsen sees a condemnation of that system of private warfare (*coniuratio*) which in early times supplemented the summer campaigns of the citizen army (*militia legitima*), but which, after its disuse, was misunderstood by the Roman annalists. (*Röm. Forsch.*, ii. 113-152, &c.)

CHAPTER VIII

THE DECEMVIRATE

TRADITIONAL DATES

	B. C.	A. U. C.
Proposals of C. Terentilius Arsa	462	292
Appointment of Decemviri	451	303
Valerio-Horatian Laws	449	305

✓ **Proposal to codify the Laws of Rome.**—The tribunate no doubt did something to protect the interests and redress the injuries of the plebeians, but, so long as the laws of Rome remained unwritten, it was impossible to secure their just and equitable administration.

Roman law rested on a basis of custom and command, and consisted largely of semi-religious usages and ceremonies, clogged with antique forms, and closely connected with gentile worships. The knowledge of the law was to the orthodox patrician, as to the Brahman of India, a mysterious science, to be jealously guarded from the vulgar gaze, and handed down by tradition only from generation to generation, as a sacred heritage of the ruling class, who alone had part or lot in the old religion of Rome. This exclusive property in law was at once a bulwark of patrician power and a stumbling-block in the path of the plebeians, and as such was marked out for tribunician assault. In 462 B.C. a tribune, C. Terentilius Arsa, proposed that a commission, consisting of five plebeians, should be appointed to codify and publish the laws of Rome. It does not appear that the proposal in its original shape sought either to reform the civil law, or to alter in any way the constitution of the state. Its effect would have been simply to deprive the patricians of their monopoly of the knowledge of law, and so to protect the plebeians against the misuse of legal technicalities, by which the magistrates perverted the course of justice.

Resistance of the Senate overcome.—But though the proposed measure was at once just and moderate, it excited the most vehement opposition. For ten years the Senate obstructed its passage into law, and for ten years the commons elected tribunes pledged to support it. During the struggle the Senate tried in vain to appease the discontent, and divert the attention of the people by various concessions, by assenting to an increase in the number of tribunes (457 B.C.), to the distribution of the Aventine in allotments to plebeians (456 B.C.), and, finally, to the limitation of the maximum fines a consul might impose to two sheep or thirty bullocks. The concessions failed to satisfy the people, who were bent on carrying the proposal of Terentilius. At last the Senate was forced to yield, and accepted the measure, though in a modified form. As a preliminary, three commissioners were despatched to Greece, to report on the laws of Solon, and other Greek codes; and on their return, two years later, it was agreed that ten men should be appointed to draw up a code of law (*decemviri consulari imperio legibus scribendis*), and to act for the year as sole and supreme magistrates. At the same time, the tribunate and the right of appeal were suspended, in order that the decemvirs might enjoy the advantage of unfettered and unlimited authority.

✓ **The Rule of the Decemvirs.**—Clearly the purpose of these

measures was to substitute for the uncertain working of the tribune's veto the fixed barrier of written law as a permanent safeguard of plebeian liberties. They were probably the result of a compromise, by which the commons on their part sacrificed the tribunate, and the nobles surrendered the monopoly of legal principles. The nobles got rid of a hated office, while the people hoped to secure, in a system of laws whose publicity raised them above all suspicion of patrician manipulation, an effective check on the power of the consuls. It would also appear that the decemvirate was legally open to plebeians as well as to patricians, and was intended to serve as an impartial board of arbitration between the orders. But all hope that the new magistracy might reconcile old dissensions, and weld the two orders at once into an united state, was frustrated by the action of the patricians, who contrived to monopolise all ten places at the first election. Satisfied with this victory, the dominant party made a sensible and moderate use of its power, so that the ten tables of laws issued by the board were at once approved by the people, and engraved on brazen tablets hung on the rostra in the Forum. But the task of publication could not be completed within a single year, so it was agreed to choose decemvirs for the next year to complete the code. At this election Appius Claudius, of the proud and noble house of the Claudii, leagued himself with the plebeian chiefs, the Icillii and Duillii, and courted the favour of the lower orders with all the arts of a demagogue. In vain the rest of the board conferred on this dangerous colleague the honour of presiding at the Comitia. Appius, perfectly alive to their meaning and thoroughly careless of precedent, not merely accepted votes for himself, but procured his own re-election to office in conjunction with men of inferior weight and position, to the exclusion of the leading patricians. Three at least, it may be five, of the new decemvirs were plebeian.

Once their election was secured, the decemvirs, neglecting the work for which they were appointed, abandoned themselves to the enjoyment of absolute power, careless alike of the lives and property of their fellow-citizens. On the pretext that their duties were not accomplished—for the last two tables had not even then been submitted to the approval of the people—they refused to abdicate at the end of their year of office, in violation of the spirit if not of the letter of the constitution. Their government became an open tyranny, whose oppression recalled the days of the Tarquins, and was in like manner commemorated in popular legends. Whatever be the historical value of these tales, the wrongs of

Virginia, like those of Lucretia, were deeply engraved on the hearts of the people. The real history of the fall of the decemvirate is hidden in mists due to popular animosity or the partiality of chroniclers. It is impossible to do more than repeat the oft-told tale of Appius Claudius, and suggest a probable interpretation of the inconsistencies and contradictions in the narratives of Livy and Dionysius.

Legend of Virginia.—When their year of office was over, the decemvirs refused to lay down their powers. The most part of them led forth the army against the Æquians and the Sabines, but they were driven back, for their soldiers hated them and would not fight. So they laid a plot against one of the chief of the malcontents, L. Sicinius, sometime tribune of the plebs, and had him murdered by his own troops. And for a while the deed was kept secret from all men, until, in the general uprising of all true Romans against the tyranny of the ten, it was brought to light. For meanwhile Appius Claudius stayed in Rome to watch over the city. And when he saw a young maiden, Virginia, daughter of a centurion, Virginius, pass his judgment-seat in the Forum day by day as she went to school, he lusted after her in his heart, and suborned his client, M. Claudius, to swear that the maiden's real mother was a slave of his own, who had given the child to the childless wife of Virginius. And Appius would have handed her over forthwith to slavery, but L. Icilius, her betrothed, and P. Numitorius, her uncle, cried out that by law all were to be considered free till they were proved to be slaves. At length Appius promised to stay judgment for a day, so that Virginius might come from the camp and plead his cause. So Virginia's friends sent one messenger to her father, praying him to come with speed, and Appius another to his colleagues, bidding them not to let him go; but his message did not come till Virginius had set out for Rome.

So in the morning Virginius came to the Forum with his daughter and his friends, and prayed the people to stand by him. Then Appius would not hear him, but as soon as Claudius had spoken, adjudged the maiden to her master's custody until she should be proved free. And he overawed the people with a band of armed men. So Virginius asked leave to speak with the maiden and her nurse aside, that he might learn the truth of Claudius' story. And when leave was given him, he snatched up a knife from a butcher's stall, and plunged it in his daughter's heart, that so he might save her freedom and her honour. Then he called down on Appius the curse of blood, and so went forth from the Forum

to the camp, for none dared obey the tyrant's order to seize him. And Icilius and Numitorius made great mourning for Virginia, so that the people rose and drove Appius and his satellites to flee for their lives, and broke their power in Rome. Then the armies, too, moved by the story of Virginia's wrongs, marched from their camps to the Aventine, and elected tribunes to lead them instead of the decemvirs. But the Senate did not force the decemvirs to resign their office, until the armies and the commons had gone once more to the sacred mount, and again threatened to build them a city there.

The legend goes on to tell how two popular patricians, L. Valerius Potitus and M. Horatius Barbatus, who were empowered to negotiate with the seceding plebeians, by yielding to their demands for the restoration of the tribunate, and for the right of appeal from the decision of all magistrates, and by granting an amnesty to the promoters of the secession, won them back to their allegiance. The fate of the Decemvirs remains uncertain. Tradition declares that Appius Claudius and Sp. Oppius, his chief plebeian supporter, died in prison, either by their own hands or by the sentence of the tribunes; their colleagues were punished by the confiscation of their goods and banishment from Rome.

Criticism of the Tradition.—The whole account of the decemvirate is vitiated by the partisan prejudice which discolours the narratives of our historians. The view of the Claudii found in Livy, which represents them as the proudest and stiffest of the patrician houses, has been disproved by Mommsen. Even in Livy, Appius Claudius, the decemvir, poses as the friend of the people, and by this means wins his commanding influence over his colleagues, and his re-election in conjunction with three plebeians. Obviously the democratic leanings of Appius were too clear to be entirely suppressed even by a partial chronicler. The true position of Appius is that of the noble leader of the commons, the patrician turned demagogue. The later transformation of the demagogue into a tyrant may possibly be the invention of patrician hatred; but there is nothing inconsistent in the two characters, and as the story of Virginia has the ring of genuine tradition, it is safer to assume the truth of the picture. The haughty decemvir prostituting justice for the satisfaction of his desires, and the lying retainer ready to do any service for his patron, reproduce so faithfully the features of the Greek tyrannies, that we may most reasonably believe that in Appius Claudius we have yet another instance of a noble obtaining power by the

pretence of popular sympathies, and using it for personal ends, to the degradation of nobles and commons alike.

✓ **The Laws of the Twelve Tables.**—But if the decemvirs perished with ignominy, their work lived, and was regarded by after-ages as the source and foundation of all law. In reality it was little more than the formulation of old Roman custom; for, though we need not reject the story of the embassy to Greece, and the co-operation of Hermodorus, the Ephesian, doubtless Greek influence is to be seen rather in the form than the matter of the decemviral legislation. The constitutional innovations contained in the laws of the twelve tables are of less interest than the statutes which regulate the relations between private individuals, and thus illustrate the social condition of the people. The immense importance attached to the forms of litigation, and the inclusion of ceremonial rules, such as those which regulate the place and method of burial, reveal the primitive character of Roman civilisation. Everywhere we can trace the spirit of compromise, which softens, while it retains, the harsh principles of the older law. Thus the authority of the father (*patria potestas*) is maintained, but a thrice-repeated sale of a son severs the bond of connection between him and the head of the family. Again, by the side of the old patrician methods of making wills and contracting marriages, the law now recognises new forms, suitable to plebeians as well as patricians. For the religious ceremony of marriage (*confarratio*) it allowed the substitution of a pretended purchase (*coemptio*), and, in place of the solemn announcement of the will before the assembled burgesses (*calata comitia*), the decemvirs authorised a fictitious sale (*per aes et libram*). Thus, while the law preserved intact the rights of relations by male descent (*agnati*) to succeed to property where there was no will, it also facilitated the making of wills, just as it ordained that a civil ceremony (*coemptio*), and even uninterrupted cohabitation (*usus*), should confer the same rights on a husband as the old religious marriage. The rights of property are sternly maintained in the decemviral code. The insolvent debtor is liable to the extremest penalties both in property and in person, the only modification of the older law being the restriction of interest to 10 per cent. (*unciarium fœnus*), and the punishment of usury. As is common in early codes, theft is more severely dealt with than violence; while, curiously enough, libel, false witness, and judicial corruption are among the offences visited with death. Most notable is the fact that, whereas in the eye of the law patrician and plebeian are equal, a difference is recognised

between the landed and the landless man. The prohibition of the inter-marriage of patricians and plebeians, long enforced by custom, now first acquired the sanction of law ; but against this unpopular statute must be set the permission given to voluntary associations (*collegia*) to make what rules they chose for their own governance, provided they did not transgress the law of the land. This statute, taken, it is said, from Solon's legislation, protected plebeian associations from the arbitrary interference of the magistrates. The enactments on public matters define and confirm the existing law. The right of appeal, given already by the *Lex Valeria*, is reasserted and guaranteed. With this is closely connected the prohibition of all laws directed against a private individual (*privilegia*), and the reservation of all capital cases for the decision of the assembly of the centuries. Taken together these laws protected all citizens, on the one hand from the arbitrary sentences of patrician magistrates, and on the other from the irregular proceedings of tribunes backed by plebeian assemblies, and secured them a trial before the whole body of their fellow-citizens. Lastly, capricious selection of precedents by the magistrate was prevented by the express enactment, that the latest decision of the people should in all cases be preferred to the earlier.

✓ **The Valerio-Horatian Laws.**—The constitutional reforms which the decemvirate failed to initiate were achieved by the second secession of the plebeians, and embodied in the Valerio-Horatian laws. Even these laws rather vindicate and re-establish the ancient liberties of the plebeians than introduce new principles. The first was in substance only a reassertion of the old right of appeal, but it further forbade expressly the creation of any magistrate whose decisions were not subject to such appeal,¹ and prescribed the penalty of death for the transgression of this provision. The second guaranteed the inviolability of the tribunes and their subordinates, the *ædiles* and ten judges, declaring that he who lifted his hand against them was accused. The old oath of the plebeians was replaced by a positive law, which prescribed the penalty of death and confiscation against offenders. The third contains the important and novel principle that the resolutions of the people, assembled in their tribes, have the binding force of law. The subject is beset with difficulties, but the most probable explanation is, that at this time patricians were admitted to the assembly of tribes, which thus developed into an assembly

¹ This was held to apply even to the dictatorship.

of the whole people (*comitia tributa*), over which patrician magistrates presided, while the tribunes still held the *concilia plebis*.

In this new assembly were henceforth elected the quaestors, who had charge of the treasury (*cf.* p. 48). To this assembly, in all probability, the right of legislation was given. At the same time, the position of the tribunes was raised. Henceforth they are entitled to attend the debates of the Senate, though not yet admitted within the doors of the house. Gradually they made good their claim to obstruct the action of the Senate's decrees by their "intercession." Thus the attempt of the patricians to get rid of the tribunate ended in the exaltation of that office, and the enlargement of its functions from the protection of individuals to a general power of interference in all affairs of state. The tribunate was too deeply rooted in the affections of the people to be lightly abolished, nor was the attempt repeated in the whole course of Roman history.

CHAPTER IX

PROGRESS OF THE PLEBEIANS

TRADITIONAL DATES

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Marriages between Patricians and Plebeians legalised, and Military Tribunate established	445	309
Appointment of Censors	443	311
Sp. Mælius killed by Ahala	439	315
Number of Quæstors raised to Four, and Quæstorship opened to Plebeians	421	333
First Plebeian Consular Tribune	400	354

Position of the Plebeians.—The force of the popular movement was not exhausted even by the attainment of the chief demands of the lower classes, the publication of written laws, and the restoration and enlargement of the powers of the tribunes. On the contrary, success inspired the leaders of the plebeians with new hopes, and nerved them to make fresh efforts. Yet there is a change in the character of the demands of the plebeians, and in the nature of the opposition they offer to the governing order. Hitherto the commons had fought to secure freedom—the personal liberties of the individual, and the power to organise themselves as a corporation unhindered by patrician interference; now they aimed

at equality, the right to take their place in the government of the state by the side of the old nobles. Obviously the earlier reforms were in the interest of the poor, whom they protected against oppression, while the removal of political disabilities interested the wealthier and more influential plebeians. But for the moment both classes were united in opposition to the patrician government. Together they had secured the passing of the twelve tables and the Valerio-Horatian laws, and together they assailed the two chief bulwarks of patrician exclusiveness.

Inter-marriage between the Orders.—In 445 B.C. the tribune C. Canuleius proposed to legalise marriages between patricians and plebeians. Whereas all children sprung from such unions had up to this time ranked as plebeians, because there could be no legitimate marriage between parents of different orders, after this the offspring of a patrician father and plebeian mother took the rank of the father. By this change the very corner-stone of the edifice of patrician exclusiveness was undermined. The sanctity of the religion of Rome had been the pretence for excluding the plebeians from the government of the state. The patricians had asserted that they alone could take the auspices, and fulfil the duties of the state towards the gods, whose worship must not be profaned by the intrusion of men outside the consecrated circle of the old families. But when men in whose veins was plebeian blood were admitted to the patrician order, the attempt to maintain a caste-system founded on purity of race was doomed. Thus the social revolution worked by the motion (*plebiscitum*) of C. Canuleius necessarily entailed political equalisation.

Military Tribune.—The first step in that direction was taken in the very year in which C. Canuleius passed his resolution. The plebeian demand to share the consulship could no longer be met by contemptuous refusal; it was evaded by a partial concession. Every year the Senate was to decide whether consuls should be elected, or military tribunes, as a rule six in number, with consular power. To this new office plebeians were eligible, though the consulship was still denied to them. We may wonder that patrician statesmen cared to maintain an irritating distinction, while they surrendered the substantial object in dispute. But an aristocracy is apt to be even more tenacious of the badges and honours which are the marks of power than of the power they signify. The consular tribune was never allowed the honour of a triumph, nor was his image placed in the family hall, like those of the curule magistrates. No doubt the sacred name of religion was invoked by the

patricians in defence of their exclusive right to the possession of the supreme magistracy, but the sincerity of the appeal may well be doubted. Throughout the patricians act rather in the spirit of petty hucksters driving a keen bargain for their wares, than of statesmen defending a great principle. There is no grace in their concessions, no strength in their refusals; their ideal of political wisdom is the craft which neutralises the popular measures it dare not resist.

In the forty years before the siege of Veii, the Senate more often than not secured the election of consuls, and even the consular tribunate was in practice, up to the year 400 B.C., confined to patricians, so that the formal equality conceded to the plebeians was a fraudulent pretence. If ever the patricians felt the control of the assembly of the centuries slipping from their grasp, the right of the presiding officer to refuse votes for a candidate, and of the patrician part of the Senate to withhold its sanction, were unscrupulously employed as party weapons in this ignoble struggle. In the last resort the colleges of priests could declare an election null and void for some real or pretended religious informality. Many opportunities for electioneering intrigues were afforded by dissensions among the plebeians themselves. The rank and file of yeomen-farmers still cared only for social and economic reforms, but the leaders aimed rather at the removal of political inequalities. A disunited party, unversed in political warfare, was naturally unable to cope with the organised obstruction of the patricians.

Censorship.—But the men who swayed the counsels of the patricians recognised from the first that obstruction could not for ever thwart the wishes of the people. So they set themselves to diminish the value of the prize for which the plebeians were striving, by severing from the consulship some of its most cherished privileges. Within a year or two (443 B.C.) of the time of the establishment of the consular tribunate, they devised a new office, the censorship, conferred, indeed, by the votes of the centuries, but confined to patricians. No doubt the financial importance and moral dignity of this office are of later growth, but even its original powers made it a worthy object of ambition. The right to fill up vacancies in the ranks of the Senate and the knights most probably was given to the censors a century later, but the solemn numbering and assessment (*census*) of the citizens at intervals of four or five years (*lustrum*), from the first invested the new magistracy with peculiar dignity. So fearful were the Romans that this high function might be perverted to personal ends, that from an early period (435 B.C.) the tenure of the censorship was limited to eighteen months, and



SUOVETAURILIA.

(Sacrifice after the Numbering of the People.)

it was later (390 B.C.) provided that if one censor died in office, the other should at once resign his powers. Even in this exceptional case the Romans clung firmly to their two cardinal principles, the short tenure and collegiate character of the magistracy.

A second attempt to diminish the powers of the consuls was turned to the confusion of its authors. In 421 B.C. the patricians proposed to relieve the consuls of the direct management of the military chest, and confer it on two new quæstors of patrician rank. In this way the practical control of all finance was to be kept in the hands of patrician censors and quæstors (*cf.* p. 72). But the commons insisted that plebeians should be eligible for the quæstorship, and, twelve years after (409 B.C.), the assembly of the tribes actually filled three out of the four quæstorships with plebeians. Encouraged by this success, the plebeians, ten years later (400 and 399 B.C.), at last carried their candidates in the assembly of the centuries, and elected a plebeian majority on the board of consular tribunes.

Spurius Mælius.—The patricians did not fail to employ the last resource of an incompetent government, intimidation. In the year 439 B.C. a terrible famine spread misery among the Roman poor, which all the edicts of L. Minucius, who was commissioned to meet the scarcity, could not relieve. Whereupon a rich plebeian knight, Sp. Mælius, bought corn in Etruria, and distributed it to the starving commons at nominal prices. The consulship, we are told, was the reward he asked in return for his magnificent generosity. Minucius, envious of the man whose success had made his own failure conspicuous, persuaded the Senate that he was conspiring to overthrow the Republic and make himself a king. The Senate proclaimed him a traitor, and a young patrician, C. Servilius Ahala, undertook to carry out its sentence. Under some pretence, he drew Mælius aside in the Forum and stabbed him with a dagger, which he had hidden under his arm for the purpose. He then justified his deed to the indignant commons, by declaring to them the treason of Mælius to the Republic. The house of the traitor, and with it the evidence of his guilt, or of his innocence, was destroyed, and the corn he had collected distributed by his enemy, Minucius. Yet it cannot be doubted that the real offence of Mælius was his popularity with the commons, which would have secured his election to the consular tribunate, not a treasonable conspiracy to win himself a kingdom. His assassination was not the act of a patriot, but of a partisan blinded by prejudice.

Another instance of the bitterness of faction may fitly conclude

this discreditable chapter in Roman history. After the conquest of Labici from the Æquians a settlement was made there, two acres of land being given to each settler; but when Bolæ, in the same district, was taken, the patricians stoutly resisted the tribunes' proposal to distribute its land in allotments. At their head was the stern and unbending consular tribune, M. Postumius Regillensis. He withheld the booty won at Bolæ from his troops, and threatened to punish any political manifestations with merciless severity. At this his soldiers rose in open revolt, and stoned to death the general to whom they were bound by the solemn oath of military obedience (*sacramentum*), an unparalleled crime as yet in Roman annals.

NOTE.—We have given the earlier version of the fate of Mælius, preserved for us by Dionysius. The introduction of Cincinnatus as dictator, and the elevation of Ahala into a master of the horse are later fictions, intended to soften our horror of the murder. But the story is evidently intended to glorify tyrannicide, and in its earlier form did so without compromise or evasion. Again, the etymological point of the tale (the derivation of the name Ahala, from *ala*, the arm-pit, in which the dagger was concealed) is lost if Servilius is not a secret assassin, but a lawful magistrate. Yet the absence of the names of ordinary magistrates from the original tradition warns us that it is a family history inserted in the annals at a later date. Indeed in early times even a romance would not dare to make a mere plebeian aspire to the throne. The importance of the legend lies, not in its truth to fact, but in its effect in after-ages. Again and again it is cited to prove that the murder of a traitor is not only the right but the duty of every loyal citizen. (Mommson, *R. H.*, ii. 199 *ff.*)

CHAPTER X


WARS FROM THE DECEMVIATE TO THE FALL OF VEII

TRADITIONAL DATES

	B. C.	A. U. C.
Capture of Fidenæ	428	326
War with Veii	406	348
Conquest of Veii by M. Furius Camillus	396	358

Wars with the Æqui and Volsci.—During the sixty years between the fall of the monarchy and the decemvirate Rome had been closely beset on all sides; in the sixty years after the decemvirate the tide of war turns slowly, but surely, in her favour.

The great reforms carried between 450 and 445 B.C. inspire her citizens with new life and ardour, and at the same time the energies of her enemies are distracted and divided. The Æquians feel the pressure of the Sabellian clans, now established round the Fucine lake; the Volscians are attacked in rear by a new power, the Samnites. Consequently the Æquians, who had wasted the country even up to the gates of Rome in 446 B.C., are driven from Labici in 418 B.C., and Bolaë in 414 B.C., the first of which at least is secured and garrisoned. Both towns helped to protect the line of communications between Rome and the Hernican country in the



ETRUSCAN HELMET DEDICATED BY HIERO I. AFTER HIS
VICTORY IN 474 B.C.

valley of the Trerus; nor could the Æquians, after their loss, maintain their hold on their ancient outpost, Mount Algidus. About the same time, the Volscians were obliged to resign their conquests in Latium; such as Satricum and Velitræ; while, if we may believe Livy, the Roman armies pushed on as far south as Circeii and Anxur (Tarracina).

Misfortunes of the Etruscans.—On her northern frontier also Rome profited by the misfortunes of her adversaries. The power of the Etruscans had long since passed its zenith; it now began to decline more rapidly. As early as 474 B.C. Hiero I. of Syracuse

had annihilated their navy, and made his own city mistress of the Tyrrhene Sea. This supremacy the Syracusans maintained, even after the fall of the great tyrants, by expeditions to Corsica and the coast of Tuscany (453 B.C.). These reverses may help to account for the inaction of the Etruscans for forty years; a fresh series of disasters opened the way for Roman conquest. The cities of the Rasenna in Campania, whose communications with the mother country, whether by land or sea, were now cut off, surrendered one after another to the assaults of roving bands of Samnites. The fall of Capua, their chief town (424 B.C.), marks the destruction of Etruscan rule in that district. To complete the tale of their disasters, Dionysius of Syracuse planted colonies in their dominions round the head of the Adriatic, and ruined the trade of Etruria by the storming of Pyrgi, the rich seaport of Cære (387-5 B.C.). But the heaviest blows which fell on the doomed people were dealt by the Gauls, who were pouring over the Alps into the plain of the Po. The most northern of the three leagues of the Rasenna was utterly swept away by the new immigrants; its great cities became, like Melpum, dim traditions, or, like Felsina (Bononia), were renamed by the Gallic victors, after whom the whole district is henceforth called.

Conquest of Fidenæ.—Greeks, Samnites, and Gauls each in turn did their part in smoothing the path of Rome. But it was the day of small things. Her petty successes in border warfare gave little promise of future greatness. The small town of Fidenæ ventured to revolt for the last time, and transferred its allegiance to Lars Tolumnius, king of Veii. It sealed its fidelity to its new master by murdering the Roman settlers and the envoys sent to demand satisfaction. But Lars Tolumnius was routed in battle, and fell himself in single combat with A. Cornelius Cossus, the leader of the Roman cavalry, who dedicated the arms of the Veientine king to Jupiter (*spolia opima*). Fidenæ submitted, and, content with this success, the Romans concluded an armistice with Veii for 200 months.

NOTE.—The spoils dedicated by Cossus to Jupiter Feretrius enable us to correct the narrative of the annalists by archaeological evidence. Augustus, when he restored the temple, found that Cossus was called consul in an inscription on the arms. Now Cossus was consul in 428 B.C. But the chroniclers used by Livy knew of no war in that year, assigning the revolt of Fidenæ and the death of Lars Tolumnius to 437 B.C., when Cossus was not a magistrate at all, and a second similar revolt to 426 B.C., when he was consular tribune. Clearly the two wars are mere variations

of one story. Neither is rightly dated, for the evidence of the inscription in favour of the year 428 B.C. is confirmed by the common opinion that only a general could win the *spolia opima*. Varro's assertion that a common soldier could do so, if he slew the leader of the enemy, is an attempt to reconcile the accepted tradition about Cossus with the chronology of the annalists.

War with Veii.—At length Rome undertook the work of conquering Southern Etruria. She was matched with no unworthy foe, for Veii equalled her in size and excelled her in the grandeur and solidity of her buildings. But whereas Rome could rely on the firm support of her true allies, the Latins and Hernicans, Veii could count only on her neighbours, Capena, Falerii, and Tarquinii. The northern Etruscans were fully occupied at home in vain efforts to repel the raids of the Gauls, and their oligarchic governments viewed with dislike the monarchy of Veii.

The end of such a conflict could hardly be doubtful, but the siege of the Roman Troy was protracted for ten long years. For the first time the Roman army was obliged to keep the field in winter as well as summer. And now that the citizen was prevented from returning to his farm after a short summer campaign, the introduction of military pay became a necessity. But despite these measures, the fortune of war was for nine years unfavourable to Rome. The fortified camps before Veii were stormed by the men of Capena and Falerii, and only recovered by a great effort. In the tenth year of the siege the plebeian consular tribunes, Genucius and Titinius, were routed in the field by the same enemies. Panic reigned in the lines before Veii, and even at Rome itself, where the Senate resolved to meet the danger by appointing a dictator. The crisis called forth the needed hero, M. Furius Camillus, with whose advent the dry annals of the chroniclers are transformed into a romantic legend of daring achievements crowned with supernatural success.

Legend of Camillus.—In the summer of the eighth year of the siege of Veii the waters of the Alban lake rose mysteriously, until at length they reached the top of the hills around the lake, and poured down into the plain below and thence into the sea. And the Romans, since they might not trust Etruscan soothsayers while they were at war with their nation, sent messengers to Delphi to ask counsel of Apollo. But the meaning of the portent was revealed to them before their messengers returned. For an old Veientine cried out to some Roman soldiers, that Veii should not

fall, until the waters of the Alban lake should flow into the sea no more. And one of the soldiers persuaded the old man to go apart with him to a lonely spot, pretending that he wished to consult him about a matter of his own. And, while they talked together, the Roman seized the old man round the body and bore him off to the camp. So the soothsayer of Veii was sent by the generals to the Senate, and prophesied to them that if the waters of the Alban lake should run into the sea woe should fall on Rome, but if they were drawn off the woe should be turned on Veii. But the Senate would not hearken to his words until they were confirmed by the answer of the oracle at Delphi. Then the Romans bored a tunnel through the side of the hills to make a passage for the water, and dug many channels in the plain below to receive it ; and the tunnel is there to this day. And when the whole flood was spent in watering the fields, so that none flowed into the sea any more, the Romans felt assured that they should take Veii, as the god foretold. Nor could they be turned from their purpose by the prayers of an embassy from Veii, nor by their prophecy that the destruction of Veii should be soon followed by the fall of Rome.

Capture of Veii.—So Camillus compassed the city round on every side, aided by the Latins and Hernicans. And he cut a tunnel underground from his camp even to the temple of Juno in the citadel of Veii. Then the whole people came forth from Rome to share in the spoil. And while the men of Veii were guarding their walls against the main army of the Romans, Camillus led a few men by the secret passage into the very heart of the city. And even as the high priest of Veii prophesied to the king that he, who should offer on the altar of Juno the victim standing by, should be victorious in the war, Camillus burst forth, and snatching the sacrifice from their hands, offered it himself. Then the Romans opened the gates of the city to their comrades, and together they sacked the town. And as Camillus looked down on the havoc from the citadel, his heart swelled with pride at the greatness of his victory. But soon he bethought him of the fickleness of fortune, and prayed that, if some ill must befall him, to balance this great glory, it might be but small. And, as he prayed with veiled head and turned himself to the right, he tripped and fell to the ground. Then was he comforted in his heart, because he supposed the jealousy of the gods had been appeased by this small mishap. And he ordered a chosen band of youths, washed in pure water and clothed in white, to go into the temple of Juno, and ask the goddess whether she would be pleased

to come with them to Rome. And the image answered and said, "I will go." Thus Juno forsook Veii, and dwelt ever after in the temple built for her on the Aventine in Rome. Never had Rome seen so splendid a triumph as when Camillus rode up the sacred street to the Capitol in a chariot drawn by white horses. And men feared that his pride might be brought low by the hand of Heaven.

Nevertheless Rome still prevailed over her enemies, and forced the men of Capena to beg for peace, and them of Falerii to shut themselves up in their city. But a certain schoolmaster, who had the charge of the sons of the chief men of the town, led the boys to the Roman camp. Scorning his treachery, Camillus ordered the boys to flog their master back into the town; for Romans, he said, fight not with children. And the Faliscans were touched by his noble deed, and submitted themselves to the power of Rome. Lastly, the great city of Volsinii, which took up arms after the fall of Veii, consented soon after to an inglorious peace. Thus Rome became mistress of Etruria as far north as the Ciminian Hills, whose gates were guarded by her allies, Sutrium and Nepete.

Fall of Camillus.—The story goes on to tell of domestic discords at Rome. Even during the death-struggle with Veii, the plebeians, headed by their tribunes, had complained bitterly of the burden of the land-tax (*tributum*), which furnished the soldiers with pay, and of the patrician monopoly of the consular tribunate. After its fall they proposed that the empty town of Veii should be repopled by the migration thither of half the citizens of Rome. This division of the one commonwealth into two cities, which must have distracted and diminished its energy, was strenuously resisted by the patricians. First they persuaded two tribunes to forbid its consideration; later, they pleaded in person against so fatal a measure to such purpose that it was rejected by the tribes, though only by a bare majority. Content with this victory, the Senate agreed to the division of the Veientine land among the commons, in allotments of the unusual size of seven jugera.

But the popularity of the great patrician leader had passed away. In the hour of victory he had vowed a tenth of the spoil of Veii to Apollo, but the soldiers had not set apart any portion of their plunder for the god. Camillus now called on them to pay the promised tithe, and thus lost the favour of the people and prepared the way for his own fall. When he was accused by the tribune Appuleius of embezzlement, because he had taken for himself some doors of bronze, which were a part of the booty won at Veii, even his own tribesmen and clients said they could not acquit him,



ETRUSCAN TERRA-COTTA SARCOPHAGUS FROM CLUSIUM.

though they would pay his fine. Then Camillus withdrew in wrath to Ardea, praying that, if he were unjustly condemned, Heaven might cause his ungrateful country to rue his loss. The ministers of vengeance were at hand : the Gauls, who had taken Melpum on the day of the fall of Veii, were next year to burn Rome.

NOTE.—The legend of Camillus is obviously mythical in its details. We can trace both Greek and pure Roman elements in the story. The ten years' siege, with the stratagem by which the town was captured, seem reminiscences of Troy, while the mission and offering to Apollo of Delphi may well be Greek inventions. Purely Italian, on the other hand, are the stories of the Etruscan soothsayer, of the offering in the temple of Juno, and of the removal of her image from Veii to Rome. The outlet of the Alban lake, a tunnel 2000 yards in length, 7 feet in height and 5 in breadth, cut through the solid rock, may still be seen, but it would seem to belong to the days when Etruscan kings ruled in Rome and Latium. It is hardly possible that the Romans should have undertaken so great a work, in the middle of a war, though they might have repaired and reopened the tunnel if it had become blocked.

CHAPTER XI

THE GAULS

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Rome taken and burnt by the Gauls	390	364
War with the Etruscans	356-1	398-403
Last Incursion of the Gauls into Latium	349	405

Migrations of the Gauls.—A new nation now makes its appearance in Roman history, destined in the end to adopt the language and culture of the Italians, but at first sharply contrasted with them in customs and character. The Gauls or Celts had long since reached the lands in which they still dwell on the shores of the Atlantic ; but their wandering tribes had not as yet been formed into stable communities, nor had they settled down to till the land they had won. They still preferred a nomad pastoral life, and recognised only the military authority of the chieftain. Restless vanity and impetuous bravery fitted them for the life of roving soldiers of fortune ; want of discipline and order prevented them from reaping the fruits of the victories won by their chivalrous courage. They remind us of the knights-errant of the Middle Ages in their fondness for single combats and deep carousals, of Italian condottieri in their insatiable greed for gold.* Thus they

fought, conquered, and destroyed in every land in Europe, but never created a national civilisation, or founded an enduring state.

Tradition affirms, with much probability, that the swarm of barbarians who poured over the Alps into Italy came from the western home of the Celts in Gaul. We are told that, in the days of King Ambiatius, those Gallic tribes, which, then as later, acknowledged the leadership of the Bituriges, sent forth two great conquering hordes, headed by Sigovesus and Bellovesus, nephews of the king. The former sought a home in the wilds of the Hercynian forest; the latter, more favoured by Heaven, took from the Etruscans their ancient heritage in the valley of the Po, and made Mediolanum (Milan) the capital of the canton of the Insubres. The Cenomani passed beyond the Adda, and settled round Brixia and Cremona. The Boii and Lingones followed the beaten Etruscans over the Po. Last of all came the Senones, who spread themselves along the coast of the Adriatic from Ariminum to Ancona.

But the Senones soon marched forward in quest of plunder and adventures. Crossing the wall of the Apennines, they attacked the great town of Clusium; whereupon the Etruscans, if we may believe a late tradition, sent to ask the aid of the conquerors of Veii. Accordingly the Senate despatched envoys to warn the Gauls not to molest friends and allies of Rome. The Celts scorned the threats of the strangers, and joined battle with the men of Clusium. In this skirmish the Roman ambassadors took part, one of them slaying a Gallic chieftain in single combat. The barbarians demanded the surrender of the men who had thus outraged the law of nations, but the Roman people rejected this reasonable request. Then the Gallic leader broke up the siege of Clusium and marched direct on Rome.

Battle of the Allia.¹—The Gauls had advanced within twelve miles of the gates of the city before a Roman army was ready to bar their path. By the rivulet of the Allia was fought a battle, in which panic fear succeeded to foolish arrogance in the Roman ranks. The fierce rush of the Celts was strange and terrible to the Italians. We hear nothing as yet of the knightly cavalry Cæsar found in Gaul, or of the war-chariots used by the Britons. But the barbarians were big men, armed with long, though ill-tempered, swords, and covered with huge shields, who by mere weight and strength broke through the Italian phalanx. Savage

¹ Mommsen places the battle on the Etruscan bank of the Tiber, opposite the inflow of the Allia. This is perhaps the meaning of Diodorus, and explains the retreat to Veii, but it makes the flight of the Vestals to Cære absurd, and directly contradicts Livy's narrative.

cries and shaggy locks, which no helmet guarded, added fancied terrors to the furious onset of the clans, whose chieftain, Brennus, shattered the Roman right at the first shock, and so rolled up their whole line of battle in a hideous rout. The bulk of the fugitives plunged into the Tiber, hoping to escape the swords and javelins of the Gauls, and make good their retreat to Veii. A scanty remnant fled by the direct road to Rome, and brought thither tidings of a calamity never forgotten by the Roman people. Even after centuries of victory, the Roman legionary needs a Caesar or a Marius to inspire and discipline him to meet the fierce barbarian, who had routed his forefathers at the Allia.

Sack of Rome.—At Rome all was confusion and dismay. Long trains of fugitives passed over the Tiber and the hill of Janiculum, leaving the doomed city to its fate. With them fled the flamen of Quirinus and the Vestal virgins, who buried some of their sacred things, and carried off with them the eternal fire to the friendly town of Cære. The flower of the patricians resolved to defend to the last the hill of the Capitol, the acropolis of Rome, the true home of its citizens and its gods. Thus when the Gauls at length appeared, on the third day after the battle, they found the walls unguarded and the gates open. Fearing an ambush, they hesitated for a whole day to enter the city, and so gave the Romans time to garrison and provision the Capitol. But not all the citizens of Rome had fled or taken refuge in the citadel. The men who had, in years long past, swayed the counsels and led the armies of the state, and were now too old to fight in its defence, proudly refused to escape death by exile. They met together and devoted themselves to the gods below, for the deliverance of their country. Then they arrayed themselves in robes of state, and sat down, each on his ivory chair, in the gateway of his house. When the Gauls found them, sitting unmoved amidst the destruction of the city, they looked on them as more than mortal. At length one of them ventured to draw near and stroke the beard of M. Papirius, but the old man resented the profane touch of the barbarian, and smote him on the head with his ivory staff. The Gaul, in fury, cut down Papirius with his sword, and thus aroused in his comrades the savage thirst for blood. The old Romans were sacrificed to the powers of death by the swords of the enemy. After sacking the city and giving its buildings to the flames, the Gauls made an open assault on the Capitol, but were repulsed with loss. They then contented themselves with a blockade, while roving bands plundered the country round.

Defence of the Capitol.—Meanwhile, the fugitives at Veii took heart to resist some marauding Etruscans, and sent to Ardea to ask Camillus, who had already cut to pieces a party of plunderers, to lead them against the Gauls. But the exiled general must first receive authority from the remnant of the Roman people gathered on the Capitol. A young man named Pontius Cominius undertook the dangerous errand. He swam the Tiber, and climbed up the cliff by a precipitous, and therefore unguarded, path. Returning, as he came, unhurt, he bore the news to Veii that the Senate recalled Camillus, and appointed him dictator. But next morning the Gauls observed the tracks of his ascent, and resolved at once to follow the same path. Silently they climbed up the cliff in the darkness. The sentinels were asleep, and even the watch-dogs heard them not. But in the Capitoline temple the sacred geese of Juno, which Roman piety, even in the day of need, had spared, cackled with fear. Roused by the sound, M. Manlius seized sword and shield, and rushed to the top of the cliff, just in time to dash the foremost Gaul down the rock. The Gaul, as he fell, bore down those behind him ; the other Romans, coming up, slaughtered them easily. Thus the cackling of the geese and the courage of Manlius saved the Capitol.

Nevertheless, despite the unhealthiness of a Roman autumn, the Gauls maintained the blockade of the Capitol, and reduced the garrison to the last extremity of hunger. At length they agreed to ransom themselves by the payment of a thousand pounds of gold, a sum collected with difficulty from the treasures of the Capitol. The gold was weighed in the Forum, but Brennus used unfair weights, and answered the complaints of Quintus Sulpicius by throwing his broadsword into the scale, with the insulting words, "*Væ victis.*" Suddenly Camillus appeared with his troops and declared any agreement made without his sanction null and void. He then drove the Gauls out of the city, and defeated them so utterly that not a man survived to carry home the news of the disaster.

Criticism of the Legend.—Such is the legend, by which patriots, like Livy, concealed the humiliation of Rome. But of its falsehood there can be no doubt. We can almost trace the steps by which the legend was fabricated. In Polybius we hear that the Gauls retired unmolested with their booty, having come to terms with the Romans because they heard that their own land was being harried by the Veneti. Suetonius allèges that the ransom of a thousand pounds was indeed paid, but brought back from Cisal-

pine Gaul by the praetor M. Livius Drusus a century later, as if barbarians were likely to hoard treasure. Finally, Diodorus declares that Camillus was made dictator after the Gauls had left Rome, but defeated them on their return from a raid into Apulia in the following year, and then recovered the ransom. From this to the patriotic fiction of Livy is but a single step. But the manifest exaggerations and contradictions of the legend must not lead us to doubt its substance. It is certain at least that a wandering horde of Gauls suddenly invaded the territory of Rome, routed the army, and sacked and burnt the town. It is almost certain that the barbarians besieged the Capitol in vain, and by selling their victory, lost it. Doubtless straggling bands of plunderers were cut to pieces, as they retreated, by the Romans and Latins, which small successes orators and chroniclers magnified into the heroic exploits of Camillus.

Re-establishment of Roman Power.—But the overthrow of Rome by the Gauls had no permanent effect on her fortunes. The invaders departed as suddenly as they had come, and Rome took up again the interrupted work of establishing her supremacy on both sides the Tiber. Once more we hear of a proposition to desert the now ruined city, and seek a new home in Veii. It is defeated, less by the impassioned eloquence of Camillus than by the chance saying of a centurion: "Standard-bearer, plant the standard here; here we had best remain," which was accepted as an omen first by the Senate and afterwards by the people. The city rose from its ruins, but the narrow and crooked streets of later Rome bear witness to the haste and irregularity of the work of rebuilding. Yet, though the Romans refused to migrate to Veii, they took care to secure their hold on the conquered territory. Sutrium and Nepete are said to have been recovered from the Etruscans once at least by the hero Camillus; they are finally garrisoned by "Latin" colonists. Four new tribes are formed in the territories of Veii, Capena, and Falerii, and in this way Etruria south of the Ciminian forest was united to Rome by common interests and sympathies. The settlement of Latium, more fully described elsewhere, occupied the Romans during the next thirty years; when that task was accomplished they turned again to Etruria (356 B.C.). The great city of Tarquinii, aided by volunteers from Caere and Falerii, tried to stem the tide of Roman success. Inspired by religious fury, the Etruscans defeated the legions in a great battle, and sacrificed three hundred and seven prisoners on the altars of their gods. A bloody revenge followed the victory of

Rome ; three hundred and fifty-eight of the nobles of Tarquinii were scourged and beheaded (351 B.C.). In the end Tarquinii concluded



FALISCAN VASE IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM.

a truce for forty years, while Cære and Falerii became dependents of Rome. Falerii was compelled to enter into perpetual alliance with the suzerain state ; Cære surrendered her political indepen-

dence, and even local self-government. The inhabitants received the private, but not the public, rights of Romans (*civitas sine suffragio*); they shared the burdens but not the honours of citizenship. A Roman prefect controlled the administration.

Raids of the Gauls.—Marauding bands of Gauls continued to disturb the peace, though they did not again threaten the existence of Rome. In the simple and credible account of Polybius two such raids are recorded; on the first occasion (360 B.C.) the Romans were taken by surprise, and did not venture to meet the enemy in the field; on the second (349 B.C.) they showed a firm front, entirely discomfiting the Gauls, who retreated rapidly and in disorder. From the highly coloured narrative of Livy, who tells of six invasions and six Roman triumphs, two stories of single combat may be given, interesting as among the last pure legends in Roman history. In 360 B.C. the Romans were encamped over against the Gauls on the Anio, not five miles from Rome. A gigantic Gaul, in splendid armour, challenged any man in the Roman ranks to single combat, and was encountered by young T. Manlius. The Roman champion closed at once; avoiding the wild sweep of the Gallic broadsword, he thrust his own blade deep into his enemy's body, and so ended the combat. He then took the golden collar (*torques*) from the Gallic chieftain's neck and put it on his own, thus earning for himself and his family the name of Torquatus. In 349 B.C. the Romans were commanded by the son of their old hero, Camillus. Again a young Roman is permitted by the general to accept the challenge of a Gallic warrior. But on this occasion the duel is decided by the direct intervention of Heaven. As the champions closed in conflict, a raven alighted on the Roman's helmet, and during the fight tore the face and eyes of the Gaul with beak and claw. Thus M. Valerius gained an easy victory over the bewildered barbarian, and ever after was known by the name of "Corvus."

These legends fitly close the story of the Gallic invasion. Though they may be nothing more than attempts to account for the family names of great houses, yet the pictures they give us of the Gauls are true and interesting. The barbarians fail because they are inferior in arms and discipline to the Italians. Never again were Gauls to bring the Roman state to the brink of destruction; rather they had served to smooth the path for its triumphal progress, by breaking the strength of the Etruscan nation. Rome was free from all anxieties on her northern frontier when she had to face a new and stubborn foe in the mountains of the south.

CHAPTER XII

THE LICINIAN LAWS AND THE EQUALISATION OF THE ORDERS

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Execution of Manlius	384	370
The Bills of Licinius and Sextius	377-367	377-387
Popular Laws of Publius Philo	339	415
Censorship of Appius Claudius	312	442
Lex Ogulnia	300	454
Lex Hortensia	287	467

M. Manlius.—The exhausting struggle with Veii and the sack of Rome by the Gauls for a time distracted the attention of the plebeians from constitutional reform. But the distress caused by these wars among the poorer farmers was widespread and severe. The introduction of pay for service in the legions was but a small compensation for the neglect and devastation of their lands. The impoverished yeomen found a champion in M. Manlius, the saviour of the Capitol. But the government raised again the old cry of treason, and procured his condemnation and execution.

NOTE.—Mommсен discredits the received story of Manlius, and believes that the oldest chronicles contained only the record of his treason and his condemnation. The tale of the saving of the Capitol was invented to explain his name (Capitolinus), which, however, can be proved to have existed before that time in the Manlian gens, and was doubtless derived from the fact that their house stood on the Capitol. The attempt to cancel debts is a fiction of the days when Cinna made their abolition part of the democratic programme. (*Cf.* p. 58 for his treatment of the story of Sp. Cassius.)

Proposals of Licinius and Sextius.—The failure of Manlius proved the powerlessness of the poor in face of an united aristocracy, but, by enlisting on their side those richer plebeians who resented their exclusion from political power, they might yet hope to obtain relief from the burden of debt and gain a share in the public lands. A coalition was formed under the able leadership of the tribunes, C. Licinius Stolo and L. Sextius. Their proposals dealt with the grievances of both sections of the plebeians. Debtors were relieved by the deduction of the interest they had already paid from the principal, and allowed three years for the payment of the residue. The monopoly of the conquered ter-

ritories by the rich was met by providing that no citizen should hold more than 500 jugera of the public land, nor keep more than 100 head of cattle and 500 sheep on the common pasture.

A clause ordering that a certain proportion of the labourers employed on an estate should be freemen belongs, in all probability, to a later age, when slave-labour was cheaper and more plentiful, but is usually ascribed, on Appian's authority, to Licinius.

To these social reforms the plebeian leaders tacked a political proposal of the greatest importance, viz., that consuls, and not consular tribunes, be henceforth elected, and that one at least of the consuls be a plebeian.

A subsequent Bill provided that the number of the priestly custodians of the Sibylline books be increased from two to ten, and that half the college be plebeian.

Opposition of the Patricians.—The measures of Licinius met with the most pertinacious opposition from the patricians. For ten years they obstructed their ratification by procuring the intervention of friendly tribunes, and by the nomination of dictators to overawe the agitation. But the two sections of the plebeians held firmly together. The poor farmers cared little for the political privileges offered to them; the rich plebeians were not in earnest about social reforms, for their author, Licinius, was himself condemned for transgressing the agrarian provisions of his law; but both perceived that union was an absolute necessity. At length their pertinacity triumphed over the obstruction of the patricians, and secured the passage of the measure and the election of the late tribune, L. Sextius Lateranus, as consul. The patricians managed to mar the grace of this great concession by clipping and paring away some of the powers of the consulate. The administration of justice was reserved for a patrician official, known as a prætor, who was considered a colleague of the consuls, though inferior to them. At the same time the charge of the market, the organisation of festivals, and various police duties were assigned to two curule ædiles of patrician birth.

Admission of the Plebeians to Magistracies.—All the heart was taken out of the patrician opposition by the surrender of the consulship. The wiser aristocrats saw that the cause of political privilege was lost, and loyally accepted the new order of things. Camillus, their great champion, appears for the last time on the stage of history, to found a temple of Concord, as a pledge and sign that the divisions of the orders were now at an end. The more stiff-necked aristocrats found themselves gradually deprived



THE LIBRAL AS (ÆS GRAVE).

of their remaining privileges. The curule ædileship was immediately thrown open by an agreement that this office should be held by plebeians and patricians in alternate years. The dictatorship was first held by a plebeian, C. Marcius Rutilus, in 356 B.C., and the censorship in 351 B.C. Though the patricians succeeded, in open defiance of the Licinian laws, in monopolising the consulate on several occasions, this abuse was finally put down in 342 B.C. by a resolution of the people which declared that both consulships might be held by plebeians. At the same time, (or perhaps in 330 B.C.), the tenure of two ordinary curule offices at once, or of the same office twice within ten years, was forbidden. These restrictions, by increasing the number of individuals who had held magistracies, tended to strengthen the plebeian nobility. Finally, in 339 B.C., a plebeian dictator, Publius Philo, carried a law which ordained that one censor must be plebeian, and in 337 B.C. the same statesman was elected prætor, and thus broke down the last barrier which excluded the plebeians from offices of state.

The Popular Assemblies.—Publius Philo also secured freedom of action for the popular assemblies. Hitherto the resolutions of the people in the comitia of the centuries had required the subsequent sanction of the patrician senators (*patres*). But Publius Philo made their assent a mere formality, by a law which enacted that it should be given beforehand. By a later, Mænian, law this rule was extended to elections held in that assembly. He also won ampler legislative powers for the comitia tributa, in which assembly all measures brought forward by a prætor are henceforth put to the vote. The emancipation of the comitia centuriata from the supervision of the *patres*, and the fuller recognition of the competence of the assembly of the tribes, are a fitting crown to the career of this great plebeian statesman.

Appius Claudius.—The next step forward was accomplished by an imperious but enlightened aristocrat. Appius Claudius Cæcus, censor in 312 B.C., showed, like his ancestor, the Decemvir, a haughty disdain for the narrow traditions of the Roman nobility. In conjunction with his colleague, C. Plautius, he conferred the full franchise on freedmen, and on all residents possessed of the private rights of citizenship (*civitas sine suffragio*). He thus enfranchised large numbers of tradesmen and artisans, and made the town population supreme in the assembly. At the same time he admitted men of the same class into the Senate. Eight years later (304 B.C.) his influence procured the election of Cn. Flavius, the son of a freedman, and a clerk in the public service, to the curule ædile-

ship. Together the proud noble and the clerk published a legal calendar and a list of the formulas of the law, which opened to all the sealed book of legal knowledge. But the reformer was before his time. By a judicious compromise the succeeding censor, Q. Fabius Rullianus, confined the newly enfranchised classes to the four city tribes, and left the twenty-seven country tribes to the landed proprietors and yeomen. Nor were the sons of freedmen again admitted to offices of state and seats in the Senate.

The Appian Road and Aqueduct.—The censorship of Appius was memorable in another way. During his term of office he carried out two great public works which were models for all time. He built a great aqueduct to carry pure water from the Sabine mountains to the most crowded part of Rome—a work of peculiar necessity owing to the insanitary state of the town and the deficiency of water,—and he constructed the first of those magnificent straight level roads which still mark the lands where Rome has ruled. The Appian Road crossed the Campagna to the Alban hills, and then, passing through the Pomptine marshes to Tarracina, threaded its way by Lautulæ, where the Volscian hills come down to the shore. Thence it led on, across the Liris and Volturnus, to Capua, 120 miles from Rome. It was continued later to Tarentum and Brundisium. To give himself time to complete these great undertakings, Appius retained his office for the full term of five years, instead of laying it down, as custom prescribed, after eighteen months. But there is no ground for supposing that he meditated a revolution or aimed at tyranny. Such fables are the inventions of chroniclers, unable or unwilling to comprehend the genius of a statesman, whose schemes resemble those of Greek reformers in their daring disregard of custom and convention.

Final Equality of the Orders.—In 300 B.C. the last strongholds of patrician exclusiveness, the sacred colleges of augurs and pontiffs, were thrown open to plebeians, and the equality of plebeians to patricians before the gods as well as before men proclaimed.¹ The reservation of the offices of the flamens, the rex sacrificulus (*cf.* p. 47), and the inter-*rex* (*cf.* p. 42) for patricians is a mere survival of no historical importance. The last step in the long process of emancipating the popular assemblies from patrician control was taken in 287 B.C. An agrarian proposal of Manius Curius had occasioned serious dissensions, and even a formal

¹ The significance of this reform will be pointed out later.

secession to Janiculum. But the breach was healed, and the liberties of the people assured, by a Hortensian law, which declared the resolutions of the meeting of the plebeians (*concilium plebis*) of binding force without ratification by any other authority.

The struggle between the orders had ended in political equality—Rome had cast off the yoke of the patrician aristocracy, and became in form a pure democracy. At the same time, the conquest of Italy furnished land for distribution among the poor, and attracted wealth to the growing town. The harshness of the old law was modified by the measure of C. Poetelius (326 or 313 B.C.), which abolished imprisonment for debt, except after a trial by jury, and allowed a debtor to preserve his liberty by ceding his property, if it was worth as much as the debt. The policy of the Licinian laws, which linked together political and social reform, was amply vindicated by the increasing vigour and the awakened patriotism of the united commonwealth. The reconciliation of jarring factions made the armies of Rome triumphant throughout Italy.

The Rise of the New Nobility.—Nevertheless, this specious show of republican equality was destined to prove an illusion. Hardly had the old aristocracy of birth lost its privileges, when a new nobility rose in its place. The plebeian was no longer debarred from office, but poverty was still a most serious hindrance in a political career. Though for a time poor men, like Fabricius and Manius Curius, force their way to the front as popular leaders, yet the wealthy classes gradually monopolise office, and establish their ascendancy in the Senate. The sovereignty of the people, absolute in theory,¹ in practice recedes into the background. In the meantime the magistracy is weakened by the subdivision of the old powers among many holders. The consuls had lost the right to revise the rolls of citizens and senators, the management of finance, and the administration of justice. No other magistrate could take their place at the head of the government; all alike tend to become officials dependent on the will of the Senate.

Ascendancy of the Senate.—That great council directed the destinies of Rome. By the Ovinian plebiscite, carried during this period, the censors were ordered to inscribe as members all who had held curule offices of state. No doubt men who had not

¹ If, indeed, a constitution like the Roman can be said to possess a theory at all, and if the theory of sovereignty can be applied to an ancient state. Theories are apt to be the work of legists and scholars, who tend to over-systematise the whole, or to exaggerate transitional phases.

held office were still admitted to fill up the ranks of the Senate, but its core was composed of statesmen elected magistrates by the free choice of the people, but retaining their seats in the Senate for life. This permanent council of state soon reduced the annual magistrates to subordination, and used them as its ministers. It regulated their provinces, and arbitrated in their quarrels. The tribunate, which, after the equalisation of the orders, seemed a useless anachronism, was transformed into a regular instrument of government. The tribunes were given the right of convoking the Senate and submitting decrees for its approval. Their powers were used to curb the self-will of consuls who refused compliance with the wishes of the Senate, or to manage the burgess assemblies in the interest of the government. But the tribunate was saved from extinction by its popular associations, and, dead as it was to all appearance, it was yet to play a conspicuous part in a new struggle of the masses against the classes who held the reins of power.

For a century and a half, however, the tide ran strong in an aristocratic direction. The magistrates and people bowed to the wisdom of the great council which made Rome the mistress of the Mediterranean, and secured for her citizens prosperity at home and honour abroad.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SUBJUGATION OF LATIUM AND CAMPANIA

	B. C.	A. U. C.
Renewed Union between Rome and Latium	358	396
Alliance with Samnites	354	400
Treaty with Carthage	348	406
First Samnite War	343-341	411-413
Mutiny in Campania	342	412
Great Latin War	340	414
Dissolution of Latin League	338	416

The Latin League.—The ancient league between Rome and Latium, ascribed to Spurius Cassius (p. 63), had been based on the assumption of complete equality between the two contracting powers—Rome and Latium were to contribute equal contingents

to the legions, and receive equal shares of the booty and territory won in war. Full equality was likewise secured for individual burgesses. The burgess of any community might at pleasure claim in any other city of the league the privilege of contracting a legal marriage (*ius conubii*), and the right to buy and sell, to hold and to bequeath land and other property (*ius commercii*). Further, all members of the Latin league had full liberty to migrate and settle in Rome, as passive burgesses, possessed of all the private rights of citizens, though debarred from office, and from the suffrage, except in the *comitia tributa*, where these settlers voted in a tribe fixed on each occasion by lot.

The internal constitutions of the Latin cities resembled as a rule that of Rome in its most remarkable feature, the collegiate tenure of the magistracy. In such instances the supreme magistrates were called by the name originally given at Rome to the consuls, prætors, while another Roman title, that of dictator, is given to the single annual magistrate found in other Latin cities. We may therefore suppose that the substitution of aristocracy for monarchy at Rome was accompanied by a similar remodelling of the constitutions of the allied cities, and that political sympathies as well as common interests strengthened the bonds of union between the leading state and the Latin league.

Disaffection in Latium.—But there is an inevitable tendency in such a confederacy for the chief city to convert her leadership into sovereignty. Without any formal alterations in the treaty of alliance, the Latins lost in practice their right to name the general and staff of the army in alternate years, and the power of making separate treaties. Again, from the nature of the case, the burdens and dangers of the Æquian and Volscian wars pressed most severely on the Latins, while the fruits of victory were reaped by Rome. Hence, when the flood of the Celtic invasion receded, the Latins hastened to cut themselves adrift from the wreck. The strong cities of Tibur and Præneste had made themselves mistresses of the smaller neighbouring towns, and were anxious to assert their independence. The discontent first came to a head at Præneste (382–380 B.C.); next it showed itself in secret assistance to the Volscians, who were struggling desperately to maintain their separate existence. At last there was a widespread revolt against the suzerain power. Præneste again flew to arms; Tibur leagued herself with a wandering tribe of Gauls; even the faithful Hernicans were for four years the open enemies of Rome (362 B.C.). But the disunited malcontents were powerless before

the masterly policy of the Senate. In a few years the Gauls were repulsed, the Hernicans reduced to submission, and the disaffected Latins compelled again to recognise the supremacy of Rome (358 B.C.), and so set her free to defend her northern frontiers against Tarquinii. At the same time the Volscians were punished by the loss of the Pomptine territory, now formed into two new tribes and incorporated with Rome. The decline of the Volscian power was doubtless in part due to assaults on their flank and rear by the Samnites, a people who were already pressing over the upper Liris on to the Ausonian plain, and with whom Rome soon after concluded a formal alliance. Tibur and Præneste were (354 B.C.) the last to acknowledge the re-establishment of the Roman suzerainty.

Closing of the Latin League.—The towns of the Latin league were now more obviously dependent on Rome. After this revolt, if not before,¹ the list of confederate cities and the limits of Latium were irrevocably fixed. Up to this time, every colony founded by Rome and Latium had been represented at the festival and diet, though of the forty-seven members of the league only thirty had been entitled to a vote. Later Latin colonies were excluded from the Alban festival and the list of the confederacy, while old members, such as Tusculum and Satricum, were retained on the list, though absorbed in the Roman state. The policy of separating the allied cities from each other and linking them only with the sovereign state was begun, by preventing all separate alliances within the league, and by completely isolating the new colonies, to whom no rights of intermarriage or of purchasing or inheriting land were granted except with Rome. We can hardly wonder that the smouldering embers of Latin discontent were destined within twenty years to burst again into flame. But for the moment the predominance of Rome was unquestioned, and was even recognised by the great naval power of Carthage, which, in 348 B.C., bound itself to spare the maritime cities of Latium, so long as they remained true to Rome, and, further, to restore to the suzerain power any revolted city that might fall into its hands.

The Samnites and Campanians.—Before Rome was brought into closer contact with the mistress of the western seas, she had to make good her claim to supremacy in Italy. Nor were her antagonists unworthy of her high destiny. In the pastures and

¹ Mommsen prefers an earlier date, *circa* 384 B.C.

valleys which skirt the snow-capped peak of Mount Matese dwelt a hardy race of herdsmen, whose confederate tribes bore the common name of Samnites. These bold warriors poured down from their mountains on to the coast-lands, which Greeks and Etruscans had enriched with cornfields and vineyards, and adorned with stately cities. One swarm of invaders had driven the Etruscans from Capua and the Greeks from Cumæ (424-420 B.C.); another, turning southward, overran Magna Græcia and made the name of the Lucanians terrible to the Achæan settlers. But these invading hordes broke off their connection with the parent stock in Samnium. Thus the Samnite dominion, extensive as it was, lacked the solid foundation on which Rome built her power. The loose confederacies of independent cantons, maintained by the Samnite race in its old mountain-home, and reproduced in its new possessions in Lucania and Campania, were ill fitted to meet the steady advance of a single centralised power. In many towns the conquerors were absorbed by the people with whom they mingled, and learnt from them the culture and civic institutions which were the heritage of the Greek. In Capua they adopted from the conquered Etruscans the employment of mercenaries, and the shows of gladiators, Rome's direst disgrace in later days. These degenerate offshoots of the Samnite stock trembled before the rude tribes which later followed the path they themselves had opened from the highlands. The townsmen of Campania looked round for a champion of civilisation to protect them from their own brethren, who still preserved the savage customs of their forefathers.

First Samnite War.—A vain attempt of the Capuans to protect the Sidicini of Teanum against the mountaineers only drew Samnite vengeance on themselves. A garrison posted on Mount Tifata, right above the town, laid waste the territories and defeated the forces of Capua. In their distress the Campanians implored and obtained the protection of Rome (343 B.C.). The Samnites refused to acknowledge the claims of Rome to rule in Campania, and war ensued. Of the details of this first Samnite war history says nothing. Neither truth nor beauty are to be found in the panegyrics pronounced on Valerius Corvus and Decius Mus. It would seem that the Romans and their allies were strong enough to drive the Samnites from the plains, though unable to penetrate into their mountain-fastnesses. Eventually Capua was retained by the Romans, and Teanum surrendered to the Samnites. Both combatants needed a respite before girding up their loins for the decisive struggle. The Samnites were troubled by the renewed

activity of Tarentum. Rome, which had but lately suppressed a serious military revolt aggravated by domestic discontent, had now to face a desperate conflict with the whole strength of Latium.

The Mutiny in Campania.—After the campaign of 343 B.C. the Roman legions, quartered in Capua for its defence, conspired together to seize the town for themselves. To frustrate this treachery, the consul, C. Marcius Rutilus, discharged the principal malcontents. But they gathered together at the pass of Lautulæ, near Tarracina, and being joined by the mass of the soldiery, marched on Rome. At the same time the commons in Rome rose in revolt against the oppressions of their creditors. M. Valerius Corvus, who had been appointed dictator, found it necessary to grant an amnesty to the insurgents, and to pass a solemn law and covenant embodying their demands. In future no military tribune could be degraded, and no soldier discharged from the ranks, at the caprice of the consul. Service in the legion at this time entitled the citizen to a share in the fruits of war, pay, plunder, and an allotment of land, while his rank in the legion determined the amount of his share. Hence the power of degrading or discharging a soldier enabled the consul to deprive obnoxious citizens of the due reward of their service to the state. The soldiery insisted on the abolition of this arbitrary power, but did not press their petition for the reduction of the pay of the horsemen. To allay the discontent in the city a measure was passed for the relief of debtors, though we can hardly believe that sober Romans ever sanctioned the proposal of the tribune Genucius for the total prohibition of interest.

Preparations for War.—These concessions, and the separate alliance concluded by Rome with the Samnites, were devised to meet the threatened defection of Latium and Campania. The Latins were determined not to sink into the position of helpless dependents, but rather to maintain their equality by force of arms. Even when Rome had deserted them they continued the Samnite war with vigour, and thus won the support of the Campanians. They now boldly demanded complete union with Rome on an equal footing. One consul and half the Senate were to be of Latin origin, and doubtless this equal division of power was to be carried out also in the popular assemblies. The Senate, led by Manlius Torquatus, indignantly rejected this proposal for an equal union, and appealed at once to the arbitrament of the sword. Rome had now to meet, not a foreign foe, but a people whose

institutions were similar to her own, and whose troops had long been trained to fight shoulder to shoulder with her legionaries, and had learnt under the same discipline to use the same arms. If we may believe tradition, the old solid phalanx had been already superseded by a more open order of battle. The legionaries were now drawn up in three divisions, of which the two first were armed with the pilum, a wooden javelin, pointed with iron, six and a half feet in length, while the third still bore the old thrusting-spear (*hasta*). At the same time the sword became the principal weapon of the soldiers, who followed up their volleys of javelins by an attack sword in hand. Thus the phalanx of spearmen was broken up into handfuls (*manipuli*) of swordsmen, who fought in open order, with marked intervals between the various divisions. Most probably this new method of fighting was perfected in mountain warfare against the Samnites; it is fully developed at least by the time of Pyrrhus. The weakness of the Latin league was not military but political. Though the old Latin cities, except Laurentum, declared for war, the colonies founded outside Latium remained, with but few exceptions, true to Rome. In Capua, and perhaps elsewhere in Campania, the aristocracy, though overpowered for the time by the popular party, refused to forsake her cause. The Hernicans proved their fidelity, and the Samnites their magnanimity, by rendering loyal aid to their Roman allies.

The Latin War.—The hostile regions of Latium and Campania separated Rome from her chief allies, the Samnites. With wise audacity, the consuls, Manlius Torquatus and Decius Mus, left Rome to be defended by the citizens, and marched round through the country of the Marsians and Pælgians to form a junction with the Samnite forces. The united army moved forward to offer battle in the plain of Capua, with their retreat into the Samnite mountains secured in case of disaster. Strict orders were issued by Manlius against all irregular skirmishing with the Latins, but his own son was provoked into a single combat with Geminus Mettius of Tusculum. The young man, forgetting the commands and remembering only the exploit of his father, slew the Latin champion. But when he returned triumphant to lay his spoils at his father's feet, the consul turned gloomily from him, and ordered his immediate execution before the assembled army. This stern sacrifice of private feeling to public duty, so characteristic of a Roman noble, ensured the obedience, though it alienated the affections, of the soldiery.

The Battle of Mount Vesuvius.—The battle that decided the

fate of Campania was fought near Mount Vesuvius.¹ The consuls were warned by a dream that the victory of the army must be purchased by the death of the general, and agreed that he whose legions first gave ground in the battle should devote himself to the gods of death. So, when the left wing, where Decius Mus commanded, fell into disorder, he called for the chief pontiff, and with veiled head repeated after him the solemn formula of self-devotion. And when he had so done and mounted his horse, he plunged into the ranks of the enemy, to seek death for himself and victory for his country. The day was saved by the heroism of Decius; it was won by the skill of Manlius. Instead of his reserve of veterans (*triarii*), he brought up the supernumeraries (*accensi*), whom he had armed for the purpose. Deceived by this manœuvre, the Latins threw their last reserves into the battle, and so had none left to meet the decisive charge of the Roman veterans. The part played by the Samnites and Hernicans in this victory is ignored or misrepresented by the chroniclers of Rome. Fleeing in confusion from Campania, the Latins made a last rally in defence of their liberties at Trifanum, but another defeat drove their troops from the field. Their fortified towns capitulated one after another, and the whole country submitted to the yoke of Rome.

Settlement of Latium and Campania.—The victory of Rome entailed the destruction of the Latin league as a political federation, though it survived as a religious association. Those Latin cities which were not absorbed into the Roman state were completely isolated from each other, and connected simply by their common dependence on Rome. Each subject community was bound to the suzerain by a separate treaty. It retained the right of local self-government, but lost all control over foreign policy, in which henceforth it followed the lead of Rome. Complete submission was ensured by a policy of isolation. The old rights of *conubium* (inter-marriage) and *commercium* (commerce and settlement (*cf.* p. 98)) were retained by the Latins only in Rome; all similar intercourse between one Latin town and another was prohibited.

Further, Rome took upon herself the duties of the old federal council. She determined the amount of the contingents which the subject cities were bound by treaty to provide and pay, and

¹ Mommsen has found reason to suspect the truth of Livy's narrative, summarised above, and follows Diodorus in omitting all but the final battle of Trifanum.

supervised the assessment of their property and the levy of their troops.

Even the strongest Latin towns, Tibur and Praeneste, had to cede their domain lands to Rome, and to follow her leadership in war. Other districts of Latium were granted less favourable terms. Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum, and Pedum were compelled to accept the Cærite franchise (pp. 89, 90). Velitræ was further punished by the destruction of its walls and the exile of the senatorial aristocracy, who had headed the opposition to Rome. The Volscian port of Antium¹ was made a Roman burgess colony; its inhabitants had to provide land for the new settlers, but were permitted to join the colony (338 B.C.). A few years later Anxur shared the same fate (329 B.C.). The memory of these measures was preserved by the erection of equestrian statues in the Forum to the consuls Mænius and Camillus, and the decoration of the orator's platform (*rostra*) with the beaks of the Antiatic triremes. Two new tribes were formed from the settlers on the confiscated lands of the Latins, and from some recently enfranchised communities. The organisation of the Volscian and Campanian districts followed. Fundi, Formiæ, Cumæ, and Capua where the fidelity of the aristocracy was richly rewarded, received the *civitas sine suffragio*, without forfeiting local autonomy. Privernum, which once more rebelled (329 B.C.), escaped with the loss of its walls; but the leader of the revolt, Vitruvius Vaccus of Fundi, paid for his boldness with his life. The strongholds of Cales (334 B.C.), which dominated the entrance to the Campanian plain, and Fregellæ (328 B.C.), which commanded the passage of the Liris, were occupied by Latin colonies. In vain the Samnites protested against the occupation of Fregellæ and Sora, as an infringement of their rights. Rome, at whose instance they had refrained from attacking Luca and Fabrateria, pursued her course without regard to their complaints. In fifteen years she had conquered Latium and Campania, and secured the newly won territories by a ring of fortresses, but this was the least part of her achievement. With far-sighted policy, the sovereign state, while she severed every link which united the subject cities, drew them each more closely to herself by the promotion of social and commercial intercourse. Already the same language and the same customs prevailed throughout Latium; Rome introduced a single system of law. Local autonomy satisfied her subjects for the present; the hope of full citizenship in the future fired their

¹ Antium, which had recovered its freedom in 459 B.C., had possibly become once more a Latin colony, 385-377 B.C. (*cf.* also p. 58).

ambition and ensured their fidelity. The union thus evoked out of discord, a union too strong to be shaken even by a Hannibal, was a proof of Rome's title to the dominion of Italy and a prophecy of her imperial mission.



ROMANO-CAMPANIAN COIN, 338-317 B.C.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SECOND SAMNITE WAR

	B. C.	A. U. C.
Outbreak of Second Samnite War	327	427
The Capitulation at the Caudine Forks	321	433
Rome drives the Samnites back into the Mountains	314	440
Etruscan War	311-308	443-446
Revolt of the Hernicans	306	448
End of the War	304	450

Alexander the Molossian.—The Samnites were not indifferent spectators of the establishment of Roman dominion in Latium and Campania, but they were fully occupied in Lower Italy. The wealthy merchants of Tarentum, the leading state in Greek Italy, had long trembled before the Samnites and Lucanians. They now called to their aid mercenary leaders from the mother country. The Spartan king Archidamus fell in battle against the Lucanians (338 B.C.), but his place was taken by an abler chieftain, Alexander the Molossian, uncle of the great Alexander. Under his banner were arrayed his countrymen of Epirus, the Greeks of Italy, and even exiled Lucanians. He captured Consentia, the chief town of the Lucanians, and after defeating the combined forces of the Samnites and Lucanians near Pæstum, made himself master of Lower Italy from sea to sea. Rome, which now feared the rivalry of the Samnites, ungratefully forgot their services in the Latin war, and made an ally of their enemy. But this sudden greatness, which

fired the Epirot prince with the hope of founding a Hellenic Empire in the west, a dream which not even his great successor, Pyrrhus, could realise, proved the precursor of his fall. The Tarentines, who needed not a master but a mercenary, withdrew their support. The attempt to form a new league of their unwilling adherents, the degenerate Greek cities of Italy, and their old enemies, the Oscan tribes, ended in the assassination of the prince by a Lucanian exile. The death of Alexander left the Greek cities to defend themselves as best they could against the Lucanians, and set the Samnites free to use their whole force against Rome in the decisive struggle for the mastery of Italy.

Outbreak of Second Samnite War.—The supremacy of Rome was now undisputed in the plains of Latium and Campania as far south as the Volturnus. Only the Greek citizens of the twin towns Paëopolis and Neapolis (Naples) were still independent. Disputes arose between the men of Paëopolis and the Roman settlers in Campania, which led the Greeks to appeal for aid to the Samnites, the only power in Italy strong enough to protect them against the encroachments of Rome. The Samnites determined to make a stand in Campania, and despatched a strong garrison to Paëopolis. The formal demand of the Roman ambassadors for its evacuation was met by a complaint of the colonisation of Fregellæ. Both nations were firmly convinced of the justice of their cause and the strength of their armies, and appealed with confidence to the judgment of the god of battle. For, in truth, though the occupation of Paëopolis formed the pretext for the war, just as that of Messana was later the occasion of the first Punic war, the struggle thus begun was no border war for the possession of a single city or even a particular district, but a mighty duel between two rival races, which was to determine whether Italy should be Latin or Oscan, and her civilisation progressive or stationary.

Diplomatic and Military Successes of Rome.—The Romans were keenly alive to the gravity of the issue, and strengthened themselves by alliances with the neighbours and enemies of the Samnites. The inhabitants of the plains of Apulia suffered from the raids of the Samnites, much as in Scotland the Lowlanders did from the Highland clans, and were ready to welcome the legions, for whose operations against the rear and flanks of the enemy they furnished a most serviceable base. The people in Lucania were eager to join their kinsmen in Samnium, to whom they were bound both by sentiment and interest, but the governing nobles

would not sanction an alliance which involved peace with their old enemies, the Greeks of Tarentum. Roman diplomacy succeeded, as so often, in playing off one race against another, and averted the danger of an Oscan coalition. The Sabellian tribes of Central Italy were from the first not unfriendly to Rome. Only the Vestini attempted an independent policy, and they were shortly reduced by the legions to submission. In this way Rome secured her communications with Apulia, a point of the utmost strategic importance. Meanwhile Publilius Philo, the most trusted of her statesmen, pushed on the siege of Palæopolis with energy, and received the unprecedented honour of a command prolonged beyond his year of office. The triumph of the first proconsul was gained rather by diplomacy than by arms. The Roman party in Palæopolis opened their gates to the legions, and forced the Samnite garrison to flee in disorder. The Greeks of the twin cities, old and new, were granted the most favourable terms, a perpetual alliance with full equality of rights. This liberality was rewarded by the fidelity of Neapolis, and may have induced the neighbouring cities of Herculaneum and Pompeii, Nola and Nuceria, to throw in their lot with Rome. The aristocratic party was in all these Oscan towns, as at Capua, the chief support of Roman supremacy. In the meantime the two consuls had advanced into Samnium, and are said to have taken several towns; at any rate they covered the operations in Campania and Central Italy by keeping the Samnites employed nearer home. Two campaigns sufficed to confine the Samnite power within the narrow bounds of their native mountains, and to secure for Rome a firm base in the cities on either coast, and a safe line of communications between them through the cantons of Central Italy.

L. Papirius Cursor and Q. Fabius Rullianus.—At this point the real history of the war is obscured by exaggerated tales of the exploits of the two principal heroes of the day, and a lively account of a dispute between them. L. Papirius Cursor, a disciplinarian of the old school, who was now dictator, was recalled from the camp to Rome, to take the auspices afresh. He left his master of the horse, Q. Fabius Rullianus, in command, but charged him most strictly to avoid a battle. Fabius disobeyed his orders and won a great victory. Papirius hastened back, vowing to punish his disobedience with death, but Fabius was saved for the moment by the soldiery, and fled to Rome to implore the protection of the Senate and people. The dictator, who pursued in hot haste, warned the tribunes not to diminish his authority by bringing his

sentence before the assembly, but was softened by the entreaties of the people and the submission of the offender to his mercy. He granted Fabius his life, but deprived him of his command.

Timely concessions averted a more serious danger in the following year. While the two consuls were engaged far away in Apulia and Samnium, discontent was rife nearer home. Tusculum, Privernum, and Velitræ flew to arms, determined to assert their independence, or extract from Rome, as the price of their support, full citizenship. At dead of night the alarm was given that the enemy were at the gates of Rome. Though the surprise failed, the attempt revealed to the Romans the danger of a general revolt, and induced them to grant the demands of the insurgents. At the next census two new tribes were formed which included the rebellious cities, and, more extraordinary still, L. Fulvius Flaccus, who had been chief magistrate of Tusculum at the time of the revolt, was, in the following year, consul of Rome. After the settlement of these difficulties Rome devoted herself to the war with renewed energy, so that the Samnites in despair sued for peace. They determined to surrender all their prisoners and plunder, and even Brutulus Papius, their bravest general, had not the patriot leader preferred suicide to the tender mercies of Rome. But when they found that nothing but unconditional submission would satisfy Roman pride, the Samnites resolved on a desperate defence of their liberty, and chose for their leader the hero of the war, Gavius Pontius.

The Caudine Forks.—The overweening confidence of Rome was to be severely punished. Black as were the days of the Allia and of Cannæ, there was one day blacker still in her calendar, the day of the Caudine Forks, because it was not only marked by disaster but branded with shame. The two consuls of the year 321 B.C., T. Veturius and Sp. Postumius, men untried in war, were enticed into the defiles of the Apennines by the news that the whole Samnite force was engaged in Apulia, besieging the town of Luceria. But as the legions pressed forward with all haste from Campania to the relief of their Apulian allies, they found the outlet of the valley of Caudium blocked by the Samnites, and, on retreating to the defile by which they had entered the fatal pass, found that also occupied by the enemy. The surrounding hills were lined with troops who had been lying in ambush; the Roman army was fairly caught in a trap, where it was hopeless to fight and impossible to fly. Their desperate attempts to break out were easily repulsed, and no resource was left but to throw them-

selves on the mercy of the conqueror. Pontius was not deaf to their entreaties. Instead of pressing his advantage, he aimed at an honourable and lasting peace. Rome was to recognise in the Samnites an equal and independent power, to restore the territories (*e.g.*, Campania) taken from them, and demolish the fortresses of Cales and Fregellæ, which she had constructed in defiance of the old treaty. These terms were accepted by the consuls, who left six hundred knights in the hands of the Samnites as hostages. Further, the consuls, the quæstors, and all the surviving officers, together with two tribunes who were with the army, swore to procure their ratification by the Senate and people. By this convention the Roman soldiers saved their lives, but they had to surrender their arms, their baggage, and even their clothes, except a single garment, and pass beneath the yoke (*cf.* p. 62). This ceremony was no peculiar insult devised by Pontius, but a regular Italian usage, like that of piling arms in a modern capitulation. After this humiliating confession that they owed their lives to the forbearance of the enemy, the legionaries were not retained as prisoners of war, but suffered to depart unharmed.

Rejection of the Compact by Rome.—Pontius little knew the enemies with whom he had to deal. He trusted to the honour of the Roman people to redeem the plighted faith of their consuls and their tribunes; he hoped that the moderation of his demands would ensure the acceptance of the proffered peace. But the Roman people knew no peace save the submission of their enemies, and cared nothing for the spirit, if only they observed the letter, of their engagements. In shame and dejection the beaten army stole homeward through Campania, and entered the city under cover of the night. A general mourning was proclaimed, and the consuls shut themselves up in their houses, leaving the conduct of the election of their successors, of which they were deemed unworthy, to an *inter-rex*. But when the Senate met, it resolved at once to cancel the convention. Sp. Postumius was the first to urge that honour would be satisfied by the surrender of its authors to the enemy; the Roman people could not be bound by the acts of magistrates who had exceeded their powers, but those who had sworn to the treaty must be delivered over to the Samnites, as men whose lives were forfeited by their breach of faith. Accordingly, all the officers of the defeated army, and even the tribunes, who protested in vain against this mockery of justice, were solemnly handed over in chains to the enemy, and, to complete the farce, Postumius kicked the Roman herald (*fetialis*), professing thus to

give Rome a just cause of war against the Samnite nation, to which he now belonged. Pontius utterly refused to allow Rome to release herself in this way from her plighted word. He justly demanded, either the ratification of the peace, or the surrender of the army into his power, as at the Caudine Forks. But, with noble generosity, he refused to wreak his vengeance on the men whose lives even Roman casuistry pronounced forfeit, the six hundred hostages and the surrendered officers. It is easy to sneer at the simplicity which led him to believe that a great nation might prefer honour to expediency, and surrender at the bidding of justice what might have been extorted at the sword's point. But even the most prejudiced historians cannot obscure the contrast between the double-dyed dishonour of the Romans, who evaded by ignoble trickery the consequences of their cowardly capitulation, and the stainless magnanimity of the Samnite hero.

Success of the Samnites.—War was at once renewed. The Roman chroniclers strive to efface the dishonour of the Caudine Forks by fictitious accounts of the recovery of Luceria and the humiliation of Pontius. But in reality Rome had to strain every nerve to keep her hold on Latium and Campania. Satricum, in the Volscian country, revolted, and though within a year the town was betrayed to the Romans, the Samnite garrison expelled, and the authors of the revolt punished, the example was fraught with danger. Still more serious was the loss of Fregellæ, because it commanded the upper road, by the valleys of the Trerus and Liris, from Rome to Campania. In Apulia fear and hatred of Samnium, not the arms of the legions, kept the country true to the Roman alliance. The fall of Luceria was balanced by the adhesion of the cities of Teanum and Canusium, and of the neighbouring tribe of the Frentani. In the following years exhaustion caused both the combatants to relax their efforts. Rome employed the respite thus given her in binding two important cities more closely to herself. The colony of Antium was reorganised, probably in the interest of the old Volscian population, and Capua was made a præfecture, at which justice was henceforth administered for Roman citizens, according to the forms of Roman law, by a præfect sent each year from Rome, an ominous encroachment on local liberty.

The Crisis of the War.—In 315 B.C. war was renewed with fresh energy. While the consuls were absent, engaged probably in recovering Luceria, Rome's hold on Campania was all but lost. Nuceria, Nola, Atella, and Calatia threw in their lot with the Samnites; Sora, on the Upper Liris, expelled its Roman colonists,

and a large force of Samnites poured down from the mountains into Campania. Q. Fabius Maximus, the Roman dictator, who had just taken Saticula, was compelled to fall back by the coast road to the pass of Lautulæ, near Anxur. Even this defensible post was stormed, and his raw levies were only saved from destruction by the heroism of his master of the horse, Q. Aulius Cerretanus, who fell in covering their retreat. The Ausonians in the country round were ripe for rebellion, and Capua showed her resentment at the recent infringement of her liberties. Suddenly the tide turned; possibly at this crisis the consuls returned to the rescue from Apulia, or compelled the Samnites to draw off to defend their own homes; at any rate Campania was won back as speedily as it had been lost. An inquiry into the conspiracy at Capua was conducted by the dictator C. Mænius, whereupon the two Calavii, the heads of the Samnite party in Capua, committed suicide. Sora was recaptured and punished. The Ausonian cities were delivered into the hands of the Romans by aristocratic traitors within their walls, and repaid by a horrible massacre for their wavering fidelity. In Campania the Samnite army was defeated and pursued over the mountains to Bovianum. Nola entered the Roman alliance on favourable terms, and the other Campanian towns followed its example. Finally, the upper road to Campania was reopened by the capture of Fregellæ.

Rome secures Apulia and Campania.—Rome hastened to secure her conquests by the foundation of colonies (313–312 B.C.), which, as has been explained (p. 57), were fortresses garrisoned by Roman citizens or Latin allies, whose mission it was to protect the frontiers and maintain the dominion of the mother city. Saticula¹ was made the outpost on the Samnite frontier, the islands of Pontia became Rome's naval station in the Campanian waters, while Suessa, Aurunca, and Interamna served to guard the great road to Capua, built (312 B.C.) by the censor Appius Claudius. At the same time the care of Roman interests in Apulia was entrusted to the 2500 colonists of Luceria. Thus the Samnites were hemmed in on both sides by a chain of fortresses, whose walls were an impregnable barrier for men unskilled in the conduct of sieges. They must soon have been reduced to submission, if they had not found support outside their own borders.

Tarentum.—The natural allies of Samnium, the men of Tarentum, remained supine in Italy, while they frittered away their strength in a naval war with Agathocles of Syracuse. After the


¹ These are all Latin colonies (*cf.* map).

disaster at Caudium they had aspired to arbitrate between the contending powers, but Rome had rejected their mediation, a rebuff which the government of Tarentum had not the spirit to resent. Even when the Spartan prince Cleonymus, at the head of their forces, had compelled the Lucanians to make peace with Tarentum, in return for the surrender of Metapontum, they still busied themselves in petty quarrels with other Greeks, instead of throwing the whole weight of South Italy into the scale against Rome. After suffering the Samnites to fall unaided, Tarentum was fortunate in obtaining a renewal of her treaty with Rome on favourable terms.

Etruscan War.—The Etruscans, whose forty years' peace with Rome had just expired, assailed the frontier fortress of Sutrium with energy. After defeating the Roman force sent to its relief, they besieged the town. The hero of this war is Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus. How much of his glory is due to the fancy of his kinsman, Fabius Pictor, the first historian of Rome, or to the family legends, which found in Etruria the most fitting scene for the exploits of the great Fabian house, we cannot tell; but his campaigns certainly made a deep impression on the imagination of the people, and first revealed to Rome the fundamental weakness of the stately edifice of Etruscan power. Fabius found the Etruscan lines too strong to be carried, so he resolved to draw off their forces by an attack on their own homes. Beyond the Ciminian hills and woods no Roman army had ever penetrated, but into this unknown land Fabius boldly led his troops. He had sent forward his brother to explore the country, and now, disregarding the orders of the Senate's messengers, he dashed into Central Etruria. A series of brilliant victories justified the adventurous general. At Sutrium, at Lake Vadimo, and at Perugia he routed the enemy, and brought the chief cities of Etruria, Perugia, Cortona, Arretium, and Tarquinii to consent to peace for forty years. (310–309 B.C.)

Fabius.—The conqueror of Etruria made the yet more glorious conquest of himself. While he was pushing his successes in Etruria, his colleague, Marcus Rutilus, was hard pressed in Samnium. The reserves which had been raised to cover Rome must be sent to his rescue, and only one man could be entrusted with such a command, Fabius' old enemy, Papirius Cursor. The consul, in the hour of his country's need, stifled private animosity, and named Papirius Cursor dictator. The old general, whose blunt humour reconciled the soldiery to his stern discipline, led

the legions for the last time to victory. The sacred band of the Samnites, who had sworn to conquer or to die, made the triumph of the dictator gay with the white or many-coloured tunics, stripped from their corpses, while their gold and silver shields, which were used to decorate the shops of the Forum on festal-days, preserved the memory of this decisive battle. In the following year Fabius reconquered Nuceria, the last stronghold of the Samnites in Campania. He then marched into Central Italy, and kept the



CHIMÆRA.

(Etruscan Bronze in the Archaeological Museum at Florence.)

Marsians and Pæignians firm in their allegiance to Rome by defeating the Samnite troops and putting down their partisans. Lastly, he marched from Samnium to meet the threatened attack of the Umbrians, and dispersed their levies at the great battle of Mevania. The Umbrians retired from the struggle, and Ocriculum entered the Roman alliance (308 B.C.).

End of the Samnite War.—The dying flames of war were revived by the rebellion of the old allies of Rome, the Hernicans. The Samnites made a last attempt to break through the iron

barrier of Roman fortresses, and to force their way to the gates of Rome by the valleys of the Liris and Trevis. They took Sora, Calatia, and Arpinum, but, before they could come to the help of their new allies, Anagnia, the Hernican capital, succumbed to the consul Marcus. The Hernicans, three of whose cities had never joined the insurrection, abandoned a struggle to which their strength, if not their resolution, was plainly unequal, and submitted to the loss of their independence. One more campaign ended the weary struggle with the Samnites. Though the mountaineers fought with unabated courage, and even poured down once more into Campania, their strength was now exhausted. The consuls, Ti. Minucius and L. Postumius Megellus, penetrated into the heart of the country, defeated and captured the Samnite general, Statius Gellius, and stormed Bovianum. The Samnites sued for peace, and were granted tolerable terms. They had to resign all their conquests, but within their native mountains, to which they were henceforth confined, they retained their ancient liberties. Whether they formally acknowledged the supremacy of Rome is uncertain; at any rate the issue of the war had placed the superiority of Rome beyond dispute, and had proved that no single nation in Italy could hold its own against the city of the seven hills. The Italians were often yet to fight in defence of their liberties; but no hope of success remained except in wide-reaching coalitions or in the aid of the foreigner, the Gaul, the Greek, or the Carthaginian.

CHAPTER XV

THE CONQUEST OF THE ITALIANS

	B. C.	A. U. C.
Outbreak of the Third Samnite War	298	456
Battle of Sentinum	295	459
The Samnites and Sabines submit to Rome	290	464

The Organisation of Central Italy.—Rome had granted peace to Samnium that she might have leisure to strengthen her hold on Central Italy. Campania she had already secured by a chain of fortresses linked to the capital by the great Appian road; she now set to work with characteristic energy to perfect the defences and organisation of her other dependencies. The rebellious Hernican communities were compelled to accept the Cærite franchise

(*cf. supra*, p. 90) ; but the three faithful towns, Alerium, Verulæ, and Ferentinum, declined the offer of the full citizenship, and Rome felt bound to respect the rights and liberties guaranteed them by the old equal alliance. In the Volscian district Arpinum and Trebula had the burdens of citizenship imposed on them without its political privileges (*civitas sine suffragio*) ; Frusino paid for its disaffection with a third of its territory, and Sora was garrisoned by four thousand colonists. The central hills and the line of communication with them along the Anio were, from a military point of view, of vital importance, and so were most carefully secured. A new tribe was formed in the valley of the Anio, and in spite of the resistance of the Æquians and Marsians, two strong fortresses, the Latin colonies, Alba Fucens and Carsioli, were planted in their country, and connected with Rome by a road named later after the Valerian house. (303-298 B.C.)

One more vulnerable point in the armour of Rome, the valley of the Tiber, was guarded by the establishment of a colony, called Narnia (299 B.C.), at the old Umbrian town of Nequinum, and the construction of the first part of the great Flaminian road through Oriculum to that fortress. About the same time the Picentines joined the central Italian cantons in allying themselves with Rome, and thus completed the strong barrier which separated the northern and southern enemies of the conquering city.

Etruria.—On the north, Rome was content to maintain her old military frontier, the Ciminian Hills, unchanged, but made use of the weakness and divisions of the Etruscans to extend her political influence. At this period the Etruscans were in great straits between their terror of the Gauls, whose tribes were now once more in a state of ferment, and their fear of the steady advance of Rome. One party in that unhappy country wished to bribe the Gallic clans to use their swords for the defence of Italian freedom ; another invoked the protection of Rome against the barbarians. Internal dissension increased the uncertainty of Etruscan policy. Rome, as her custom was, befriended the nobility, and gained a useful ally by restoring the exiled Cilnii to power at Arretium.

Outbreak of War.—The Samnites saw that such a peace was more fatal to the liberties of Italy than the most disastrous war. If Rome were allowed time to consolidate her power in Central Italy, to dominate Etruria and overawe the Gauls, their last hope of independence was gone. Only a coalition of all these jarring elements could make head against the growing power of Rome.

But the Samnites had learnt by bitter experience the danger of leaving an enemy in their rear. Accordingly, while the Romans were engaged in watching the advance of a plundering horde of Gauls, the Samnites suddenly threw themselves on Lucania, and placed their partisans in power throughout that region. Rome at once required the Samnites to withdraw from Lucania, and answered their refusal by declaring war (298 B.C.).


The movements of the contending armies in the first years of the war are uncertain or unintelligible, partly perhaps from a want of combination in the plans of the confederates, partly from the contradictions in our records of the war. It seems certain that the Romans won no great victories, for though L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus, the first of a famous line, is glorified both by Livy and by the epitaph on his tomb, their conflicting stories deserve no credence. The victory at Volaterræ over the Etruscans described by Livy, and the conquest of Lucania mentioned on the tomb seem to be equally imaginary. The more modest portions of the epitaph¹ which record the capture of two unknown places in Samnium and the reception of hostages from Lucania, taken in connection with the triumph of Fulvius over the Samnites, seem to show that both consuls were engaged in restoring Roman ascendancy in the south. In the following year the Romans expected to be assailed on all sides, and pressed the consulship on their tried and trusted general, Q. Fabius. The old hero insisted that the honour should be shared by his friend, P. Decius Mus. But the expected storm passed off for the moment; the Gauls had not come, and the Etruscans would not move, so that the Samnites had to bear the whole brunt of the battle. Their armies were defeated and their country laid waste by both the consuls (297 B.C.).

Gellius Egnatius.—Next year the storm broke. Gellius Egnatius, the Samnite general, had the boldness to conceive and the ability to execute a daring march through Central Italy to Umbria. It was essential to bring the Gauls and Etruscans to strike a great blow for the deliverance of Italy. So the Samnite leader left the ordinary levies to oppose the legions in Samnium and to make a descent on Campania, while he led the flower of his troops to his chosen battle-ground. The consul Volumnius was obliged to hasten from Samnium to the aid of his colleague, Appius Claudius, in Etruria, and then return with speed to preserve Campania from devastation. Yet the year closed without a decisive encounter;

¹ "Taurasia Cisauna Samnio cepit
Subigit omne Loucanam opsidesque abdoucit."

each side was bracing its energies for the final struggle in the succeeding spring.

The Senate was dismayed when they heard that Gellius Egnatius had frustrated their efforts to separate the south from the north, and was gathering to his standards the discontented Etruscans and the restless Gauls. The courts of law were closed, and all citizens, old and young, freedmen as well as free-born, were called to arms. The chief command was entrusted to old Q. Fabius, who again



TOMB OF L. CORNELIVS SCIPIO BARBATUS.

stipulated that Decius Mus should be his colleague. Besides the main army, two reserves were called out, one of which was posted at Falerii to guard the line of communications, and the other retained for the immediate protection of the city. L. Scipio was sent forward with the vanguard towards Clusium, but his forces were surprised and cut to pieces by the Gauls. A movement of the reserve from Falerii into Central Etruria was more successful, as it recalled the Etruscans from Umbria to the defence of their own homes. Etruria, as usual, proved a broken reed in the hour

of danger, and the Gauls and Samnites fell back sullenly over the Apennines.

Battle of Sentinum.—The consuls, eager to give battle while the Etruscans were away, at once pursued the retreating enemy. On the other side, Gellius Egnatius knew that the Gauls would soon be weary of war, and trembled at the thought that the coalition effected by his skill and daring might dissolve away at the very moment when victory was in his grasp. Both armies were eager for the fray when they met on a fair field near the city of Sentinum. On the right wing, Fabius, whose troops were not shaken by the first rush of the enemy, drove back the Samnites foot by foot; but on the left the Roman horse was thrown into disorder by the charge of the Gallic war-chariots, and in its flight broke the line of the infantry. Decius Mus, remembering his father's example, devoted himself, together with the host of the enemy, to the powers of the grave, and found the death he sought in the serried ranks of the Gauls. His legions rallied, and, supported by the reserves which Fabius sent to their aid, restored the battle. The fortune of the day was decided by the repeated charges of the fine Campanian cavalry, which first turned the Samnites to flight, and then fell on the uncovered flanks and rear of the still unbroken masses of Gallic swordsmen. Gellius Egnatius fell at the gate of the camp in a last attempt to rally the beaten troops; his followers, disdaining to surrender, fought their way back to their native mountains; but the Gauls dispersed, and the great coalition, by which Egnatius had hoped to save Italy, was shattered at one blow on the field of Sentinum (295 B.C.).

The Samnites alone hold out.—Umbria passed at once into the hands of the Romans; the disaffected cities of Etruria, in particular Volsinii and Perusia, made their peace in the following year; and Campania was rescued from the attacks of the Samnite freebooters. But within their highland fastnesses that unconquerable people still defied the might of Rome. The sturdy Swiss, who scattered the chivalry of Burgundy and of Austria, and made their Alps the cradle and stronghold of liberty, were more fortunate but not more heroic than the shepherds and herdsmen of the Apennines. The consuls of the next year, L. Postumius Megellus and M. Atilius Regulus, were repulsed with loss, and obliged to remain on the defensive both in Apulia and Campania. All they could boast of was the preservation of Luceria and the rescue of Interamna, on the Liris, from the enemy. In 293 B.C. the Romans,

who seem to have relaxed their efforts for a while after the great deliverance at Sentinum, returned to the fray with renewed vigour. L. Papirius Cursor, son of the hero of the second Samnite war, invaded Samnium itself, supported by his colleague, Sp. Carvilius. The Samnites on their part are said again to have raised a sacred band, marked by white tunics and nodding plumes, and bound by the most horrible oaths to conquer or to die. Their gloomy resolution was no match for the cheerful courage inspired in the Romans by the homely bluntness of Papirius, who at the crisis of the battle promised Jupiter, not a splendid temple, but a cup of honeyed wine before a drop touched his own lips. The surrender of Cominium and other Samnite strongholds crowned the victory of Aquilonia, and splendid spoils graced the triumph of the conqueror. The last gleams of success which shone on the arms of the Samnites brightened a name already glorious, that of Gavius Pontius. The old general (unless, indeed, it be his son) chastised the rashness of the consul Q. Fabius Gurgus, as he pressed in hot haste into the mountains after the retreating Samnites. Another veteran, Fabius Maximus, took the field to save the honour and retrieve the errors of his son. At length the victor of the Caudine Forks was defeated and captured, and the bitter and shameful memories of that day were yet more shamefully avenged by the death of the Samnite hero. The triumphs of Roman conquerors were constantly stained by the unjust execution of vanquished opponents, but no more odious instance of a heartless custom can be given than the cruel fate of Pontius. The task of completing the subjugation of the Samnites fell to Manius Curius, who appears to have granted them an honourable peace (290 B.C.).

Roman Colonies.—The Romans at once devoted themselves to the work of securing the ground they had gained in the late war. On the coast of Campania they had already (296 B.C.) established fortresses at Minturnæ and Sinuessa, whose inhabitants received the full citizenship, as was the rule in maritime colonies. In 290 B.C. Manius Curius conquered the Sabines, and compelled them to accept Roman citizenship without the franchise; in the following years Rome strengthened her hold on the eastern coast by the foundation of colonies at Hatria, 289 B.C. (Latin), and Castrum Novum, 283 B.C. (burgess). But the chief settlement of the time was Venusia, on the confines of Samnium, Apulia, and Lucania, to which place as many as twenty thousand Latin colonists were sent (291 B.C.). This important fortress, connected with Rome by an extension of the Appian road, was designed to block the

communications of the Samnites with Tarentum. For, though Tarentum had suffered her fears of Agathocles and her troubles with the Lucanians to blind her eyes to the pressing needs of the Samnites, she was the one city left in Italy strong enough to rouse the suspicions of Rome ; and by calling on Greece to redress the balance in Italy, she was yet to give the vanquished one more chance of striking at the heart of Rome, under the banner of the greatest captain of the age.

CHAPTER XVI


THE WAR WITH TARENTUM AND PYRRHUS

	B.C.	A.U.C.
War with the Lucanians breaks out	289	465
Battle of Lake Vadimo	283	471
Declaration of War against Tarentum, which summons Pyrrhus from Epirus	281	473
Battle of Heraclea—Embassy of Cineas	280	474
Battle of Ausculum—Alliance of Rome and Carthage	279	475
Pyrrhus goes to Sicily	278	476
Pyrrhus defeated by M. Curius at Beneventum	275	479
Milo surrenders Tarentum—Submission of South Italy	272	482
Rhegium taken	271	483

War with the Lucanians.—The submission of the Samnites did not secure for Italy the promised respite from trouble. In the late war the Lucanians had been most useful to Rome by occupying the attention of Tarentum ; they now expected to reap their reward in the plunder of the rich cities of Magna Græcia. With this object Sthenius Statilius, the Lucanian general, laid siege to Thurii, which, in despair of all other help, threw itself on the mercy of Rome. That power, which, since the subjugation of Samnium and the foundation of Venusia, no longer needed the help of the Lucanians, lent a ready ear to the prayer of Thurii, and ordered Statilius to cease his assaults on the beleaguered city. The Lucanians replied by the vigorous prosecution of the siege, and by a summons to all South Italy to unite with them in resisting the new pretensions of Rome.

Etruria and the Gauls.—A more pressing danger prevented Rome throwing all her energies into the defence of Thurii. The Gauls and Etruscans had, on the whole, kept the peace since the

great battle of Sentinum, for the revolt of Falerii (293 B.C.) hardly disturbed the general quiet, but they were now encouraged by the war in the south to tempt fortune again. The forces raised by the Etruscan malcontents, which were composed chiefly of Senonian mercenaries, laid siege to the faithful town of Arretium, and annihilated the Roman army sent to its relief. An embassy was despatched to the chiefs of the Senones, who were nominally



FALISCAN VASE IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM.

at peace with Rome, to complain that their people had served in the armies of Rome's enemies, and to demand the release of the prisoners. But the Gallic chieftain, Britomaris, slew the sacred envoys in revenge for the death of his father in the late battle. The outrage was signally avenged. The consul, P. Cornelius Dolabella, advanced into the land of the Senones, while the flower of their warriors was in Etruria, and destroyed the whole tribe. The men were slain without quarter, the women and children

enslaved; the very name of the Senones disappears from the muster-rolls of Italy. The neighbouring clan of the Boii, in whom rage mastered terror, flew to arms to avenge their slaughtered countrymen. They poured over the Apennines, and were joined in their march on Rome by the Etruscans and their Gallic mercenaries. But their combined forces were utterly defeated by Dolabella, while they were attempting to cross the Tiber near Lake Vadimo (283 B.C.). In the following year, after a second defeat near Populonia, the Boii concluded a separate peace. The land of the Senones was given to the burgesses settled at Sena Gallica, which fortress was designed to serve as a check on the Gauls and a station for a Roman fleet on the Adriatic (283 B.C.).¹

The Breach with Tarentum.—After the submission of the Gauls the Roman army took the offensive in Lucania. Hitherto it had been content to defend Thurii; now C. Fabricius raised the siege by the defeat and capture of the Lucanian general, Statilius. The neighbouring cities of Croton, Locri, and Rhegium, following the example of Thurii, willingly received Roman garrisons. Tarentum was thus hemmed in on all sides by the outposts of Rome; even her maritime ascendancy was threatened, in the Adriatic by the colonies of Hatria and Sena, and in the home waters by the Greek cities which had allied themselves with the barbarians. Though she had not drawn the sword against Rome, she was suspected of having instigated the war which she had not the courage herself to undertake. Suddenly the Roman admiral, Valerius, appeared in the bay of Tarentum at the head of a squadron of ten ships of war. Whether Valerius simply intended to put in at a friendly port on his way to the Adriatic, or hoped to enable the aristocratic partisans of Rome in Tarentum to seize the reins of government, is a moot point. In any case his act was contrary to Greek international law, and a direct violation of an existing treaty, which forbade the ships of Rome to sail beyond the Lacinian promontory at the western extremity of the Tarentine gulf. The people of Tarentum, assembled in the theatre overlooking their harbour, saw the Romans advance, and were easily persuaded by the demagogue Philocharis to avenge the insult. The Roman squadron was put to flight by their hastily manned galleys; the admiral fell; four ships were sunk

¹ The account given in Polybius, ii. 19, 20, and preferred by Mommsen, is different in many points, and lays more stress on the part played by the Gauls.

and one taken. The prisoners were either put to death or sold into slavery.

The die was now cast. The democrats of Tarentum, who had witnessed unmoved the long death-agonies of the Samnite nation, had been hurried by passion into the conflict which they had so long avoided. They resolved to follow up their first blow with energy. They marched to Thurii, compelled the Roman garrison to withdraw, and punished the principal citizens by exile and confiscation for preferring the assistance of barbarians to that of their own neighbours and countrymen (282 B.C.).

Outbreak of War.—The Romans, who were afraid of driving Tarentum into the arms of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, behaved with studied moderation. They despatched, not an army, but an embassy to Tarentum to demand satisfaction. The terms proposed were moderate—the release of the captives, the surrender of the demagogues who had instigated the assault on the Roman fleet, and the reversal of the late revolution at Thurii. The statesmen of Rome sought to place her partisans in power in both the Greek cities, and thus secure her ascendancy without recourse to arms. But the democrats of Tarentum had gone too far to retreat. When the Roman ambassadors reached Tarentum, their foreign dress and broken Greek were ridiculed by the disorderly rabble gathered in the theatre to celebrate the Dionysia. Gravely and simply L. Postumius delivered his message, heedless of the insults showered upon him. But at last a drunken wretch bespattered the envoy's white toga with dirt, an outrage which was greeted by the riotous mob with shouts of laughter and thunders of applause. The Roman held up the sullied toga to the crowd, and solemnly warned them that the stains upon it would be washed out in their best blood. We may suspect that this tale has been invented or exaggerated to exalt the Roman by depreciating the Greek, but the contrast between the staid dignity of the ambassador and the insolent levity of the populace points a true moral, even if the anecdote itself is false. Notwithstanding this insult the Roman Senate was unwilling to proceed to extreme measures. They were conscious that the capture of Tarentum was beyond their powers, for its walls were strong enough to defy their rude siege-engines, and its superior fleet made an effective blockade impossible. The city could neither be forced nor starved into a surrender, and the attempt would only precipitate what Rome most feared, a summons to Pyrrhus. But it was still possible that Tarentum might be induced to prefer the peaceful acknow-

ledgment of Rome's supremacy to the hardships of war. Accordingly the consul L. Æmilius Barbula was instructed still to offer the same terms, but to begin hostilities at once if satisfaction were again refused. He scattered the troops and laid waste the lands of Tarentum, but spared the lives and properties of the aristocrats. Rome still hoped by wielding the sword with one hand, while with the other she offered the olive-branch, to bring moderate men in Tarentum to listen to reason. Nor were her hopes unfounded. While the principal democrats were absent on a mission to Pyrrhus, the aristocrats secured the election of their leader, Agis, as commander-in-chief. But, before he could take office and come to terms with Rome, the envoys returned from the Epirot court, accompanied by Cineas, the minister of Pyrrhus, who promised immediate support from his master. The democratic party used their restored ascendancy to depose Agis, and to promise the king pay and provisions for his troops, as well as the command of all the recruits they could raise in Italy. The admission of his most trusted general, Milo, with 3000 Epirots into the citadel finally committed Tarentum to the cause of the adventurous prince, who hoped to rival Alexander by spreading Hellenic rule and civilisation to the western boundary of the known world (281 B.C.).

The Early Career of Pyrrhus.—Pyrrhus was the son of Æacides—a cousin of Alexander the Molossian, and his successor on the throne. Æacides lost his kingdom and his life through the intrigues of Cassander, the wily regent of Macedon, who thus avenged the support Æacides had given to the ill-starred family of Alexander the Great. Pyrrhus was protected, and, while yet a boy, restored to the throne by Glaucias, an Illyrian chieftain. When fresh disturbances drove him again into exile, he joined his brother-in-law, Demetrius Poliorcetes, and fought bravely by his side on the field of Ipsus. After that crushing defeat he was sent as a hostage for Demetrius to the court of Alexandria. There he won the good opinion of King Ptolemy by his soldierly spirit, and the favour of Berenice by his manly beauty and courteous bearing. With the help of the Egyptian king he re-established himself on the throne of his forefathers, and, in the troubles that followed the death of Cassander, won for the Epirots a much-needed outlet to the sea, by gaining command over the Gulf of Ambracia and the island of Corcyra. After some years of peace, Pyrrhus was encouraged by Ptolemy of Egypt, Seleucus of Syria, and Lysimachus of Thrace, who were again

leagued together against the restless and ambitious Demetrius, to drive that prince from the throne of Macedon. But after a seven months' reign the discontent of the Macedonians and the forces of Lysimachus compelled him to retire once more to his own kingdom of Epirus. In the petty duties of a tribal chieftain Pyrrhus could find no scope for his lofty ambition and military genius, and through six long years looked in vain for employment abroad. At last the appeal of the distressed Hellenic cities of the West for aid came as a message of release for the caged eagle of Epirus.

The Schemes of Pyrrhus.—The ideas which animated the Epirot were not less bold than those which led Alexander across the Hellespont to gain the empire of the East. As the Macedonian had ended by his victory the long struggle with Persia, so Pyrrhus aspired to deliver the Greeks of the West from the dominion of the rude Italian and the hated Canaanite. Often in the ages past had the Carthaginian been driven from Eastern Sicily by the captains-general of Western Hellas. In older days Sicily had found leaders in the great tyrants, Gelo Hiero and Dionysius ; more recently she had looked for deliverance to the mother country, and found a saviour in the hero, Timoleon. Pyrrhus believed himself destined to complete and unite the schemes of his kinsman, Alexander of Epirus, and of his father-in-law, Agathocles, to humble Rome and Carthage to the dust, and found on the ruins of their dominions an Hellenic empire of the West. But this empire was the dream of a great adventurer, not the reasoned project of a statesman. When Alexander set out for the East he left Macedon securely guarded and Greece subject. Pyrrhus relied for the safety of Epirus on the good faith of neighbouring princes. Alexander led a sufficient army of Macedonian veterans to scatter the ill-disciplined hordes of Persia ; Pyrrhus had to face the national levies of Italy at the head of a motley army of allies and mercenaries, and for the navy, without which he could not hope to break the power of Carthage, was dependent on the fickle democracies of Syracuse and Tarentum. But though the schemes of Pyrrhus were doomed to failure, their surpassing interest sheds a reflected glory on their author. As the last great effort to deliver the West from the barbarian, and the first meeting of the phalanx and the legion in battle, the expedition of Pyrrhus is a turning-point in history. His defeat left Sicily the helpless prize in a mighty struggle between the rival cities of the West, and showed how powerless was the military science and political craft


of the Greek to meet the unflinching resolution of Roman statesmen and the patriotic devotion of the Roman militia.

The Beginning of the War.—Pyrrhus landed in Italy at the head of an army raised for the most part in Northern and Western Greece, and consisting of 20,000 heavy-armed footmen, 3000 horse, 2500 archers and slingers, and 20 elephants. He found the hopes and promises of a general rising in Italy utterly vain. Even the men of Tarentum would not join heartily in the war which they had provoked. They had expected to hire a mercenary to fight their battles; they found the king a stern and exacting master. He compelled the lazy burghers to mount guard on the wall; he put down their clubs and assemblies, and shut up their theatre and gymnasia; in fine, he treated Tarentum as a conquered town. The citizens were left no choice in the matter; their resources were employed to hire Italian mercenaries, and their citadel became the base of the operations of the Epirot army.

Rome was not behindhand in preparing for the coming conflict. She repressed discontent among her subjects with a firm hand, and summoned to her standards full contingents both of her allies and her own citizens. A force advanced into Etruria to compel the revolted cities, Volci and Volsinii, to lay down their arms; a second was held in reserve at Rome. Garrisons were placed in the Greek towns of Lower Italy, while the Lucanians and Samnites were held in check by the colonists of Venusia and a weak corps of observation. P. Valerius Lævinus, with the main army, hastened to meet the invader before he could effect a junction with the Samnites or foster insurrections in Magna Græcia. He found the Epirot troops occupying a position which covered the Tarentine colony of Heraclea.

Battle of Heraclea.—Pyrrhus allowed the Romans to force the passage of the Siris, and thus compelled them to fight with a river in their rear. Seven times the legions strove to pierce the serried ranks of the Epirots, and but for the prayers and entreaties of the king the phalanx would have given way. At length each general brought up his last reserves, but the Roman horse would not face the terrors of the elephants. Their disordered flight broke the ranks of the infantry, and the whole army, horse and foot together, fled in confusion over the Siris. The military skill of Pyrrhus had won the day at Heraclea. By enticing the Roman legions into the plain, where his phalanx could maintain unbroken order and repel with ease all assaults on its bristling rows of pikes, he had gained a tactical advantage, which the

terror inspired by the strange and monstrous appearance of the elephants had enabled him to turn to the best account. But it was a victory which could not be often repeated. Many of the best Epirot officers and four thousand veterans were left dead upon the field. Pyrrhus may well have felt that such a victory resembled a defeat.



TETRADRACHM OF PYRRHUS STRUCK IN ITALY.—HEAD OF ZEUS
OF DODONA, AND THE GODDESS DIONE.

But the successful encounter with a Roman army in the field encouraged South Italy to throw in its lot with the conqueror. When Lævinus retired into Apulia, the Samnites, the Lucanians, and the Bruttians joined Pyrrhus. All the Greek cities, except Rhegium, now welcomed their deliverer. Even Rhegium was lost to the Romans, for its Campanian garrison seized the town, and entered into a close alliance with their kinsmen and neighbours, the Mamertines, who, with like treachery, had deserted Agathocles, and taken Messana for themselves. On the other hand, the Latins remained true to Rome. (280 B.C.)

Embassy of Cineas.—Pyrrhus resolved to use his victory to make peace with Rome and devote his energies to the conquest of Punic Sicily. He sent his most trusted minister, Cineas the Thessalian, to try the arts of diplomacy, learnt in Hellenistic courts, on the Roman Senate. The concessions demanded were the release of the Greek towns in Italy from their allegiance to Rome, and the surrender of the strongholds of Roman power in South Italy, Venusia, and Luceria. The flattery, if not the gifts, of Cineas all but cajoled the Roman Senate into the acceptance of the proffered peace. But the indomitable resolution of Rome

found voice in the greatest man of her proudest house, the blind old consular, Appius Claudius. Lord Chatham protested in vain with dying voice against the dishonour of yielding to the coalition of France and America ; Appius inspired his countrymen with his own burning patriotism, and first enunciated the proud maxim that Rome never negotiated while foreign troops stood on Italian ground. Cineas, with all his courtier's arts, had failed in his mission, and returned to his master deeply impressed with the majesty of the Senate, which he called an assembly of kings. Pyrrhus, who had advanced into Campania to support by arms the demands of his envoy, was goaded by their rejection into a march on Rome. But the legions recalled from Etruria and the reserve in the capital were ready to repel any assault, and Lævinus, reinforced by two newly levied legions, hung upon his rear. Pyrrhus could only plunder the rich country south of Rome, and retire with his booty, first to Campania, and then to winter quarters at Tarentum. The arrival of a Roman embassy encouraged him to renew his offer of peace. But the consular, Fabricius, could not, we are told, be bribed, cajoled, or terrified into compliance with the king's wishes. Pyrrhus was obliged again to try the fortunes of war.

Battle of Ausculum.—The second campaign was fought in Apulia. Pyrrhus, whose keen eye had perceived the value of the open order of battle adopted by the Romans, interspersed Italian cohorts between the subdivisions of his phalanx. But on the first day of the hard-fought battle at Ausculum the device availed him little. On the broken ground by the steep banks of a river his cavalry and elephants could not act. On the second day, however, he managed to deploy his phalanx on the plain beyond, and a second time the legionaries with their short swords hewed in vain at the hedge of pikes, till the arrival of the elephants was once more the signal for a general flight. The Roman army made good its retreat across the river to its camp with the loss of six thousand men ; the conquerors admitted that three thousand five hundred of their number had fallen. Such a victory was not calculated to break up the Roman confederacy, and sadly weakened the Epirot army. (279 B.C.)

Pyrrhus goes to Sicily—Alliance of Rome and Carthage.—Pyrrhus was weary of fruitless victories, and anxious to escape with honour from an impossible position. While the indomitable resistance of Rome was wearing out his energies, Syracuse was anxiously expecting deliverance at his hands from the Cartha-

ginians. The king readily accepted the invitation, but the immediate effect of his new policy was to unite his enemies. Rome and Carthage entered into a league against him, by which each bound itself to render assistance to the other if its territory was attacked, and to refuse all offers of a separate peace. The Romans thus gained the assistance of the Punic navy; the Carthaginians hoped to complete the conquest of Sicily, while their allies detained the king in Italy. But Pyrrhus seized the first chance offered him of patching up an armistice with the Romans. The consul Fabricius handed over to the king a traitor who proposed to poison him for money, and so paved the way for an interchange of prisoners and a cessation of hostilities. (278 B.C.)

Leaving Milo in Tarentum, and his own son Alexander at Locri, Pyrrhus set sail for Syracuse. During his absence the war in Italy languished. The Lucanians and Bruttians were punished for their insurrection, but the Samnites once again repulsed the Roman armies. The Greek cities were gradually subdued; Heraclea obtained favourable terms; Croton was captured by a stratagem; Locri massacred its Epirot garrison, and thus atoned for its earlier treachery to Rome. Only Tarentum was held for the king.

Pyrrhus in Sicily.—In Sicily, Pyrrhus won a series of triumphs. City after city was taken, until the Carthaginians were shut up in Lilybæum and the Mamertines in Messana. The Carthaginians offered as the price of peace to resign all claim to the sovereignty of Sicily if they might keep Lilybæum. But Pyrrhus rejected the insidious proposal, for he saw that if Carthage kept a foothold in Sicily she could at once regain her dominions when he had gone. He preferred to continue the struggle, and called on his Sicilian allies to build a fleet. But the fickle Sicilians murmured at the burden of military service, and resented the autocratic rule of the king. They negotiated with their enemies, the Mamertines and Carthaginians, and treated their deliverer as a tyrant. In the field Pyrrhus was as brilliant as ever; he drove the Carthaginian army, which ventured out from Lilybæum, back into its stronghold; but he felt that the day of his greatness was past. Sicily had shown herself unworthy of the hero to whom she had called for aid. (277–6 B.C.)

Defeat and Departure of Pyrrhus.—Turning his back on Sicily, Pyrrhus returned to Tarentum a “soured and disappointed” man. On his way he had to fight the Carthaginian fleet off Syracuse and the Mamertine army near Rhegium. He succeeded

in surprising Locri, and replenished his treasury with the plunder of the temple of Persephone. But his Sicilian dominions fell away from him as soon as he left the island, and his Italian allies had lost faith in his star. His brave Epirots had fallen on many a well-fought field, and their places had been taken by forced levies or by foreign mercenaries. Yet the Romans took the field for the decisive campaign in 275 B.C. with reluctance and apprehension. While L. Cornelius Lentulus marched into Lucania, Manius Curius faced Pyrrhus in Samnium. The Romans occupied a strong position in the hills near Beneventum, which Pyrrhus determined to storm before Lentulus could come to his colleague's assistance. But everything went wrong with the attacking force. A whole division lost its way in the forest, and came up too late; neither the phalanx nor the cavalry could act, and the elephants, terrified by the storm of burning arrows with which the Romans received them, rushed furiously back through the ranks of their own friends. Pyrrhus could not keep the field after his defeat. His entreaties to his allies, the kings of Macedon, Syria, and Egypt, for help were coldly rejected. With a heavy heart he took leave of Italy, and returned to his own land. There he grasped once more at the crown of Macedon, but his vehement and haughty courage, which still gained him victories, was no match for the cool and cautious policy of Antigonos Gonatas. At length, he fell ingloriously in a street fight at Argos, struck down by a tile thrown by a woman's hand.

Surrender of Tarentum.—Milo had been left in Italy to hold Tarentum. So long as his master lived, he withstood boldly the disaffection of the citizens and the attacks of Rome. But when news came of his death, he cared only to secure an honourable retreat for the Epirot garrison. A Roman army was outside the walls, a Carthaginian fleet before the harbour. Each power strained every nerve to win the prize. Milo preferred to treat with the Roman general, L. Papirius, and by the surrender of the citadel purchased a free departure for himself and his troops. The Carthaginians, who had doubtless hoped to secure in Tarentum a second Lilybæum, now disavowed all selfish intentions, and professed to have merely offered naval assistance to the Roman army in conformity with the treaty. Tarentum, deprived of her army, her ships, and her walls, lost her independence and prosperity, but retained the right of local self-government. (272 B.C.)

Submission of Italy to Rome.—In the same year the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians submitted to the inevitable yoke of

Rome. Bands of guerrillas still haunted the mountains, but three years later sword and cord established peace even in those wild regions. The sternest punishment was meted out to the mutineers who had seized Rhegium. These freebooters filled up the cup of their iniquity by the sack of Croton and the massacre of its Roman garrison. A strong force was sent against them; Hiero, the new master of Syracuse, sent help to the Romans, and kept their friends and compatriots, the Mamertines of Messina, occupied at home. After a severe struggle the town was stormed, and its defenders, who survived the assault, executed. The city was restored to its ancient inhabitants and retained its local autonomy. Rome now ruled supreme from the straits of Messina to the river Arno and the headland of Ancona. A new act in the drama begins when the mistress of Italy comes into conflict with the great naval power of Carthage. The struggle had been already foreseen by Pyrrhus, who, when he turned his back on Sicily, repined at leaving so fair a battlefield to the Romans and Carthaginians. The issue of the great duel secured for Rome the empire of the civilised world.

CHAPTER XVII


THE POSITION AND RESOURCES OF ROME AND CARTHAGE

Retrospect and Prospect—Organisation of Italy—Roman Army and Navy—Carthage, Constitution, Organisation and Resources.

Rome a Great Power.—The battle of Beneventum and the subjugation of the revolted tribes closes the chapter of Italian struggle and opens the period of external conquest. A new power, with a peculiar organisation and a national army, was revealed to the civilised world, schooled by experience to deal with the new and grave problems presented by the state of foreign affairs. Rome, mistress of Italy from the *Æsis* to the sea, was recognised in 273 B.C. by Egypt as a great power, and in 272 B.C. the collision with Carthage at Tarentum foreshadowed the course of coming events.

Retrospect and Prospect.—We have traced the growth of the united city as the struggle for existence became a struggle for predominance; we have watched the gradual consolidation of her

orders and her institutions. Her people, strong in its qualities and in its defects, without genius, culture, or elasticity, endowed with a sense of order and discipline, strictly legal and endlessly tenacious, secure in conquered rights, and led by a vigorous and patriotic nobility as yet uncorrupted by the plunder of provinces, had proved itself more than a match for even the picked troops of the finest soldier of the day. It had been welded by constitutional conflict, and educated by political action ; it had benefited



KING IN CHARIOT.

(*Terra-cotta of Punic workmanship.*)

equally by victory and defeat in civic training and military tactics. It had now to enter on a new path. Ancient policy did not recognise the balance of power. Its scientific frontier was found in a belt of weakness ; it tolerated no rival on its borders whose strength was a possible danger. It was this, and the necessities of the moment, with the natural appetite for expansion and plunder, which urged the Government, not so much to make a bold bid for empire, as to enter on a policy of piecemeal annexation

and half-reluctant aggression, for which the character neither of the people nor of its institutions was thoroughly adequate. We have now to trace the beginnings of the provincial system, the growth of the professional army ; the reaction of both on the city-state and its finance, on morals and religion ; the decay of the constitutional factors, the break-down of the military organisation, the gradual growth of an Italian question, the rise of a proletariat, the extension of slavery, the intensification of the old social and economic difficulties. Here, too, begins with the career of Scipio Africanus the line of commanding personalities, whose life and action, accustoming men to the idea of a single ruler, set the precedents and paved the way for Cæsar.

In the period immediately before us the democratic movement has subsided. The comitia, hampered by religious and constitutional restrictions, weakened by war and the diffusion of the citizen body throughout Italy, fall under the control of the magistrates. The magistrates, coming out of and returning into the Senate, with short tenure of office, saddled with the intercession of colleague or tribune, fall in their turn under the control of the Senate. The Senate, the sole deliberative assembly, permanent in power and patronage, becomes the *de facto* government of Rome. It directs military operations ; it arranges for the cumulation or prorogation of office ; it manages the departments of finance and foreign policy, in an age when finance and foreign policy are dominant. The day of patrician intrigue and reactionary conservatism is over. With the admission of the plebs to the higher honours, the passing of the Lex Ovinia, and the accession of plebeians to the censorship (351 B.C.), a career had been opened to ability, the emulation of the nobles stirred ; there was an influx into the Senate of younger, abler men of moderate views and tried capacity. The House, filled almost automatically with ex-officers of state, strengthened with a constant supply of new blood, entered on a new course with larger ideas and a broader policy.

But in this period, also, the decay of the yeomanry and the growth of capitalism coincides with the extension of the empire. A new political order—the Equites—forms alongside of the official nobility, while the growing contact with Greece and the East tends more and more to affect the simplicity of Roman manners.

Italian Organisation.—Rome's territory was compact ; her subjects were divided by no deep cleavage of race, feeling, or culture. Step by step her steady, ceaseless advance was secured


by a network of roads and fortresses. The peoples she annexed were not at once, as in modern times, levelled with their conquerors by allegiance to a common lord. She maintained the distinction of subject and citizen. The Roman franchise was at once an object of desire and a privileged position, granted at discretion to individuals or to whole states. The organisation of Italy was peculiar, and differed essentially from modern methods. There was no division into administrative districts, no uniformity of local government, law, and taxation. Annexation, colonisation, federation, had placed Rome at the head of a species of confederacy, whose elements formed a congeries of communities with diverse and graduated rights. The national leagues were dissolved, or limited to religious ceremonies; joint assemblies and reciprocal franchises¹ were abolished; a policy of subdivision and isolation, with a carefully adjusted distribution of privilege, paralysed joint action and drew the separated units closely to Rome. The jealousy of states, and the jealousy of orders in the states, was carefully utilised; the constitutions were often remodelled in an aristocratic sense. This system combined to some extent the advantages of local government and centralisation. The weightier questions of internal administration, the whole foreign and intercommunal relations of the several states, were controlled by the paramount power.

Local matters were settled by local councils and magistrates in accordance with the law or treaty which regulated the affairs of each community. The prerogatives of sovereignty extended indeed beyond the formal rights of coinage, peace, and war, but the relation of sovereign and subject was left purposely indefinite, and there was no technical name for the Roman hegemony. The burghers of Rome of the thirty-three tribes—finally thirty-five—included, besides the actual inhabitants of the city and its immediate territory, and of the subject or allied towns to which full rights had been granted out of gratitude or policy, those who had been settled on confiscated land throughout Italy, either individually, or collectively in citizen colonies.² The latter were a privileged class, with undiminished rights as citizens, rapidly assimilating in each town the subject population alongside them.

Beneath these, in various stages of autonomous dependency,

¹ The right of intermarriage and settlement, *vide* p. 98.

² The citizen-colonies were mainly maritime; the Latin colonies commanded the great roads, *vide* map.



come (1) the different classes of *municipia*, possessing the private rights of citizens, the *civitas sine suffragio et sine iure honorum*, with the *ius privatum* of Rome administered by Roman præfects, burdened with personal service in the legion and the payment of the *tributum*, retaining or not, according to circumstances, the full or partial administration of local business ;¹ (2) the *civitates federatæ*, whose dependence, nominally in political matters only, was actually more deeply felt. They furnished each a contingent to the army, and enjoyed full local autonomy, the right of coinage, of jurisdiction, and the *ius exilii*. Among these come the Latin colonies, or Colonies of Latin Right, the outposts and watch-towers of Rome, dependent on Rome for life and land, with smaller franchise and larger autonomy than the colony of burgesses, with fuller rights than the ordinary ally ;² the rest are strictly *socii*, enjoying various immunities, limited only in foreign policy, and bound to render aid in war with ships or men ; such are Neapolis, Heraclea, or Tarentum. No doubt the rights so granted were gradually curtailed in proportion as the bestowal of the franchise was restricted, and the policy of Rome changed from one of incorporation and extension to one of jealous exclusion. The one thing sure was the gradual equalisation of pressure ; the one thing definitely fixed was the contingent of men or ships—determined in the end only by the necessities or the power of Rome. But, in the meantime, policy mitigated despotism ; the allies enjoyed a free communal constitution, exemption from taxation, save that implied in the equipment and payment of their conscripts, with a large share in the military and political successes which they helped to achieve, and in the august name and destinies of Rome. The strength of the growing Italian feeling, the solidity of this unique organisation, and the value of the Latin fortresses were severely tested in the war of Hannibal ; and the failure to follow up the wise policy of their fathers in this respect brought the Romans of the next period into deadly peril. In contrast with the factious Grecian states, with the loosely organised empire of Carthage, with the decrepit kingdoms of the East and the restless tribes of the North, stands the compacted Italian republic, with its strong national spirit, its willing, obedient subjects.

The Army.—In ancient times the form and character of a

¹ The term "*municipium*" comes to mean, later on, a country town of Roman citizens.

² By the year 268 B.C. they were twenty-two in number, *vide map.* These, with the relics of the Cassian League, make up the *Nomen Latinum*.

government was largely determined by the character of the national armaments. The army is a fundamental institution of Rome, with whose history is inseparably bound up the history of her total development. She was essentially a fighting nation. The history of that army follows a general law of ancient military progress. To the system of caste, when a ruling aristocracy retains in its own hands the science of war, succeeds the citizen army or fleet, whose special character is dictated by the local characteristics or political necessities of each state. From the citizen-militia is developed the professional, often the mercenary, army, to be succeeded by the standing armies and palace guard of a military monarchy. Power passes to the trained battalions. The Roman army exhibits such a gradual change in its tactics, its organisation, its recruiting fields, and each change is reflected in the face of current politics. As each new class enters the service, it presses against the limits of the franchise. Extended operations, distant fields of war, the requirements of the provinces, the development of tactics and individual drill combine with moral and economic causes to transform the farmer conscript of Camillus into the professional veteran of Cæsar. At this period the backbone of the legions was still formed by that sound yeomanry, whose conservative instincts and fighting qualities made them the bulwark alike of Rome's constitution and power. From the same class came the Italian cohorts. But with the increasing need of troops and the growing distaste of the wealthier classes for their military duties, the property qualification for the legion is gradually lowered, the proletariat press in, and the effect is seen in the remodelling (*circa* 241 B.C.) of the *comitia centuriata*: there is a marked growth in the allied contingents; the cavalry service passes from the burgesses to the allies, the soldier tends to separate from the citizen, while the appointment of the staff by the people drags the army into the sphere of party politics.

Service was at once a duty and a privilege; every citizen was liable to serve, and, strictly speaking, only a citizen could serve. He was liable from the seventeenth to the forty-sixth year, and for sixteen to twenty campaigns in the infantry, ten in the cavalry. A certain number of campaigns was the condition of civil promotion, and the military tribuneship the first step in the career of office (311 B.C.). The *capite censi* and freedmen, except in a crisis, were relegated to the fleet. Owing to this extension of service, the total force at the disposal of the Senate, with whom rested the

control of the army, may be estimated for this period at over 700,000 foot and 70,000 horse, exclusive of the seniors reserved for garrison duty, but inclusive of the contingents of the Latin name and allies. Of this total, the citizens, with the *cives sine suffragio*,¹ might amount to over 273,000, the allies to over 497,000. A first summons on a great emergency could place above 200,000 soldiers in the field. The proportion of allies to citizens serving with the colours was, strictly speaking, determined in accordance with the original arrangement or treaty, on a scale relative to the number of available men and the number of legions on foot. Theoretically they furnished an equal force of infantry and thrice the cavalry, but the number steadily rose till two allies were summoned for every citizen. At this period, of the normal levy of two consular armies or four legions annually raised and annually discharged—41,600 men—the allies contributed 20,000 foot and 3600 horse to the 16,800 foot and 1200 horse of the regular army; *i.e.*, roughly, about 4 to 3²—a number not disproportioned to their population. As, however, their population decreased, while that of Rome increased, the burden of the growing contingent, equipped and paid as it was by the various communities, and only maintained in the field by Rome, became heavier. In the Punic wars the pressure was often severely felt.

Besides the allies we have to recognise the corps of auxilia—allies or mercenary—Cretan archers, Moorish javelineers, Spanish infantry, Gallic cavalry, who were needed to meet the light troops of Hannibal.

With these additions, we may reckon a consular army at from 20,000 to 24,000 men, consisting of two legions, each containing 4200 (rising occasionally to 5200) legionaries and 300 Roman horse, with 5000 foot and 900 horse of the allies.

The number of legions on foot rises in the second Punic war to as many as from eighteen to twenty-three—not, of course, acting in combination.

Development of the Legion.—The Greek phalanx of the Servian army, as a tactical body, lacked mobility. Against a Gallic charge or for mountain warfare it was useless. Only as strong as any one of its sides, its dislocation was disastrous, and it had no reserve. At the same time, the heavy burden of unpaid

¹ Numbering about 50,000 and furnishing the Legio Campana, so named because the largest number came from Campania.

² In case of necessity, and especially where a district was liable to be the seat of war, the proportion naturally rises.

service and the tributum rendered short campaigns a necessity to the small farmer. Strategy was out of the question. A series of gradual and undated changes in tactics and organisation leads us to the manipular legion. With the introduction of pay in 406 B.C., the burden of payment was shifted from the tribe to the treasury; the gradual accession of plebeians to high command improved the position of the common soldier. War ceased to be ruinous, and (*cf.* law of 342 B.C.¹) became actually attractive. Recruits pressed in with the prospect of pay, booty, and allotments of land. The civic system of classes gave way before the demand for men and for a more uniform armament required by the change of tactics. Position in the ranks was determined by age and experience rather than by wealth. The new levies were formed upon a reserve of professional, disciplined, experienced soldiers.

By a development of principles often attributed to Camillus, and already at work in the fourth century, open order was substituted for close formation. The new system was worked out in the Gallic and Samnite wars. The brigade was drawn up in three divisions. In front stood the younger men—Hastati—1200 strong; in the second line the Principes, men in the vigour of life, also 1200. A veteran corps of 600 Triarii acted as reserve; 1200 light-armed troops, or Velites, organised 211 B.C., take the place of the old Rorarii and Accensi. The heavy-armed troops were broken up into maniples or companies, ten in each line—each an independent tactical unit—consisting of 120 men, subdivided for mobility into two centuries of 60 (in the Triarii, 60 and 30 respectively). The maniples were arranged with distances of three feet between each rank and file—occasionally six feet—and with intervals of equal size between the companies, each interval covered by its rear company, like squares on a chess-board. The intervals served for the skirmishers, attached to the maniples—twenty to each century,—to advance or retire, left space to receive a broken or throw forward a reserve division, and permitted the passage of cavalry when the companies covered to form a column of cohorts. For probably as early as this, certainly by the time of Marius, the brigade was broken, as to its depth, into ten battalions of three companies, larger tactical bodies, called cohorts.

The so-called Quincunx order soon gave way to continuous lines. The names of the three ranks lost all connection with their armament. By this time the Triarii had temporarily dropped the

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 101.

pilum, and received the hasta or pike ; the two first lines were armed with the hurling pilum, the characteristic Roman arm, a formidable weapon of considerable range and penetration. The short, straight, stabbing Spanish sword was adopted in the second Punic war ; a short knife, bronze casque with plume, the oblong scutum, greave, and cuirass complete the ordinary equipment.

Each legion was officered by six tribunes, of whom those appointed to the regular four legions were chosen by the people, the rest by the commander, noble youths who made their office the first step in civil life, and served their preliminary campaigns in the cavalry or on the general's suite. Promotion in the ranks ceased with the centurions, sixty in number, two to each manipule, the senior commanding the company, among whom a regular order tended to be established from the lowest centurion of the first division to the primus pilus, or senior centurion of the Triarii.

Cavalry.—The regular cavalry, 300 strong, was divided into ten *turmæ* or squadrons of thirty men, each commanded by the senior decurion, with two decurions and three optiones under his orders. It was, strictly speaking, drawn from the richest citizens, and enjoyed triple pay and other privileges ; but the old eighteen centuries had become a parade corps, and the cavalry was chiefly supplied, first by volunteers, and then by allies and auxiliaries. It had been, and remained, a secondary matter, and proved itself, both in numbers and handling, a lasting weakness of the Roman service. At Capua (211 B.C.) it required to be strengthened by the new corps of Velites, who either acted as a sort of mounted infantry, riding *en croupe*, or closed the intervals of the maniples, or skirmished in double line before the heavy-armed.

Allies.—The contingents of the allies, armed, equipped, and organised in the Roman fashion, were formed into two *alæ*, each commanded by three Roman *præfecti socium*, with local officers beneath them. These were divided into cohorts 420 strong, each under a *præfect*—according to races—and subdivided into maniples and centuries. 1600 foot and 600 horse were normally selected to form a special corps of *Extraordinarii*. The cavalry was divided into squadrons 300 strong, with five *turmæ* of sixty each.

Tactics, &c.—The legions were levied on the Capitol, the allies raised by the several communities. The military oath was taken for the campaign to the commanding officer. On the march the army moved in a single column, unless in face of an enemy,

especially in the ensuing wars, developed into more elaborate orders of attack.

The new army was thus flexible and mobile, adapted to any ground, except for its weakness in cavalry, and not easily dislocated. Its units were independent, its soldiers well trained, with free play for their sword and shield. Its strict discipline, its remodelled organisation, its splendid physique and morale, made it the unequalled instrument of the broader offensive policy of the reformed Senate. With its camp and third division, its pilum and sword, it combined the principle of a reserve with the union of the offensive and defensive, and of the close and distant methods of fighting.

But good as were the soldiers, and careful as were the field exercise and minor tactics, Roman generals, unaccustomed to the handling of large forces, had no idea of larger tactics and comprehensive strategy. They could ill adapt their stiff dispositions and rigid manœuvring to new circumstances. They were incapable of even understanding a well-conceived campaign and the subtle combinations of genius. The election of two annual commanders without reference to military capacity, unfamiliar with their troops, ill instructed in the art of war, often at variance with each other, was a certain source of disaster. The absence of a permanent army and regular staff added to the peril, though no doubt an increasing reserve both of veterans and officers was gradually built up, and men of experience served among the legates and on the suite of the consul. However great the civic danger of continuous command and standing armies, militarily speaking the price paid was dear.

The Navy.—By the destruction of the Etruscan naval power, Syracuse had become the first maritime state, next to Carthage, of the West, and as such her subjugation was necessary to Carthage. In this task the Phœnician people had partially succeeded, while Rome had destroyed the power of Tarentum. Massilia confined herself to her own waters, and on the seas Rome and Carthage were left face to face.


Rome had been long accustomed to maritime commerce. We have evidence of early relations, not merely with Caere, but with Massilia, the Sicilian Greeks, Líbya, and even Greece itself; and, in days when piracy was respectable and privateering recognised in treaties, we must presuppose armed ships and some species of sea-police. But her war-marine, in spite of fitful outbursts of energy, as in 338, 313, and 311 B.C., though never wholly neglected,

was arrested in its progress by internal crises and continental war. Her weakness is expressed in the disastrous treaties of navigation with Carthage and Tarentum, by which her movements on the sea were seriously restricted.¹ The protection of the coast was entrusted to a chain of maritime colonies, and to the Greek communities of Lower Italy. In spite of the appointment of *duoviri navales* in 311, and of four *quæstores classici* in 267, and in spite of the appearance of a Roman squadron at Tarentum in 282, the terms of the Pœno-Roman treaty of alliance against Pyrrhus in 279 B.C., and the events of the first years of the Punic war reveal the starved condition of the fleet. Naval tactics and armament had made but slight progress in the ancient world since the days of the Athenian navy, and Rome especially had never realised the value of a fleet as an essential arm of her service. Her commercial marine was large; she had abundant timber, and there was probably no lack of triremes and galleys. Of *quinqueremes*, or ships of the line, she had perhaps none. Her crews were drawn from the lowest classes or from the allies. Her admirals, rash and headstrong, applied to naval warfare the maxims and tactics of a soldiers' battle. She had failed to organise the resources of Etruria and the cities of Magna Græcia, on whom, with Massilia and Syracuse, Apollonia, and even Rhodes, she relied for the nucleus of a fleet. From these sources on an emergency she might indeed equip a respectable squadron, but Carthage remained mistress of the Western waters; without her leave, she boasted, no Roman could wash his hands in the sea. The development and expansion of Rome were at her mercy. Commerce alone, therefore, would force Rome's attention to her natural outlets in the West. Italy was in a double danger from the commercial and naval supremacy and monopoly of Carthage. While her geographical position, with the protection of a fleet, rendered her the political and strategical centre of the Mediterranean, without that protection her long coast-line, so favourable

¹ The treaty of 509 B.C., probably renewed in 348 B.C., and the still more prohibitive treaty of 306 B.C., practically exclude Rome from the Western waters, and from free trade in Libya and Sardinia, while opening Carthage and Sicily. The coasts of Latium are guaranteed from Punic pirates. The treaty with Tarentum confined Roman vessels within the Lacinian promontory. However disputed in date, they afford evidence of Roman commerce. (*Vide* Strachan-Davidson, "Polybius," *Introd.*, *Exc. on Carth. Treaties.*) In 279 B.C. the Carthaginians undertake to provide ships for transport and naval warfare. *Cf.* p. 129.

to traffic, exposed her to attack at every vital point. Mere fortification was idle. Her extended sea-frontier, as with the Italy of to-day, demanded a powerful marine to ensure her independence. This necessity was not yet grasped, and to that error in conception was due the length of the impending struggle. Willingly or unwillingly, Rome must enter upon a Mediterranean policy. Like England in the days of Elizabeth or Cromwell, she must refuse to submit to an intolerable position. The serious problem of her policy is henceforth how to check the advance of Carthage to an absolute control of the Western Mediterranean. As Pyrrhus had foreseen, the battle of the elephant and whale was bound to come; and the natural field of war was the debatable ground of Sicily. Rome could not permit the extinction of Hellenism in Sicily, or the permanent occupation of Italian islands. Whatever the actual occasion or immediate motives and pretexts of the war, in this fact, seen or unseen, lay its ultimate necessity and justification.

Carthage.—(1) People.—The people of Kirjath-Hadeschath (Carthage, the "New Town") belonged to the Phœnician branch of the Semitic stock, to a nation of commercial pioneers, mechanics, artisans, and manufacturers. The Genoese of the old world, they covered the seas with a network of factories, and the lands with the lines of their caravan-routes, from the coast of Coromandel to the mines of Cornwall. Ingenious and self-reliant, with little original culture and slight assimilating power, lacking also many of the higher instincts of political life, they were the porters of civilisation, the carriers of the world, whose genius for utilising the discoveries of others, whose steady power of resistance and strong local attachments, aided a shrewd commercial policy of discreet submission and masterly inactivity to preserve their individuality as a nation, and even their status as a power. Retiring from the Eastern Mediterranean before the developing energy of Greece, their essentially pacific and mercantile bias drove them to seek outlets for their colonisation and commerce in the West. Their settlements were not garrisoned fortresses, but civic factories dotted among the western islands and along the Spanish and African coast. Of these, not the earliest, originally even a dependency perhaps of Utica, Carthage, by her favourable situation and the vigour of her inhabitants, became by degrees the most prominent, and concentrated the Phœnicians of the West into a single powerful state. The city was founded, about 100 years before Rome, on a small hilly



THE SMALLER CISTERNS AT CARTHAGE.

peninsula jutting out into the Bay of Tunis, not far from the ancient mouth of the Bagradas. It consisted later of a citadel—Byrsa—of the Cothon or harbour-quarter, and the Megara or suburbs, covering an area of twenty-three miles, with a population of nearly a million. The fortifications were stupendous, the harbour well situated, the territory fertile. To these advantages was due her rapid but unchronicled commercial and political development. Circumstances made her the natural head of the Western Phoenicians against the Greeks of Sicily, Cyrene, and Massilia. These energetic colonisers had already monopolised Eastern Sicily and Southern Italy. The Phocæans had penetrated to Spain. Massilia was founded in 600 B.C.; Selinus, 628; Agrigentum, 580. The Phœnician was now in danger of losing the control of the Western waters and the monopoly of the carrying trade. The necessary resistance was undertaken by Carthage. She entered into relations with Etruria and the natives of Sicily, and established an early intercourse with Latium. Motye, Panormus, and Solus riveted her hold on Western Sicily; Sardinia and the other Italian islands were annexed. The Phœnician settlements in Libya were brought to submission, and the Libyan farmers were reduced to fellaheen. Her rule extended from the desert to the Atlantic. Her revenue was swelled by the tribute of the subject Phœnician and African communities, by the mines of Spain and the commerce of the ocean. Her system of agriculture and plantation was the model of the ancient



SICULO-PUNIC TETRADRACHM—HEAD OF PERSEPHONE, WITH DOLPHINS.

world. She had changed from a commercial to a conquering power; her fleet had made the Western Mediterranean a Punic lake. The decline of Tyre and Sidon left her the first Semitic state and the commercial capital of the world.

2. **Organisation of her Dominions.**—That state consisted of a

Libyan and a Colonial Empire. To the first belonged, beside the actual citizens, the native Libyans, the Liby-Phœnicians, the confederate cities, and the dependent Numidian, or Berber, tribes. The Libyans, with precarious rights under an arbitrary government, were a standing danger. The Liby-Phœnicians were partly half-castes, partly a legal class corresponding to the "Latin name" in the Roman system. The confederate cities, except Utica, enjoyed a strictly limited autonomy. The Numidians, with their magnificent cavalry and uncertain temper, were at once the strength and weakness of the military organisation. The Colonial Empire included the North African settlements, the factories and mines of Andalusia (Gades, 1000 B.C.), the Balianic islands, the coast of Sardinia, Malta, and the West Sicilian fortresses. In Sicily the Greeks and Phœnicians lived side by side, in spite of the crushing defeat of the latter at Himera in 480 B.C., till the fall of the Etruscans left Carthage on the seas face to face with Syracuse. A series of devastating wars, with many changes of fortune, ensued, lasting two centuries and a half, destroyed the most flourishing of the intermediate states, and ended in the ruin of the naval power of Syracuse, which had been, with Tarentum and Rhegium, the objective of Punic effort. The maritime supremacy and commercial monopoly so gained were maintained by jealous cruelty and prohibitive treaties. The organisation of the foreign empire, however adapted to the purposes of commerce, was too loose for military necessities, especially for those of defensive warfare. Its maintenance depended on the effective control of the sea.

Home Government. — The home government, originally a monarchy, had become a republic. Occidental in character, it preserved its municipal institutions, and, in spite of the fickle populace, enjoyed a high reputation for stability. The constitution has been described as "an oligarchy at home, a monarchy in the field." Its general spirit was highly oligarchical. A few noble and wealthy families monopolised office and controlled the machinery of government. A steady development without violent reaction, peace and prosperity at home, extension of empire abroad, bear witness to their sagacity and success. Of the elements of the constitution little is clearly known. Up to the fifth century the chief magistrates seem to have been two *suffetes* or judges, annually elected, whose prerogatives had dwindled to religious and judicial functions and the presidency of the Senate. The latter was a numerous body, with inner committees, which transacted the ordinary business of the state. In case of disagreement between it and the *suffes*,

the question was referred to the people. The conduct of affairs in the field passed from the *suffes* to the general, who exercised abroad a dictatorship tempered by crucifixion. The indefinite term and undivided command contrast favourably with the Roman system, though the general was often hampered by the presence in the army of a certain number of senators. The office became at one time almost hereditary in the families of Mago and Hamilcar, but never grew into an actual despotism. The offices of the state were either purchasable or, at least, so expensive that they were open only to the rich. Both the Senate and officers were largely controlled by the council of 104 ("centum iudices"), the keystone of the oligarchical constitution, whose original functions expanded into a general supervision, like that of the Spartan Ephors. Whatever its origin, it absorbed the reality of power, calling officials to account, assigning punishments, and interfering in every department. It was, in fact, an oligarchic board constituted by co-optation. The people, traders and seamen, with no middle class between them and the lords, corrupt and ungovernable, had few definite political rights and small political influence. In later times the power of the democracy was developed by the patriotic opposition, which supported the Barcine family. This constitution was the growth of circumstances and centuries, and in its best epoch was an oligarchy, clear-sighted, consistent, and moderate, but narrow, suspicious, and exclusive.

3. **Resources.**—It remains to estimate the resources of Carthage for the war. She was the centre of capital; her revenues were



SICULO-PUNIC TETRADRACHM—HEAD OF PERSEPHONE, WITH DOLPHINS.

immense; she had highly developed the means and methods of agriculture and finance. She was rich in tributes and customs, and the produce of her colonies and mines. Besides her citizen militia, she raised for foreign service in her transmarine possessions huge

armies of mercenaries and conscripts. In these motley hosts, round the Phœnician officers and the small nucleus of citizens who supported the commander and acted as a bodyguard and last reserve, gathered the Libyan light or heavy foot, Iberian heavy cavalry and infantry (the best in her pay), hardy active Ligurians, the splendid slingers of the Balaric Islands, an occasional corps of Campanians or Greeks, and rash, ill-disciplined hordes of huge half-naked Gauls. Her Numidian cavalry, a service to which Carthage paid especial attention, was the finest light horse in the world. Her magazines were full of stores, her stables of elephants. In the skill and daring of her navigators, in the build and size of her ships, she was vastly superior to Rome. The rich plains of Africa were free from the scourge of war and safe under cover of her fleet. A defeat cost nothing but cash ; war was a speculation waged with limited liability. On the other hand, her tributes and customs were liable to fail her at a crisis ; she had no regular army ; her militia, however brave, lacked training and permanence ; her people as a whole were unequal to the Roman people as a whole ; her subjects less faithful. Her mercenary troops, whose very variety was dangerous to any but a consummate commander, and a delusive security against revolt, for all her jealous surveillance and cruel discipline, were costly, dangerous, and untrustworthy. Her infantry was weak, her cavalry not wholly reliable ; she possessed no fortresses and no friends. Taxation and conscription, ruthlessly carried out, filled her subjects with a deadly hatred. The expeditions of Agathocles and Regulus showed the inner weakness of her political and military system. With the same oligarchical constitution and the same tendency to limit her executive, Rome possessed a Senate more open and representative, less hampered in a crisis by internal difficulties. Her subjects were more homogeneous ; geographically and politically she was more compact. She was strong in the simplicity, reverence, earnestness of her people, and in her iron resolution, tenacity, and self-restraint. Her slow constitutional progress, the concentration of practical ability in the Senate, her citizen-army, her fortresses, and, above all, the solidarity of her people enabled her to meet successfully the navies, the capital, the genius and courage, of Carthage.

We know little of the history, the constitution, the literature and character, of the Carthaginians. What we learn is derived entirely from the accounts of their enemies. But we know enough to see that the charges of cruelty and faithlessness have been

exaggerated, that the sneer at a "nation of shopkeepers" is unjust. She produced the greatest statesmen and generals of this age. The combatants in the struggle were not ill matched—a struggle which began as a war of nations and ended as a duel between a nation and a man.



SICULO-PUNIC TETRADRACHM—HEAD OF HERAKLES (MILKARTH).

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Rome and Messana—Outbreak of First Punic War	264	490
Hiero makes Peace and Alliance with Rome	263	491
Fall of Agrigentum	262	492
The new Fleet and the Battle of Mylæ	260	494
Regulus in Africa	256-255	498-499
Victory of Panormus—Siege of Lilybæum begun	250	504
Hamilcar Barca in Sicily	247-241	507-513
Victory of the Ægates Insulæ	241	513
Peace made	241	513

Causes of War.—The natural battlefield of Rome and Carthage was, geographically and politically, Sicily, which had already been the seat of the struggle of Semite and Hellene. The result of the long wars, which had resolved themselves into a contest between Carthage and Syracuse, had been to leave the Halycus the boundary between the two peoples. On the expulsion of Pyrrhus the south-eastern corner alone remained in the hands of Syracuse.

The relations of Rome with her rival up to the Pyrrhic war had been confined mainly to maritime and commercial affairs. The treaties already mentioned reveal, only with increasing clearness, the naval impotence of the Latin state. The alliance of 279 B.C.

was due to the pressure of a common fear, and led to small results. The collision at Tarentum in 272 B.C. was followed in 264 by the affair of Messana, the immediate occasion of the war.

Messana.—A free company of Campanian mercenaries who had served under Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, had, after his death, captured Messana by treason, ejected the inhabitants, and divided their property. Under the name of Mamertines they held the key of Sicily, and, in concert with the mutinous Campanian legion which had seized Rhegium, controlled the passage of the straits. While Rome crushed her rebel troops, and recalled the citizens of Rhegium, the Syracusans, relieved from the evils of sedition and the pressure of Carthage by the victories of Pyrrhus and the skill and policy of Hiero II., besieged the Mamertines in Messana. By his successes in the field, the able and sagacious Hiero, whose prudence, moderation, and firmness had already restored the affairs of his country, paved at once his own way to monarchy, and compelled the Mamertines to appeal for help to Rome and Carthage. Anxious to prevent the extension of Syracuse, the Punic admiral, Hannibal, temporarily occupied the citadel. Later on, joint action with Syracuse against the Mamertines seemed advisable, till the latter, hard pressed by the siege and divided sharply into factions, placed themselves at one moment under the protection of Rome, and shortly after accepted a Punic garrison under the command of Hanno. It was natural for Carthage to treat foreign intervention in Sicily as a *casus belli*. The question for Rome was more difficult. Honour, gratitude to Hiero, and her own procedure at Rhegium forbade her to support the rebels of Messana. It meant, besides, war with her own allies—a transmarine war. It would be the first step out of Italy, the end of a definite continental policy, the beginning of a policy of adventure, whose issue it might be difficult to see. At the same time it was necessary to check Carthage, to secure the straits, and to grasp the key of Sicily, if not to complete Italy by the conquest of her islands. The Senate hesitated to decide; the assembly, "with a light heart," assumed the protectorate of the Mamertines. Interest carried the day against the claims of public morality.

The Carthaginians met the demands of Rome with studied moderation. War was not formally declared, but a Roman army and transports arrived at Rhegium, while a Punic fleet lay in the harbour of Messana. Gaius Claudius, the energetic emissary of the consul, took advantage of the difficult situation, amused

the deluded admiral, and by adroit treachery seized the city, which was besieged by Hiero and a second Hanno in concert. The consul Appius Claudius Caudex crossed the straits by night, evading the Punic fleet, defeated the allies in detail, and raised the siege. The first campaign, in spite of the subsequent disastrous retreat of Claudius from Syracuse, had been so far successful.

Rome and Hiero.—In the following year, however, two consular armies entered Sicily. The sufferings of Appius' troops and his comparative failure had shown the danger of throwing an army upon an island unsupported by a fleet. In the meantime ships had been rapidly built or collected, and with their aid the consul M'. Valerius Maximus was able to achieve a considerable victory near Messina over the united Carthaginians and Syracusans, earning thereby a triumph and the surname *Messalla*. Sixty-seven cities passed over to Rome, and the far-sighted Hiero, already distrustful of the energy and loyalty of Carthage, gladly threw over his uncongenial alliance, surrendered his prisoners, paid a war indemnity, and secured the favour of Rome. He remained a faithful and trusted ally whose value was often felt, as the Romans in Sicily, in face of the Carthaginian superiority at sea, had largely to depend on Syracuse for supplies.

Agrigentum.—Unreadiness, negligence, or internal troubles had cost Carthage her hold on Eastern Sicily. She now bestirred herself. A large force of mercenaries was thrown into the once populous Agrigentum, under the command of Hannibal, son of Gisco. It was still, in spite of its losses in previous wars, the second Greek city of the island, and by its strong position, and nearness to Syracuse, offered a convenient base of operations. Its one weakness was its distance from the sea and the fleet, from which supplies would be drawn. Unable to storm, the consuls blockaded the town, and cut its communications by means of two fortified camps and a double line of entrenchments. In spite of the capture of the Roman magazines at Erbessus, Hanno, who had been at length despatched in October to the rescue, was compelled by the distress of the besieged to risk a general action. His infantry was decisively defeated and a sortie in force repelled. The elephants, employed by Carthage for the first time, did themselves no credit. Hannibal escaped by night through the hostile lines, leaving the town and its inhabitants to the tender mercies of Romans irritated by a seven months' siege. Masters of Agrigentum, Messina, and Syracuse, the Romans

pushed their fortune among the inland towns and drove the enemy stoutly back upon the western strongholds. Their ideas extended now to the expulsion of Carthage from Sicily. But to bring matters to a decisive issue meant carrying the war into the enemy's country. They were learning their lesson—a lesson driven home by the activity of the Punic fleet, which relieved or subdued the maritime towns of Sicily, harassed the Italian coasts, and scourged Italian commerce.


The New Fleet.—Carthage needed a trustworthy infantry, Rome an effective fleet. We must not exaggerate the naval weakness of Rome, nor can we accept the legend of the building of the fleet. Rome had docks and ships and allies, and though the vessels of the Greek states were mainly triremes and penteconters, it is incredible that no city in Italy should have possessed a quinquereme. The Romans, it is true, were no sailors; they disliked the service and neglected the fleet, while naval tactics and shipbuilding were certainly at a low ebb; but we cannot believe that a fleet of one hundred ships of the line and twenty frigates, modelled on a stranded Punic quinquereme,¹ equipped in sixty days, and manned by land-lubbers taught to row on shore, should have been able to meet and defeat the well-built ships and trained seamen of Carthage. To the nucleus of ships that she possessed already, or had rapidly collected from the allies, Rome added a large number of new vessels, hastily built and equipped at the various ports. The officers and crews were largely provided by the allies, supplemented by proletarians and slaves. The practical experiences, however, of the last two years had probably convinced the Romans that new methods were necessary. In all the movements of ancient naval tactics—breaking the line, ramming, crushing through and disabling the oarage—everything depended, as the sails and masts were cleared for action, on the strength of the ship, the skill of the steersman, and, above all, on the combined and controlled action of the huge body of rowers. In the number and manœuvring power of her ships, the experience of her officers, and the precision of her oarsmen Rome was vastly inferior. As fighting-men, however, even her sailors were superior, man for man, to the “rabble of an African crew.”

The Corvus.—The invention of the corvus,² or swinging

¹ Wrecked in the straits of Messina four years before.

² A mast 24 feet high was fixed on the prow; round it swung a gangway 4 feet wide × 36 feet long, with parapets on each side. It swung in a hole cut 12 feet from the end of the gangway, and was so made that it could be drawn

boarding-bridge, and a large increase in the marines enabled personal qualities to compensate for tactical deficiencies. It utilised the superiority of the Roman soldier by substituting close combat for clever manœuvres. Ten marines were enough for an



THE COLUMNA ROSTRATA (*rostrata*).

Athenian trireme with a total crew of nearly 200; the Roman man-of-war, with its 310 oarsmen, carried a complement of 120.

Duilius.—The fleet sailed for Sicily under the command of

up close to the mast. It was suspended from a pulley on the mast-head by a rope attached to a hook at its farther end, and lowered with a rush. A heavy grappling-spike was fixed at the same extremity. To clear the bulwarks and improve the blow, it was fastened to the mast 12 feet above the deck, and therefore the first 12 feet must have been connected by a hinge to make it accessible. It played freely round the mast and could be lowered on either side. The soldiers, covered by their shields and the parapets, boarded two abreast. It also served to break the force of the enemy's impact.

Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who succeeded in losing his advanced squadron of seventeen sail, and earning the nickname Asina, by falling into a Punic trap at Lipara. The remainder of the fleet, under the land-general C. Duilius, gained a complete and surprising victory over the fleet of Hannibal, 130 strong, at Mylae, a promontory to the north-west of Messina (260 B.C.). The success was due as much to the contemptuous carelessness of the Carthaginians as to the novel tactics of Duilius. Hurrying to the attack in sanguine disorder, they were astonished, puzzled, and discomfited by the swiftly turning *Raven*. The moral effect was immense. Carthage had been beaten at sea with a loss of fifty ships; the siege of Segesta was promptly raised. Signal honours

CORNELIO FSCIPIO
IDILES COSOL CESOR

HONCOINOPIRVME COSENTIONTR
DVONORO OTVM OFVISE VIRO
LVCIOM SCIPIONE FILIOS BARBATI
NSOL CENSOR AIDILIS HIC FVET A
CCEPIT CORSICA ALERIAQVE VRBE
DET TEMPESTATE BVSAIDE MERETO


EPITAPH OF LUCIUS SCIPIO.

awaited the plebeian admiral; the Columna Rostrata commemorated the event.

In the following years the skill and energy of the earlier Hamilcar, basing on Panormus, improved the position of Carthage, which was further strengthened by the fortification of Drepana. The severe measures taken by Rome with the helpless Greek states at once impaired her hold on Sicily and damaged the prize of victory. Meanwhile L. Scipio, the grandfather of Africanus, had beaten Hanno and captured Aleria, in Corsica, the timber depôt of Carthage, and ravaged the rich and populous Sardinia, whose mines of silver, lead, and iron, and wealth of corn made her a valued element of strength.

In Sicily towns continued to be taken and retaken, the land wasted and depopulated. Nor was the situation changed by the indecisive sea-fight at Tyndaris (257 B.C.). With considerable losses Rome maintained, on the whole, her superiority.

Attack on Africa.—Tired of the fluctuation of the Sicilian war, the Senate now determined by a bold stroke to assume a strong offensive and transfer the war to Africa. Trade was ruined, Italy harassed; Rome was draining away her life-blood; the impatience of the allies at the naval conscription had almost broken into actual mutiny. Carthage, safe at home, easily renewed her



PLAN OF ECNOMUS.

fleet, and raised fresh armies of aliens. The attack on Africa may, of course, have been intended only as a powerful diversion; in any case, had Rome concentrated her energy upon it, the internal weakness of Carthage and the absence of fortresses would have ensured complete success. It demanded a powerful fleet to convoy a strong army and secure its communications, and accordingly vast naval preparations were made, to which Carthage, spurred by memories of the raid of Agathocles, responded with equal vigour.

Ecnomus.—Off Ecnomus, half-way between Gela and Agrigen-

tum, the Roman fleet of 330 ships, carrying 40,000 picked troops and 100,000 seamen, under the consulars M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Volso, was met by Hamilcar and Hanno with 350 ships and 150,000 men. The Punic fleet advanced in a long line of four divisions to meet the Roman wedge, its left thrown forward at an obtuse angle, resting on the Sicilian coast; its right outflanking the Romans, who moved forward in a hollow triangle, led by the consuls—a defensive formation, in which each prow, with its corvus, covered the unprotected stern of the ship in front. The base-division towed the transports; the rear was covered by the fourth division. The wedge, intended to split the Punic line, was itself broken by the withdrawal of the hostile centre and its own hasty advance; the Punic right fell on the rear-guard, their left on the third division, which had thrown off the transports. Outmanœuvred and outsailed, the Romans, by sheer force and the corvus, were able to defeat the enemy's centre and relieve their hard-pressed rear. They had lost twenty-four ships and taken or destroyed ninety-four. After delay for repairs, the fleet proceeded to Africa, and disembarked the troops at Clupea, where an entrenched camp secured their base (256 B.C.).

Regulus.—The first blunder of the campaign was the failure to march at once on Carthage; the second was the recall, in accordance with Roman routine and red-tape, of one of the consuls with his army. The recall of the bulk of the fleet was the worst blunder of all. But the whole business, whether due to the limited ideas of the Senate, or to constitutional eccentricities, or to the incapacity and self-esteem of Regulus, was a hopeless bungle. Regulus, however, with his "adequate force" of 40 ships, 15,000 infantry, and 500 cavalry—barely a consular army—was able to carry on the devastation of the rich and beautiful country, with its villas and gardens, its vineyards and olive-groves, to defeat the local leaders, capture the open cities, and establish himself for the winter at Tunes. Hamilcar, recalled from Sicily, joined Hasdrubal and Bostar with a strong detachment; but the bulk of the troops were absent, the country was unprepared, the militia inadequate, and the ever-suspicious oligarchy, even in its hour of danger, distrusted its leaders and divided the command. The disunited chiefs, ignorant of their real strength, mismanaged the campaign. But what Regulus gained by the difficulties of Carthage and the folly of her leaders he lost by the rash and brutal insolence of his demands. The suffering and overcrowded city, hemmed in by the Romans and distressed by Numidian in-

cursions, was inclined to treat, but rejected with scorn the ultimatum of the consul and prepared for a passionate defence. Recruits were raised. Xanthippus, a trained Spartan officer, supported by popular feeling in his outspoken contempt for Punic tactics, taught them the value and use of cavalry and elephants, drilled a competent infantry, and inspired confidence by his obvious ability in handling the troops. His organising talent and tactical skill decided the issue. The incapable proconsul had neglected his rear and wasted his resources; his strength was inadequate to a siege; he was terribly inferior in cavalry. Forced to accept battle on a plain, he was thoroughly beaten and himself taken prisoner. The remnant of his army—the rest had been stamped out under the feet of the elephants—was rescued by a Roman fleet, whose commanders lost all the credit gained in a battle off the Hermæan Cape¹ by the obstinacy which sacrificed an immense number of their ships in a storm off the south coast of Sicily (255 B.C.).

The fate of Regulus is uncertain. He lived some time at Carthage; but the story of his mission to Rome, his refusal to see his family, his return to Carthage, and death there under cruel tortures, is a highly coloured legend that possibly covers a true tale of a bloody Roman vengeance.

Africa had been evacuated, but with a new fleet² rapidly equipped Cn. Cornelius Scipio surprised the rich and populous Panormus, and acquired a new and important base. The north coast of Sicily was now practically Roman. Carthage, occupied at home, made little resistance. In 253 B.C. a further disaster due to bad seamanship cost the Romans 150 ships and reduced the fleet to convoy-duty and coast defence. In 252 the Romans took Himera, Thermæ, and Lipara. Meanwhile Hasdrubal had reinforced Carthago at Libyæum with 30,000 men and 140 elephants. The hostile armies treated each other with distant respect. The Romans had not forgotten their fear of elephants; Hasdrubal distrusted his infantry.

Panormus.—Next year the brilliant victory of L. Cæcilius Metellus at Panormus (250 B.C.), restored confidence and demonstrated the danger of elephants as an arm of war. Drawn by every art under the walls of the town, assailed from battlements and trenches by a storm of missiles, the maddened brutes turned

¹ A victory grossly exaggerated or turned to very little account.

² Two hundred and twenty ships, said to have been built in three months.

and trampled down the following infantry. The rout was completed by a successful sortie. One hundred and four elephants graced the triumph of Metellus.



DENARIUS STRUCK CIRCA 133 B.C., TO COMMEMORATE VICTORY OF PANORMUS.

Terms offered by Carthage were rejected. With this embassy is connected the mission of Regulus (*vide supra*), but the whole story is doubtful. It was customary to ransom prisoners, and Rome especially had no reason to refuse. A new fleet of 200 sail and a double consular army besieged Lilybæum (the modern Marsala).

Siege of Lilybæum.—This siege brings us to the crisis of the war. Here had Carthage concentrated her resources in a strongly fortified position, on a promontory, the extreme west point of Sicily, commanding communications with Africa. Its magnificent lines and difficult harbour, the genius of Himilco, and the tenacity of Semites preserved the virgin fortress through a siege of unparalleled length, in which every means of attack and defence was exhausted. The Roman force may have reached, with crews and allies, a total of 100,000; to meet which Himilco disposed of 10,000 infantry, 7000 cavalry, and a large population. Regular siege-works were pushed forward—trenches, approaches, and mines. Greek skill provided machines and engines of attack. They were met by inner walls and counter-mines and endless bloody sallies. Brilliant incidents diversified the record of hard work and hard fighting. Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, with fifty ships and 10,000 men, steered by clever pilots, audaciously burst through the blockading line, borne on a rising wind and swelling sea, relieved the garrison, and removed the useless cavalry to prey effectively on the Roman rear. A namesake of his, surnamed the Rhodian, several times ran the gauntlet of the whole fleet with a single swift ship to bring supplies. Finally Himilco burnt the Roman works and converted the siege into a dogged but in-

effective blockade, rendered possible to the wretched and starving Romans only by the aid of Hiero. In 249 B.C. P. Claudius Pulcher, a haughty aristocrat, arrived with fresh crews and orders.

III A



X

MILESTONE OF P. CLAUDIUS PULCHER AND OF C. FURIUS (ÆDILES).¹

Drepana.—Weary of the fruitless assault of this Sicilian Sebastopol, he attempted, with the best of the decaying ships and a picked force, to carry Drepana by a *coup-de-main*. Adherbal, taken by surprise in the early morning, availed himself of the curving conformation of the harbour and the cover of an island to stand out to sea along the northern, as the consul coasted in, ship by ship, along the southern, shore. Having thus outflanked the enemy, he was able to crush the clumsily turning Roman ships against a hostile coast. Claudius escaped with a shameful loss of ninety-three ships. The sceptical consul, who had flung the sacred chickens into the sea that "they might drink if they would not eat," and had contemptuously nominated a servant as dictator, was fined if not exiled. Aulus Atilius Calatinus was created dictator, the first appointed for command outside Italy. The disaster of Drepana was completed by the utter destruction,


¹ This milestone from the Appian Way is the earliest extant.

on the south coast of Sicily, of the immense Roman transport-fleet under L. Junius Pullus. Carthage, by her one naval victory, had regained the mastery of the sea, and her admirals followed up their success with judgment and energy. But owing to exhaustion, indolence, or economy, possibly to internal troubles caused by the cruel severity of her taxation, she failed to push her advantage by land against the besieging army. Calatinus maintained his position. She neither hindered nor helped her only general, the kingly statesman and soldier, Hamilcar Barca, who, by strict discipline and a policy of patience, by a war of outposts, incursions, and privateering, was creating a trustworthy and attached infantry out of his mutinous and fickle mercenaries. Rome was also exhausted. Her loss in men and material, the damage to trade and agriculture, had been enormous. Her burgess roll fell by a sixth between 253 B.C. and 247; the coinage had been debased; taxation heavily increased. She had no fleet and no generals, and contented herself with founding new citizen colonies to protect the coast. The only relief in Sicily was the capture of Eryx by Pullus with the remnant of his shipwrecked crews.

Hamilcar Barca.—The last years of the war were uneventful, and resolved themselves into a display of accomplished "military pugilism." From his impregnable post on Mount Ercte (Monte Pellegrino), an isolated rock rising sharply from the sea, severed from the other hills, with a little haven at its base, Hamilcar threatened Panormus and harassed the Romans in Sicily and at home, hampering their communications and cutting off their supplies. In 244 B.C. he transferred himself to Mount Eryx, close to Drepana, and in this difficult position, between the Roman garrison on the summit and the Roman camp at the base, he fought his drawn battle to the end, schooling his attached troops and teaching a succession of consuls the art of war. At length Rome roused herself to a supreme effort. A compulsory loan repayable by the state, or a voluntary contribution in the Athenian manner, created a fleet at private cost of 200 ships of the line, of light build and good construction, either newly modelled on a captured ship or taken from the swarm of privateers which had recently, combining patriotism and profit, taken the place of a Roman navy and ravaged the African coast.

Ægates Insulæ.—With these, in the twenty-third year of the war, C. Lutatius Catulus occupied the harbours of Lilybæum and Drepana, trained and practised his sailors unceasingly, and in the spring of 241 B.C., brought the war to a close by the de-

struction of the hastily equipped fleet of 250 sail, with transports, sent under Hanno to relieve the fortress. The Carthaginians, with their heavy overladen ships, forced to engage, like the Spanish Armada, before they could embark their real commander, Hamilcar, were outsailed and tactically beaten by the patriotic fleet, temporarily commanded by P. Valerius Falto, in spite of the high sea and favourable wind (March 10, 241 B.C.). This defeat at the Ægatian Islands broke the spirit of Carthage. Her reserve was exhausted. The fortresses must fall.



REMAINS OF THE TOWN OF ERYX.

Peace.—Hamilcar received full powers to treat. Refusing to lay down his arms and evacuate as a preliminary, he induced Lutatius, anxious to conclude the war himself, to accede to more favourable conditions. The provisional treaty was rejected by the people, but a commission of ten appointed by the Senate concluded a definitive peace upon the spot. They raised the amount of the indemnity and shortened the term for payment. Carthage was to pay 3200 Euboic talents (£790,000) in ten years, to surrender Sicily and the islands between Sicily and Italy, and to give up all prisoners without ransom. The integrity of the Carthaginian state

was guaranteed, and Hamilcar departed with the honours of war. To compensate her immense losses, Rome had gained her first province and the control of her own seas.

Carthage, hard hit in mercenaries, revenues, and trade, had lost her naval prestige and commercial monopoly. In spite of her seamanship she had been constantly defeated on her own element. Sicily, the object of the efforts and sacrifices of centuries, had been lost. From Lilybæum, her foe controlled the passage between the eastern and western basins of the Mediterranean and threatened the defences of the capital. Her resources were, however, as elastic as her spirit. She soon recovered from her prostration, and her losses in Sicily were soon redressed by the Barcid conquest of Spain.

The conduct of the war on both sides had been weak and vacillating, without clear objective or definite policy, a fact due to novel conditions and divided counsels. It had brought out the essential defects of both systems. An organisation adapted to short campaigns, resting on the capital and the Italian fortresses, was unsuited to wide combinations and distant regions, to maritime war and protracted sieges. With equal distinctness was revealed the rottenness of an organisation which rested on a mercenary infantry. The struggle had ended in a suspension of hostilities. It was but the tedious prologue to the deadly duel. Carthage retained the Western Mediterranean ; Rome was launched on her career of conquest.¹

CHAPTER XIX

THE EXTENSION OF ITALY TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES

	B.C.		A.U.C.	
The Mercenary War at Carthage .	241-237		513-517	
Gallic Wars	238-236	226-222	516-518	528-532
Illyrian Wars	230-229	219	524-525	535

Revolt of the Mercenaries at Carthage.—Before passing to the next stage in the story of Roman expansion abroad, and of the grave social and political changes which that expansion involved, we have to describe the extension of Roman Italy to its natural

¹ The internal history will be reserved till the close of the period.

boundaries. One series of events in foreign history, however—the so-called “Truceless War,” the struggle of Carthage with her revolted mercenaries and subjects—is of importance for us as throwing light upon the internal weakness of that state and her relation to her African subjects. Its importance for Rome lies in the delay it imposed upon the far-reaching plans of Hamilcar. The details of the war belong to Carthaginian history. Disaffection had broken out among the unpaid and not yet disbanded veterans of Sicily, who had been allowed, on the evacuation of the island, to gather in force at Carthage, and had been alternately cheated and coaxed by a weak and impecunious government. It swelled to a mutiny under the leadership of Spendius, a Campanian deserter, Matho, a Libyan, and Autaritus, a Gaul. The miscellaneous rabble of mercenaries was joined by the Libyan subjects, who rose *en masse* to avenge the conscriptions, extortions, and evictions under which they writhed.

After a desperate and ferocious struggle, prolonged by the dissensions and incapacity of the Punic leaders, the mutiny was stamped out in blood by Hamilcar Barca.

Sardinia.—To complete the troubles of Carthage, Rome, who, with a loyalty due possibly to exhaustion, had permitted the way Hiero to assist with supplies and men the tottering state, and, by prolonging the life of Carthage, to secure the existence of Syracuse; who had rejected the overtures of the rebels in Utica and Sardinia; who had shown an unwonted courtesy and sense of treaty obligation when it was in her power to complete the ruin of her rival, Rome succumbed to temptation, and in response to an appeal from the Sardinian mutineers, occupied the rich and valuable island. The mercenaries were hard pressed by the natives, and the Romans, in accepting their invitation, with characteristic sophistry



COIN STRUCK AT CARTHAGE—HEAD OF PERSEPHONE.

treated Sardinia as a masterless land. A remonstrance from Carthage was met with a blank menace of war (238 B.C.). She was

forced to resign Sardinia and Corsica, and to pay an indemnity of 1200 talents (£292,000). Rome had gained a province—organised in 231 B.C.—and secured the control of her own waters. By this act of simple brigandage, and by her high-handed support of her blockade-running subjects, she kindled, to her cost, the undying hatred of Hamilcar and prepared the just and terrible vengeance of the Hannibalic war.

Sicily.—In Sicily, Hiero had been left an independent prince; the remainder of the ruined and depopulated island was organised under a temporary arrangement till the establishment of a regular provincial government in 227 B.C. The old policy of isolation broke up the existing groups of states and shattered existing ties and relations. Messina became a federated state; some few were left free and untaxed; a large number retained their autonomy on payment of a tithe of their produce (*decumæ*); a large number again saw their land converted to *ager publicus*, leased by the Roman censor.¹ The removal of the *ius commercii* between states threw large masses of land into the possession of the Romans and the few privileged Sicilians. Prices fell, agriculture declined, big estates, plantations, and the slave system spread in all directions.

Italy.—In Italy proper, except the absurd revolt of Falerii, crushed after six days' war, and the formation of colonies,² there is no matter of military importance. The predatory incursions of the Ligurians gave trouble for some years, while the stubborn inhabitants of Sardinia and Corsica offered a steady resistance to the conquerors. In 238 B.C. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus defeated the Ligurians and was active in the islands, in 236–235 the Carthaginians fomented disturbances in all three regions, and T. Manlius Torquatus defeated the Sardinians. The disturbances continued without decisive action down to 230. Turning to the Adriatic, we find that the line of colonies guarding the coast had been completed by the foundation of Brundisium.

The Illyrians.—The Adriatic had become a Roman sea, covered with Roman ships. Occupied hitherto with the Punic war, Roman policy in the East had confined itself to watching Macedonia and Syria and maintaining relations with Egypt, which had treated Rome with respectful attention since the em-

¹ This organisation was not completed till 210 B.C. Cf. pp. 211, 212.

² Viz., besides the burgess-colonies at Æsium and Alsium (247 B.C.), and Fregennæ (245 B.C.), the Latin colonies at Pæstum, and Cosa (on Lucanian coast?) (273 B.C.), Beneventum and Ariminum (268 B.C.), Firmum (264 B.C.), Æsernia (263 B.C.), Brundisium (244 B.C.), and Spoletium (241 B.C.).

bassy of Ptolemy Philadelphus in 273 B.C. In Greece the constant jars of the Achæan and Ætolian leagues, of Sparta and of Macedon, spared her the trouble of interference. On the sea, however, the decay of the Greek fleets, the naval weakness of Rome, and her innate aversion from salt water, left a free hand to the pirates who flourished under the favour of Macedonia. The difficult waters and dangerous coast, avoided by Greek colonisation, formed an excellent school of hardy sailors and a safe retreat for the light Liburnian cutters. Here piracy had been ever at home, fitfully restrained by the sea-police of Corcyra or Syracuse. By this time the Illyrian buccaneers mustered powerful squadrons, which harried the coasts and swept the seas as far as Messene. The forces of King Agron and his widow Teuta made themselves felt in continental affairs. At length the complaints of the Greek commercial towns, Issa, Pharos, Epidamnus, and Apollonia, and the losses sustained by Roman trade, drew an embassy from the Senate to the rulers of Scodra (Scutari). Queen Teuta declared herself ready to observe a correct attitude towards Rome in her public capacity, but was unable, she said, to restrict the private undertakings of her subjects on the high seas. Coruncanius retorted, with proper but ill-timed spirit, that the Romans would make it their business to improve the relations of sovereign and subject in Illyria. A murderous outrage upon the embassy was followed by war. A powerful fleet and army under the command of Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and L. Postumius Albinus, in a single campaign, relieved the Greek cities, captured Corcyra, which had been occupied by the Illyrians, and reduced the Queen to submission (229 B.C.). Her conquests were restored, her land made tributary, her armed ships forbidden to sail south of Lissus. The Greek states, Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Apollonia, entered the Roman alliance, and Demetrius of Pharos was rewarded for his well-timed help by territory in Dalmatia. The new possessions were placed under the general consular authority, with special subordinate officers in Corcyra and elsewhere. Rome had secured good harbours on the Adriatic, and a first foothold in Greece. She was recognised by the Greeks as a civilised state, welcomed as a liberator, and admitted to the mysteries of Eleusis and to the Isthmian games. The keys of the East were in her hand. Macedon did not stir.

Ten years later, Demetrius of Pharos, more shrewd than wise, relying on his connection with Antigonos Doseon, the victor of Sellasia, and on Rome's actual and expected difficulties with

Gauls and Carthaginians, treated the conditions of peace with open contempt and extended his rule in Illyria. Prompt action was demanded to secure Rome's flank in the obviously impending war with Carthage. L. Æmilius Paullus and M. Livius Salinator captured Pharos, drove Demetrius into exile, and settled the affairs of Illyria. Demetrius took refuge with Philip of Macedon. The two consuls were accused, and Livius condemned, for maladministration of the booty.

Cisalpine Gaul.—We have now to trace the extension of Rome to her natural boundary on the north. Political and military considerations pointed to the Alps as the scientific frontier of Italy. The plain of the Po and the passes of the mountains were held by Celtic tribes, her ancient and hereditary enemies. At the foot of the Alps, the Salassi and Taurini occupied the headwaters of the Po; the Insubres round Mediolanum, the Cenomani round Brixia and Cremona, and the Veneti, a non-Gallic clan, filled the space in order between the Po, the Alps, and the Gulf of Venice. To the south, the Ligures held the slopes of the Apennines from the Maritime Alps to Arretium and Pisæ. The right bank of the Po was held by the smaller tribes of the Anares and Lingones, below whom the strong Boii extended from Parma to Bologna. The Senones had once dwelt between the Apennines and the sea as far as Ancona. Of these, the Insubres, the Cenomani, and the Veneti remained neutral; the Senones were extinct.

Forty-five years had elapsed since the last Gallic war and the battle of the Vadimonian Lake. During the Pyrrhic and Punic wars the Gauls had fortunately kept the peace, but the younger generation was now in a state of ferment, and entered into communication with the Transalpine Celts. The first outbreak was not serious. In 238 and 237 B.C. the Gauls suffered some defeats, and in 236 a powerful Boian army reinforced by Transalpine Gauls, appeared before Ariminum, Rome's northern outpost, but was compelled by internal dissension to break up and to accept the moderate terms imposed.

Flaminius.—A second more serious outbreak was precipitated by the popular policy of C. Flaminius, tribune of the plebs. It was clearly necessary to strengthen the north-eastern frontier. It was possible to secure this end, and at the same time to relieve the peasantry, suffering under the effects of the long wars and the scarcity of money, to deplete the overcrowded capital and reward the veterans by allotting to colonists the *ager publicus* in Picenum and the land forfeited by the Senonian Gauls.

In 232 B.C. the popular leader carried his agrarian law in the teeth of the nobles and the financial class, who maintained their own interests in the system of pasturage and occupation and the accumulation of large slave-worked estates. The measure was excellent, the means dubious. The folly of the Senate compelled an appeal to the constitutional powers of the tribes, and Flaminius, by his victory, set a precedent to his successors which they were not slow to follow.¹

It was a loss to the Senate of moral weight, and the statesmen of later ages found in Flaminius the herald of the Roman revolution. The law was vigorously carried out in spite of the intrigues of the nobles, and one of its results was the irritation of the already impatient Gallic tribes. In 225 B.C. a combined force of Italian Celts and Gallic adventurers from the Rhone (Gæsatæ), amounting to 50,000 foot and 20,000 horse, moving by the west coast route, eluded the Roman posts and marched on Clusium, within three days of Rome. A detachment had been left to watch the Cenomani and Veneti, who were acting with Rome. The terror of a common danger, stimulated by the usual prodigies, caused an outburst of superstition, in which two Gauls and two Greeks were buried alive in the Forum Boarium, followed by a general levy of the Italian peoples. The dispositions for defence were as follows :—L. Æmilius Papus held the passage at Ariminum with a consular army; the western roads were blocked by 55,000 Etruscans and Sabines at Fæsulæ and Arretium, pending the arrival of C. Atilius Regulus with the army of Sardinia; the Umbrian militia, in the centre, were ready to fall on the enemy's flank; a reserve of 50,000 was posted at Rome. The Etruscan troops had been already entrapped and defeated when Æmilius appeared on the Gallic flank.

Battle of Telamon.—Turning homeward by the coast to secure their booty, their steps dogged by the consul, the Gauls fell in at Telamon with the Sardinian army, which had landed at Pisæ. Caught between two armies, they protected their wings with barricades and fought on a double front. A flank attack of the victorious Roman cavalry helped superior discipline and armament to decide this strange and desperate battle. The value of the pilum for distant fighting was amply demonstrated on the naked bodies of the close-ranked Gauls. Forty thousand of the enemy were killed, ten thousand captured. The defeat was

¹ On the land question *vide infra*, on Ti. Gracchus and the agrarian laws

followed up by the invasion of Cisalpine Gaul, whose conquest was completed more by the valour of the Roman soldier than by the tactics of the politician Flaminius, who succeeded to the command.

Conquest of Cisalpine Gaul.—With the help of the Cenomani, he ravaged the land of the Insubres, and refused peace except on the hardest terms. The Boii and Lingones had already submitted. In 222 B.C. the Insubres called in once more the Gæsatae, but their final efforts were crushed by M. Marcellus, who with his own hand won the *spolia opima*¹ from Viridomarus, and by Cn. Scipio, who captured Mediolanum and Comum. The power of



DENARIUS OF CIRCA 45 B.C.—MARCELLUS AND SPOLIA OPIMA.

the Gauls was broken. Rome had secured her flank and extended her boundary to the Alps, while her true strength had been seen in the common front presented to a common danger. It remained to Romanise the conquered land. The great northern road was extended from Narnia and Spoletium to Ariminum as the “*via Flaminia*.” Colonies were laid out (B.C. 218) at Placentia and Cremona (Latin), and Mutina (burgess). Communication with Illyricum was assured by the expedition to Istria. The allied tribes remained in nominal independence; the western clans were on the whole undisturbed.

The Senate hoped to bring the impending Punic struggle to an issue in Spain. Upon their unfinished work and half-founded colonies, sweeping with rapid march from the storm of Saguntum to the passes of the Alps, Hannibal descended like a thunder-cloud in a clear sky, to wage war through the length and breadth of Italy, and to march his troops to the gates of Rome.

¹ *Vide supra* pp. 79 and 80.

CHAPTER XX

HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL

	B. C.	A. D. C.
Hamilcar in Spain	236-228	518-526
Hasdrubal	228-221	526-533
Hannibal takes Saguntum	219	535

State of Carthage.—While Rome thus secured her position Carthage had not been idle. The Celtic troubles and wavering policy of her foe had given a chance that she was not slow to seize. She had doubtless lost her commercial supremacy, her command of the seas, and the Sicilian tribute; she retained Africa, the Spanish factories, and the gates of the ocean. But the surrender of Sardinia and the bullying attitude of Rome proved the precariousness of a tenure which hung upon the moods of the masters of Lilybæum. Carthage existed by the grace of Rome. To all but the cowardly and incapable opportunists of the peace-party, whose sole idea was a policy of "scuttle" abroad, and taxation and crucifixion at home, the position was clearly intolerable, and war, sooner or later, a necessity. The distinction between the reactionaries and reformers, the capitalists and the democracy, was thus merged in the distinction between the parties of war and peace. Hanno "the great" led the governing aristocracy. At the head of the opposition stood Hamilcar Barca. Checked by the disasters in Sicily, and hampered by the weakness of the government, the democratic leader, with all the energy and tenacity of his character, educated a party, and pushed his plans alternately by military success and political adroitness. Sicily was lost and Africa drained of men and money, but to the statesman and soldier Spain offered a wider and a safer field, in which, with larger ideas and resources, at a convenient distance from Rome, to build up again the military and material power of his country. Precious time had been lost in the Mercenary war; his popularity had been sacrificed; his attached veterans had perished in battle or on the cross. At the same time the folly and incompetence of Hanno had strengthened the hands of the "Barcine faction." Hamilcar had saved his country by his generalship, self-control, and diplomacy, and his reward had been an impeachment; but the disasters of a government are the opportunity of its opponents. He was appointed generalissimo by popular vote. The Romanising

nobility accepted the situation, which had its advantages even for them, and his actions, however little the Punic Senate grasped or approved his larger projects, were not without its knowledge and sanction. To it Spain offered a new source of revenue, and removed a dangerous man; to him, as a recruiting ground and base of operations, with its fruitful soil, rich mines, and gallant tribes, it afforded "a new world to redress the balance of the old," the one means for saving Carthage and revenging her wrongs.

Hamilcar in Spain.—The constitution remained unaltered, but the democrats ("ἐταῖρα τῶν πονηροτάτων ἀνθρώπων"), without being in office, were in power. They controlled the government and directed its policy. The commander-in-chief, at once dreaded, detested, and adored by his countrymen, with a personal and national hatred in his heart, crossed to Spain in the summer of 236 B.C. to organise the "*revanche*,"—a virtual dictator, removable only by the people, who had appointed him. With him went his young son Hannibal, who by the altar of Carthage had sworn an oath of undying enmity to Rome. Hasdrubal, too, his son-in-law, commanded the fleet. He had to form an army, create material, supply his friends, bribe his enemies, win Spain, and watch Carthage. The war must support the war, and the party as well. He must conceal, deceive, and defy on both sides at once, forging a sword he was destined never to use. Spain had long been connected with the Phœnicians, whose private factories anciently established on the west formed the starting-point of his enterprise. Tartessus (Tarshish) was the El Dorado of antiquity, and Gades (founded *circa* 1000 B.C.) the centre of western commerce. But hitherto the settlements had been as purely commercial as the original factories of the English in India. The time had come for conquest. For nine years, by arms, diplomacy, and personal influence, he attracted, quelled, organised Spain—an uncrowned "king of men," possessing his soul in patience with one end before his eyes, creating an empire, preparing victory. A new army was raised and trained; trade followed the flag; the state-chest shared with his troops and his party in the proceeds. The Romans were secretly harassed, the Gallic tribes conciliated, the Numidian insurgents crushed; and yet Rome, arrogant or ignorant, spoke no word.

Hasdrubal.—In 228 B.C. Hamilcar died, but his work throve in the hands of the astute statesman and successful soldier, Hasdrubal, who gained the command by the right of merit, by the favour of the army, and by his personal popularity. Shrewd, versatile, and eloquent, more at home in diplomacy than on the field, he

pushed, with the aid of Hannibal and of reinforcements from home, the Punic province to the Ebro. He founded Nova Carthago, opened up the mines, and developed commerce. The party of Hanno was silenced by success. From Spain, Carthage could draw revenue, conscripts, and mercenaries; in Spain she was acquiring an infantry that would meet the legions on equal terms. Rome, underrating the elasticity of Carthage, blind to the strategic value of this new dominion, contented herself (228 B.C.) with the "paper boundary" of the Ebro, a limit as valuable as a Central Asian frontier. Besides this convention, she secured herself a base of action by alliances with Saguntum and Emporiae, in the fixed and fatal idea that the decisive struggle would be fought at her convenience and on the field of her choice. If the policy of Hasdrubal and the energy of his lieutenant did at last arouse suspicion and alarm, her hands were full at home. Nor did she realise till the eleventh hour the rapidity of mobilisation, the swift movement, the audacious genius, of her great opponent. In limiting Hasdrubal by the Ebro, and giving him a free hand beyond that boundary, the Romans may have stipulated for the neutrality of Saguntum, and possibly of the other Greek towns, but they dealt only with Hasdrubal personally, whose action could be easily disavowed by the Punic government. Hasdrubal on his part was content to buy a respite and consolidate his power; he even neglected the opportunity afforded by the Gallic war. In 221 B.C. an act of private vengeance closed his eight years' rule in the peninsula.

Character of Hannibal.—The voice of the army, confirmed by the Carthaginian people, called to the command Hasdrubal's right arm, Hannibal, a young man in his twenty-sixth or twenty-ninth year, a trained athlete and soldier, a brilliant cavalry officer, a fair linguist, not destitute of culture. The "inheritor of the unfulfilled renown" of Hamilcar, the heir of his hate and of his genius, the embodiment of the national revenge, he concentrated the spirit of his house and country in one long deadly struggle with her detested rival and oppressor. Rome was now to reap the fruits of her policy of "plunder and blunder." She had irritated without destroying; she had imposed limits without effective safeguards; she had allowed her enemy twenty years to recuperate her strength; and now the ideas of Hamilcar were ripe. A trustworthy infantry was there to support the finest cavalry in the world; the finances were restored, and all was ready. The war-party controlled the state. For, in spite of Hanno and the Senate, whose treasonable

tendencies have been exaggerated, and whatever the lies of Roman historians and the excuses of Punic ambassadors, Carthage supported her leader and his actions. It was no mere policy of drift, venality, or partisanship that accepted the siege of Saguntum, and maintained for seventeen years the waste and wear of the Hannibalic war. It was clear that war was inevitable, and that Hannibal was the man to wage it. To this he had been consecrated from his boyhood. The great son of a great father, a master of the art of war, a crafty strategist, patient and audacious, warily cautious and daringly indiscreet, able to read as well as to lead men, he united policy and soldiership, subtle tactics and broad combinations. He was accused of perfidy, irreligion, cruelty, and avarice. The charges are questionable, their source suspected. If the strength and tenacity of a great people, well supplied with ordinary ability, triumphed in the end over her own disasters and the character and genius of an extraordinary man, we cannot accept the calumnies with which the ungenerous victors—victors alike in the field of war and the pages of history—have blackened the fair fame of “dirus Hannibal.” He was less barbarous than his nation or his times ; his avarice was only public, to support the charges of the war ; yet Carthage thought him covetous and Rome cruel. He had a tinge of superstition in his character ; at times he showed a certain grim humour. He was not incapable of love ; he married a Spanish maiden, and solaced the toils of war with the charms of a Salapian lady. Such was the man whose spirit, moving in all the complications of the times, the soul of all that happened in Spain, Italy, Africa, and Macedon, gave to this prolonged death-grapple the well-earned title of the Hannibalic war. It was to him a necessary and a national work ; it was no mere war of ambition or aggrandisement ; there was no thought of a personal despotism.

Siege of Saguntum.—The immediate occasion of war was found in the ambiguous position of Saguntum, which plays the part of Messana in the first struggle. Lying within the Punic sphere of influence, it was protected by a treaty with Rome. Hannibal, disregarding alike this treaty and the doubtful provisions of the peace of Catulus, turned from the subjugation of the tribes of the central plateau—Olcades, Vaccæi, and Carpetani—and created a *casus belli* by an attack on Saguntum. He had spent two years in securing his base, training his troops, and inspiring confidence at home and in the camp, and now took advantage of Rome’s interference in the party contests of Saguntum

to declare its neutrality violated and the convention a dead letter. Such was his answer to the Roman embassy which came at the appeal of the threatened city. Its protest was ineffectual. He could not afford to leave the city in his rear—this Roman Calais,



ROMAN IN TOGA.

the key to Spain. Defended for eight months with the courage of despair, and sacrificed by the culpable negligence of Rome, it fell before the vigorous assaults of Maharbal and Hannibal. The siege became a blockade, and at the final storm the Spanish chiefs

perished in the flames of the houses which their own hands had kindled. Hannibal by this success—whose difficulty was an omen of his future failure in Italian sieges—had defied Rome, secured Spain, and committed Carthage. The agents of Rome found a contemptuous reception among the Spanish tribes, while an embassy, headed by Q. Fabius, proceeded to Carthage and demanded *pro formâ* the surrender of Hannibal. The ultimatum was met by an attempt to discuss the question of formal right. The time for this was past. The causes of the war lay, not in the breach of treaties nor in the attack on Saguntum; they lay in the action and relation of two peoples. It was a duel to the death between east and west, a struggle for life embittered by cruel memories, which could be settled only by the sword. Fabius put the sharp alternative to the Punic Senate. He gathered his toga in two folds—"War or peace," he cried; "which will you have?" "Which you will," was the answer. He shook out the fold of war, and war was accepted by Carthage with a light heart.

CHAPTER XXI

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR UP TO THE BATTLE OF CANNÆ

	B. C.	A. U. C.
Second Punic War begins—Battles of the Ticinus and the Trebia	218	536
Battle of Lake Trasimene	217	537
Battle of Cannæ	216	538

Strength of Rome and Carthage compared.—The strength of the combatants must now be differently estimated. In the interval between the wars Rome had gained by the consolidation of Italy and the growth of national feeling. The tribes that had fallen before her were bound to her now by ties of kinship, fought under her flag, and shared in the glories and profits of the empire. They enjoyed the Pax Romana; their burdens were as yet moderate, their allegiance secured by their interest and their affection, and, last but not least, by the network of roads and fortresses, the centres and pathways of Roman force and of Roman feeling. Rome's true strength lay in the loyalty of her colonies and allies. She had gained the control of the sea, and held the chief harbours



THE
GINIAN EMPIRE
& Dependencies.

thaginian Dominions
thaginian Dependencies
ulom or Hiero
martini
with its march from Carthago Nova to Cannae.
our territory or allies

ton, New York. Bombay & Calcutta.

of the Western Mediterranean, except those of Spain. She was strong in the temper and numbers of her citizen army, but she retained all the weakness of changing chiefs and divided counsels ; in cavalry she was deficient ; her generals lacked the tactics and strategy to meet the inventive and original genius of Hannibal. Carthage remained a loosely organised state, weak where Rome was strong. If she had partially restored her shattered finances, yet her naval monopoly was a thing of the past ; she retained her commercial ideas and unmilitary instincts, her untrustworthy population, and tendency to fight her battles with purchased mercenaries or reluctant conscripts. She was not untrue to her great leader, however inadequate her support may seem, but it was in Spain that Hannibal found his true base, and from Spain that he drew his reinforcements. He was strong in himself and in his army, especially strong in his magnificent cavalry, with its gallant leaders, Mago and Maharbal. He was weak in his siege-train and engineers, in the distance of his base and the difficulty of communication by sea. Above all was he weak in the spirit and energy of his country, at least as contrasted with the iron constancy of Rome.

Plans of Hannibal.—Hannibal's plan of campaign reveals at once a genius for wide combinations and a careful provision for possible contingencies. The year 219 B.C. he spent in assiduous preparations and such reconnaissance of the future field of war as was yet possible. His central idea was to strike at Rome in Italy itself, and, while securing his remoter bases in Spain and Africa, and his communications with those bases, to find a nearer *point d'appui* in Cisalpine Gaul, from whence, if opportunity served, he might transfer his operations to Central and Southern Italy, recovering contact with Carthage. He could not, like Wellington, base himself upon a fleet, but his negotiations had provided powerful allies in the plains of the Po. Irritated by the colonies, the roads, and the land-distributions, the Boii and Insubres would furnish guides, supplies, and recruits whose numbers and enthusiasm would render them a formidable addition to the veteran nucleus of the Spanish army. He expected that Macedon, strengthened by the victory of Sellasia, and annoyed by Roman interference in Greek politics, would actively support him ; he might hope that the appearance of his army in the north would raise the South Italians in the Roman rear. All strategical considerations therefore pointed to the valley of the Po. The combined assault on Rome from north and south at once remained

the dominant idea of Carthaginian warfare. In pursuance of this scheme, Hannibal, while he arranged for naval demonstrations in South Italy and at Lilybæum, devoted the bulk of his forces to the army of the north. His dispositions and designs show a complete control of the national resources and security in the national support. His available strength may have reached 120,000 foot, 16,000 cavalry, 58 elephants, and 50 ships of war—not all manned. The troops were mostly trained conscripts or allied contingents, no longer mercenaries. Of these, 20,000, mainly Spaniards, secured Africa and the route to Spain and held the passage of the straits, while the western garrisons were moved to Carthage. His brother Hasdrubal occupied Spain with 12,000 infantry, 2500 horse, half the elephants, and the fleet—a force mainly African.

Hannibal marches into Gaul.—Having thus guaranteed the discipline and loyalty of his troops, and assured the safety of the capital and the vital points of connection, Hannibal, with 90,000 foot, 12,000 horse, and 37 elephants, his troops refreshed by rest and stimulated to enthusiasm, marched from Carthage about the beginning of May B.C. 218, carrying with him “the desolation of Italy.” He had chosen a difficult and dangerous route. Before him lay the Ebro, the Rhone, the Pyrenees, and the Alps, the strength of Rome, and the uncertain temper of the Gauls. Yet the coloured reports of his guides, geographical ignorance, the perils of the sea, swept by the Roman fleet, and the advantage of joining his allies precisely at the point chosen, combined to draw the leader of a maritime people by a land-route, often before traversed by marauding Gallic hordes descending upon Italy. The difficulties of the route appeared at once. It cost him 20,000 men to force his passage to the Pyrenees. Hanno was left behind with 10,000 men in the newly conquered province; a second 10,000 was dismissed to purge the army and create a good impression in the country he was leaving. With 50,000 foot and 9000 horse he pressed his march to the Rhone by the coast route, touching the river opposite Avignon late in the summer of 218 B.C. Delay in Spain made haste essential to forestall the closing of the Alpine passes. Previous negotiations had paved his way. From Avignon the valley of the Durance afforded an easy access to the lowest, least difficult, and probably most familiar gates of the mountain barrier between the valleys of the Rhone and Po—the Col de l’Argentière and Mont Genève. Hither he was directing his march, avoiding the more difficult passages to the north, and the dangers of the Ligurian

coast road, doubtless beset by Roman posts and hostile tribes, when he was met on the Rhone by a strong Gallic force to dispute his crossing, and shed the first Italian blood in a cavalry skirmish on the left bank.

Preparations of the Romans.—The Romans were aghast, like the Austrian generals who fought the young Napoleon, at the deliberate audacity of this brilliant offensive idea. Unaccustomed to the strokes of genius and secure in the strength of Rome, they leisurely proceeded with ordinary preparations. Repeated warnings were in vain. With over half a million troops available, with a fleet of 220 quinqueremes, apparently superior in all but the quality and numerical proportion of their cavalry, they should have followed up the declaration of war with a rapid and crushing blow in Africa, combined with a descent in force on Spain. Both objects were certainly embraced in their plan, but they underrated the strength and speed of Hannibal, as they misunderstood his character and ideas. Of the consuls for 218 B.C., Ti. Sempronius Longus was destined for Sicily and Africa, with two legions, 16,000 allies, 2,400 horse, and 160 quinqueremes; while P. Cornelius Scipio received the Spanish command with 22,000 infantry, 2200 horse, and 60 men-of-war. Including a smaller force under L. Manlius Volso in Cisalpine Gaul, Livy estimates the force under arms at 70,000 men, with 220 ships. The levies were late, and the expedition to Spain, vitally important as that was, to save the allies of Rome and threaten Hannibal's communications if it could not check his advance, was further delayed by an outbreak of the Gauls in North Italy, partly fomented by Punic agents, partly due to anger at the foundation of the fortress-colonies of Placentia and Cremona. The colonists—six thousand had been allotted to each—were expelled, their leaders imprisoned, and the prætor driven disgracefully into Tannetum. Scipio's troops were diverted to the north, and new regiments raised for the Spanish service. Saguntum had already fallen, and Scipio, coasting leisurely to Massilia, now learned with incredulous horror that Hannibal had crushed the tribes, passed the Pyrenees, and was in full march to the Rhone. The presence of the enemy on the Rhone confirmed the unwelcome news. A cavalry reconnaissance on the left bank drove in a Numidian squadron, only to learn that while the Romans had dawdled on the route and dallied at the mouth, neglecting the farther bank, Hannibal had scattered their allies and crossed the river. A tardy advance in force made it at length clear that his real objective was Italy. The Rhone

was lost, and Scipio, returning from an idle pursuit, in obedience to orders or to a true military instinct, despatched his brother Gnaeus with the bulk of the troops to Spain, and hastened in person to meet the enemy, debouching from the Alps, with the division of Cisalpine Gaul. Considering the large forces available in Italy and the value of Spain to Carthage and Hannibal, this conduct deserves the highest praise, and the Senate, with wise tenacity, maintained their Spanish army through the darkest years of the war, till the leader of that army closed the struggle on the field of Zama.

Passage of the Rhone.—Hannibal, on arriving at the Rhone, perceived his passage blocked at Roquemaure, four days' march from the sea, by a Gallic levy raised by Massiliot influence. Accordingly, while he rapidly accumulated the means of transport, he sent a strong division under Hanno, son of Bomilcar, to cross the river at a shallower point above and take the Gauls in the rear. When the signal-column of smoke arose, he pushed across with a select force in face of the enemy, who broke and fled as Hanno's men fired their camp and fell upon them from behind. The remainder followed at leisure; the snow-fed stream was broken by a line of heavy ships moored athwart the current; the elephants passed on rafts cunningly prepared. In six days, or possibly more, he had crossed a swift, broad, and dangerous river almost under the eyes of the Roman consul, of whose presence his cavalry made him aware. To run the gauntlet of a Roman army before he joined his allies offered no advantage. He determined to free his flank by an inland march, and, encouraging his dispirited troops by the promises of the Boian envoys and his own enthusiasm, marched four days upstream to the so-called "Island," the angle of the Rhone and the Isère. Here he decided by arbitration or the sword the disputed succession to the chieftainship of the Allobroges, and received in return ample supplies of food and clothing.

The Passes of the Alps.—By what route Hannibal crossed the Alps is still disputed. It is a question of mountain geography, as well as a question of military, and to some extent of political, expediency. The decision, if at all possible, rests with the expert and the soldier, not with the historian. His military object was to find the shortest and safest route not so much to Italy as to his allies on the Po, and a route covered from flank attacks from the sea, to be traversed by a regular army with baggage-train and elephants. His choice was conditioned, besides, by the late season—it was October, or possibly November, before he reached the

summit, and he had meant to be earlier—by the movements of Scipio, which had thrown him farther inland, and by the position of friendly and hostile tribes on either side. In spite of his careful inquiries his information was certainly inaccurate; nor can we read into the argument our own more intimate knowledge. In any case he had probably under-estimated the difficulties of what he knew to be a daring and a difficult project; but he judged it not impossible. We need not exaggerate the risk of an undertaking planned and executed with the deliberate rashness of genius. Excluding at once the Cornice road and the passes to the north and east as obviously dangerous or impracticable, two main avenues are left diverging into four possible passes—the valleys of (1) the Isère, leading to the Little St. Bernard (7076 ft.) through the Graian Alps; (2) its tributary, the Arc, leading up to Mont Ceniz (6859 ft.); (3) the Durance, ascending to Mont Genève (6101 ft.) over the Cottian Alps; and (4) the Ubaye, which leads from the Durance to the Col de l'Argentière (6538 ft.). By several of these gorges armies had crossed; all had been used as pathways of intercourse. The appearance of Scipio on Hannibal's flank, as we have seen, diverted his march from the Durance to the Isère. His route thence would be determined by the direction of the valleys and the relative easiness of the passes at that season of the year. Military considerations being equal, the best mountaineering authority would point to the southerly routes; that is, either to Mont Genève or the Col de l'Argentière. In any case, we must remember that the seasons, and therefore the difficulties, of the Alps vary with different years; bridges or roads, such as Rome constructed later, there were none. They were traversed by mountain tracks, skirting the torrents and precipices by which the chain was cloven, broken continually by the storm and the avalanche.

Statements of Polybius and Livy.—Turning to our authorities, we find in the general vagueness and uncertainty of geographical knowledge, in the absence of maps, and of any close attention to nature, nothing but rough outlines and inexact details. Polybius shows an ignorance not merely of larger physical formations, but even of the points of the compass. He is obscure as to North Italy, wrong as to the course of the Rhone; he indulges in colourless and self-complacent generalities, and mentions few names. He made a personal, if limited, acquaintance with the Alps, but he had no eye for the general course or minor features of the range. An excellent military and political historian, he is also the older and more original writer, but we must as little press his stock touches

and approximate distances as the picturesque details which adorn the clear and consistent narrative of Livy. The descriptions given can be adapted to every Alpine pass and its approaches, and even the names of tribes may be due to later inquiries. The same sources were before both, and, in spite of the discrepancies between them as to the course of the stream followed or the names of the opposing clans, they agree in many of their details, in the starting-point, and, possibly, in the terminus, of the march. Nor need we emphasise their disagreement. The account of Polybius points probably to Mont Cenis, if not to the Little St. Bernard. The latter, though the generally accepted route, debouching upon the Salassi and the vale of Aosta-Ivrea (the *Dora Baltea*), a familiar road for Gallic hordes, seems scarcely probable. In this case Hannibal would ascend not directly by the *Isère*, but by the *Rhone* to *Vienne*, across the country of the *Allobroges* to the *Mont du Chat* and *Chambéry*, and thence by the river-valleys to the foot of the pass. Thus he would march along two sides of a triangle to reach a higher, longer, and steeper passage. The top does not command a view of Italy, but of the glaciers of *Mont Blanc*. It ends in a long and perilous defile, and leads not to the *Taurini*, but to the *Salassi*, contrary to our authorities, while to move thence on *Turin* with *Scipio* at *Placentia* would be obviously idle. Climatic conditions alone make the Little St. Bernard incredible. We may conclude, then, that Hannibal followed the line of march described by Livy, whose account is based upon the history of *L. Cincius Alimentus*, then a captive in the Punic army. Of the two passes to which his narrative might point, both lower and more southern and both offering a more direct descent, *Mont Genève* is the more generally favoured, but the *Col de l'Argentière* is supported by a fragment of *Varro*¹ and by high Alpine authority.

Hannibal crosses the Alps.—Hannibal, then, who had not crossed the *Isère*, followed its valley to the left, avoiding the direct route by the *Col de Cabres*. Skirting the *Vocontii*, he turned south-east from *Grenoble*, and countermarching along the *Drac*, reached his original objective, the upper valley of the *Durance*, by the *Col Bayard*, whence he either followed the stream to *Mont Genève* or struck across by *Embrun* to the upper waters of the *Ubaye* and the *Col de l'Argentière*. The ascent cost him nine days, fighting his way along the swollen torrent through the hostile clans. Twice he owed his escape from imminent destruction as much to good fortune as to good tactics. In the first encounter with the hill-

¹ Preserved by *Servius* on *Virgil's Æneid*, x. 13.

tribes they beset the defiles and crowned the heights. Hannibal amused them with a feigned attack, occupied by a night-surprise their ill-secured position, and after desperate fighting in the narrow gorge, with great loss of beasts and baggage, finally stormed their forts and revictualled his army. In the second struggle higher up he was treacherously surrounded ; great blocks were tumbled down the mountain-side upon the broken and disordered column. He spent the night in arms at the "White Rock," to which he had drawn back, but in the morning succeeded in restoring order. The attacks fell off, and he arrived at length with a worn and weakened host at the small plain on the summit, where he indulged his men with two days of such rest as the autumn nights would allow. The despondent and disheartened troops were cheered by the enthusiasm of their chief, who felt that he had stormed the ramparts of Italy, and pointed their gaze in imagination to the walls of Rome. Storms of snow added to their discomfort and to the dangers of the descent. The steeper slope, coated with fresh-fallen flakes, was far more difficult, especially for the beasts of burden ; at one point the path had been broken by an avalanche, and in attempting to turn it men and elephants slid and slipped upon the treacherous surface of the trampled and frozen bed of older snow beneath. The attempt was renounced and a camp pitched, while the road was reconstructed. In cutting the rocks it is said that the sour soldiers' wine was used to soften the stone calcined first by fire. From that point the army rapidly reached without opposition the lower valleys, and there recruited its shattered strength. The long march had reached its end ; with 20,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, "unkempt, emaciated scarecrows," Hannibal stood on the soil of Italy. Cold and hunger, the precipices and the sword, had cost him over 30,000 men, of whom two-thirds marked with their bones the passage of the Alps. With this handful of heroic "shadows," trusting to Italy for recruits, commissariat, and immediate base, he flung himself upon the gigantic power of Rome. We are not in a position to criticise ; we do not know the nature of his alternatives, his difficulties, and original calculations. Its hazardous character does not impair the grandeur of an idea whose moral effect was worth a victory. Tremendous as were the sacrifices, whether foreseen or unforeseen, they were justified by success, and by success alone.

NOTE.—The absence of accurate indications and definite distances, the utter confusion of the actual Roman Calendar, and erroneous geographi-

cal ideas render it difficult to fix precisely the distances, topography, or chronology of this march and the following campaign. The length of the march from Carthagera to Italy, exclusive of deviations and fighting, may have been from 900 to 1000 miles, equal at the rate of fifteen miles a day to, roughly, ten weeks' pure marching. The passage of the Rhone cost at least six days, the Alps fifteen. The total time allowed may be estimated at from five to six months at the least. Hannibal was later than he expected, and starting in May, reached the summit sometime between October 26 and November 7, the Trebia being fought near December 21. He was at the Rhone probably about the middle of August. Scipio, delayed also, may have left Rome in July, and arrived at Marseilles in August, moving leisurely. The despatch leading to the recall of Sempronius must have been sent to the Senate from the Rhone not later than the beginning of September. All dating depends on the time assumed respectively for Hannibal's arrival at the Rhone and on the summit. For the passage of the Rhone and the ascent, &c., a more liberal allowance must be made than is usual. The places of the encounters with the tribes vary, of course, according to the route given, and are purely conjectural.

Scipio in Cisalpine Gaul.—Hannibal had arrived unexpected and with unexpected celerity; he had a good start, and used it well. The Roman armies that should have met him were in Spain and Sicily. There was nothing at the front but the relics of the legion of Manlius and the division of C. Atilius, the prætor, that had not yet sufficed to quell the Celtic outbreak, to which alone was due the presence of any considerable force in the valley of the Po. In sending his army to Spain, Scipio had naturally trusted to the Senate for reinforcements in Italy, and the Senate at once recalled Sempronius. But they exaggerated the mountain obstacle; they were ignorant of the genius of Hannibal and the altered character of Punic troops. Had Scipio landed at Genoa, moved along the chord of the arc and flung his whole force upon Turin, he might have choked the war in its birth. But a mountain range is a notoriously dubious barrier, to close its issues a complex problem. A difficult country and doubtful information would increase the risk. With uncertain allies and certain foes on flank and rear, Scipio might, if scattered, have been defeated in detail, if concentrated at Turin,¹ turned by the St. Bernard, and rolled up against the very mountains he was watching. As it was he arrived at Pisa with a small division in September, crossed the Apennines, and picking up the corps of North Italy, marched with a force of 20,000 men to intercept and destroy a wearied and broken army,

¹ Cf. the campaign of Marengo.

if the mountains had not already spared him the trouble. In two months he had restored order on the right bank of the Po, and crossing to the left, from which the Romans had been expelled, was menacing the Insubres, when he became aware of the presence of Hannibal. A few days' rest had sufficed to recruit the Punic army, a few more to afford the Taurini, in the bloody storm of Taurasia, a convincing argument for friendship; the troops were stimulated by a *tournement à outrance* among their Celtic prisoners to strike for the prize of victory or death.

Battle on the Ticinus: Retreat of Scipio.—Moving down the left bank to relieve his Insubrian allies, Hannibal suddenly gained touch with the army of Scipio. The surprise was mutual. At the head of a strong reconnaissance of cavalry and light troops, Scipio, who, with rebels in his rear, had crossed, instead of disputing, the line of the Ticinus, met a similar party under Hannibal in person. In the vigorous skirmish that followed his foot were routed; his horse, outflanked and taken in rear by the Numidians, after severe fighting fled with the wounded consul, whose life was saved by his son, the future Africanus. Scipio had advanced with inferior numbers and a weak cavalry. His confidence was disabused; he saw the weakness of his force in the plains of the Po, and extricating himself from his dangerous position, fell back to the main stream by a rapid and almost precipitate march, broke down the bridges at some sacrifice, evacuated the left bank, and sat down under the walls of Placentia. Here he determined to maintain the defensive till his colleague arrived. Placentia and Cremona furnished him with a strong support, commanded the passage and navigation of the Po, and curbed the unquiet clans. Hannibal, unable to prevent this unexpected retreat or to pass the stream in face of the enemy, effected his crossing at a higher point, opened negotiations with the local tribes, and moving along the right bank, encamped in front of Scipio. Policy and strategy alike made him anxious for a general action to confirm the wavering Gauls, and to secure his commissariat and quarters. Scipio, wounded and waiting, refused battle—the tactics of patience were clearly wisest. But, alarmed by the treachery of a Gallic contingent, and thinking his position on the level insecure in face of superior cavalry, he retired across the Trebia in the silence of night, pursued by the Numidian horse, whose attention was luckily called off by the plunder of the camp, and took up a stronger position on a spur of the Apennines, covered by the mountain torrent.



TOMBSTONE OF ROMAN HORSE-SOLDIER FROM HEXHAM.
(Of later date.)

Position of the Two Armies.—The key to these and the subsequent operations lies in the position of the Trebia, a stream which, descending rapidly from the hills, spreads in the plain a broad and pebbly bed, widening considerably to its mouth above Placentia. Nearly dry in summer, its course is rapidly filled by rain, and runs in winter with a strong and turbulent flood. The plain, at this point narrowed to a width of seven miles, presents an apparently level surface, seamed by similar streams with deep deceptive courses clad with bush. All strategical considerations go to prove that the first position of Scipio would be in front of the Trebia (left bank), connected with Placentia, probably by a bridge of boats; that he then crossed the stream, and, protected by it, rested his right on the fortress, his left on the Apennines, covering his junction with Sempronius and his communications with Rome, while he checked the movements of the Celts, already hampered by the hostile attitude of the Cenomani. The weight of authority and the description given by Livy would certainly point to the opposite supposition, namely, that Scipio encamped immediately under Placentia, crossed the Trebia to the left bank, and there rested upon the Apennines and the magazines of Clastidium and *Vicumvæ*, while Hannibal flung himself across his communications. The first view is difficult to reconcile with the language of Livy, who was scarcely ignorant of the position of Placentia, and with the movements of the defeated Romans, while the successful junction of Sempronius and the capture of Clastidium by the Punic general conflict with the second.¹

Sempronius.—Meanwhile, in pursuance of Hannibal's schemes, descents were made on the Italian coast. The Liparian islands had already been seized, when a lucky accident put Hiero in possession of the Carthaginian plans; the prætor Æmilius was warned, and the attempt to surprise Lilybæum was defeated with loss. Sempronius Longus, who arrived immediately after in Sicily with 160 ships and a consular army, successfully frittered his time away over the capture of Melita and such minor operations, till, to his chagrin, he was recalled by the Senate. After providing for the naval defence of the southern coasts, he despatched his troops, whether by land or sea is uncertain, to Ariminum, and from that point effected his junction with his colleague unopposed. Rash and ambitious—if the friend² of the Scipios may be trusted—he was as anxious to crown his

¹ Polybius' account leaves the real point undecided, but agrees with Livy's in the main.

² Polybius.

consulship as Hannibal his first campaign with an exploit. The loss of Clastidium, betrayed by its Latin commandant, his at least equal forces—40,000 men, without reckoning the Cenomani—the ravages of Hannibal, and the dubious attitude of the Gauls were powerful arguments for action. Scipio's masterly inactivity was probably the wisest tactics, but not easy to follow. Sempronius had yet to buy his experience of Hannibal, and that general habitually sold it dear. A cavalry action, brought on by the Carthaginian raids, elated the impetuous spirit of the Roman with a victory conceded by the cautious generalship of an experienced leader. It was Hannibal's policy to tempt his man from a strong position to a field of his own choosing, under the worst conditions.

Battle of the Trebia.—The design succeeded. In one of the river-beds, in the rear of his chosen ground, concealed by the bushes and the banks, he placed an ambush of 2000 picked men, horse and foot, under his young and able adjutant and brother, Mago. On a day of mingled rain and snow, driven "by a nipping and an eager" wind, the well-instructed Numidians, in the early morning, drew the irritated Romans, cold and hungry, horse and man—first the cavalry, then the light-armed, finally the infantry—to wade breast-high across the swollen ice-cold stream. The famished and shivering soldiers were confronted with a warmed and well-fed host. They fought with a river in their rear, outflanked on level ground by a superior cavalry. The fight was lost, before it was begun, by a bad tactical blunder. The Punic foot stood in one long line, with 8000 skirmishers in front and 10,000 cavalry and the elephants on their flanks. The Romans took their usual order. The light troops in front of their battle were scattered at once, and the strong Punic cavalry with the elephants, aided by the Balaric skirmishers, soon drove off the Roman horse in headlong flight. Then, outflanked and taken in rear by the victorious cavalry, the Roman infantry maintained a gallant soldiers' battle till the outbreak of Mago's ambush—a brilliant stratagem brilliantly developed—and the dispersal of the Gallic auxiliaries gave the *coup-de-grâce*. One corps, 10,000 strong, cut its way with splendid courage through the Punic line, and picking up the stragglers, forced its way to Placentia. Of the rest, many were cut down at the passage of the river, some found their way through the waters to the camp; the rest were dispersed. The pursuit was stayed by the increasing fierceness of the storm; the remnant of the army, with the wounded, were conveyed by Scipio, under cover of night and foul weather, to Placentia. The Romans had lost at least

20,000 men ; Hannibal suffered mainly in auxiliaries. But the cruel weather of the winter and the spring was fatal to his elephants, which ceased henceforth in Italy to play their dubious part. By this splendid victory he crowned and justified his march ; he could now secure recruits and supplies ; he could organise the insurrection in Gaul. The enemy were shut up in their strongholds, and the consul, hurrying to the elections, barely escaped the squadrons which scoured the country.

Flaminius elected Consul.—As the truth leaked out, the alarm at Rome was as great as hope had been sure. The situation was aggravated by a political crisis. Popular gratitude had raised to a second consulship C. Flaminius, a brave and blundering soldier of the Roman type, hero of hard escapes from his own bad strategy, statesman and friend of the people, whose attempt to limit the power of the oligarchy and stem the tide of capitalism made him the precursor of the Gracchi in their aims, and partially in their fate. The superstitious machinery of the Senate he met with sceptical defiance. In the teeth of the auspices he had maintained his earlier office (223 B.C.), and sealed his resistance by victory. He had triumphed by popular vote, and if the omen of a squeaking mouse had cost him the mastership of the horse, it only taught him now to anticipate such manoeuvres, to shirk the formalities of inauguration, and to turn his back on the storm of portents and prodigies rained by the complacent heavens upon the unbelieving and inconvenient demagogue.

Roman Preparations.—The preparations of Rome were vigorous but not extraordinary. The coast garrisons were increased, Spain reinforced, the fleet and cavalry alike strengthened, while Hiero despatched a large body of auxiliaries. With four new legions and the remnants of the army of the Po, the consuls occupied Arretium and Ariminum. Resting on their magazines and covering the main roads to Rome, their outposts extending on the east to Cremona and Placentia, and on the west from the fortress of Pisa to Luca and Luna, they intended primarily to block the issues of the Apennines, and then developing the offensive, to hold Hannibal in front, threaten his right flank, and roll him back on the Po. The position, much the same as in 225 B.C., was turned as then by a rapid advance on the western flank.


Passage of the Apennines and the Arno.—Hannibal, in his winter quarters, had contented himself with minor operations ; he had neither time nor means for a war of sieges. The inconstant Gauls, impatient of billeting, eager for plunder, had little stomach for a

serious campaign. By means of disguises he eluded assassins and gained information. Gaul offered no permanent base, nor had he meant to find one there. By favourable treatment of Italian prisoners he attempted to sap the Roman alliance, and was preparing a new base in Italy itself. Weak as he was in the weakness of his country, in his isolation, in his home support and the number of his troops, he fought a political as much as a military campaign. The steady, methodical warfare of a Wellington, securing a patient advance, was not the game of genius. It was his idea rather, by puzzling, discomfiting, and discrediting Roman generals, to break up and destroy the Roman system. As the champion of the Italian subjects he could alone hope for ultimate success. Accordingly in the spring, after a reconnaissance repelled by tempest, he started from some point between Parma and Bologna, with an army largely swelled by Gallic recruits, and passed the chain of the Apennines, in the direction of Lucca and Pistoja. Thence, careless of communications and commissariat, he descended to the valley of the Arno, and pushed on by a short cut through the marshes and floods that covered the lowlands of the Serchio and Arno towards Fæsulæ. This march, probably from Pescia to Empoli, took him four days of incredible suffering from fatigue, cold, and sleeplessness.¹ His trusted troops formed the van, while Mago with the cavalry drove on the floundering and disheartened Gauls. He emerged with severe loss in men and horses, and at the cost of one of his eyes, destroyed by ophthalmia. But his object was gained. He had slipped through the chain of posts, and, after recruiting his strength and informing himself of the nature of the country and the character of his opponent, he took the inner road, passed Flaminius on the left, and striking for Cortona, cut his communications with Rome. By thus menacing the city and by systematic plunder he meant to rouse public feeling and force the popular general to action. At the same time, to have left 60,000 men in his rear was a piece of strategy that needed justification. The Roman position had now been turned. It was the duty of the consuls to secure the Flaminian Way and save the capital. Their plan appears to have been, either to repeat the tactics of the campaign of Telamon, taking Hannibal between two armies, or to form a junction at Perusia, and to crush him with their united force. Accordingly, Flaminius, tracking Hannibal by

¹ The country was more marshy and exposed to floods, also nearer the sea, than now. Even on the higher ground by Fæsulæ and in the valley of the Ombrone floods were frequent.

his devastations, hung upon his rear, at a distance justified by the Roman habit of entrenchment. If he fell into the trap laid for him, the disaster was due not so much to self-confidence, jealousy of his colleague, or the necessities of a politician, as to ignorance of his enemy and a thoroughly Roman neglect of the elementary duty of scouting. He did not force on, he had not even the option of battle.

Battle of Lake Trasimene.—The lake of Trasimene is a large



PLAN OF BATTLE OF LAKE TRASIMENE.

sheet of water, girdled by considerable hills, in the east of Etruria, between the Clanis and the Tiber. The road from Cortona to Perugia, turning to the left at the north-west corner, near Borghetto, is caught between Monte Gualandro and the marshy margin of the lake. After a narrow passage the mountains recede, leaving a small plain, divided into two bays by the projecting spur of Tuoro. At Passignano the hills close in again and form a long defile ($2\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 miles) to the north-east and east, from the end of which

the road turns abruptly up the hillside to Magione. This latter ascent is closed by a hill in front, and by the lake in the rear, and opens slightly at the lake-end by La Torricella. For the battlefield two sites are offered. Polybius seems to place it on the Torricella-Magione line, in a spot whose natural features scarcely fit his topography; while Livy, whose clear and consistent account we follow, places it on the northern shore. The African and Spanish infantry were posted in the plain at the end, the Baliares and light troops in extended order on the northern hills, while the cavalry and the Gauls were concealed under Monte Gualandro, ready to close the entrance. Flaminius, in the mist of an early morning towards the end of April, entered the pass. From the clearer hill-tops the enemy listened to the tramp of the invisible legions marching into the jaws of death. When the head of the column gained touch with the Punic infantry and the rear-guard was already entangled in the defile, Hannibal gave the word, and his troops began the attack from all sides. It was a *mêlée* and a massacre. Caught in column of route, rolled in a mist, plunged suddenly from confidence to despair, the Romans were unable even to arm, much less to form order of battle. Commands could neither be given nor obeyed. Powerless to estimate the nature and direction of the attack or to restore order in the hubbub, the consul toiled like a common soldier, and redeemed his errors by death, the victim of a Gallic lance. For three hours the carnage lasted; some were cut down where they stood, fighting in chance groups; some were speared, some drowned in the lake; 6000 men alone, the head of the column, cut their way to the eastern hills, and halted till the mist rose over the shambles beneath. Thence they broke out, only to surrender to Maharbal next day; but Hannibal repudiated his lieutenant's terms, and they swelled the number of the 15,000 prisoners of war. As many more had fallen, and the army of Flaminius had ceased to exist. The Punic loss amounted to 1500 men. During the battle an earthquake shock rolled away unfelt. To complete the disaster, the cavalry corps, 4000 strong, sent forward by Servilius to help his colleague, was cut to pieces or captured by Maharbal as it fell back on the main body, a loss which crippled his whole army.

Fabius Maximus.—"We have been beaten in a great battle," said the prætor Pomponius to the panic-stricken crowd, whose belief in Flaminius is attested by the crowd of non-combatants which had thronged his camp. The Senate acted with energy. In the absence of the consul, the Assembly elected Q. Fabius

Maximus dictator,¹ with M. Minucius as Master of the Horse. He was a patrician of the highest house, stiff in opinion, proud and self-conscious, with a firmness that was almost obstinacy and a deliberation which was sometimes excessive. Reverent of authority, tradition, and religion, he despised public opinion and the popular leaders, an opposition which intensified the peculiar traits of his character. Rome was hastily put in a state of defence, and the claims of offended religion satisfied. The army of Servilius was recalled and strengthened with two new legions. Orders were given to devastate the country and retire to the fortresses wherever Hannibal was likely to appear. Men of the lower class and freedmen were utilised for the city-garrison, and for the fleet which Servilius went to organise at Ostia, to meet the Carthaginian squadron, now cruising off Etruria in support of Hannibal.

Hannibal Marches into Apulia.—That general, however, destitute of a proper train and taught by Saguntum, had no idea of exhausting his force on a desperate siege in a wasted land where each man was a soldier and an enemy. Cool head and daring spirit, he combined the audacity of a Murat with the forethought of a Moltke. He had still to wait for Italian support; Gaul was a broken reed, and, even after Trasimene, Etruria gave no sign. He turned with hope to the warlike Sabellian tribes, his real objective, and moving west, after a fruitless assault on the colony of Spoletium, marched through Umbria to Picenum, marking his path by plunder and massacre. In ten days he reached the Adriatic. The time gained by this unexpected movement he employed in recruiting his way-worn troops and horses, and in reorganising and rearming the African infantry with the spoils of victory—a dangerous manœuvre in a hostile country. Hence he sent by sea his first official despatch to Carthage; its news stirred his people to enthusiastic support. From Picenum he passed along the coast into Apulia, maintaining his connection with Carthage and Macedon. The sympathy of the Samnites was not yet forthcoming. Local autonomy, national feeling, and the prestige of Rome kept her allies faithful—a gain worth many victories. *Tantæ molis erat Romanam perdere gentem.* As he marched into Apulia, Fabius appeared on his right flank at Ecae, on the edge of the Daunian plain. Masterly inaction sums up the tactics of Fabius—to worry, weaken, and starve an enemy whose necessity was victory, opposing a passive resistance to the

¹ That he was only pro-dictator is probably a mere subtlety of the Augustan lawyers.

provocations of Hannibal and the murmurs of the camp. The war must mark time while recruits were trained, confidence revived, and a new staff created by a campaign of skirmishes. Keeping his men together, carefully reconnoitring the ground, dogging the footsteps of his leader, making his enemy's eagerness the measure of his own caution, "Hannibal's lackey" kept his army intact, overawed the allies, and forced the enemy into a system of devastation, which, if it harassed Rome, endangered the keystone of his own policy. He was scarcely likely to intimidate Rome by plundering her confederates.

The War in Campania.—Impatient of delay, Hannibal, who had already tampered with the faith of Capua, the powerful, ambitious and suspected capital of Campania, broke out from Arpi, and, closely observed by Fabius, passed Beneventum, ravaging as he went, and struck by Telesia for Casilinum. Casilinum was the bridge-head of Capua, holding the passage of the Volturnus, the point of junction of the Appian and Latin ways, the key to the Roman communications with the garden of Italy. Taken by error as far as Allifæ on the road to Casinum, he returned and wasted the Falernian plain under the eyes of the Roman army. Fabius, inferior in cavalry, watched with contentment his opportunity from the Massic mount. Securing the Appian road and the passes of Lautulæ and Suessa, he drew the net tighter, as the enemy looked for retreat from the wasted land where no gates opened to him. Supports were thrown into Casilinum; the dictator, moving along the heights, covered from his central position, by Cales and Teanum, the broad exit of the Latin road and the hills beyond; while to the eastward 4000 men beset the remaining road, the entering defile between the Mons Callicula and the river-barrier. But the meshes were too wide, the weaver too timid. Hannibal, building on the caution of Fabius, as he had on the rashness of Flaminius, by a famous stratagem drove 2000 oxen with lighted faggots on their horns up the hills to the left of the defile, drew off the puzzled guard by this semblance of a torchlight march, and passed at leisure through the gap, disengaging his light troops, with heavy loss to the Romans, next day. Fabius was too far off, or too suspicious, to impede the manœuvre; nor could he prevent the plunder of the Pælignian land, or the settlement in winter quarters at Gereonium, on the edge of the Apulian plain, within equal reach of the broad cornfields and the upland pastures. Here, by the modern Capriola or Casa Calenda, close to Larino, Hannibal encamped outside the town, whose empty houses were stocked with the produce of syste-

matic foraging. If he was disappointed with the results of the year, at Rome and in the camp the feeling was strong against Fabius, the value of whose system, temporary at best, was scarcely as apparent as its defects. The discontent was exasperated by the stiff attitude of the dictator, and by the real success of his lieutenant, Minucius, who, by a judicious but unauthorised movement, had reaped the fruits of Fabius' tactics, cut up Hannibal's foragers, and forced him to fall back and concentrate in his old camp. Now, on the proposal of Metilius, backed by Terentius Varro and the popular party, in defiance of political and military precedent, a premium was set upon insubordination, and the majesty of the office and the value of a single command was destroyed by the appointment of Minucius as co-dictator. But the Fabian system was justified and discipline restored when, entrapped in a second version of the Trebia, Minucius was only saved from total ruin by his outraged but loyal colleague.

The consul suffectus, M. Atilius Regulus, with Servilius, who had returned from a futile expedition to Africa, took over the legions and tactics of Fabius, as consuls and proconsuls, till the arrival of their successors in the following year (216 B.C.). The close of the campaign left Hannibal master of the ground scoured by his famous horse, unconquered in the field, politically no further advanced. A still stronger blow was required yet to loosen the joints of the confederacy whose compact structure supplied the place of genius. The reinforcements he required were not substantially forthcoming. The resolute spirit of Rome in face of her wasted territory and vanished legions is shown by her refusal of help from Neapolis and Prestum, by the summons to Philip to surrender the rebel Demetrius of Pharos, and by the despatch of P. Scipio with thirty ships and 8000 men to Spain, to close the overland route to Italy.

Parties at Rome.—In the elections for the consulate a severe party struggle came to a head. Impatient of the burdens of the war, with whose prolongation they charged the aristocracy, the popular faction saddled the Senate with the odium of the Fabian system—equally unpalatable as it was to the majority of that body. Gradually, in opposition to the new nobility, the masses had consolidated themselves into a new democratic party, whose natural growth was favoured by the excitement of a disastrous war, and now, as if the soldier-politician had not done mischief enough already, they claimed and carried a genuine plebeian consul, a true son of the people, an active and eloquent anti-aristocrat, in a


purely military crisis. In this election and its consequences, as in the previous conduct of the war, we find the clearest proofs of the inadequacy of Roman municipal institutions for an imperial and military policy. Annual election and dual leadership, the management of the war in a partisan sense by a Flaminius or a Fabius, the change of front in face of the enemy, the strategy of the Forum or the Curia, the disunion of government and governed, and the formal weakness of the real government—these things, more than the genius of Hannibal, account for the disasters of Rome.

Varro.—C. Terentius Varro, a military ignoramus, to whose respectable civil talents and personal qualities his regular career of office and constant subsequent employment sufficiently testify, of bourgeois family and average education, eloquent partisan and wretched tactician, came out alone at the head of the poll, a result due to irritation at the electoral manœuvres of the aristocracy. L. Æmilius Paullus, an able soldier of Illyrian fame and unpopularity (p. 166), accepted unwillingly the second place as Senatorian nominee. The day of the Cunctator was over; policy and finance alike demanded a striking blow to confirm the allies and maintain the credit of Rome. All parties were at one; and the consuls received definite orders and an overwhelming force. With eight strong legions of 5000 foot and 300 horse, and a correspondingly large contingent of Italians—equal infantry and double horse—*i.e.*, with 80,000 foot and 6000 cavalry, they were to envelop and destroy the 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry of Hannibal. To effect a diversion, L. Postumius Albinus and M. Claudius Marcellus, consulars of tried ability, were despatched respectively to Gaul and Sicily, while Otacilius was directed to Africa.

Hannibal, who, by his personal influence and care for their comfort, had kept together his motley host through the tedium of winter quarters, with troops grown restive in the increasing dearth of pay and provisions, unable to draw the proconsuls to the field, remained at Gereonium till May. Once already he had tried and failed to lure them to destruction by the bait of an apparently deserted and plunder-laden camp, and now, under cover of a similar suspicious trap, trading on their wariness, he broke up in earnest, gained a day's march, and surprised the Roman magazines at Cannæ. At what point of time the consuls arrived is not clear, but their arrival precipitated a struggle.

Battle of Cannæ.—By his march to Cannæ, Hannibal had cut off their supplies, and himself commanded the ripening harvest.

In the now exhausted land provisions must be drawn from a distance, and the huge army had the option of a dangerous retreat or a pitched battle on the unfavourable ground to which their skilful enemy had drawn them. In two days the Romans reached, without crossing, the Aufidus, at a point six miles from Hannibal's camp, which was pitched on the right bank of the river, on a slope of the projecting ridge of Cannæ. The course of the Aufidus (Ofanto) is, roughly speaking, south-west to north-east. Eight miles from the sea it issues from a distinct valley, a mile wide, confined




THE AUFIDUS NEAR CANNÆ.

by moderate hills. On the left these hills terminate in a wide and waterless plain stretching to the sea; on the right they break down in a series of undulations to a wide and fairly level upper plain, whose edge towards the river, continuing the ridge of Cannæ, forms a bank from sixty to seventy feet high, which confines the vagaries of the stream and forms the boundary between the upper and lower level. Close at its foot may then have flowed the Aufidus, whose shrunken summer-stream, largest as it is of the eastern rivers, presented no difficulties. Its course for the direct six miles

has been, and remains, erratic ; but none of its bends affords an adequate battlefield, nor is there space in the valley above to manœuvre an army. The upper plain is, if not so obviously good as the lower, yet "an excellent fighting-ground" for cavalry ; the contending forces would rest their wings on the bank, which was not too steep for horse to climb. Here Varro was more ready to risk battle than on the left bank ; nor was Hannibal unwilling to accept it. The evils of alternate command made themselves manifest in the action of the Romans. Elated by a successful skirmish, Varro had pressed his advance ; it only remained for his colleague to secure more equal terms for the contest. Fortifying a large camp on the left bank, and a smaller entrenchment on the right, lower down the stream, he hoped, by restricting the enemy's supplies, to force his retreat to a ground less dangerous for infantry. Hannibal transferred his camp to the left, and offered battle, which Æmilius, aware of his situation, refused ; but on the sixth day, when his turn came, Varro, impatient of dilatory tactics and stung by the annoyance of the Numidian horse, who harassed his watering-parties, crossed the stream and drew out his army for action. The slight advantage of the eastern bank tempted his inexperience, and here, careless of retreat when all was staked on the single hazard, he posted his troops with their back to the sea, as Hannibal, with greater reason, neglected the Roman strongholds in his rear. The wind drove the dust in their eyes as they faced the south ; their right was crowded on the stream, their left exposed. Leaving 10,000 men in the large camp, to menace the Punic entrenchments and withdraw a division from their weakened army, he massed the infantry in column of cohorts in the centre, and flanked them on the right with the Roman cavalry, on the left with the stronger allied horse, covering the front with the usual screen of skirmishers. The maniples, drawn up thus directly behind each other—not in the ordinary quincunx—their depth many times greater than their front, increased the pressure of the column, but offered a prolonged flank to the enemy's superior cavalry. This extraordinary formation—for the intervals between the maniples were at the same time diminished—whether due to the number of recruits, to the demoralisation of the soldiery, or to a reminiscence of earlier tactics against elephants, sacrificed the advantage of superior numbers and was largely responsible for the disaster. This mistake enabled Hannibal not merely to extend an equal front, but to adopt a formation recently in use among the Zulus. He threw forward the Gallic and Spanish infantry in echelon, or possibly in line with


retiring flanks, a crescent-like formation, on either horn of which the African infantry, armed in Roman fashion, were drawn up in deep column with a narrow front. The heavy cavalry under Hasdrubal was posted on the left, while Maharbal, with the light brigade, outflanked the allied horse; the Baliares skirmished in front. Hannibal took the centre in person; Hasdrubal faced Æmilius; the Roman left was under Varro; Servilius took post in the centre. The battle, opened by the light troops, raged with especial fury on the Roman right and centre. In the confined



PLAN OF CANNÆ.

space cavalry tactics were useless. Locked in deadly struggle, the heavy troopers, tearing each other from their horses, fought man to man, till the Romans broke and fled. Then the legions took up the fight, and pushing forward with converging front, drove in the convex Celtic line, and charging on with irresistible weight, shrouded in the dust of battle, buried themselves deeper and deeper in the living *cul-de-sac*. In an instant the Libyan columns faced right and left; the now concave line of Gauls blocked the advance, while in tempestuous charges Hasdrubal with the heavy cavalry dashed upon their rear. He was in the

nick of time. The Numidian horsemen on the left had kept the allies in play, but could effect little against regular cavalry in a pitched battle, till Hasdrubal, passing round the Roman rear, scattered them to the winds, and leaving them, with sound judgment, to the pursuit of the Africans, decided the day by his timely attack on the main body. Jammed and packed by their own mass and momentum between the hostile columns, helpless and hopeless, unable to fight or fly, the men were hewn down where they stood. It was a carnival of cold steel, a butchery, not



CARTHAGINIAN HELMET FOUND AT CANNÆ.

a battle. Æmilius, Servilius, and Minucius, with eighty senators and most of the officers, died on the field. Varro, with fifty horsemen, escaped to Venusia. The army of Rome had been wiped out, and the victory was completed by the capture of the two camps. At least 50,000 fell. The captives may have reached 20,000. At the utmost 10,000 escaped. The actual figures are difficult to establish.¹ The detachments which escaped cut their way through to Canusium, where they were joined by the braver spirits from the two camps and the surviving consul.

¹ The existence of two *legiones Cannenses* testifies to a larger number of fugitives than Polybius allows.

CHAPTER XXII

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR FROM CANNÆ TO ZAMA

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Capua and most of South Italy joins Hannibal	216	538
War in Campania	216-214	538-540
Death of Hiero—Philip of Macedon allies himself with Hannibal	215	539
Marcellus besieges Syracuse	213	541
Hannibal seizes Tarentum—Capua besieged and Syracuse taken by the Romans—The Defeat of the Scipios compels the Romans to give up Spain south of the Ebro	212	542
Capua taken—Young Publius Scipio appointed to command in Spain	211	543
Scipio surprises New Carthage	210	544
Fabius recovers Tarentum	209	545
Defeat and Death of Hasdrubal at the Metaurus	207	547
Philip makes Peace with Rome	205	549
Scipio lands in Africa, but fails to take Utica	204	550
Scipio's Victories lead to the Recall of Hannibal from Italy	203	551
Battle of Zama	202	552
Peace arranged	201	553

After Cannæ.—With the battle of Cannæ the dramatic unity and breathless interest of the war ceases ; its surging mass, broken on the walls of the Roman fortresses—no bad type of the unconquerable resolution of a people “most dangerous when at bay”—foams away in ruin and devastation through the South Italian provinces—ever victorious, ever receding. Rome, assailed on all sides by open foe and forsworn friend, driven to her last man and lowest coin, “ever great and greater grows” in the strength of her strong will and loyal people, widening the circle around her with rapid blows in Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and Macedon, while she slowly loosens the grip fastened on her throat at home, till in the end, when the hour and the man are come, the final fight on the African sands closes at one moment the struggle for life and seats her mistress of the world.

At Rome, as the day of battle approached, clamorous piety besieged the altars. An agony of despair followed. There was mourning in every house. Already one-fifth of the population had been killed or taken, and, to complete the tale, before the military year was out (216-215 B.C.) L. Postumius Albinus, consul elect, with two legions, had been cut to pieces in a Gallic ambush

at Silva Litana. His skull set in metal remained a ghastly trophy, to deck the banquet-table.

Q. Fabius Maximus, in power but not in office, led the Senate, whose calm energy restored order and confidence. Its unfaltering courage, its wisdom, its sacrifices, its splendid tenacity, vindicated its claim to the commanding position imposed by circumstances on the ruling body. Measures were taken for a last defence, the streets policed, mourning curtailed; a mission under Fabius Pictor proceeded to Delphi; recourse was even had to human sacrifice to satisfy the offended gods. In the camp, Varro collected the wreckage of his army; a plot of faint-hearted nobles to abandon Italy was stifled by the young officers App. Claudius and P. Scipio; two weak legions were formed, which were subsequently sent as punishment battalions to Sicily. The consul, who had behaved with spirit, returned, a defeated fugitive and a discredited leader, to face his judges at Rome. But in the common resolution born of common suffering the voice of faction was silent; the thanks of the Senate offered to the man who had not despaired of the Republic witness at once to his merit and the spirit of his country.

Hannibal's Plans.—Hannibal, self-possessed, refused the invitation of Maharbal "to dine with him on the Capitol in five days," and tried even now to negotiate. A rush on Rome was the idea of a cavalry officer, not of a general. A surprise would be impossible, a demonstration idle. The defeat of Regulus had shown that the results of an entire campaign might be frittered away in the siege of a fortified capital. It was the policy of Hannibal to storm, not the capital, but the confederacy. He liberated the Italian prisoners, and, content with his exploits as a soldier, meant now to reap the harvest of his political combinations. He expected reinforcements; his agents were working in Sicily and Macedon; the Gauls were moving in the north; in the south the Roman alliance was beginning to give. Though his Spanish succours had been intercepted at the Ebro, the home government, in full communication at last and justified in their policy by victory, was able to ignore the peace party and give a more than naval support. Mago, who had already organised the revolt in Bruttium, carried to Carthage the despatches of Hannibal and a bushel of gold rings from the fallen nobles of Cannæ; 4000 horse and forty elephants were ordered to Italy; an additional army was to be raised in Spain. The support was indeed inadequate, but a commercial nation expected a successful war to pay. The indecision of Philip delayed

the action of Macedon ; and it was not till the following year that Sicily was ripe for revolution.

Capua and South Italy join Hannibal.—The first-fruits of victory were plucked in South Italy. The Lucanians and Bruttians, with few exceptions, were eager to resume their attacks on the Greek cities protected by Rome. Arpi, Salapia, and Herdonea, in Apulia, and the Samnite tribes, except the Pentrians, with the Hirpini, joined the revolt. Last and most important of all was Capua. This city, the second in Italy, closely connected with Rome, possessing lesser Roman rights, and the privilege of service in the legion, enjoying autonomy under its Senate and the Meddix Tuticus, with an army of 30,000 foot and 4000 excellent cavalry, was, like all the Campanian cities, divided between two factions, a Romanising aristocracy and an anti-Roman populace. Jealous and ambitious, irritated by the Roman government on some question of the public land, the people, led by the aspiring Pacuvius Calavius, overbore the Senate, and sealed the terms of their desertion to Hannibal by the murder of the Roman inhabitants. They stipulated for independence and immunity from burdens ; they looked to the future sovereignty of Italy. But the arrest and deportation of Decius Magius, the irreconcilable leader of the Roman party, by order of Hannibal, furnished an inconvenient commentary on Punic guarantees.

Hannibal's Difficulties.—Hannibal was thus master of Italy to the Voltturnus, with a wealthy city as a base, with Carthage behind him, with a veteran army, a magnificent staff ; and yet from this moment his warfare is mainly defensive. He toiled, fought, organised, sustained the struggle in five countries at once, while he directed the policy of the State at home, undefeated in the field, never greater than in his lowest fortune—"of all that befell the Romans and Carthaginians, good or bad, the one cause." If he failed in his attempt to crush and pulverise his enemy, the main cause of his failure lies not so much in the sporadic character of the war—this was a part of his plan—nor in the lukewarm attitude of Carthage, whose support was given persistently, if not wisely, to the last, nor in the character or organisation of his victorious army, as in the lack of subordination, insight, and self-sacrifice of his allies. The Italians showed little enthusiasm ; his position forbade conscription. He possessed a base that he must maintain, not a base from which to advance. He was cramped by the Roman fortresses,¹

¹ Such as Luceria, Venusia, Æsernia, Beneventum, Brundisium, Cales, Pæstum, Cosa.

which, holding the best positions, standing menaces in his rear and flanks, hampered his movements and occupied his friends. Depending on Rome for their very life, they were open neither to threats nor cajolery. His artillery and engineers were deficient; in a war of sieges and hill-fighting his strong arm—the cavalry—became comparatively useless. His effective force, weakened by the garrisons, which the existence of the colonies and of a Roman party in the towns themselves demanded, was insufficient to mask the fortresses, defend his frontier, and resume the offensive. All depended now on the auxiliary operations in Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and Macedon, and chiefly on the part played by Philip of Macedon and the armies of Spain. It was the folly of Philip and the defeat of Hasdrubal which finally shattered the vast combinations of Hannibal.

Marcellus in Campania.—Meanwhile Marcellus, who was organising the fleet at Ostia, sent forward a legion of marines to Teanum, and picking up the relics of Cannæ, followed the enemy to Campania. Too late for Capua, he threw a garrison into Neapolis and occupied Nola, where Hannibal's failure was magnified into a victory. Repulsed at Neapolis and Cumæ, Hannibal reduced Nuceria and Acerræ. Casilinum, heroically defended by M. Anicius of Præneste, capitulated in the spring of 215 B.C. He had secured the key of the Latin road, but failed to master a port, and now retired for the winter to Capua. The Senate refused his terms and expelled his envoys. The prisoners of Cannæ, "*pour encourager les autres*" and to save money, were left unransomed.¹ Extraordinary measures were taken to meet the deficiency of men and means. Already 120,000 men had been lost to the State, and the disorganisation of finance, agriculture, and society was making itself felt. The dictator M. Junius Pera called out four new legions and 1000 horse, and with a motley mass of available troops, ransomed slaves, debtors, criminals, and boys—25,000 strong—hurried to Teanum, to cover the capital and co-operate with Marcellus. To such desperate resorts was the city reduced! When the levies were completed over 30,000 men had taken the field, with another 30,000 in reserve. The war received a new character; the lesson of experience had been learned. Henceforth capable officers are elected and continued in command, Fabius, Fulvius, Manlius, Gracchus, above all the veteran M. Claudius Marcellus,

¹ The atrocities attributed to Hannibal on this and other occasions are of doubtful authority, and sort ill with his character and position.

the hero of the Gallic war, whose soldierly qualities and dogged determination need none of the spurious adornment with which the courtly writers of a later age have decorated the Marcelline legend. Resting on strong positions, accepting action with retreat secured, evading the redoubtable cavalry, they pursued the subtle offensive of persistent vigilance, a war of raids and entrenchments, cutting supplies, recovering the lost, overawing the doubtful. Rome still retained her Latin allies and her own citizens, Etruria and Central Italy, with the Greek harbours whose dangerous position had attached them to the Philhellenic city—Neapolis, Thurii, Rhegium, Tarentum. The feeling of Italian unity, of western civilisation, of common culture and interests, was strengthened by a natural and national antipathy to Gaul and Semite, and by fear of the possible vengeance of vindictive Rome. The forlorn defence of Petelia and Consentia was of good omen for her cause.

Extraordinary Measures at Rome.—To meet the monetary crisis which threatened insolvency and revolution, a commission of three, *triumviri mensarii*, were appointed, whose functions remain uncertain. The fearful gaps in the Senate were filled up by an extraordinary dictator, M. Fabius Buteo, appointed *ad hoc*, who, in a conservative spirit, selected from the men of political and military services 177 new members, and resigned the same day. The liberal but untimely proposal of Spurius Carvilius to call up representative Latins was indignantly thrown out.

The War in Campania.—In the following spring (215 B.C.) over 60,000 men enveloped Hannibal in Campania. Fabius at Cales covered the Latin road; Gracchus, with slaves and allies, occupied Liternum and protected the Greek harbours; while Marcellus watched Nola from the lines of Suessula. Tarentum and Brundisium were strongly garrisoned; and in Apulia, M. Valerius Laevinus disposed of two legions. These forces, with the troops abroad, made up a grand total of fourteen legions, or 140,000 men,¹ besides marines and irregulars. Squadrons cruised on the Latin and Calabrian coasts, though the bulk of the active fleet was at Lilybæum. The legions of Cannæ had been transferred to Sicily. Hannibal was probably stronger than any of the three opposing armies, his Italian recruits, in spite of Capua's independent attitude, supplying the place of his garrisons and detachments. From Mons Tifata he commanded the plain, and, with nothing to

¹ That is, if the allied contingents were, after the loss of South Italy, at all in proportion to the citizens.

get by action in face of the cautious tactics of the Roman generals, waited the development of events. He waited for Mago, for the action of Syracuse, for Sardinia, for Macedon, but above all he waited for the decay of the Roman confederacy. Luxurious Capua, that cherished Nemesis of Roman legend, was not Hannibal's Cannæ: with his old tactical caution, he was preparing for Rome a political Trasimenne.

The campaign opened in Italy with the surprise and massacre by Gracchus of 2000 Capuans at the Campanian feast at Hamæ. Too late to avenge a treachery which Gracchus covered by a counter-charge of treason, Hannibal besieged Cumæ, but was repulsed with some loss. Meanwhile Fabius had marched round Capua to Suessula, and moved Marcellus to Nola, whither Hannibal also proceeded, to effect a junction with his reinforcements brought over by Bomilcar, and to check the ravages of Marcellus in the Caudine valleys. In the three days' fighting before Nola, Marcellus, by a successful sortie, broke the spell of victory with a decided check, whose moral effect was seen in the desertion of some Punic troops. The defeat of Hanno at Grumentum and the raids of Lævinus from Luceria, with the Punic capture of Locri and Croton, are the only other incidents of a dull year. The Gauls, by their suicidal inaction after the disaster of Postumius, enabled Rome to utilise the resources of Umbria and Etruria, and to organise a corps of observation at Ariminum, with a small reserve under Varro in Picenum. Punishment was postponed, not forgotten.

Death of Hiero : Revolt of Sicily and Sardinia.—Abroad events were maturing. In 216–215 B.C. died the sage and politic Hiero, over ninety years old. For fifty-four years his firm and conciliatory rule had secured the peace and prosperity of Syracuse. A patron of science, agriculture, and the arts, a far-sighted and sagacious statesman, a consistent and generous ally, he had won the approval of Greece, and maintained his friendship with Rome without forfeiting his interest at Carthage. To preserve the balance of power, on which the existence of his state depended, or, if this was impossible, to cling to the safer Roman alliance, was the wise policy which his young and flighty grandson Hieronymus now flung to the winds. Egged on by an ambitious court, encouraged by the emissaries of Hannibal,—the soldier-politicians of mixed Punic and Syracusan blood and interests, Hippocrates and Epicydes, pupils of the tactics and policy of their master,—in face of the protests of the Roman prætor and his own wiser counsellors, he denounced the Roman alliance and made terms with Carthage,

whose easy liberality granted extravagant demands. There was sufficient irritation in the Roman province, and ferment in the turbulent and vacillating Paris of antiquity, to support him. In



COIN OF HIERO II. OF SYRACUSE.

Sardinia smouldering discontent, enhanced by the exactions of the starving troops and fleet, left by Rome to forage for themselves, broke out in open rebellion. A strong force despatched by Carthage under Hasdrubal Calvus was delayed by tempests, and T. Manlius Torquatus massed in the interval sufficient strength to crush the insurrection, destroy the reinforcements, and secure the island.

Hannibal's Reinforcements diverted.—To increase Rome's difficulties, the young and restless Philip, annoyed by Roman interference in Illyria and instigated by Demetrius of Pharos, adopted a policy sound in itself and dictated by his position, but carried out with fatal hesitation. He concluded with Hannibal an offensive and defensive alliance, whose price would be the Roman possessions in Illyria and the help of Carthage in his Grecian wars. The interception of his first embassy delayed action for a year, and gave Rome time not merely to increase her eastern fleet, but to prepare, if necessary, for the offensive in Macedon. Meanwhile the news from Spain had diverted thither the reinforcements destined by Carthage for the army of Italy. Had the Spanish and Sardinian armies, supported by Macedon, joined Hannibal in the spring the issue of the war had been different. At Rome the payment of her huge armies necessitated exceptional measures. Doubled taxes, which merely paralysed the paying power, were followed at the end of the year by a system of voluntary contribution towards the

navy, amounting to a graduated property-tax. All classes, officers, contractors, slave-owners, sacrificed pay or profit. To supply the Spanish forces, three companies of contractors accepted deferred payment (the State guaranteeing all risks and exempting them from personal service), and contrived to combine patriotism and jobbery by over-insuring their scuttled ships. The *Lex Oppia* restricted expenditure by limiting the ornaments of women.

The War in 214-213 B.C.—The change for the better was maintained (214 B.C.). Twenty legions were on foot, and 150 ships guarded the coast. The general dispositions remained the same. Eight legions, resting upon Luceria, Beneventum, Cales, and Suessula, operated against Hannibal; the remainder were serving abroad, in reserve at Rome, or watching Gaul or Macedon. Fabius, who had arbitrarily prevented the election of incompetent officers, was, with Marcellus, in chief command. The attempts of Hannibal on Puteoli and Tarentum were frustrated; the Punic garrison of Casilinum surrendered after a strenuous defence, but were cut to pieces in the act of evacuation by the truce-breaker Marcellus, whose chronicler records yet another victory at Nola.

The chief exploit of the campaign was the defeat of Hanno's Brutian levies by the slave-legions of Gracchus, who received their liberty, the citizenship, and a triumphal reception at Beneventum. Hannibal retired to Apulia, and the combined Roman armies ravaged Samnium. During the year the theatre of war had widened, but in spite of Punic successes in Sicily the balance of advantage lay with Rome. Hannibal's reinforcements had been frittered away; his allies were inactive; in Spain the Scipios more than held their ground. During 213 B.C. there was little progress. Hannibal watched Tarentum, so important for his communications with Carthage and Macedon; Fabius surprised Arpi, and several Brutian towns surrendered. The block in the war was, if unfavourable to the Punic leader, discreditable to Rome. There were a few skirmishes, and Hanno destroyed a number of Roman irregulars.

Hannibal takes Tarentum.—To this inconceivable inaction with so large an army succeeded the military and political blunders of 212 B.C. The execution of fugitive Tarentine and Thurian hostages, held as pledges at Rome, was a crime and a mistake. Treason co-operated with negligence, and Tarentum, except its citadel, was captured by Hannibal. Heraclea, Thurii, and Metapontum followed suit. The coast was in his hands, and the way open for the Macedonian phalanx. Only on the fortified hill which forms

the apex of the water-washed triangle of Tarentum the Roman garrison maintained itself to the end.

Siege of Capua.—As the war went on its effects were growing more visible in the decline of faith, the worship of strange gods, and the demoralisation of society. The frauds of patriotic contractors, such as Postumius Pyrgensis, came to light, and met with tardy if severe punishment. The Senate dealt with the new gods and the danger to the national religion; special commissioners raised the reluctant recruits, and sent malingerers to join the punishment regiments in Sicily. The army was made up to twenty-four legions on home and foreign service; a new post was created in Etruria, which had been drained by requisitions for supplies; the consuls concentrated at Bovianum for the siege of Capua. To strengthen the garrison Hannibal threw in 2000 horse, but the convoy prepared by Hanno to revictual the town was captured and the covering force destroyed by Q. Fulvius Flaccus near Beneventum. In spite of a sudden cavalry onslaught, which cost them 1500 men, Appius Claudius Pulcher and his colleague Fulvius had closed upon the city, when Hannibal unexpectedly arrived and scattered them to the winds. He followed the retreating Appius into Lucania, till that general threw him off and swung round to his old position. He then retired to Tarentum, cutting to pieces on his march the irregulars of M. Centenius, a promoted centurion, and shortly after destroyed at Herdonea the two legions of the lax and negligent Gnæus Fulvius. Gracchus, who covered the siege on the Appian Way, fell a victim to the treachery of a turncoat Lucanian, in an ambushade. His slaves dispersed; his cavalry joined the consuls. Lucania was clear, and, confident in the strength of Capua, after a failure at Brundisium, Hannibal returned to Apulia to recruit his tired army and watch for Macedon. As he departed the avenging legions gathered round the doomed city. Summoning C. Claudius Nero from Suessula, the consuls, at the head of a combined force of 60,000 men, surrounded Capua with double continuous lines connecting their entrenched camps—"a city round a city," based on magazines at Puteoli, Casilinum, and the neighbouring posts. The works were completed late in the winter, in the teeth of the enemy's active cavalry. The democratic party, it appears, controlled the government of the town; all terms were refused, nor was there one word of surrender. In 211 B.C. the same officers, as proconsuls, pressed the siege, strengthening their horse with light troops to meet the sallies of cavalry. Hannibal, warned of the danger, by

road, pushed by the strongholds of Cales, Teanum, Fregellæ, onwards by Gabii, dawdling and plundering as he went, extending his flying squadrons right and left as far as Suessa and Allifæ, encamping finally unmolested near the Anio, three miles from Rome. On this supposition, it was his design to draw the legions from Capua to battle, and so relieve the town. According to the other account, which is generally preferred, he pressed by a circuitous but rapid march through Samnium, and having thrown the enemy off the scent, turned suddenly to surprise Rome, across the Anio from Reate, by Tibur and the Valerian Way. Hannibal was at the gates, and the agony of Rome was intense. But the urban levy then on foot and the mass of citizens and fugitives were enough to secure the walls, with the 10,000 loyal men of Alba Fucens whom legend has sent to Rome to rival the renown of the gallant Plateans. If he had meant to surprise Rome, Hannibal had failed, and he failed equally to raise the siege of Capua. The mass of the Roman troops remained; only Fulvius,¹ with 16,000 men, hastened by forced marches along the Appian Way to the defence of Rome. Hannibal reconnoitred leisurely up to the very walls. He stayed a while to plunder the virgin soil and lure, if possible, the garrison to battle, while he gave time for the besieging armies to break up, then turned away through Samnium to Capua, by the Tibur road, followed by the consular legions. On these, when he learned his disappointed hope, he turned, beat them badly from their ground, and retiring hastily to Bruttium, attempted to surprise the port of Rhegium. He had seen his enemy face to face, and driven the iron deep into her soul, as his cavalry wasted in triumph the lands of the Roman tribes. The march and retreat are framed in myths, that cover with bravado, superstition, and lies at once the danger, the terror, and the unyielding spirit of Rome. The temple of Rediculus Tutanus, at the spot where Hannibal turned, remained as monument of her peril and her gratitude.

Fall of Capua.—Capua fell, surrendered at discretion by the starving people, and Fulvius “did not his work negligently.” The murder of Roman citizens and political necessity exacted an example, allowed by the bloody rules of ancient warfare. The leading men died by the axe, or of starvation in prison; their lands and goods were confiscated, the population sold as slaves, transplanted, dispersed; the land became *ager publicus* of the Roman people,

¹ This is denied. According to Polybius, none stirred. There was a garrison at Rome and an army in Etruria.

the city, deprived of its corporate existence, a *receptaculum aratorum* inhabited by an unorganised mob under a *praefectus iuri dicundo* annually sent from Rome. The *ager Campanus* was later a mainstay of Roman revenue in the *vectigal*, or dues, paid by the lessees. A few colonies were founded to hold the country down. The second city of Italy ceased to exist. Such was the stern settlement of the Senate, empowered by the Comitia to deal with the matter. It was the decisive point of the war. The fall of Capua after two years' siege, in the teeth of Hannibal, shook confidence in his cause. Its moral effect, followed by the failure at Rhegium and the relief of Tarentum, by creating disaffection and breeding suspicion, more than counterbalanced all he could gain from the discontent and exhaustion of Roman subjects. His hopes depended now on Spain and Macedon.

Marcellus in Sicily.—Syracuse had already fallen. The childish tyranny of Hieronymus—a typical despot in embryo—led to his murder in the narrow street of Leontini. Revolution succeeded revolution with Parisian mobility and ferocity, watched with interest by the Roman and Carthaginian fleets. At length, for all the intrigues of Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had fished to purpose in the troubled waters and been carried by the reaction to high office, the Roman party, the older men, heirs of Hiero's policy but not his temper, supported by the Roman fleet, forced on a truce. But when Marcellus, specially despatched from Rome, stormed Leontini, where the Syracusan malcontents had declared their independence of both Syracuse and Rome, and massacred the deserters there captured, the highly coloured story of the Roman "fury" roused a storm of indignation. With the triumph of the popular party, Hippocrates and Epicydes assumed the government in the name of liberty and Hannibal. Mutiny was followed by massacre; the worst elements were set loose; the mob, the mercenaries, and the Roman deserters dominated the town. Marcellus and Appius early in 213 B.C. commenced the siege by sea and land. Syracuse consisted roughly of three towns. The original island settlement of Ortygia had expanded into the new city of Achradina, on the mainland to the north, and had become itself the citadel, arsenal, palace, and barrack. Since the great Athenian siege, beyond the walls of Achradina, two suburbs—Tyche and Neapolis—had grown up on the west, enclosed later by the great triangular lines of Dionysius the elder, eighteen miles in length, crowning the cliffs of Epipolæ and running up to the apex fort of Euryalus. The lines, too long for adequate defence, were strong by site and art, lavishly supplied

with the splendid artillery of Archimedes. The scientific appliances of the great mathematician, the "geometrical Briareus," his ballistæ, his blocks, hooks, and cranes, which raised the assailants' ships and dashed them beneath the waves, baffled and discomfited Marcellus, while Bomilcar's fleet made a blockade impossible. The Punic government, inspired by Hannibal, strongly supported the revolt. Himilco, with a powerful army, landed at Agrigentum, and was joined by Hippocrates. A treacherous massacre by the Roman garrison at Enna and the cruelties of Marcellus added fuel to fire. If the legions of Cannæ secured the western arsenals, Marcellus and Crispinus, with an additional division, could effect nothing.

Marcellus takes Syracuse.—The war marked time, while Marcellus waited the working of treason. At last, during the careless jollity of the Artemisia of 212 B.C., the wall was scaled by night at a favourable point. Led by the traitor Sosis, a party seized Hexapylon, the key of the lines, and by morning Marcellus was master of Epipolæ. The timely surrender of Euryalus secured his difficult position between the Punic and Syracusan armies and the city walls. He was able, as well as his lieutenant Crispinus, who had entrenched a position on the right bank of the Anapus, to beat off a combined attack of the besieged, the allied armies, and the marines of the strong Punic fleet. As summer advanced the deadly malaria, the ancient ally of Syracuse, decimated her defenders encamped on the marshes. Himilco and Hippocrates died; the Sicilians dispersed. Famine, disease, and anarchy raged within the walls; the relieving fleet of Bomilcar, detained by contrary winds and watched by a Roman squadron, broke up; the men-of-war slipped away to Hannibal at Tarentum; the transports returned to Carthage. An attempt to treat called forth a reign of terror; the mutinous mercenaries and deserters controlled the city; till at length the treachery of a Spanish officer admitted a detachment into Ortygia; a larger force entered under cover of a general attack, and, the citadel island lost, Achradina surrendered (autumn 212 B.C.). Forgetful of her past services and unhappy circumstances, Marcellus gave up the city to plunder and rapine, the great Archimedes perishing in the tumult. Stripped of her artistic glories, merged in the Roman province, a helpless tributary of Rome, Syracuse was reduced to extol the tender mercies of the ruthless conqueror. The misery of the ruined state drew compassion even from the Senate. Leontini *en bloc* became Roman domain, leased out by the Censors.

Submission of Sicily.—For some years after, the flying squadrons of Muttines, a brilliant officer of Hannibal's school, aided by the anti-Roman feeling, carried on a successful guerrilla warfare, till the folly and jealousy of Hanno led to his own emphatic defeat by Marcellus at the Himera (211 B.C.), and the delivery of Agrigentum (210 B.C.) by the superseded and indignant Muttines to Marcellus' successor, M. Valerius Lævinus. The town became a Roman colony and fortress; Sicily was tranquillised, agriculture restored; the prætor L. Cincius Alimentus regulated the island as a compact province, and arranged the relations of the different allied or subject communities. Gradually it recovered from the waste of the war, to fall beneath the cruel scourge of Roman business-men, Romanised Sicilian speculators, and annual Roman viceroys—its cities isolated, its lands exploited, its labour crushed by slave-gangs. The seeds of the Sicilian slave-war were sown by the forfeitures and confiscations, the robberies and outrages, that followed the *Pax Romana*.

First War with Macedon.—Syracuse had fallen, and Macedon proved a broken reed. In 214 B.C. Philip opened the first Macedonian war (214–205 B.C.) with a wretched fiasco; Lævinus relieved Apollonia, and for three years, with one legion and a small fleet, paralysed his power at the very crisis of the struggle. Young, warlike, and popular, marked out by his position to be the leader of united Greece, Philip failed to see the necessity of a vigorous offensive in Italy and wasted a random and feverish energy on aimless enterprises. The discordant factions into which Greece was split were as incapable of subordinating their jarring interests to a common good as Philip of looking beyond the narrow horizon of the Greek hegemony. Their petty nationalism run mad had accepted foreign aid to crush a kindred state at every period of their history; and now, whatever a larger patriotism, prescient of the future, suggested to wiser minds, they showed themselves again incapable of common action against the common enemy, at a time when the indolence of Egypt and the embarrassments of Syria left the field open for the assertion of Hellenism in the west.

At length, in 211 B.C., Rome, alarmed by the fall of Tarentum, utilised the irritation caused by Philip's aggressive policy to organise against Macedon a coalition of Greek states, at the head of which stood the Ætolian league, supported by Athens, Sparta, Elis, and Pergamum, while the Achæans acted for Philip. The partners in this complot, which, ugly as it looks, is in accordance with ancient precedent, agreed to divide the spoil. The Ætolians

stipulated for Acarnania and the conquered towns, the Romans receiving, in consideration of naval support, the movable booty and prisoners. Philip, occasionally helped by the Punic fleet, met the savage and desultory war with ubiquitous activity. In spite of repeated attempts at mediation, it spread into each corner of Hellenic sea and land, bringing debt and desolation in its train. At length the Ætolians, distressed and harassed by the struggle, weary of doing Rome's dirty work while their ally complacently regarded a contest which occupied her enemy and cost her little, in spite of Rome's protests, concluded a separate treaty with Macedon. The Senate followed suit in 205 B.C. One solitary action distinguished the wretched record of the ten years' war, the defeat of the Spartan tyrant Machanidas by the brave and able Achæan officer Philopœmen at Mantinea (207 B.C.). The Ætolians had ruined themselves and earned no thanks from their employers. Philip had made a dangerous attack and a still more dangerous peace; he now went on to irritate all his possible allies in the coming contest with the incensed Romans. He had gained nothing but a paltry concession in Illyria, where Rome retained her chief possessions.

The War in Spain.—Of the Spanish war the distance of the operations, the family legends of the Scipios, and the geographical ignorance of our authorities combine to present us with a confused and uncertain record. Invention and exaggeration are rampant. The character of the country and its inhabitants have throughout history made Spain easy to grasp, difficult to hold, and impressed on military operations from Hannibal to Napoleon a character of strange vicissitude. The same reversals of fortune, the same persistent guerrilla warfare, the same incapacity for sustained and regular combination, the same desperate sieges, the same massing and dispersion of brave but untrustworthy hosts, mark the story of the Roman conquest. At the outset a mere corollary of the Italian war—presenting a purely defensive problem, to hold the barrier of the Pyrenees and the line of the Ebro—it ends, by a necessary consequence, as a war for the expulsion of Carthage.

Victories of the Scipios.—The unexpected arrival of Cn. Scipio at Emporiæ in 218 B.C. revived the Roman connection in the north. The defeat of Hanno at Cissis (218 B.C.) effaced the effects of Hannibal's brief and bloody campaign. From his base at Tarraco, Scipio was able to keep the activity of Hasdrubal in check. Early in 217 B.C. he succeeded in cutting out a Punic squadron at the mouth

of the Ebro, and on the arrival of Publius with a fresh legion, the two brothers, able generals and skilled diplomatists, crossed the Ebro, and equally by force and policy advanced the cause of Rome. The treachery of the Spaniard Abelux and the unwonted simplicity of a Punic officer placed in their hands a useful weapon in the Spanish hostages collected at Saguntum. Meanwhile a Punic fleet, co-operating with Hannibal off Etruria, which had intercepted their transport fleet at Cosa, was driven from the waters by the consul Servilius with 120 sail. In the following year Hasdrubal, who had been occupied in stamping out a desperate insurrection on the Bætis, in the south, received definite orders to resume the offensive and force his way to Italy. In the actual state of Spain this was only possible if an adequate force was left behind; but though, in answer to Hasdrubal's remonstrances, Himilco appeared with reinforcements to take over the command, the government under-estimated the strength of the Scipios and the weakness of their Spanish empire. The troops had been worth more in Italy. Fully awake to the crisis, the Scipios encountered Hasdrubal's columns at the Ebro. The spiritless conduct of the local conscripts decided the issue, and the victory of Ibera (216 B.C.) saved the existence of Rome. Hasdrubal barely escaped, and the next year the masters of the north pushed their arms to the Bætis. The victories of Iliturgi and Intibili, however grossly exaggerated, represent an advance sufficient, when taken with the rising of the tribes, to prevent a forward movement and divert to Spain the reinforcements raised by Mago for Hannibal. With this new strength Hasdrubal had been able (214 B.C.) to crush the insurgents and push the Romans behind the Ebro, where they maintained themselves with difficulty, when the outbreak of a near and dangerous war with Syphax, the Massæsylian king, withdrew a strong force to Africa and reduced the remainder to the defensive. Saguntum, besieged by Publius, fell in 214 B.C.; Gnaeus extended the Roman protectorate over the central plateau. In 213 B.C. negotiations were opened with Syphax, and an attempt made to organise his Numidian infantry, while the legions were strengthened with the ominous aid of 20,000 Spanish mercenaries, of whom some were sent to Italy.


Defeat of the Romans.—But the defeats of Syphax (213–212 B.C.) by Carthage, with the aid of Massinissa, chief of the Massylians, brought the Scipios face to face with a powerful and victorious army under Hasdrubal, Mago, and Hasdrubal Gisgo. In the campaign that followed, the brothers, with divided forces, abandoned by the fickle and possibly unpaid mercenaries, were attacked

and destroyed in detail, Publius in the field, Gnæus in his ill-constructed camp (212-211 B.C.). L. Marcius and T. Fonteius collected the remnants, called in the garrisons, and made good their retreat to the Ebro. Aided by the jealousy of the Punic leaders and the rapacious cruelty of Mago and Hasdrubal Gisgo, they maintained a gallant stand till the arrival of C. Claudius Nero with a strong legion and 1100 horse, released at a critical moment by the fall of Capua. This capable leader is credited with a victory in Andalusia over Hasdrubal; but the dangerous state of affairs led at the end of 211 B.C. to the appointment of an extraordinary officer for the Spanish war. The miraculous exploits of the defeated Roman armies deserve little belief, but through all the veil of fable the inactivity of the Punic leaders remains surprising. Thus in the eighth year of the war the tide of conquest rolled back to the Pyrenees; with untiring patience Hasdrubal had organised victory out of defeat; skilled diplomatist and gallant soldier, his personal influence and tactical ability had reaped at length their reward.

Character of Scipio.—At Rome the Senate had been for some time aware of the danger threatened from Spain by the preparations of Carthage. The war claimed a commander of no common gifts as soldier and statesman, to meet with daring initiative and powerful personality the gifted and magnetic Barcid. His services at the Ticinus and Cannæ, his kinship with the dead, his peculiar qualities, backed by the interest of the great Cornelian house, pointed to the young and gallant son of Publius, P. Cornelius Scipio, the future conqueror of Zama. It is difficult to disentangle from our party-coloured authorities either the character or exploits of a man at once admired, loved, and hated. The power of his family is seen as much in his election as in the hereditary character of the Spanish war, and the arbitrary conduct of the three kinsmen alike in the military and political administration. The self-conscious kingliness of his demeanour, the half-superstitious, half-politic mysticism, his Greek culture, and the un-Roman charm and grace of his manner attracted as much suspicion as homage. A self-idealised hero, young, handsome, melancholy, enthusiastic, he united pride and generosity, piety and calculation. By his keen intelligence and power of inspiration, his successful soldiery and refined diplomacy, he was marked out to be the "leader in these glorious wars." Saviour of his country as he was by his good fortune and his gifts, at the same time by his personal and family policy, by his impatience of equality and isolated attitude above and beyond republican forms and restrictions, he set the first unconscious pre-

cedents of monarchy. The irregularities in his character are the contradictions of a spirit above and yet limited by his age and people ; nor can they be summed up in a single narrow formula, religious or political.

The romance of his election may be dismissed ; with abundance of able officers, the Spanish command could not have gone begging. It was to save friction and spare feelings that the Senate left to



BUST OF SCIPIO AFRICANUS.

the people an ostensibly unpremeditated choice ; and at the age of twenty-four (or twenty-seven) a young man of merely ædilician rank was raised by his strong connections and popular favour to the most responsible and independent command in the war. Confident in divine support, sought so often in solitary prayer, the heaven-sent hero set sail as proconsul with 11,000 men, with Gaius Lælius and Junius Silanus as adjutants and advisers.

Capture of New Carthage.—The Carthaginians were occupied

in completing their work ; their divisions operated at some distance from each other, while the nearest was ten days' march from their centre and military capital, the key of their communications, Nova Carthago. Here were their magazines, hostages, and war material, defended by a small garrison, whose numbers, as well as the general spiritless conduct of the war by the Punic leaders, may be explained by a possible recall of troops to Africa or Sicily. During the winter Scipio had prepared his forces, and now, in the spring of 210 B.C., he secretly and swiftly crossed the Ebro with 28,000 men, to strike with happy audacity at the enemy's heart. The city, whose ancient site differs somewhat from the modern, lay upon hills of tolerable height, at the head of its harbour, on a tongue of land joined on the east by an isthmus to the mainland, surrounded on the south and west by the waters of the bay, on the north by a lagoon connected artificially with the sea, whose water-level sank at the ebb. Drawing his lines across the isthmus, he beat back a desperate sally, but was baffled in the assault, till, covering the movement by a double attack in front and from the sea, he rushed the walls across the lagoon at low water. Valuable prisoners, hostages, ships, and stores, with a large sum of money, fell into the victor's hands ; the artificers were spared to re-arm his troops with the Spanish sword, and to equip a larger force to meet the rumoured movements from Carthage ; the city was strengthened and garrisoned. Traits of generosity relieved the customary butchery of a Roman storm, and it is in this connection that we read of the restoration of the beauteous captive to her Spanish lover—the story of the continence of Scipio. Henceforth the Punic armies rest on the ancient arsenal of Gades.

Hasdrubal outmanœuvres Scipio.—A pause ensued, spent by Scipio in treating with the tribes, while Hasdrubal husbanded his resources. In 209 B.C. Scipio laid up his fleet to swell his army, and moved out in search of Hasdrubal, now reinforced, and collecting men, money, and supplies for the long-planned and by this time indispensable march to Italy. He found him in the strong position of Bæcula (Bailen), on the Upper Guadalquivir. An affair followed in which Scipio claimed the victory, but was clearly outmanœuvred by Hasdrubal, who, cleverly masking the movement, gave him the slip, and with his best troops, elephants, and war-chest, struck unpursued north, and penetrated uninterrupted, either in the same or the following year (208 B.C.), by a route which ran along the north coast and through the western passes into Gaul. It looks as if Scipio had been designedly drawn from

his post by feigned inaction and rumoured dissensions, and occupied by the army of Spain or a rearguard while the expeditionary column escaped. By the winter of 208 B.C. Hasdrubal had pierced to the Upper Rhone, and, out of reach of the coast, was recruiting himself among the friendly Arverni. Scipio's assumption of the offensive and neglect to secure the western passes—a route he had not expected and may not have known—were responsible for the crisis of the Metaurus, where the victory of the superseded Claudius saved the laurels of his fortunate successor.

Victory of Scipio.—He had retired to Tarraco, to close the eastern routes. In 208 B.C. little of note occurred; the departure of Hasdrubal, the withdrawal of his namesake to Lusitania, and of Mago to the Balears, left Scipio master of the east. His personal prestige and charm attracted the chivalrous Spaniards; at Tarraco the popular "Imperator" kept an almost royal court, and by his legates carried on the war. Silanus defeated Hanno and Mago (207 B.C.) and drove the Carthaginians into the fortresses of Bætica; Lucius Scipio stormed Oringis (Jaen). It was in the following year (206 B.C.)—so far as facts can be extracted from the epic of Scipio—that the crowning battle was fought at a place called Ilipa, Silpia, or Baccula, on the right bank of the Bætis. It was decided by the skilful tactics and cool handling of the Roman general. For some days the two armies manœuvred in front of each other, till in the early morning Scipio led his well-fed, well-instructed troops to attack the enemy, strongly posted with superior numbers on the skirts of a hill falling to a plain. Reversing, under cover of a screen of cavalry and skirmishers, the familiar arrangement of his troops, he drew his unsteady Spaniards to the centre, to contain the corps of African veterans, and moved the Romans to the flank in face of the enemy's Spanish recruits. Then, to prevent outflanking, as he rapidly advanced he withdrew the screen and wheeled his wings from line to column, simultaneously extending his front by a diagonal march, and bringing his cavalry from rear to flank. His centre thus refused, he charged the wavering wings, and by the ingenious if dangerous combination decided the campaign. The victory, prosecuted vigorously by Silanus, was followed by large adhesions of the native tribes.

Scipio returns to Rome.—Scipio had already contemplated an attack on Africa. With Quixotic hardihood, he is said to have clinched his relations with Syphax by a personal visit. The story of his hairbreadth escape, of his meeting with Hasdrubal Gisco at the king's table, of Sophonisba and the Libyan king,

belongs to the annals of adventure, though we need not reject as fictitious all the exploits ascribed by tradition and poetry to an extraordinary character in history. Little in any case was gained by the escapade. The charms of Hasdrubal's daughter Sophonisba carried the day for Carthage. The Senate was not yet disposed to sanction the daring enterprise. With Massinissa he had formed a more useful connection. Finally, in 206 B.C., after storming the fortresses of the south, Iliturgi, Castulo, and Astapa, suppressing a dangerous mutiny by an energetic *coup de théâtre*, crushing a native insurrection, and accepting the surrender of Gades, Scipio returned to Rome for the elections, to strike at once for the consulate and Africa. On technical grounds, the proconsul, who had not yet held the full imperium, was refused a triumph by the pedantic jealousy of the cautious Senate. Meanwhile Mago, who had evacuated Gades and failed to surprise Carthago Nova, wintered in the Baliares, whence, in the absence of the fleet, laid up at Tarraco, he was able to transfer a formidable army, by order of the Punic Senate, to co-operate from Liguria with Hannibal.

In Italy (210 B.C.) the fall of Syracuse and Capua permitted a slight reduction in the active army; a self-denying ordinance filled the empty chest and furnished forth the fleet when additional taxation met with steady passive resistance. Marcellus, in spite of the bitter charges of the afflicted Syracusans, received a well-earned ovation and a fourth consulship, but, with all his boasting bulletins from Lucania, scored a very moderate success. A second Fulvius was destroyed at a second battle of Herdonea; yet the fall of Salapia and the loss of its garrison taught Hannibal to draw in his outlying detachments—a process not unattended with cruel excesses. The defeat of their squadron at Tarentum left the Romans still masters of the citadel; while the fall of Carthagera, the inaction of Macedon, and the renewal of the Egyptian treaty balanced the account well in their favour.

Fabius recovers Tarentum.—The elections of 209 B.C. were arbitrarily decided for Fabius and Fulvius, who pursued the respectful policy of driving Hannibal by inches to the sea. Covered by his colleague's operations in Lucania and the Hirpinian country, and the dogged watchfulness of Marcellus in Apulia, Fabius recaptured the desperately defended Tarentum more by treason than force, and gave a second bloody warning to the revolted towns. Three thousand talents and 30,000 slaves were the relics of the promiscuous plunder and carnage. Hannibal, unable to save the city, handled Marcellus so severely in a series of smaller actions that

he shut himself up in Venusia. Then hurrying to the relief of Caulonia, he captured the band of Sicilian banditti transferred by Lavinius to Rhegium, who from that centre were harrying Bruttium. A natural feeling of disappointment at these meagre results, backed by the impatience felt at the monopoly of power by an able but exclusive clique, found vent in the impeachment of the "ever-victorious" Marcellus.

Discontent among the Latin Colonies and in Etruria.—A more serious anxiety harassed Rome in the blank refusal of twelve of the Latin colonies to furnish their quota of men and money for the war. This movement, whether prompted by actual exhaustion or smouldering discontent, threatened the existence of Rome. It appeared chiefly among the oldest and nearest colonies, in Latium, Etruria, North Campania, and among the Marsi. In her hour of bitterness she was only saved by the equally splendid and far-sighted patriotism of the remaining eighteen, headed by the gallant and ill-fated Fregellæ. Picenum and the north, with the great fortresses in South Italy, were true to the cause of Latin influence and Italian independence. While public gratitude honoured the faithful delegates, the government, with wise and terrible moderation, left the recalcitrants severely alone. To meet the want of funds, the accumulated reserve from the "vicesima manu missionum,"—5 per cent. tax on manumitted slaves, imposed 357 B.C.,—was appropriated.

Not unconnected with the Latin trouble, the agitation in Etruria, closely watched since 212 B.C., due to the pressure of naval and military requisitions, was coming to a head in secret conspiracies, when it was energetically repressed, Arretium garrisoned, hostages exacted, and the country patrolled. The strength of Rome was under-estimated exactly by those who lay nearest the grasping and farthest from the fighting hand.

Death of Marcellus.—Fabius now retired from active service (208 B.C.). The campaign opened with an attack on Locri, Hannibal's Bruttian base, but not only was Crispinus forced to fall back upon his colleague Marcellus, but the legion of Tarentum, moving to co-operate with a Sicilian fleet in carrying on the siege after his retirement, was cut to pieces on the march near Petelia by an unexpected back-stroke of Hannibal, who now proceeded to face the combined consular armies at Venusia. It was here, while reconnoitring a wooded height between the hostile camps, that the two consuls, with their cavalry escort, were enveloped by the cunning Numidian horsemen. Marcellus fell fighting, as he had lived ;

Crispinus died later of his wounds ; their armies were paralysed, while Hannibal by a rapid onslaught relieved Locri once more, and drove the besiegers to their ships. Rome was the poorer by the brave old soldier, a true Roman of the blunt type. Strong heart and ready hand, spirit but half-humanised by culture, his cruelty, treachery, and greed, the vices of his nation and his time, are something condoned by the unflinching loyalty and dogged courage which thwarted, if they could not conquer, his great opponent. Hannibal honoured himself by the honourable treatment of Marcellus' corpse.

Hasdrubal and Hannibal.—Except in Spain, with twenty-one legions on foot, nothing had been effected. With failing allies and fainting hearts, with her land exhausted, her population sinking, with famine prices and ruined prosperity, her armies locked up, her trusted leaders old or dead, Rome was now to face the last great moment of the war. In 207 B.C. Hasdrubal, with unexpected ease and speed, passed the Alps, and calling the Gallic and Ligurian tribes to arms, threatened to realise at the eleventh hour the gigantic scheme of Hannibal. Not in vain had he waited ; the blunder of Scipio was the opportunity of Carthage. Rome put forth her utmost energy. With solemn sacrifice and inhuman superstition, the gods were summoned to bless her mighty armaments. Gaius Claudius Nero, who had served with distinction before Capua and in Spain, was chosen consul, and received as colleague his personal foe, the injured and embittered conqueror of Illyria, the stern and sullen M. Livius Salinator, reluctantly dragged to Rome, reluctantly reconciled. Their powers and forces were alike exceptional. To contain Hannibal, Claudius disposed of six legions, two under his personal command and four available in support at Tarentum and in Bruttium. With an equal force Livius was destined to hold down the disaffected communities and intercept the invader ; 150,000 men were in arms in Italy alone, fifteen legions made up by strict recruiting and exceptional enlistments, of whom upwards of 100,000 were disposable in the field, to meet a total Punic strength of 80,000—a divided and inferior force, led, however, by the first masters of the art of war. Hasdrubal meanwhile was his own messenger. He had knocked at the gates of Placentia, the virgin fortress, but effected nothing, and now, with 56,000 men and fifteen elephants, was in full march on Ariminum, driving before him a corps of observation under the prætor L. Porcius. Livius, with a strong army, joined his lieutenant, and fell back over the Metaurus to Sena. In the south, Claudius, with a similarly

strengthened force of over 40,000 men, marched to check the advance of Hannibal, who effected his concentration rapidly, watched but not impeded by Nero, as he moved hither and thither to pick up his allies and garrisons. Finally Hannibal re-entered Apulia, advanced to Canusium, and there halted to gather supplies and information. The consul, in spite of a reported victory at Grumentum, had been baffled, beaten, and eluded. But Hannibal was unable to advance, and unwilling as yet to risk a general action without more definite news. He could not abandon his allies and depôts, and leave his base undefended. The army of the north must cut its own way first before he could reach out his hand. But the adventurous troopers who had carried the despatches of Hasdrubal in safety to the south were captured near Tarentum; their news decided the consul's action. Hasdrubal begged his brother to meet him in Umbria, to move thence by Narnia upon Rome.

March of Nero.—Nero, a man of no considerable exploits before or after, adopted in this agony of his country's fate an original and audacious strategy. It was open to him, as to Grouchy before Waterloo, to adhere to orders; he might merely have detached reinforcements; he did not so conceive the problem. Ordering the urban reserves to Narnia and the Capuan supports to Rome, he left the bulk of his force to front Hannibal, while he hurried in person, at the head of a picked corps of 7000 men, by forced marches to join his colleague. The Senate approved a step they could not prevent. Amid immense enthusiasm, welcomed by the blessings of a people, his way prepared by cavalry, veterans flocking to his standard, he passed with the speed of life and death through Italy, and entered Livius' lines in the silence of night. He had thrown the enemies' spies off the scent by a pretended foray into Lucania; six or seven days after he was deciding the issue of a battle in the north, upon which hung not merely the vindication of his bold stroke, but the very existence of Rome.

Battle of the Metaurus.—Criticism was silenced by success. Next morning the enemy's suspicions were roused by increased numbers and the jaded appearance of a portion of the Roman cavalry; they were confirmed by the twice-sounded signal from the camp, which announced two consuls in the field. Fearing for his brother's fate, Hasdrubal declined battle, and broke up by night, with the intention of falling back upon Gaul, there to await tidings from the south. Abandoned by his guides in the rough and unknown country, he missed the ford of the Metaurus, which for the

last part of its course flowed in a kind of trough enclosed by steep walls—a sunken valley within a wider valley bounded by the hills—with a deeper bed and larger volume of water than it now possesses. The following day, as his weary columns wound along the wooded cliffs of the right bank, he was overtaken by the Roman cavalry, followed closely by the foot. He used the unfavourable conditions with tactical skill. The drunken and unmanageable Gauls were posted on the left, protected in front and flank by difficult ground; the Ligurians and elephants formed the centre; the right he closed himself with the firm African and Spanish battalions. Thus, with left refused, with deep files and narrow front, Hasdrubal awaited the attack of the stronger Roman army. A doubtful and desperate struggle ensued on the Punic right, and the event was still undecided, when Claudius grasped the situation, abandoned his useless attack on the refused flank, left a force to contain the equally defended and impeded Gauls, and passing behind the Roman line, flung himself with decisive weight on Hasdrubal's flank and rear. The Spaniards fell where they stood; the drunken Celts were butchered as they lay. Hasdrubal, unwilling to survive the disaster, plunged in the thick of the fight, and died like a gallant soldier and a son of Hamilcar. With him fell the towering schemes of Hannibal. The victory of the Metaurus decided for a time the secular struggle of Semite and Aryan, of east and west. Claudius, daring strategist and cool tactician, vanished swiftly, as he came, from the well-fought field, carrying the head of Hasdrubal. The ghastly token flung with Claudian cruelty into the Punic lines—an ill repayment for his own generosity—told Hannibal at once his brother's and his country's fate. He evacuated Metapontum, abandoned Lucania and Apulia, and drew back to Bruttium. At Rome the news of victory, awaited with feverish eagerness, received with incredulous ears, roused, as credence grew, a boundless exultation. The consuls enjoyed the first real triumph of the war; but the services of the unpopular chiefs, whose grim tenacity and brilliant ability had made victory possible, "paled their ineffectual fires" before the rising sun of Scipio.

Hannibal in Bruttium.—The dying embers of the war smouldered away in Bruttium. Forgetful of Hannibal, the Romans gave themselves up to the pursuits of peace. What they had gained by a skilful use of superior force, the inner lines, and full communication with a central base was flung away by hide-bound strategical pedantry. No attempt was made to pour the united and victorious

armies upon Hannibal. Undeclared and undismayed, with splendid if useless obstinacy, he clung for four years to his untenable corner, to resign it at his own convenience and the call of duty. Never was his generalship and control of men through good and evil fortune more magnificent. The reaction at Rome continued; the need of rest, the effects of moral and material exhaustion, made themselves felt in the absence of immediate danger. The army and navy were reduced, and the large forces still in the field did little or nothing. The government applied itself to reorganising the administration, restoring agriculture, resettling and restocking the waste and depopulated districts. Arrears were looked up, the refractory colonies visited, and a beginning made of paying off the loans.

Schemes of Scipio.—Scipio, on his return in 206 B.C., was irregularly but unanimously elected consul, and received the province of Sicily, with its ordinary fleet and army. Clear of his purpose and his powers, and backed by popular feeling, he claimed the conduct of an African expedition. No doubt Hannibal was still in Italy, and the finances low; nor could reliance be placed on the Numidian chiefs; but a small force could easily hold him in check, till the loss of his communications and the danger to Carthage from foreign war and native mutiny should recall him home. There alone could the war be decided and an end put to the waste and wear of Italy. A methodical defensive was now an anachronism. Scipio was opposed by the devotees of red-tape and the old school, who disliked the man, with his modern culture and dominating habits, doubted his discipline and questioned the opportuneness of the enterprise. Balked by the majority of the Senate, who were supported by the tribunes, the popular consul showed a dangerous disposition to break through the usage of the constitution by an appeal to the Comitia. But for this the time was not ripe, and Scipio finally accepted a compromise. The expedition was permitted, the state forests placed at his disposal; he might draw on the liberality of Etruria and Umbria, where the suspected communities, notably Arretium, anxiously established their character for patriotism. He must organise his own force without burdening the state-chest. From these and Sicilian sources he created a new fleet of thirty sail. Two of the four Sicilian legions, strengthened by drafts from the legions of Cannæ, and a body of 7000 volunteers, veterans of the war—another symptom of growing professionalism—formed a total of 30,000 or 35,000 men. The year was spent in drilling, equipping, and

organising the army, in face of obstructive economy, with wisdom and forethought, as well as in ordering the affairs of the province. Lælius, who was despatched to reconnoitre the ground and prepare the way with the Numidian chiefs, met with small encouragement. Carthage had taken energetic measures. Though the supplies destined for Hannibal were intercepted and the exhausted Philip could not be spurred to action, Mago was reinforced with men, money, and ships, and ordered to Liguria to renew the Italian war. At the same time Syphax was detached from the Roman interest, and the restless and adventurous Massinissa, at once his personal enemy and rival for the hand of the fair, brilliant, and patriotic Sophonisba, was expelled from his kingdom. Romance tells of his thrilling escapes, his restoration and revenge, his capture of his rival's bride, their marriage, and her tragic death. Her father, Hasdrubal, collected a powerful army and fleet, strengthened by Spanish mercenaries, a Macedonian corps and 140 elephants.

Meanwhile Hannibal had evacuated Thurii; and Locri was recaptured by an expedition organised by Scipio, aided by a detachment from Rhegium. The plunder and outrage which stained the exploit, and the scandalous conduct of his officer, Pleminius, reflected the gravest discredit on the discipline and even the personal character of Scipio. It was of a piece, men said, with his un-Roman habits and the culpable laxness of his command. Fabius and his opponents seized the handle; lively debates took place, but the commission of inquiry which arrived on the spot with powers of recall and arrest, and afterwards proceeded to review his work in Sicily, were happily able to exonerate the general, of whose preparations they presented a glowing account. The provincial governors made up what was lacking in official support.

Mago in Italy.—Mago landed at Genua with 14,000 men (205 B.C.). His army, reinforced from home and strengthened with Gallic and Ligurian levies, soon reached a respectable total. It was "one more for Hannibal," one more cub of the lion's brood to work his father's will. Lævinus and Livius took up the old defensive positions of Arretium and Ariminum; nor could Mago venture to attack them, still less could he divert Scipio from the dream of his life. In 204 B.C. Mago crossed into Cisalpine Gaul, where he occupied himself in raising recruits and tampering with the Etrurian malcontents. The conspiracy was, however, stamped out; and in the next year (203 B.C.) a decisive and bloody action was fought in the

Milanese, in which Varus and Cethegus claimed the victory ; but the wounded Mago was able to make good his long retreat unopposed to the sea. In obedience to orders he embarked for Carthage, but died of his wounds on ship. For some years after, Punic officers kept North Italy in a ferment.


Scipio lands in Africa.—A noteworthy incident of 205 B.C. was the introduction of the Phrygian worship of Cybele, utilised if not prepared by Scipio, whose expedition the coming of the *Magna mater* from Pessinus (in Galatia) crowned with a gracious omen of victory. Undaunted by the warnings of Syphax, Scipio sailed from Lilybæum with two legions, forty ships, 400 transports, and a siege-train (204 B.C.). On the voyage, whether by design or misadventure, he shifted his objective from the Emporia to Utica, where he disembarked without resistance. But his force was too small at once to secure a base at Utica and assume the offensive. The sequel showed that the point of attack had been ill chosen and the difficulties of the campaign undervalued. Massinissa brought little but himself; the subjects and allies of Carthage required a striking success to efface the memories of the mutiny. After a successful skirmish he proceeded to lay siege to Utica. Its stubborn resistance enabled Syphax to combine with Hasdrubal and relieve the town. The war was not to be ended at a rush. Before the vastly superior force, with its powerful cavalry, Scipio retired to his strong lines—called afterwards the Cornelian camp—on a small peninsula between Utica and Carthage. His position was sufficiently precarious, his surprise repulsed, himself hemmed in if not surrounded, dependent on the sea for his supplies, with nothing to hope from the home government. It was now that Massinissa, trained in the Punic service, versed in Punic politics, bold, persistent, and crafty, with all his influence among the fickle Berbers, proved his value. In the spring of 203 B.C. Scipio amused the Carthaginians with proposals to treat; Syphax accepted readily the rôle of arbiter. Under cover of the negotiations, trusty officers reconnoitred the hostile lines. The terms proposed, a reciprocal evacuation of Africa and Italy, could not be seriously entertained. After all Rome's sacrifices, Carthage could not so cry quits. A fleet was preparing to co-operate with the Punic armies.

Victories of Scipio.—Lulled to a fatal security, the Carthaginians had no expectation of attack, a carelessness encouraged by Scipio, who, breaking off the preliminaries, feigned a new attack on Utica, while he prepared to surprise the enemy's camps. They lay at some distance apart; their inflammable huts were thatched with

reeds and straw, their outpost duty neglected. The somewhat dubious stratagem succeeded admirably. The alarmed Numidians rushed from their blazing barracks on the swords of the column of Lælius; roused by the glare and tumult, Hasdrubal hurried to help his ally, but was intercepted by Scipio, who had flung himself between the camps. His huts burst into fire; the bewildered soldiers fell in heaps. Thus extricated from the toils, Scipio, in the beginning of May, scattered in a second battle on the great plain the hasty Punic levies, strengthened though they were with a Spanish and a Macedonian corps. Massinissa, welcomed by his tribesmen, followed, attacked, and captured his rival Syphax, and by the reduction of Cirta gained only to lose the loved and lovely Sophonisba. Numidia declared for Rome.

Negotiations for Peace.—

Meanwhile Scipio had occupied Tunis, and was receiving the submission of some subject communities, when he was summoned to Utica by an attack on his fleet, which he succeeded at length in beating off at some expense, by means of a boom composed of transports moored four deep. On his return from a plundering raid to the entrenched camp at Tunis he received an embassy for peace. The democratic party



PANORAMIC VIEW OF THE PENINSULA OF CARTHAGE.

had by this time given way to the opposition, to whose request Scipio granted an armistice of forty-five days, during which Carthage was to pay and victual the troops. Whatever preliminaries he may have proposed, he had no power to conclude a treaty; accordingly the envoys proceeded to Rome, where they met with a cool and contemptuous reception. Stormy and protracted debates delayed the decision. At length the desire for peace, a sense of the danger involved in the return of the Barcidæ to Carthage, and the acknowledged services of Scipio procured the despatch of a commission late in September to assist the general in negotiation. Scipio wished to end the war in person, and was not in a position to be exorbitant. To this, as well as to the name of Hannibal and the strong walls of Carthage, was due the moderation of the terms. They included the surrender of deserters and captives, the evacuation of Italy, the renunciation of Spain and the islands, a large war indemnity, the restoration of Massinissa, and the permanent reduction of the fleet to thirty men-of-war.

Recall of Hannibal.—During these events the war in Bruttium had dragged on indecisively, pushed with large forces and little energy. Punishment was exacted, in loss of privilege and additional burdens, from the Latin offenders. The careful census of Livius and Nero (204 B.C.) revealed the ravages of war, pestilence and desolation. The Burgess-roll had sunk from 270,213 in 220 B.C. to 214,000. Hannibal clung to his last stronghold so long as his tenacity could prevent the reinforcement of Scipio's ill-sustained expedition. The African defeats and the defection of Numidia now demanded his presence. The Barcidæ were summoned home, whether recalled by the war party preparing for a final struggle, or in accordance with the terms of the armistice, or because the Senate, true to its traditions, refused to negotiate with an enemy still on Italian soil. Hannibal alone returned to measure swords with Scipio. Leaving in the temple of the Lacinian Juno a record of his exploits engraved on tablets of bronze—seen and used by Polybius—he sailed from Croton in the autumn of 203 B.C. If the negotiations should prove abortive, as the patriots probably intended, a winter would give him time to create an army which could extort a peace less dangerous to his country's independence. With the flower of his army—the rest he discharged or massacred in Italy—he landed at Hadrumetum, where he was joined by the troops of Mago. On his departure the Senate honoured the veteran Fabius with the wreath of grass as the saviour of

the state. Shortly after, Fabius died (203 B.C.), at the age of nearly ninety years.

Failure of the Negotiations for Peace.—The peace preliminaries led again to prolonged debates. The provinces for 202 B.C., including Africa, had already been allotted, and strong influences hindered the ratification of the terms, till the friends of Scipio procured the approval of the people, and the final confirmation by the Senate about April 202 B.C. It was then too late. The arrival of Hannibal had strengthened the hands of the patriots; a strong reaction carried them to power, aided by the distress, the burden of the Roman army, and the delays and difficulties connected with the peace. By one or other party the able and moderate Hasdrubal was condemned to death; his fate is variously recorded.

A shipwrecked Roman convoy supplied the occasion sought; the hungry and angry masses forced the hand of government; the plunder of the distressed fleet during truce constituted an act of war. Whether this was merely a spontaneous outburst, or Scipio had been just deluded and repaid in kind, may be left uncertain. Anxious to avoid a rupture, he demanded satisfaction, but the refusal of his request and a treacherous attack on his returning envoys clinched the business. Unable to besiege the capital, Scipio wasted with fire and sword the fertile valley of the Bagradas, moving to join Massinissa, whom he had summoned from Numidia. Numidia was equally the objective of Hannibal. He could view with stern contentment a movement which drew the enemy farther from his base. Thither he pressed from Hadrumentum to strike at their point of junction, intercept the Numidians, and drive the Romans headlong to the coast. With 50,000 men and eighty elephants he appeared at Zama Regia. But the impatiently expected chieftain had effected his junction with Scipio, bringing 10,000 Africans, horse and foot, and the allies, aware of Hannibal's design, now pushed on to Naraggara (near Sicca), where they encamped. Here Hannibal met them. In a personal interview he is said to have offered the renunciation of all non-African possessions as the condition of peace. Scipio, though defeat meant destruction, in face of Hannibal, far from the sea, with no support but the restless Numidians, reiterated his demands. Rome's sacrifices and her honour demanded indemnity for the broken truce and guarantees for the future.

Battle of Zama.—At an uncertain time and place, whether in the spring or autumn of 202 B.C., not far from Sicca, was fought the decisive action known as the battle of Zama. Hannibal disposed

the elephants—a formidable line—in front ; the mercenaries of Mago's army, 12,000 strong, formed the next line ; in support were the Libyan and national militia ; at some distance, in reserve, stood a strong corps of Italian veterans, with the Macedonian auxiliaries. A powerful Numidian contingent did not appear in time ; nor could he wholly depend on the loyalty of the troops, some of whom deserted in the fight. His inferior cavalry covered the flanks. To meet the elephants Scipio formed his maniples in column of cohorts, leaving nine broad avenues through the triple line, filling the intervals in front with skirmishers destined to harass the huge beasts and draw or drive them harmless through the gaps. Lælius and Massinissa, with the heavy and light cavalry, took post respectively on the left and right wings. Hannibal commenced the attack with a charge of elephants. Scared by the blasts of horns and trumpets, vexed by a shower of missiles from the light troops, some turned in terror on the Numidian horse, whose rout was completed by the dashing onset of Massinissa, some trampled over the light troops, and charged down the open gangways, sped on their path with blows, some threw the Punic cavalry on the right into a confusion which Lælius promptly turned to account. Then with a shout the front lines closed ; in bloody conflict hand to hand, the Hastati, borne on by the steady pressure of the supports, thrust back the mercenary van. Then in the Carthaginian host a wild *mêlée* ensued ; with cries of treason, in mutual distrust, the undisciplined levies and their suspected and suspicious hirelings turned their arms upon each other. Promptly from the disordered mass of hacking soldiery Hannibal withdrew the two front lines to the flanks and pushed forward his strong reserves ; while Scipio reformed the broken divisions where they stood, marched up the steady Principes and the corps of veterans in column over the slippery ground, and deployed them outwards, forming continuous line on the new centre. Then came the final desperate shock ; the furious fight was only decided by the charges of the victorious cavalry in rear. The outnumbered remnant fell where they stood, like the old Guard at Waterloo. Hannibal, when all was lost, fled to Hadrumetum, while Scipio followed up with vigour the crushing victory. Roman pride dwelt complacently on the part played in the defeat of Zama by the fugitive relics of the field of Cannæ. The epic of Ennius and the Scipionic legends fill in the shadowy outlines of the African campaign.

While Scipio was fighting the combined armies of Carthage, whose concentration had been permitted by the policy or dilatoriness of the Senate, eleven legions were in arms in Italy. Personal

pique wilfully held back the supports doled out by the government on the news of the rupture. The decisive battle had been fought and won when a serviceable fleet and convoy arrived under the admiral, P. Lentulus.

Terms of Peace.—Thus strengthened, Scipio could menace Carthage by sea and land; the thorough defeat of Vermina's Numidian reliefs brought her finally to terms. Hannibal, trusted even in disaster, took the helm and conducted the negotiations. Protected by an armistice, the envoys proceeded to Rome, where, in spite of protracted discussion and the secret intrigues of the new consul, Cn. Lentulus, anxious for the credit of ending the war, the counsels of vengeance and personal machinations yielded to the will of the people, strong for peace and Scipio. At Carthage the hand of Hannibal dragged from his perch the clamorous agitator who harangued against the peace. Motives of generosity, humanity, and a far-sighted statesmanship may have aided military and political considerations in dictating moderate terms. The strength of despair, the exhaustion of Rome, the designs of Scipio's enemies, the genius of Hannibal, had all their weight. Rome as yet desired no province. It was her policy to cripple, not crush; to balance rival and ally. An elastic clause restored the possessions of Massinissa, to be a thorn in the flesh of Carthage and a convenient weapon of aggression, at the will of the suzerain power, but Vermina was left to check this dangerous friend. The surrender of navy, elephants, prisoners, and deserters; the cession of Spain and the islands; compensation for the plundered convoy; a war indemnity of 200 talents (£48,000) a year for fifty years, guaranteed by hostages; the permanent reduction of her fleet, and the subordination of her foreign policy to Rome were the remaining terms of a peace that left Carthage a tributary vassal at the mercy of her conqueror. They were accepted with bitter tears, and an agitation sternly repressed by Hannibal. A defeated nation that demands revenge must organise its resources in patience and wait the progress of events abroad.

Scipio returned in triumph. Rome could now dispense punishments and rewards. The reduction of the Celts necessarily followed. Heavy as was the doom of Capua, a heavier fate befell the Bruttian people, henceforth the serfs and Gibeonites of Rome. Heavily the allies of Hannibal paid in loss of lands and privileges, in executions and confiscations, for their defection—Sabellians, Etruscans, Lucanians, and Greeks. The veterans of Africa received allotments, on some of the appropriated land new colonies were settled,

while the colonies that curbed the dangerous districts received additional garrisons. Large tracts fell as domain land to the occupation farms and slave-tended pastures of the grasping nobility.

Character of the Hannibalic War.—The honours of the war remained with Carthage ; the profits, chequered with past losses and new perils, fell to Rome. The Punic armies, splendidly officered, had surpassed the Roman levies alike in tactics, strategy, and steadiness. From them was learned the freer handling of troops and bolder military ideas of Nero and Scipio. The combinations of Hannibal had not once only threatened the existence of Rome. But the failure of his allies, the organisation of Italy, the unity of feeling and superior numbers of her military population, with her central position, enabled Rome to hamper his movements, harass his supporters, secure her own territory, while she checked his advance, and holding the narrow passages of the peninsula, to cut him from his communications—in a word, to wear him out. In the last struggle the genius of Scipio was aided by the absence of fortresses and the weakness of the Punic organisation to gain a victory earned and prepared by steadfast will and stern self-sacrifice. The nation conquered the man, and with that conquest began an imperial system in which the small state system of the old world would be fused and lost. The absence of large naval operations is a remarkable feature of the war. Navies and transports pass to and fro freely on the waters. Descents and minor actions are alone recorded. Rome kept, on the whole, her command of the sea, a fact of decisive importance, while the energies of Carthage, after the failures of the first war, seemed chiefly diverted to the land service. Even in Greece the war-marine had everywhere declined.

Results of the War in Italy and Abroad.—In Italy, Rome's victory welded the chains of the non-Latin allies. More and more the grades of autonomy are lost in the uniformity of a common subjection. Abroad, the fall of Carthage left her mistress of the West. Two new provinces were formed in Spain ; Sicily absorbed the realm of Hiero. In Africa, Rome exercised a protectorate ; in the East she had relations with Egypt and Pergamum ; her connection with Greece must draw her farther and farther from her cherished Italian policy. She had entered on the path from which there was no retreat ; the consequences of her action and the chain of events carried her half unwillingly on to fulfil her imperial mission—to pulverise and assimilate the civilised world. To that empire, for lack of genius to create a new system adapted to new needs, she was to sacrifice her liberty and her constitution. The old

forms were stretched to bursting as the centre of Italy became the centre of the world.

Economic and Social Effects of the War.—But the effects of the war were felt not alone in external dominion or political organisation, but in the inner character and life of an essentially military people. The system of annual reliefs and changing commands, like the older tactics, had broken down beneath the strain of the long struggle and the distant fields of war. Plunder supplemented the miserable pay; camp-life ruined the simple tastes of the yeoman, whose tone was further deteriorated by the slaves and criminals whom the state was forced to employ. The citizen soldier ceased to exist, and the affairs of Locri and Enna were symptoms of degeneration. In fact, the yeoman class as such was rapidly dying out. Its decay, due in the first instance to the waste of the war, was hastened by the growing monopoly of land by the rich. By the side of a thriving plutocracy stood an impoverished proletariat. Wealth based on plunder and speculation, on war prices and fraudulent contracts, and on the exploitation of the state domains, contrasted vividly with the poverty of the ruined farmers, who flocked to swell the mob of pauper clients, or worked as serfs on the bloated estates of the great proprietors. The competition of foreign corn, the growth of slave-labour, and the attractions of the capital combined with the effects of the war to create that swarm of dangerous drones, at once bribed and despised, the tool of the agitator, the lever of revolution, useless for good, powerful for evil, the sovereign mob. This growth of extremes, and the decay of the old equality of culture, feeling, and possessions, had its political counterpart in the timid exclusiveness which closed the gates of office equally against the genius of a noble and the aspiration of the *novus homo*.

The burgess population had suffered by almost a fourth—the flower of the citizens; Italian economy had been shaken to its centre; the losses in men, money, and material were untold; the misery unspeakable. Trade and commerce had stagnated. Great as were the results of the war in wealth and empire, her heroic struggle and splendid victory left Rome face to face with grave problems of policy. A wise statesmanship had to consider the proper government of the provinces and the modifications in her municipal constitution entailed by empire, the unification of Italy, the reorganisation of the army, and the restoration of rural economy and sound finance. To limit the love of pleasure, expressed in the increase of festivals and games, of funeral feasts and gladia-

torial shows ; to stem the tide of scepticism and make a genuine culture of the fashionable Hellenism ; to meet the relaxation born of reaction and the war ; to breathe an imperial spirit into the ruling people—these were problems of a deeper order. To sharpen the distinction of governors and governed and close the burgess list ; to sacrifice Italian culture and feeling ; to plunder the provinces and share the spoils ; to crush the relics of the yeomanry, block the paths to distinction, and bribe the populace with plunder ; to govern at home in the interests of a class, abroad to accept the profits and refuse the responsibilities of empire ; to live from hand to mouth with a policy of makeshift,—would be to sacrifice the noblest fruits of victory, the gratitude of the conquered, and the homage of history.



CARTHAGINIAN DODECADRACHM—HEAD OF PERSEPHONE.

CHAPTER XXIII

FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST—THE WARS IN THE WEST

	B. C.	A. U. C.
Extension to the Alps—Cisalpine Gaul conquered	200-191	554-563
Peace restored by Gracchus in Spain	179	575
The Spanish Wars renewed	149-133	605-621
Viriathus	149-140	605-614
Numantia	144-133	610-621

Rome not Aggressive.—The struggle for life was over. With the peace of 201 B.C. closes the heroic period of Roman history, the period of vigorous effort and strong national life, of energy in the

government, devotion in the people, of manners still uncorrupted and institutions still unimpaired. The story of the next fifty years sounds with the ceaseless tramp of legions marching, as by a resistless ordinance of fate, at once to the conquest of the world and the ruin of the Roman Republic. Yet Rome must not be regarded merely as an intriguing and covetous power. This career of conquest was in no sense the result of a deliberate scheme of annexation. It was the outcome of existing political ideas, grasped and applied under peculiarly favourable circumstances by a cool, consistent, narrow-minded statesmanship. The growth of Roman dominion was the necessary and natural advance of a genuine governing nation in a world politically disordered, like the advance of the English in India, as unlike the empire of an Alexander or Mohammed as it is unlike the expansion of a colonising and commercial people. Selfish aggression there was ; but the aims of Roman statesmen were limited at first to the maintenance of Rome's supremacy in Italy against actual or possible enemies at home or abroad who might obstruct or menace her peaceful development. It was the means they employed and the drift of events that led directly to a far different result. To understand this thoroughly, it will be instructive to compare for a moment the different issue of Greek efforts at unity and dominion. In spite of the various confederacies and hegemonies formed at different epochs, Hellas failed to found any abiding state system. This was due partly to geographical reasons, and partly to racial antipathies, as well as to the reaction against the Oriental empires, but it was mainly caused by the absence of political discipline, the incapacity for combination, and the hopeless separatism that sacrificed Hellas to the city-state, and the city-state to the party. Rome scarcely developed a party-system ; in her best days she stamped on contending factions a character of common loyalty to the common weal. Better, too, than any people of antiquity the Romans knew how to attract and assimilate kindred or even alien elements, just as they were ready to borrow useful institutions and adopt a higher cultivation. They could incorporate a people without destroying its individuality or its self-respect. Their settled government and respect for law gave them an unique position in the civilised world, and made their city the natural refuge of the weaker, as their reputation for wisdom and good faith rendered them the arbitrators of distracted Greece. Ancient policy did not willingly recognise equal states living in armed peace. The European concert, the balance of power, and the

rights of nations are modern ideas. The only recognised right was the right of self-preservation and the might of the stronger. Between neighbours the alternatives lay between predominance, however veiled under the forms of alliance, and extinction. International politics are even now rarely disinterested; in antiquity never. Rome differed from the rest merely in the logical thoroughness with which she worked out her principles. She started with the advantages of a country physically united, in a strategically central position, severing the East from the West, and enabled by her westward aspect to escape serious disturbance from the East. She had perfected in these years of struggle her military and social organisation; her people, apt for discipline, had been severely drilled and trained as citizens and soldiers; her unflinching policy, depending on no individual, rarely touched by sentiment, and never diverted by disaster, spared no sacrifices, shrank from no instruments, lost no chances in compassing its ends, whether "by force or persuasion of gods or men." She knew how to isolate her foes, and disintegrate her friends, how to conquer by dividing and crush in detail, how to anticipate a danger or postpone a crisis. She watched a strong ally more jealously than a beaten enemy; she could stoop at times to the lowest resources of a bullying or temporising diplomacy. Rome was not likely to fight for ideas. Finally, for a force so favoured and so wielded, the state of the Mediterranean world afforded a peculiarly appropriate field.

Change for the Worse.—In the course of the ensuing wars a distinct deterioration is visible, which corresponds closely to the change for the worse in Rome's relation to her Italian confederates. The crooked methods of a new school supplant the honest appeal to brute force. The old frugality and laboriousness, the famous probity and fairness, public and private, give way before the temptations of power. Cruelty, cynicism, and greed, even assassination, stamp the new methods. Mutiny, corruption, and cowardice rot the armies and stain the officers. A policy of plunder and annexation succeeds to the old theory of a paternal protectorate. Yet the indestructible vitality of the nation and the weakness of its opponents enabled it to surmount all obstacles and survive all disasters, to conquer in spite of its generals and rule in spite of itself. Rome had reserves morally and materially; its enemies fell each at a blow. The explosive little states of Greece, vapouring and corrupted Asia, enervated Egypt, and the exhausted phalanx of Macedon could oppose no effective resistance; and if the Hellenic East had no national life, the barbarian West had no

national cohesion. Above all, the weakness of the Eastern states drew Rome inevitably forward, as her relations became more and more complicated. It is hard for an impèrial power to distinguish between its rights and its interests. Rome is more justified by modern practice than she is fairly condemned by modern morality. The change for the worse was gradual, and perceived only by the best men ; and even so, her reputation remained high among the nations. Compared with the Ptolemies, Seleucids, and Antigonids, her hands were clean, her motives pure, her rule bearable. In that intolerable Eastern hubbub, men's eyes turned still with envy and wonder to the stable and well-ordered republic of the West.

General Survey.—In the West the heirs of Carthage were bound to organise the legacy they inherited. Sicily, the necessary appendage of Italy, had received definitive form, placed under a single prætor (210 and 201 B.C.) ; a few cohorts secured a profound peace till the slave-outbreaks of 136 B.C. From her the capital drew corn, the army its stores and clothing. Sardinia and Corsica were yet to be pacified ; and the two Spains, with their four standing legions, presented a grave military and financial problem. In this latter case Rome was forced to break with her traditional policy. Besides the value of the Spanish mines and commerce, there was the danger of a second Hamilcar, and the absence of any organised government capable of acting as her deputy and keeping the peace in this Roman India. The retention of Spain involved the control of the line of communication along the southern coast of Gaul. In Northern Italy the natural process of expansion took its course. It is in Africa and the East that a change of principle is most clearly marked. Reluctantly enough in the first instance Rome drifted into conquest. The chastisement of the Illyrian pirates (229 B.C.) had cleared the Adriatic ports and opened up relations with the Greek maritime states. Then the alliance of Macedon and Carthage, kindling a deep resentment and revealing a new danger, led to the war with Philip. Subtle statesmanship and sentiment were perhaps combined in the creation of that Roman protectorate over the several Greek cities which was ultimately fatal to Hellenic independence. The position so acquired or so thrust upon her, source as it was of endless intervention, and the complex relations of the Eastern communities, drew her Senate further and further into an Eastern policy, whose necessary results were the humiliation of Macedon and the shattering of Syria. At first Rome acted with genuine and statesmanlike moderation. Content with the dignity of paramount power, she took from the spoils of war nothing but

gold and glory. But the position was untenable. The spread of anarchy, due to the prostration of the governments and her own jealous methods of dismemberment as much as to the natural decay of society and the greed of despots, broke down the system of protectorates, while her own appetite came with the eating. The client-states were neither one thing nor the other. Actors in a burlesque of liberty seriously meant, they wasted their last energies in idle debates and idler struggles, dynastic feuds and pigmy politics. Their very feebleness made a tyrant of their protector, who neither suffered freedom nor enforced authority. Incessant commissions reported to a government whose utterances were neither consistent nor peremptory. The tribes of Lilliput could venture to ignore their master, neglect his orders, and provoke destruction. Meanwhile the frontiers of civilisation were exposed, denuded of their natural guardians, and new forces were being consolidated beyond the Roman horizon, in Parthia, Pontus, and Armenia, against which Rome's enfeebled clients would prove but sorry "buffers." The position was not realised, and this was due partly to a conflict of ideas at Rome, partly to a natural and laudable hesitation in undertaking such vast responsibilities, partly to lack of insight. Such problems are often less clear to contemporaries than to philosophic historians, while the difficulties of confronting them loom larger to the eyes of statesmen who have to deal with them.

Italy : (1) The Gauls.—In Italy the Gauls displayed a belated energy when the work of punishment and frontier extension was resumed as the natural sequence of Hannibal's failure. The Boii, who, lying between Italy and the Po, behind the Roman advanced posts, were the first to be menaced, were encouraged by a slight success to break out in open rebellion (200 B.C.) under Hamilcar, an officer of Mago, and were supported by the Insubres and Cenomani. They sacked Placentia and beset Cremona, thus delaying to some extent the war with Macedon ; but ere the year was out the Carthaginian had fallen and Cremona was relieved. The struggle dragged on, till the final reduction of the Boii in 191 B.C., with varying fortune, severe defeats being balanced by still more bloody victories, which witness to the mendacity of Roman consuls and the "multiplying eye" of family chroniclers. In 197 B.C. the Insubres, victorious in the previous year, were deserted on the field by the Cenomani, and suffered a crushing defeat by the river Mincius. The fall of Comum (196 B.C.), captured by M. Claudius Marcellus, sealed their submission. The Insubres and Cenomani were left free from tribute,

in the enjoyment of their cantonal organisation, but for ever excluded from the Roman franchise. They were to serve as bulwarks against the inroads of their Transalpine brethren. The effect of these successes was seen in the humble attitude of the Helvetii beyond. The rapid Latinisation of the Transpadane district, followed by increasing population and prosperity, carried Roman influence to the Alps. The isolated Boii offered, however, a desperate resistance to the obviously impending occupation of their territory, but after the disasters incident to semi-savage warfare, their strength was broken (191 B.C.), the almost annihilated tribe ceded half its lands, and in the end vanished from Italian soil. The existing fortresses, reorganised in 198 B.C., were supplemented by fresh foundations, as the municipal system was gradually carried to the Po. Potentia and Pisaurum (184 B.C.), Bononia (Latin) (189 B.C.), Mutina and Parma (183 B.C.), guarded the new settlements, and communications were secured by the Via Æmilia (187 B.C.) from Ariminum to Placentia, and the new Via Flaminia from Arretium to Bononia.


(2) **The Ligurians, Istrians, &c.**—To clear the coast-route to Spain and secure the lowland towns, Rome had now to reduce the Ligurians, who had been driven by the advancing Celts into the heights that girdle the Gulf of Genoa from Marseilles to the Arno. These freebooting shepherds in their mountain fastnesses, during more than twenty years of guerrilla warfare, read some severe lessons to the incompetent leaders in the series of casual campaigns (197–173, 166 B.C., &c.). In 177 B.C. the burgess-colony of Luna (Spezzia) was founded to check their raids, and to serve as a port of embarkation for the West. Several thousands of the tribesmen had been already transplanted to repeople Samnium. By 176 B.C. the land was clear between the Arno and the Po, though the western clans still afforded materials for fictitious triumphs. In 154 B.C. Opimius was able, in defence of Massilia, to win the first Roman victory in Transalpine Gaul. Meanwhile the foundation of Aquileia, the last Latin colony in Italy, built to command the eastern passes and to control the Northern Adriatic, had led to a somewhat inglorious two years' campaign against the Istrians (178–177 B.C.). In 156 B.C. the reduction of the predatory Dalmatians completed the pacification of that seaboard.

In Sardinia and Corsica the unconquered highlanders of the interior harassed the Roman fringe with ceaseless raids till the vigorous action of Tiberius Gracchus made "cheap Sardinians" a drug in the market (177 B.C.).

Spain.—The two Spains were as yet the only transmarine provinces of Rome. Of these, the Northern or Hither Spain—the north-eastern corner—included the modern Arragon and Catalonia, while Farther Spain covered the south and south-east, Andalusia, Murcia, and Valencia; *i.e.*, the old territory of Carthage. Here the Greek and Punic towns adhered to Rome, and, amid the strange mixture of peoples and crossing of civilisations, some ground had been prepared, especially among the more cultured and wealthy Turdetani, for the rapid growth of Roman feelings and ideas. And this was already prefigured and the way opened by the success of Scipio's veteran settlement at Italica, on the Bætis. Hitherto just the narrow and unbroken fringe of coast-land in that compact and little-known peninsula had been dotted by the factories of the Phœnician or the colonies of the Greek. Only the arms and policy of the Barcids had penetrated the wild and dangerous table-land. West and north and centre alike were filled with hardy barbarians, hungry for plunder and glory, simple, restless, chivalrous. These freebooters and guerrilleros were dangerous enough in battle, with their heavy column and short sharp swords, and died heroically behind their strong walls; but their hasty levies, loose in combination and lacking in discipline, were apt to melt away like a Highland army of Montrose. The Roman government, as successor to Carthage, had now to determine its wavering frontier, to round off its possessions by the reduction of the two Castiles (Celtiberia), and to repress the incursions of the tribes of Portugal and of the yet unvisited north.

Character of the Spanish Wars.—Rome had retained Spain, for military and commercial reasons, in spite of the cost, the distance, and the dislike to the sea and the service, which rose occasionally to mutiny, in spite even of the fact that the maintenance of a standing garrison of experienced troops led directly to a state of things subversive of her military and political system. Prolongation of service, and the use of volunteers, veterans and mercenaries, favoured the rise of a professional army. The disastrous and fatiguing campaigns were a constant drain on Italy. The frequent prorogation and the independence of the commands reacted on the character of the officers. The uncertain nature of the warfare, the scantiness of the booty, and the unsatisfied greed of ever-changing officers, helped to give a stamp of treachery, avarice, and violence to the Spanish struggle; and here, too, the system of annual reliefs was especially ruinous. For the actual fighting we have, as

usual, no trustworthy authorities. The vagueness of the geography and ethnography assists the family annalist to confuse our accounts. A want of continuity and the ever-capricious character of irregular warfare adds to the already abundant difficulties of military operations in this country. A sudden tide of war as suddenly ebbs, leaving nothing behind but the bones of a defeated legion. Surprises, stratagems, victories and defeats, succeed each other. In 195 B.C. M. Porcius Cato, as consul, began the whole task of subjugation afresh, starting from the port of Emporiæ, but his



DECREE OF L. ÆMILIUS PAULLUS, PRÆTOR OF FURTHER SPAIN, REGULATING THE POSITION OF A SPANISH CLIENT-COMMUNITY (189 B.C.).

apparently thorough work had to be repeated again and again. Fighting went on in both provinces. There is the old series of defeats, regularly compensated by victories. We may well doubt the numbers of the towns taken and the men slain, but in the end Rome succeeded. The most permanent results were achieved by L. Æmilius Paullus (189 B.C.), by C. Calpurnius over the Lusitanians (185 B.C.), by Q. Fulvius Flaccus over the Celtiberians (181 B.C.), and most notably by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (179-178 B.C.), who by policy more than arms secured the fruits of conquest. Rome's

sovereignty was recognised and the rights of the communities secured by wise and equitable treaties. The chieftains were attracted to her service; in the Spanish contingents she gained valuable troops; the tribesmen were settled in new towns. The name of Gracchus was gratefully remembered, and it was only the greed and cruelty of his successors which broke up a peace of thirty years, and prevented the natural extension of organised government over the divided tribes. As yet, Spain was treated with consideration; the tributary communities paid fixed and moderate money taxes. Saguntum, Gades, and Tarraco became allies of the Roman people. It was the complaint of the Spaniards (171 B.C.) that gave the first impulse to the commission De Repetundis, and to protect them special decrees were passed. The intention of the government was good; its arm was weak.

Celtiberian War.—Trouble broke out again in 154 and 153 B.C., when the Belli and Titthi, refusing acquiescence in certain demands—a dispute in which each party relied on their version of the Gracchan arrangements and recent precedents—were attacked by the consul Q. Fulvius Nobilior. He allowed himself to be surprised among the mountains (153 B.C.), and in following up the victorious but retiring enemy towards Numantia was again defeated. Ocilis also, with its magazines, surrendered. About the same time the Lusitanians (154 B.C.), under Punicus, severely defeated the southern army, and, with the aid of the Vettones, inflicted on it a second defeat (153 B.C.) by the banks of the Tagus. Their further advance was checked by the prætor L. Mummius.

The good results obtained in the north by the abler strategy and humaner methods of M. Marcellus (152-151 B.C.), who induced the Arevaci, the Belli, and Titthi to submit, confirming a peace under the walls of Numantia, were disturbed by the grasping greed of L. Lucullus.¹ Having treacherously attacked the peaceful and independent Vaccaei, by the massacre of the inhabitants of Cauca (near Segovia), after terms accepted, he closed the gates of other cities to his disappointed avarice. At Intercatia the starving invaders owed their supplies and a safe retreat to the pledged word of the military tribune Æmilianus. The siege of Pallantia was raised, and the beaten and baffled general was pursued to the Douro. Thence he proceeded south to support his worthy colleague, Sulpicius Galba, who had been defeated by the Lusi-

¹ He had been imprisoned with his colleague by the tribunes for severity in conscription, when the example of the younger Scipio alone produced the necessary supply of officers.

tanians. Next year this same Galba perfidiously massacred or enslaved 7000 surrendered and unsuspecting tribesmen (150 B.C.).

Viriathus.—The revolted conscience of Rome yielded, in spite of Cato's protests, to the persuasions of rhetoric and the purse. Galba evaded conviction, but from that massacre was kindled a "fiery war." Viriathus had escaped, to show himself, for the next ten years, a master of irregular fighting. Wily as brave, the low-descended, homely prince, with his fine figure, enduring frame, and temperate habits, fired by language and example his despondent countrymen, and beat, baffled, and broke his blind and clumsy opponents. His is the one figure that attracts our sympathy in these sordid and squalid campaigns. In 149 B.C. he saved the surrounded and despairing Lusitanians from destruction, held an army in check for two days with 1000 horse, trapped, defeated, and killed Vetilius, and scattered the allies who came to the Romans' rescue. In the three succeeding years three Roman generals succumbed. Legion after legion vanished in the defiles of the mountains, whose tops were crowned with trophies of Roman arms. At last (146 B.C.) the Senate, free from the pressure of the African and Macedonian wars, despatched Scipio's brother, Q. Fabius Maximus, with two legions to the Farther province, supported by C. Lælius in Hither Spain. The raw levies and demoralised veterans distinctly failed, till a stricter discipline enabled Fabius to gain the upper hand (144 B.C.). But no real impression was made. His successor, Quinctius, after repeated disasters, shut himself up in Corduba, leaving Viriathus to ravage the southern districts. Fabius' brother by adoption, Servilianus, arriving with fresh forces, experienced the capricious character of Spanish fighting. He penetrated Lusitania, but after some hard-won successes, marked by extreme cruelty, he was defeated (141 B.C.) before Erisane, cut off, and compelled to treat. The barbarian hero of this new Caudine Forks made no reprisals. Peace was confirmed, Rome recognising the independence of Lusitania under its chosen chief. Viriathus had mistaken his enemies. Secretly supported by the indignant Senate, Servilianus' brother and successor, Q. Servilius Cæpio (140 B.C.), by intrigue and perfidy forced on the war. Viriathus evaded a conflict, and in 139 B.C., pressed on both sides, Popillius Lænas co-operating from the north, sued for peace. A series of harsh orders were executed by the natives, till finally their arms were demanded. The fate of Carthage was still fresh in men's minds, but the refusal it prompted came too late. Cæpio had suborned the chieftain's nearest friends, and Viriathus was

stabbed in his bed. His successor, Tautamus, proved unequal to the task, and Lusitania was disarmed. The pacification of the country was completed by D. Junius Brutus (138 and 137 B.C.), and the *triste et contumeliosum bellum* came to a close.

Numantia.—A yet more disgraceful war had arisen in the Hither province. Viriathus' success had roused the Celtiberian tribes, especially the Arevaci, in their chief towns of Termantia and Numantia. The latter (Guarray, on the Upper Douro), strong both by art and nature, perched on its fortified precipices, girdled by two rivers, with its one passage to the plain blocked by mounds and trenches, held at bay for twelve years the gigantic resources of Rome. It was strong in its position and its distance, but it was stronger still in the incapacity of Roman generals.

By 142 B.C., indeed, Q. Cæcilius Metellus Macedonicus had reduced the Celtiberians except the two towns, which a demand for disarmament had at the last moment thrown back into obstinate resistance. But his successor, Q. Pompeius, a *novus homo*,¹ with an army four times the fighting population of the city, was twice defeated and compelled to negotiate. Termantia then came in; but the Numantine peace, made on moderate conditions, was shamelessly disowned by the wretched lawyer on his successor's arrival, and the Senate adopted his action. Lænas resumed the siege, and was in turn routed (138 B.C.). But the crowning disgrace befell C. Hostilius Mancinus (137 B.C.) and his demoralised mob of insubordinate "men with swords." A disgraceful panic ended in a shameful capitulation. That even this was permitted was due alone to respect for the word of Ti. Gracchus, the noble son of an upright father, and the collective oath of the staff. Numantia unwisely took no hostages, and the equitable treaty was repudiated by the Senate. Mancinus, the scapegoat of the army, was delivered to the enemy, stripped and chained, and shivered a whole day in his shirt before the closed gates of the indignant town. The disaster and the farce alike was a still more shabby version of the affair of Caudium. Mancinus' colleague, Lepidus, keeping his hand in by an unprovoked attack on the Vaccæi, was half destroyed as he retreated from Pallantia (136 B.C.).

Scipio Æmilianus.—At last, in 134 B.C., Rome's only general, Æmilianus, the conqueror of Carthage, was elected consul for the second time, for this special service, before the lapse of the proper interval. Stingily supplied by the Senate, he strengthened his army

¹ *i.e.*, the first of his family to obtain curule office.

with allied troops, and protected his person by a guard, or *cohors prætoris* of 500 friends and clients. Under his command met Jugurtha and Gaius Marius. He purged the camp of its train of courtesans, sutlers, and soothsayers, of its luxurious furniture and baggage-train. A course of merciless drilling, marching, and trenching was seasoned with bitter contempt. Finally, with 60,000 men against 8000, fighting his battles with the spade against an enemy ready with the sword, he drew a double line of circumvallation more than five miles long, according to the strictest science, round the doomed city. The Douro was blocked by a boom, and a gallant effort at relief was bloodily thwarted. Only in the last extremity the garrison surrendered (133 B.C.), as "brave men to the mercy of the brave." The big battalions had won by famine. Those who had not perished by their own hand were sold as slaves, and the city was razed. All resistance was now broken, and this, added to the successes of the able and generous Decimus Brutus, who had settled Lusitania, founded Valentia (138 B.C.), and crushed the Gallæci (136 B.C.), completed the subjugation of Spain. No doubt in the Asturian mountains work was left for Augustus and Agrippa, while brigandage and guerrilla fighting went on, but there was no more national war in Spain. In its reorganisation by Scipio and the Senate's commission the lines laid down by Gracchus were followed. The growing prosperity of the land was further secured when Q. Metellus Baliaricus suppressed piracy in the Balaric Islands (123 B.C.). Roman culture took deep root; commerce and agriculture flourished in the best administered of the Roman provinces.


CHAPTER XXIV

FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST

AFRICA

	B.C.	A. U.C.
Massinissa and Carthage—Siege of Carthage	149-146	605-608
Scipio Æmilianus—Province of Africa	146	608

Carthage and Massinissa.—The policy of Rome in Africa was to harass Carthage, while maintaining a rough balance of power. The settlement of 201 B.C. had left, in the vagueness of the clause securing the territorial rights of Numidia, especially as interpreted by the



REMAINS OF ANCIENT HARBOURS AT CARTHAGE.

Mr. Cecil Torr's careful investigations make the traditional account of the Harbours of Carthage scarcely tenable. There is little reason to doubt that the small ponds, now existing—once, perhaps, the sole harbours of the city—must have become inadequate for her vast naval and commercial fleets, to provide for which, basins were constructed by means of piers and jetties running out into the sea. The “ponds” then became the inner docks and basins. But from our scanty information, and the inaccurate narrative of Appian, it is difficult to reconstruct the original plan.

nervous partiality of the Senate, and in the prohibition of war with Rome's allies, two powerful weapons for the vindictive and ambitious Massinissa. Under the conduct of Hannibal the city had rapidly recovered. The finances had been reorganised and the government reformed in a democratic sense; the indemnity was being discharged as fast as Rome would permit, and Hannibal himself was looking hopefully to the East, when, in 195 B.C., on the eve of the war with Antiochus, he was denounced by the oligarchs and Roman spies and his surrender demanded. The suffete fled; his house was razed, his goods confiscated, and in the ferment of parties the Romanising oligarchs took the lead. But even now the unjust judges at Rome encouraged the Numidian king's encroachments. The patient Phœnicians, loyal to their engagements, whatever the continual rumours to the contrary, appealed regularly to the suzerain, only to receive the visits of commissions, who discussed, reported, adjourned, and carried back stories of the imperishable wealth of the populous and prosperous city. The fertile districts of the Emporia, on the Lesser Syrtis, were already gone, and Carthage had actually paid a large indemnity to the aggressor, when, after an interval of apparent peace, fresh robberies produced fresh complaints, and the bitter cry for justice or downright subjection drew some little succour. For the times were still critical, and Massinissa had grown too strong. On the ruins of Syphax's nomad state he had founded a real kingdom. With the favour of Rome, he had thrown a girdle of annexation round Carthage, his destined capital, from the borders of Mauretania to the sands of Cyrene. He had filled his treasury, settled his people, and formed an army. He was a true king and tried soldier, tough and unscrupulous, as temperate and enduring as he was supple and cunning, who lived strongly every hour of his ninety years. He had created a capital at Cirta, had fostered a mingled Libyan and Punic civilisation destined to a vigorous life, and founded a nation. He had now to learn, in spite of all his help in the Spanish and Eastern wars, of all his self-abasing flattery, that the day of vassal kingdoms was over. A wiser policy would have kept the balance, as Hiero had done at Syracuse, between the rival states of Rome and Carthage.


Cato and Carthage.—In 157 B.C. the commission under M. Porcius Cato, which, after long delay, came to deal with the seizure by Numidia of Tusca and the plains by the Bagradas, left the question undecided, but brought back the settled conviction that closed each speech of the narrow-minded censor with the phrase, "Censeo

delendam esse Carthaginem." Her docks and shipping, her fair gardens and crowded streets, her full treasury and arsenals, condemned her. In vain Scipio Nasica and the minority protested. The annexationists prevailed, supported as they were by the influence of commercial jealousy, of the old natural and nervous hatred, and of the zeal, eloquence, and enthusiasm of the aged and powerful Cato. Crippled, insulted, robbed, Carthage was still a terror to Rome, an eyesore to her commerce. The *casus belli* was not far to seek. In a struggle of factions the national democrats had banished some partisans of Numidia, and refused their reinstatement at the cost of war and in spite of the persuasions or commands of Rome.

In 151 B.C. the vain and corpulent Hasdrubal had been thoroughly beaten by Massinissa under the eyes of Æmilianus, sent to Africa to get elephants for the Spanish army. The peace Scipio mediated broke down. The Punic troops surrendered, were disarmed and massacred. Now that the hard work was done, Rome, who had watched with secret pleasure her allies cut each other's throats, pushed aside her disappointed agent and appeared as principal.

Breach with Carthage.—The treaty had been broken, an ally attacked, Rome's demand for disarmament neglected, her legates even roughly handled—at least such was the plea—and the enemy had already fallen. She prepared for war, and Utica, at odds with Carthage, at once surrendered, affording Rome a strong and convenient base. In vain Carthage condemned her leaders to death and offered every satisfaction. In 149 B.C. Manilius and Censorinus, with an unusually powerful force, left Lilybæum with secret orders. Before they left, the Punic plenipotentiaries had made an absolute submission. It was accepted, and they were guaranteed, on condition of giving up 300 hostages and "obeying such further commands as should be imposed by the consuls," their liberty, laws, territory, all but the city itself.

The ominous conditions and equally ominous omission were marked, but not realised. Though the hostages were sent, the army sailed, and on its arrival at Utica the master-stroke of perfidy was played. The "further orders" were issued one by one. At last, when walls were stripped, arms delivered, ships surrendered, came the fatal command to destroy the city and settle ten miles from the beloved sea. It was a sentence of death. The ancient feeling for hearth and home, the gods and the dead, for the sacred city and its hallowed soil, for their harbours and their seas, fed by




all the power of Punic patience, of Semitic hatred and passionate indignation at the shameless mockery of right, blazed out in a frenzy of despair.

Material and hands were abundant. The whole town became a workshop of war, in which men and women toiled alike. A truce of thirty days, granted by mistaken policy and utilised with superhuman energy, concealed by a still more marvellous coolness, prepared for the consuls a surprise as ugly as their own. The city, armed in a month, twice repelled an assault; and Hasdrubal, with 20,000 men outside the walls, prevented a formal blockade.

Site of Carthage.—The city proper lay on the southern portion of a low peninsula jutting into the Gulf of Tunis, between Capes Farina and Bon. Except on the west, it is encompassed by water, and the isthmus which connects it with the mainland is about two miles broad, expanding towards the east, and running up into hills at the seaward extremity. On one of these stood the citadel (Byrsa) of the old town, which was covered on the landward side by the most massive fortifications of antiquity. The wall, forty-five feet in height, was towered and battlemented and furnished with vast casemates, serving as stables, store-rooms, and barracks, the whole extending to a breadth of thirty-three feet. Slighter lines protected the rich and beautiful suburb (Megara or Magalia), which, with the necropolis, filled the remainder of the peninsula to the north and west. At the south-east corner lay the double artificial harbour—the inner circular basin (Cothon), with the port-admiral's house on the central island, strongly fortified by the city wall—and the outer rectangular commercial harbour, with its broad quays and weaker walls, and an extension quay running along its seaward side. From this point a long narrow tongue of land ran out south, almost wholly shutting off the shallow lake of Tunis, which, washing the south side of the city, formed a station for ships of lighter draught.

The defence was conducted by Hasdrubal, a grandson of Massinissa, with whom co-operated the army of Numidian rebels and Punic emigrants under Hasdrubal the Fat. The Numidian cavalry of Himilco Phameas were especially useful. Manilius lay on the isthmus, while Censorinus operated from the tongue (Tænia) and the bay, where the wall was weakest. The attack was repulsed. The inactivity and death of Massinissa, disease, and famine crippled the Roman offensive. An expedition against Hasdrubal ended in disgrace, and the year's work redounded only to the credit of the tribune Scipio, who crowned his brilliant exploits as a soldier by

the skilful diplomacy with which he settled the Berber king's



PLAN OF HARBOURS AT CARTHAGE.


heritance among his sons, Micipsa, Gulussa, and Mastanabal, a

induced Himilco to bring over his light horse, earning by his energy the praise of the veteran Cato, as the one man among the gliding shades.

Numidia was left, by a precarious arrangement, to the common rule, with divided functions, of its three heirs. The next year, 148 B.C., was spent in futile attacks on the coast-towns, while Carthage received the deserter Bithyas, with 800 Numidian horse, and negotiated with the pseudo-Philip of Macedon.

Appointment of Scipio.—In 147 B.C. Publius Scipio, the adopted grandson of the hero of Zama, son of L. Æmilius Paullus, a distinguished officer and gifted statesman, by popular favour and family influence was elected consul, contrary to law, at the age of thirty-seven, and appointed specially to the African command. He was thorough, if not brilliant, and it is highly probable that his services have been overcoloured by the partial estimate of his friend Polybius. Purging the demoralised camp, he tightened up the relaxed discipline and restored the tone of the army. He had simply to apply overwhelming resources with patience and persistence. Arriving at a critical moment, he rescued Mancinus, who had contrived, by a bold stroke, to isolate himself on a cliff on the steep seaward side of Magalia, whence he could neither advance nor retreat.

The Siege.—The siege began in form. Hasdrubal and Bithyas, who had drawn close to Carthage, were forced to enter the city, abandoning the isthmus and the suburb. But Scipio, despairing of a storm, neglected the advantage, and drew a double line across the isthmus from sea to sea. The usual struggle of fanatics and moderates ensued in the beleaguered city, followed by a *coup d'état* and the murder of Roman prisoners and partisans. Hasdrubal received dictatorial power. Carthage had numbered 700,000 souls at the beginning of the siege, and in the narrow compass of the old city, the remnant, crowded, starved, and diseased, depended for supplies on the brilliant blockade-running of Bithyas and the daring merchantmen. To complete his work, Scipio constructed a mole, ninety-six feet broad, from the north end of the Tænia, to close the harbour-mouth. Its approaching success silenced the scoffs of the besieged, but the laugh turned once more when out of a new passage, pierced by the silent and secret work of two months, in the narrow eastern wall of the Cothon, a new-built fleet of fifty ships put out to sea. Losing the chance of a sudden attack on Scipio's dismantled fleet, they returned on the third day, to fight an indecisive battle, and suffered severe damage in effecting



TRILINGUAL INSCRIPTION ON AN ALTAR DEDICATED TO THE GOD ESHMÛN, BY CLEON, AN OFFICER OF THE SALT-REVENUE. (CIRC. 150 B.C.).

their return through the narrow entry. Scipio now attacked the outer quay, defended for the emergency by a hasty rampart. Once the assault was baffled with splendid courage, but a lodgment was at length effected, a position fortified on the quays, and the blockade completed. The fall of Nepheris, whence the supplies had been thrown in, left famine and pestilence to do the rest, and yet Hasdrubal rejected terms for himself and his friends.

Carthage Taken and Destroyed.—In the spring of 146 B.C., when these strong allies had reduced the starving city to despair, Scipio advanced to storm. The outer harbour was evacuated and burned, and, unperceived in the smoke and tumult, C. Lælius scaled the wall and pushed into the Cothon. From the adjoining market-place the legions forced their way in a prolonged and bloody street-fight, from storey to storey, from house to house, up the three narrow lanes that led to the citadel. On the seventh day the remnant on the Byrsa, 50,000 men and women, surrendered. Hasdrubal, who, with the Roman deserters, had fled to the huge and lofty temple of Eshmûn on the citadel rock, escaped at the last moment from the flames, in which his comrades and his wife, with bitter taunts on the dastard, perished.

By special orders from Rome the city was burned, its site ploughed up and cursed. With vast booty, Scipio returned in triumph, a triumph chastened by melancholy forebodings for the future of Rome herself. As he gazed on the fire, that burned for seventeen days, he burst into tears, and the line escaped his lips—

ἔσσεται ἡμαρ ὅταν ποτ' ὀλώλῃ Ἴλιος ἱρή.

Of the captives, Hasdrubal, whose services have deserved perhaps better terms than those bestowed by Polybius on the "pot-bellied, strutting, and incapable coward, glutton, and tyrant," remained a prisoner in Italy. The rest died in chains or slavery.

Africa a Province.—Africa became a province (stretching along the coast from the Tusca to Thenæ), whose capital was the free city of Utica, the centre of Roman trade. It paid a moderate stipendium, or definite fixed tribute, raised directly from the subject communities, who kept their lands and liberties on sufferance. The allied cities were declared free; the territory of those destroyed was leased as domain land by the censors. Numidia, with definite limits, was left to defend the frontier, and retained its possessions, surrounding the province on three sides.

CHAPTER XXV

FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST

THE EASTERN STATES AND THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Rome declares war on Philip	200	554
Flaminius appointed General	198	556
Battle of Cynoscephalæ	197	557
Peace made—Settlement of Greece	195	558

The Eastern States.—The story of the nations beyond the Adriatic concerns us only so far as they enter the Roman sphere of influence. Even so, it is difficult enough to give any brief and clear account of the internal condition of the several communities, or of their constantly changing relations to each other at this epoch. The powers of the East may be roughly classified as monarchies and free republics, from which standpoint we may say, on the whole, that Rome and the free states stood together

against the kings ; or they may be divided into essentially peaceful and essentially aggressive states, when Rome may be said to give support to the pacific governments.

Macedon.—Of the three great monarchies carved by his successors out of the empire of Alexander, which maintained at this time an unstable equilibrium, Macedon, under the personal rule of Philip V. (B.C. 220-179); was the soundest and strongest. The vigorous peasantry, although wasted by war and by the recent incursions of the Gauls, retained its national spirit and its ancient fidelity to the half-constitutional despotism of its kings. Her compact and imposing phalanx, the one genuine fighting-force of the East, except the Parthian cavalry, with her hold on the "fetters of Greece," the fortresses of Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth, made Macedon the dominant power in Greece. Ætolia had been humbled in the "Social War," which ended with the peace of Naupactus (217 B.C.). Macedon controlled Thessaly ; she held the keys of the Peloponnese, and, since Aratus, dreading the designs and jealous of the talents of Cleomenes, the reformer-king of Sparta, had flung the Achæan league into her hands, Achæan policy followed her lead. Sparta had been crushed at Sellasia (221 B.C.), and only the death of Antigonus Doson and the lack of sea-power had prevented the organisation of Macedonian hegemony. But neither the disposition and policy of Philip nor the character of his people and their form of government were calculated to render Macedon the real centre of Greek political life. The meddling of the kings provoked reaction in the free states ; the race of the Antigonids had degenerated ; their efforts were directed to mere aggrandisement ; of an Hellenic ideal there is no trace.


Syria.—The kingdom of "Asia," under the third Antiochus (228-187 B.C.), nominally the premier state, with its shallow culture, corrupt court, and lax Oriental methods, was rotten to the core. Asiatic in its pretensions as in its armaments, it was European only in the creation and maintenance of numerous and important cities. The empire of the Seleucids, supposed to extend from the Ægean to the Indus, was fast breaking up. Pressed by the rising power of the Parthians, it was shedding its Eastern satrapies. The rising tide of Oriental reaction was steadily thrusting back the intruders from the West. In Asia Minor it kept a wavering grasp on its possessions in Caria, Phrygia, and Lydia, and on the narrow line of communication that passed inland through level Cilicia to Antioch. From the sea it was cut off in almost every direction by the naval power of Egypt. Its ever-active kings, pushing their

dynastic interests, and engaged in constant interference abroad and constant struggle at home, held together as they could a loose aggregate of half-independent provinces, autonomous towns, and restless tribes, a Greek caricature of the empire of Darius.

Egypt.—Egypt in the hands of the Lagidæ and their clever ministers, with a centralised administration, squeezing an ample revenue from the passive fellaheen, and pursuing an unscrupulous, clear-sighted, and selfish policy, had used her favourable strategic position to extend her dominion and influence. The state encouraged art, enterprise, and inquiry with a business eye, and Alexandria became at once the centre of learning and of Eastern commerce. The first financial and maritime power of the Levant, she had annexed Cyrene and Cyprus, Cœlesyria and Phœnicia. Her influence was predominant along the southern coast of Asia Minor—West Cilicia, Pamphylia, Lycia. She had stations in the Ægean, at Ephesus, Samos, and elsewhere; she enjoyed good relations with Rhodes, and “protected” to some extent most of the towns and islands of the Asian sea-board up to the Thracian shore. But this expansion demanded a strong hand and a strong navy, and, by exposing her to attack, cost her the privilege of isolation. Egypt had nothing more to get; her policy is now directed to fostering the minor powers and maintaining the *status quo*. But the race of the Ptolemies rapidly deteriorated. To Ptolemy II., Philadelphus, the statesman who had recognised Rome in 273 B.C., and Ptolemy III., Euergetes, an energetic soldier, had succeeded the fourth of that name, Philopator, an indolent and vicious debauchee (224–204 B.C.). His young son, Epiphanes (204–181 B.C.), was, and remained, a puppet in the hands of a succession of ministers whose resignations were effected by riot and murder. The native element asserted itself in politics, manners and religion, and with its wild mobs, ceaseless cabals, and corrupt kings, the land of the Pharaohs drifted into the hands of Rome.

Gauls: Pergamum, and Rhodes.—Omitting the states that acknowledged a nominal allegiance to Syria, or those, like Pontus or Parthia, whose important but obscure development lies beyond our present scope, there remain to notice in Asia the Celts, the free republics, and Pergamum. Bithynia, indeed, under the able and vigorous Prusias I. (228–185 B.C.), and his son, Prusias II. (c. 185 to c. 149 B.C.), pursued a crafty, and often contemptible, policy with undeserved success. But neither this state nor Cappadocia (Ariarathes IV., 220–163 B.C.) are of any immediate moment.

The Galatian freebooters and mercenaries, a race of restless



intruders, divided into three tribes, Tolistoboi, Trocmi, and Tectosages, and organised in cantons under tetrarchs, plundered right and left, and were an especial thorn in the side of Pergamum and the Greek cities. Pergamum, in the valley of the Caicus, a "miniature Egypt," was the domain of the rich and sagacious Attalids, whose power, founded on wealth, was maintained by subtle statesmanship, by alliances, and the use of mercenary troops. They had no people behind them; their strength lay in their strong citadel and in the power of the purse, and they acted as champions of the coast-towns against the Celts. They played off the great states against each other, and directed their efforts to weakening their dangerous neighbours, building a navy, fostering commerce, and creating a new school of art and literature. The reigning king of this bourgeois dynasty was Attalus I. (241-197 B.C.), who inherited the possessions of his cousin Eumenes and his uncle Philetærus, the founder of the house. Last and best of all come the free Greek cities, the centres of Greek culture and civic freedom, such as Byzantium, which attempted to control the important Pontic trade, Cyzicus, Abydos, the key of the Hellespont, or Rhodes, the great peace-power and head of a sort of Hansa league of the commercial coast-towns. The good position of Rhodes secured her a great carrying-trade; her strong fleet policed the sea and protected her allies; her impartial policy and noble character made her the arbitrator of the Ægean. For the rest, their actual status largely depended on the ever-changing circumstances of the moment and the presence of stronger powers, curtailing though not destroying their theoretical freedom.

Achæan and Ætolian Leagues.—In Greece itself there was Athens, the university of the world, starving on the memories of her past, wisely if somewhat ignobly neutral, holding aloof from general politics, while she cultivated good relations with the sea-powers and her ally, Rome. In Sparta, the standing obstacle to Greek union, whose last chance perished with the hero Cleomenes, ruled the brigand and pirate Nabis (207-192 B.C.). Setting aside the dependencies of Macedon, and the petty communities of Bœotia, Epirus, and Acarnania, there remain but two powers of importance, the Ætolian and Achæan leagues. The constitution of the rival leagues was in essential points similar. Each had a federal executive, at the head of which stood the annual strategus; each apparently had a council, or some sort of permanent committee, a common centre, and general assemblies, which met for

the Ætolian League at Thermon, for the Achæan at Ægium. The Ætolians also called meetings at Delphi for the benefit of their outside members, while Philopœmen later enabled the Achæan assemblies to meet in other places than the ancestral and religious centre. Both represent an important advance on the old Greek alternative of separatism or hegemony, and the Achæans in particular boasted with justice of the generosity and liberalism of their institutions. But neither constitution was completely worked out, and neither could overcome the disunion of Greece. The Ætolian League was a combination of peasants, reckless and restless, the chartered libertines of Greece, ready for fighting on any side and in any land. They subsisted on plunder and their pay as mercenaries. At this epoch their power was considerable, both in Central Greece, where they held Delphi, Thermopylæ, and Naupectus; in the Peloponnesus, where they controlled Elis and part of Arcadia, and on the Hellespont, where several important cities were allies or actual members of the league. Their dubious policy was largely determined by the rivalries and passions of the moment.

The Achæan Federation had a greater moral worth and more real significance. Revived and reconstructed as the power of Macedon waned, the ancient league gained political importance by the gradual accession of Sicyon, Corinth, Megalopolis, Argos, and other considerable towns in Peloponnesus, a growth due in the main to the wealth and tactics of the politician and diplomatist, Aratus.¹ To him also was due in part the weakness of its military organisation, and to his fear of Spartan hegemony and the social revolution Achæa owed her unworthy subservience to Macedon, to whom he sacrificed the citadel of Corinth. Under the guidance of the patriotic soldier, Philopœmen (Strat. 208 B.C., &c.), and later on of Lycortas, father of Polybius, the league assumed a more dignified and independent attitude; and, on the whole, it stands out, by its attempt at political fairness and its genuine effort to effect the union at least of Peloponnesus, if not of all Greece, in a national democratic confederacy of a moderate type. The expansion of Rome gave it no chance of success, nor had it sufficient force to maintain its independence of Macedon or overpower the nagging resistance of Sparta, Elis, and Messene. But the real rock ahead was the impatience of restraint, the invincible separatism, the intense party-feeling which made larger politics impossible, which

¹ Born 271 B.C.; poisoned by Philip, 213 B.C.

preferred treason to compromise, and readily invoked the common enemy to win a triumph over a political opponent. To draw these jarring atoms to a cohesive mass the league lacked both attractive and coercive power.

Philip V.—Philip had the force but not the ability. In his contradictory character we trace a rapid deterioration. Corrupted by power, the gifted if arrogant autocrat of eighteen, the keen soldier and clever speaker, the strenuous, active, and skilful king degenerated into a bloodthirsty, grasping, and obstinate despot. Bent on being king indeed, he was misled by ill-chosen counsellors. He mingled refinement and vandalism, cruelty and good-humour, indolence and restlessness. His cold heart and inconstant purpose, his short-sighted jealousy, marred at the critical moment the far-reaching plans of Hannibal, shattered his own schemes, and alienated his natural allies. He lacked grip and concentration; he was incapable of conceiving large purposes, and disgraced his crown and his country by the use of poison, by aimless barbarism and sheer brutality. To sum up the situation. The disturbing elements in the Hellenic world were the kings of Syria and Macedon, and the half-piratic Ætolian League; the powers that made for peace were Egypt, Pergamum, and Rhodes, and in non-Peloponnesian politics, the Achæans. Rome, on good



TETRADRACHM OF PHILIP V.—ATHENA ALKIS HURLING FULMEN.

terms with the peaceful states, was irritated with the Ætolians and suspicious of Macedon.

Philip and Antiochus.—The peace of Naupactus (217 B.C.) had been made under the impression of the Hannibalic struggle. But the warning of Agelaus to beware of "the thunder-cloud from the

West," bore little fruit. Philip turned lightly from his half-hearted attack on Rome to seek compensation for failure, in the East and South. On the death of Ptolemy Philopator (204 B.C.), he combined with Antiochus III. against his successor, a boy of five, in a nefarious partition treaty. Each played for his own hand, without regard to his partner.

Philip, on his side, in alliance with Prusias, invaded Asia Minor, attacking towns and islands which were under Egyptian or Ætolian protection, and captured Chalcedon, Lysimachia, Cius, and Thasos. His atrocities only sharpened the indignation of the Greek communities, who saw a common danger in the advance of the Macedonian tyrant. Rhodes, Pergamum, and Byzantium took up arms; and behind them, invisible to the short-sighted schemer, loomed the power of Rome. Philip's great ships were roughly treated near Chios by the lighter and well-handled fleet of the allies, but his defeat, if such it was, did not prevent him from beating Rhodes at Lade, occupying Miletus, and ravaging Caria. The campaign was suspended by the natural hindrances of the season and the country, and leaving garrisons to secure his conquests, Philip slipped through the combined fleets and returned to Macedon. Already Valerius Lævinus had entered the Ægean with thirty-eight sail; yet, blinded by his adventurous advisers, the king pursued his plans (200 B.C.), and by the reduction of the Thracian coast-towns and the bloody butchery of Abydos, secured the passage of the straits and his communications with Antiochus in the face of superior fleets.

Interference of Rome.—Before Abydos he received, and politely put aside, the remonstrances of M. Æmilius Lepidus, who, at the request of Egypt, had been appointed guardian of Epiphanes. The envoy, whose "impertinence the king pardoned because he was young, handsome, and a Roman," contrived, however, in the course of this mission to the East, to secure the neutrality of Antiochus at the expense of Egypt, and negotiated a coalition of the minor states against Philip. The kingdom of the Ptolemies appears henceforth as the client of Rome, though its actual cession and complete reduction were long deferred. To the Greek republics the Roman Senate seemed a more natural and less dangerous friend than the Greek monarchs. If they appealed to the foreigner once more, it was in the cause of freedom and culture. For Rome the position was difficult. She was free to act since Zama, but reluctant, in her exhaustion, to undertake fresh adventures; yet she was compelled to force on the unpopular war.

Apart from the unsatisfactory nature of the armistice of 205 B.C., Philip was upsetting the equilibrium in the East. The disappearance of the minor states, the paralysis of Egypt, and the growth of Macedon threatened Roman interests. Hannibal was alive, and Carthage reviving. If Rome had no formal ground for interference, her real reasons were adequate. But her action was not wholly selfish nor her aims ambitious. Sympathy and the claims of friendly and protected states strengthened considerations of policy. A *casus belli* was soon afforded by action that could be construed as an aggression on Rome's ancient ally, Athens. The object of the war was not to conquer but to weaken Macedon, and the plan of campaign was to husband the strength of Rome and utilise her Greek allies.

Second Macedonian War (200-196 B.C.).—The declaration of war, at first rejected by the Comitia, which felt only the exhaustion of Italy, blind to ulterior reasons, was finally granted in return for concessions, made at the cost of the overburdened *socii*¹ and of military efficiency. The veterans of the Punic war were discharged, the Italian garrisons were constituted by *socii* alone, and six legions of so-called volunteers were impressed for service in the city, and in Etruria and Macedon. Besides his garrisons in Thrace and Asia, his small fleet and coastguards, Philip could only muster 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. The year 200 B.C. was mainly spent in diplomatic preliminaries, in which Attalus played a leading part, and Philip's enterprises materially assisted Rome. He had angered the *Ætoli*ans, alienated the free cities, attacked Egypt; all whose interest it would have been to exclude Western interference were now leagued against him. His lukewarm ally, Antiochus, pushed his own schemes. He could only count on Acarnania, Beotia, and the honest neutrality of the Achæan League, led by the patriot Philopœmen, which had failed, by its proffered mediation between the Greek disputants, to avoid an appeal to Rome.

P. Sulpicius Galba, with two legions, arrived at Apollonia too late to pierce the mountain barrier, but a detachment from the fleet at Corcyra, under Claudius Cento, relieved Athens and burnt the magazines of Chalcis. For the second campaign Galba organised a combined attack by the Dardanians from the north, the allied fleet on the east, and by the Athamanes and *Ætoli*ans, whose flattered arrogance finally accepted the more promising of

¹ *i.e.* Italian allies.

their two suitors, from the south, while he himself was to break through by the defiles of the Apsus, reconnoitred in the preceding year. The attack failed on all hands. Galba neither entered Macedon nor formed a junction, and owed his safe retreat, after hard fighting on difficult ground, more to the diversions effected by the allies than to his own soldiership. The king's active strategy, after baffling Galba, drove the Ætolians from Thessaly, scattered the Dardani, and left him master of the field. The fleet wasted its superiority in idle plunder, so ignorant was ancient warfare of the value of combined naval and military operations. Antiochus retired from Pergamum in obedience to Rome, and maintained his short-sighted neutrality.

Flamininus.—In 198 B.C. Philip was encouraged to take the offensive, advancing to watch the Roman movements from a strong position on the Aous. Here he was confronted by the consul T. Quinctius Flamininus, elected by powerful influence at the age of thirty, a Roman of the new type, a respectable officer and skilful diplomatist, a cool and clear-headed statesman, whose keen sympathy with Hellenic culture and knowledge of Hellenic affairs was henceforth used by the Senate, in its half-subtle, half-generous policy of playing off the Greek communities against Macedon. After the fall of Macedon the subtlety got the better of the sentiment, as Rome turned the factions of Hellas to its own profit. And even now, though there was yet room for generous idealism, it hardly affected the main lines of Roman policy, even as interpreted by Flamininus, the unofficial manager of Greek affairs in the Senate. Such was the man who, now succeeding to the command, was able at length, after a vain attempt at negotiation, by the treachery of the Epirot Charops, to turn Philip's flank, and force a hasty retreat to Tempe. The Epirots at once deserted, while the Ætolians overran Thessaly, whose faithful fortresses alone remained to Philip in the north. The advance of Flamininus with the army to Phocis and the fleet to Cenchreæ determined the Achæans, under the guidance of Aristænus, to abandon an untenable neutrality. The price of this inevitable decision, arrived at in a stormy congress at Sicyon, was the reversion of the powerful city of Corinth, whither their forces proceeded to support the siege. Corinth, desperately defended, was relieved by the Macedonian Philocles from Chalcis, who also succeeded in securing Argos. To buy Spartan support, Philip presented Argos to Nabis, who, with equal cynicism, accepted the present and betrayed the donor. An attempt to treat broke upon the stern terms of the Roman

ultimatum, and Flaminius, whose command had been specially prolonged, proceeded in the spring of 197 B.C. to secure his communications by the capture of Thebes, and masking Corinth with the allied troops, advanced northward by the direct route through Thermopylæ on Tempe, depending for supplies on his accompanying fleet.

Battle of Cynoscephalæ.—His heterogeneous army, including a strong Ætolian contingent, was superior in cavalry alone to the Macedonian army, raised by strict levies to nearly 26,000 men, of whom 16,000 formed the trusted phalanx. With this force Philip, eager for battle and fearing for his fortresses, advanced by Larissa on Pheræ, close to which the Romans had encamped. Here the advanced guards met, but after a skirmish of reconnoitring parties both generals, embarrassed by the difficult ground and anxious to secure supplies, moved by parallel lines on Scotussa, separated by a range of hills, and groping about through the mist and rain of autumn, in ignorance of each other's movements. On the third day, a casual encounter, in dark and dirty weather, between the Macedonian reserve, posted to secure the flanking heights, and a scouting party of Flaminius brought on a general engagement. The Romans were getting the worst of the skirmish, till their supports reinforced the attack, when the tables were turned again by the advent of the Macedonian cavalry and light infantry. Their victorious charge was only stemmed by the gallantry of the Ætolian horse, inferior as skirmishers to the Numidians alone, who gave the proconsul time to draw out his whole force for action. Then Philip yielded, against his better judgment, to the desire of his troops. With the right wing of the phalanx he hastily climbed the hill, formed on the ridge, received his retreating troops on the right, and charging at once in dense, deep column, with the weight of the phalanx on the sloping ground drove in and shattered the Roman left. But the rapid advance had dislocated his line. Flaminius, passing to his right, hurled his maniples, with the elephants in front, upon the unformed Macedonian left, disordered by haste and the uneven ground, as Nicanor hurried it up to support his king. The battle was decided by the brilliant stroke of a nameless tribune, who, disengaging some companies from the victorious right, fell with disastrous effect upon Philip's defenceless rear.

The Phalanx and the Legion.—Cynoscephalæ was a soldiers' battle, brought on by chance, and won by superiority of formation. The famous phalanx, with its close order, long pikes, and crushing

weight of sixteen files,¹ irresistible in a charge and impregnable to a front attack, could not be handled easily in the field. It had lost what mobility it had possessed in its creator's hands; it was readily dislocated by movement; it was useless on unfavourable ground; exposed to attack on flank and rear, and incapable of manœuvring rapidly, as a whole or in detachments, it had no chance against the flexible formation, the easy movement, and individual training of the legionaries, who, once within the enemy's guard, made short work of their stiffly drilled opponents.

Settlement of Macedon and Greece.—The reduction of Macedon cost 700 men. With a loss of 13,000, coupled with serious reverses elsewhere, Philip had no choice. An armistice was conceded, and Flamininus, severely snubbing the Ætolian "victors of Cynoscephalæ," and to the disappointment of the spiteful Greeks, arranged a peace in 196 B.C., on terms whose moderation was due as well to a chivalrous feeling as to the need of maintaining the equilibrium in the East and of providing a bulwark against northern incursions. The king surrendered his foreign possessions, his ships, and the province of Orestis, reduced his forces, paid an indemnity of a thousand talents, entered into alliance, and subjected his foreign policy to the control of Rome. Macedon, as a power, ceased to exist, but Rome neither annexed nor permitted encroachment. Scodra was indeed strengthened and Athens enriched; discontented Ætolia received a few towns and was denied more; the Achæan League profited by the incorporation of the surrendered possessions in Peloponnesus and the isthmus, Rhodes and Pergamum by the maintenance of the *status quo*; while Thessaly was neutralised and divided into four independent confederacies. Finally, Rome, unable or unwilling to settle the conflicting claims of the jarring polities, proclaimed by the mouth of Flamininus to the assembled Greeks at the Isthmian games the freedom of Hellas. If Greece, as the Ætolians complained, had only changed masters, the new relation was carefully concealed. In the following year Nabis was compelled by the combined forces to disgorge the cruelly oppressed Argos, Messene, the Cretan cities, and the Spartan coast on which the sufferers by his reign of terror were planted as free Laconians and members of the League. Thus crippled and fined, the Spartan "Boar of Ardennes" was left independent, his other acts uncanceled, to

¹ Five spears (*sarissæ*) over 20 feet in length projected in a descending scale from 15 to 3 feet in front of each man, so that every Roman soldier in his looser order confronted two phalangites and ten spears.

the deep discontent of Greece, as a check on the Achæan League.

State of Greece.—Flamininus, with some fairness and much policy, refrained from unnecessary interference; the factious opposition of the pig-headed Bœotians was borne with patience. Wherever possible, the ascendancy of the wealthier and Romanising party was secured in the various communities. For the rest, they were left to stew in their own juice. However tickled by Greek flattery or sensitive to Greek satire, however strong her fashionable Hellenism, Rome showed as much contempt as kindness, and still more astuteness, in that degrading gift of freedom, so unwisely, if generously, confirmed by the evacuation of the Greek fortresses in 194 B.C. Rent by faction, corrupt in morals, decayed in population, permeated by socialism, the Greek states with their petty politics were overshadowed by the power and proximity of Rome. She had destroyed Macedon, hampered Achaia, she suffered no predominance, and instituted no control. It was a blunder, almost a crime. At the same time direct annexation was as yet unnecessary to Rome. Her commercial and political interests were secured by the existence of a free and friendly system of powers, acting as check upon one another and upon possible enemies. Annexation would have been a shock to sentiment at home and to Roman influence in the East, no less than a breach of her traditional policy.

CHAPTER XXVI

FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST

THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Antiochus lands in Greece	192	562
Battle of Thermopylæ	191	563
Battle of Magnesia	190	564
Settlement of Asia and Greece	189-188	565-566
Deaths of Hannibal, Scipio, and Philopœmen	183	571

Antiochus.—We have seen that during the Macedonian war Roman diplomacy had kept Antiochus III. quiet. The short-sighted monarch, whose early energy had earned him the surname of "Great," and whose designs on Egypt, checked by the bloody defeat of Raphia in 217 B.C., had been renewed in the Partition Treaty with Philip, had, in his covetous rivalry, not only failed to support his ally, but had utilised his fall and earned his

deadly hatred for the future. In 201 and 200 B.C. he had attacked the Syrian coast, and in 198 B.C. reduced Egypt to terms by the victory of Mount Panium, securing his conquests in the Levant, the reversion of Philip's Egyptian conquests on the Asia Minor



GOLD OCTADRACHM OF ANTIOCHUS III.—APOLLO SEATED ON OMPHALOS.

sea-board, and the betrothal of the boy-king, Epiphanes, to his daughter Cleopatra.

Rome and Antiochus.—Nevertheless, except in protecting Pergamum, the Senate had practised a "masterly inactivity." In 197 B.C. a strong Syrian fleet and army threatened the ceded districts, and even the free states of the Ægean coasts, whose liberty Rome had demanded from Philip. In spite of the resistance of Rhodes, by 196 B.C. Antiochus had occupied Ephesus and other positions, whence he crossed into Europe, restored and fortified Lysimachia, meeting the protests of the Romans and the warnings of Flamininus with a curt request that they would mind their own business. Their claim to a protectorate was, in his view, untenable. He had now a footing in Europe; Thrace was a satrapy; Rome's allies had been attacked, her predominance threatened. In 195 B.C. Hannibal was received at Ephesus with marked honour. Antiochus avoided a direct rupture, and Rome took the wind out of her diplomacy by withdrawing her Greek garrisons. She had many reasons for war, but no *casus belli*. This hesitation fostered the arrogance of Antiochus and the disaffection of Greece. Embassies passed to and fro (193-192 B.C.), till Rome, disappointed of a bloodless victory by the rejection of her ultimatum, was forced to meet in arms an enemy to whom her own sloth had given the choice of time, place, and allies.

Attitude of the Minor States.—Meanwhile the king, by con-

cessions to the leading free cities, by marriages and presents, attempted to conciliate his subjects and rivals, Pergamum, Cappadocia, Egypt, Rhodes, and to secure his rear in Asia Minor. Greece, already impatient of the new order and given over to the play of party, was fermenting with discontent. His chances appeared good, but neither did his combinations succeed nor were his ideas consistently carried out. The scheme of Hannibal for a descent on Italy served only to alarm Rome and endanger Carthage, and Hannibal, suspected and disliked, was left to "cut blocks with a razor" among the petty courtiers of the "great" king.

Bithynia, Pergamum, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Egypt sided with Rome, when the restless Ætolians, discontented with their share of Macedonian booty, made themselves the agents of Antiochus in Greece, and precipitated the conflict.

Antiochus lands in Greece.—The wavering monarch, landing in 192 B.C. as the liberator of Greece, at once deceiver and deceived, brought inadequate levies to meet fictitious allies. The Ætolians, indignant at peace, dreaming, in their ignorance and arrogance, of a campaign on the Tiber, declared formal war with Rome. At their instigation Nabis had already broken out, and been exemplarily punished (192 B.C.) by Philopœmen; and now, to egg on their ally and fire anti-Roman feeling by a successful stroke, they attempted to surprise Sparta, Chalcis, and Demetrias. At Sparta the plot succeeded only in joining that state to the Achæan league, a result hastened by the appearance of the Roman fleet under Atilius Serranus at Gythium. Chalcis was saved; Demetrias fell. To secure his advantage, in the autumn of 192 B.C. the king entered Greece with a small force, intended to serve as a nucleus of a Greco-Asiatic host. But Philip preferred an open conqueror to a disloyal ally. Epirus was doubtful, and the Achæan league, solicited by both, with wise fidelity adhered to Rome, and garrisoned the Piræus and Chalcis. Except the Ætolians and Bœotians, only a few insignificant states, impelled more by party-feeling than patriotism, joined the liberator. The supineness of the enemy enabled him to secure a base at Chalcis, in Eubœa. Hence he advanced to demonstrate with some success in Thessaly, and hither retired from before Larissa, on the approach of Appius Claudius from Apollonia, to celebrate a marriage with a Chalcidian dame and wage a war of pen and ink.

Antiochus expelled from Greece (191 B.C.).—In the following spring the Romans, who had neglected a vigorous offensive, from uncertainty where the enemy's blow would fall, an uncertainty

encouraged by the smallness of his force in Greece, having now provided for the security of Italy and the islands, doubled their fleet and took up the war in earnest. They raised the army of the East, whose vanguard was already in Epirus, to 40,000, with an increased proportion of allies and auxiliaries, including African cavalry and elephants. M'. Acilius Glabrio was in command, assisted by the consulars Cato and Flaccus serving as simple tribunes. Swelled by the Greek contingents, the army overran Athamania, cleared Thessaly and concentrated at Larissa. The aimless king, whose reinforcements had failed him, and whose communications were cut by the stronger fleet, instead of promptly evacuating, drew together the rotten remnant of his host in the entrenchments of Thermopylæ, there to await his main force. Hence he was quickly driven in complete rout, when Cato surprised the careless Ætolians on the heights of Callidromos, and the phalanx, attacked in flank and front, was cut to pieces in the pass. The king fled to Ephesus; all was lost but Thrace; only the Ætolians, driven to despair by the contemptuous harshness of Glabrio, stood at bay in Naupactus, till Flamininus, with wiser policy, arranged an armistice to permit an embassy to Rome. Elis and Messene reluctantly entered the League, and Peloponnesus became, with some reservations, Achæan. But when the League desired Zacynthus, Flamininus reminded them that the tortoise was safest in its shell.

Naval War.—The allied fleet, which had broken the king's communications, now took the offensive. To prepare for the passage into Asia, C. Livius attacked and defeated Polyxenidas at Cyssus, or Corycus, near Chios, and with the aid of the Rhodians shut him up in Ephesus. Rome held the seas and could prepare for a home-blow, an adventure more dangerous in appearance than reality. While many of the Asiatic small states, such as Smyrna, Samos, and Chios, followed the lead of their aristocracy and went over to Rome, Antiochus levied a huge host, increased his fleet at Ephesus, and directed Hannibal to raise new ships in Syria and Phœnicia. Rome leisurely strengthened her fleets and armies all along the line; and in March 190 B.C. P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, as legate, with his incompetent brother Lucius, consul by family influence, as nominal superior, and 5000 volunteer veterans, took up the command. Pacifying the Ætolians, once more exasperated by a harsh ultimatum, with a six months' armistice, he pushed on for the Hellespont, selecting the long and arduous land-route, made possible only by the loyalty of Philip and the submission

of Bithynia, in preference to the chances of the sea, where Roman superiority was not yet absolute. Meanwhile Livius, who had gone to the Hellespont to reduce Sestos and Abydos, the fortresses commanding the passage, had been recalled by the defeat of the



CIPPUS OF A ROMAN MARINE OF LATER DATE.

Rhodian observing squadron at Samos, and had once more shut up the Syrian admiral in Ephesus. He was presently succeeded by L. Æmilius Regillus, whose task was threefold—to facilitate the crossing, to watch Polyxenidas, and to prevent the junction of Hannibal's belated fleet. The last object was effected by the well-

built and well-handled Rhodian squadron, who defeated off Aspendus, in Pamphylia, the final effort of the Punic hero. About the end of August the blockading fleet, whose Pergamene division had sailed to the Hellespont, was attacked by a slightly superior force. At Myonnesus, near Colophon, Polyxenidas was swept from the seas, with a loss of forty-two sail, a result mainly due to the tactics of the Rhodian admiral, Eudamus. The effect was immediate. Antiochus, whose Gallic mercenaries had been driven back from Pergamum by Eumenes, was stunned by the blow. As he had neglected to harass the march through Thrace, so now he hastily evacuated the Hellespont, sacrificed his stores, and permitted the enemy to land unopposed, instead of intimidating Prusias and forcing Scipio to take up his winter quarters in his distant and dangerous position.

Battle of Magnesia.—These errors he crowned when, having failed to bribe the legate and refused his demand for a full indemnity and the cession of Asia up to Mount Taurus, he flung his unwieldy, undisciplined, and motley mass in the way of the Roman legions, whose one desire was decisive action before winter. At Magnesia, under Sipylus, in the late autumn of 190 B.C., while Scipio was still sick at Elæa, Cn. Domitius drew the irresolute Antiochus out of his powerful lines beyond the Hermus on the mountain slopes, from which he threatened Smyrna and covered Ephesus, Sardis, and the great eastern road. Never had the Roman soldiers so despised an enemy. The army, 30,000 strong, including 5000 Achæans and Pergamenes, with 2000 Macedonians and Thracians to guard the camp, rested its left on the river Phrygius, scarcely covered by a few squadrons; the cavalry and light infantry, under Eumenes, were massed on the right; the legions took post in the centre. The armaments of the East, 12,000 horse and 60,000 foot, stretched to an invisible length, through the thick mist of an autumn morning. In the centre, dangerously deepened to thirty-two file, broken into ten divisions, each with a front of fifty, a wall of steel marked as with battlements and towers by the huge forms of elephants, posted two and two on its flanks and in its intervals, stood the grand but cumbrous phalanx. Its deep and naked flanks were covered by a long line of peltasts and the swarms of cavalry, on which the king relied, heavy dragoons, cuirassiers, and light horse, with archers and slingers, their strings and slings useless in the damp air. Reserves of elephants strengthened the fighting line; to the front skirmished the camel corps, the mounted archers, and the idle

menace of the scythed chariots. It was the Roman cue to shatter the wings, to drive them on the crowded phalanx, and plough their way into flanks and rear. With the eye of a soldier, Eumenes, drawing out his skirmishers from the right, by a storm of missiles drove the infuriated chariot teams on the camels, hurling both back on the left front, spreading a general panic. Then charging with his whole brigade, he routed the confused and cowardly masses on the left, baring the side of the central column, now forced to halt and form square. Meanwhile Antiochus had pressed up to the Roman camp, vigorously resisted by the garrison. As he retired victoriously he became aware of the whole disaster and fled. For the phalanx, stripped of its supports, taken in front and rear, decimated by the showers of missiles, had retired at first in good order and grim despair, till the frightened elephants tore through the ranks. Then the incredible slaughter was only enhanced by a futile effort to hold the camp. The legions, unemployed, watched the destruction of Syria; the control of Asia had cost the blood of a handful of allies.

Peace and Settlement of Asia.—The effect on the Oriental imagination was crushing. Asia Minor yielded to the fortune of Rome. Peace was concluded by a commission of ten under Cn. Manlius Volso, and its ratification secured by the presence of the army at the king's expense. The terms included an indemnity of 15,000 talents and the surrender of all possessions west of Mount Taurus and the Halys. His rights of levying war and of navigation in the West, of raising troops and building ships, were strictly limited. Antiochus as a great king stood abolished. He retained Cilicia, but Cappadocia became frankly independent under Ariarathes, the Armenian satrapies became principalities, and the Artaxiads began their career of greatness. For the rest, Rome strove to keep a balance among the jarring claims of her various clients. She made no province, stood aloof from purely Asian affairs, and when her armies evacuated Asia (188 B.C.) she took away only gold and honour. Meanwhile Volso occupied his troops, and served his own pockets and the Greek states, by crushing the Asiatic Celts and levying contributions all round. His action illustrates once more the dangerous powers of the imperium exercised at a distance from control by annually changing officers. Prusias kept Bithynia. In the West, Eumenes, the victor of Magnesia, received the Chersonese and the majority of the ceded districts in Asia, with the protectorate of such Greek cities as were not declared free. Pergamum, delivered from Celtic incursions,

thus became a powerful wedge between Syria and Macedon in the interests of Rome. The free cities which had joined Rome had their charters confirmed. Rhodes was gratified with Lycia and most of Caria. Roman policy left in Asia no dangerous power behind, but it left also no permanent security against formidable growths. The sea remained in the control of her Rhodian allies.

Treatment of Macedon and Greece.—In Greece the Ætolians, deluded by false news, had risen with some success against Philip. Magnesia closed the day of truces, and in 189 B.C. M. Fulvius Nobilior captured Ambracia, and with the aid of the Achæans and Macedon, stamped out the gallant resistance of these wild-cats of the mountain. Reasonable terms were granted. Rome completed her chain of Adriatic posts with Cephallenia and Zacynthus, secured the cession of all captured lands and cities, a substantial but not crushing indemnity, and the control of foreign relations, leaving Ætolia, now an ally, as a thorn in the side of Macedon. Philip received but a scanty reward for his loyal and useful support. He saw, with indignation, the growth of Pergamum. Nor was he alone aggrieved by the policy of equilibrium. The Achæans, who had, in the course of these proceedings, dragged Sparta, Elis, and Messene into their league, were annoyed by the limits set by Rome to Hellenic nationalism. Apart from Rome's open policy of *Divide et impera*, the very existence of a universal referee, only too pleased to intervene, was fatal to the growth of a national life. Even within the Peloponnesus the League failed to create a real unity; to create a power was impossible. The wisest course would have been to bow with dignity to the inevitable, and, accepting a foreign supremacy, to secure internal peace and prosperity. It is hard no doubt to acknowledge political nullity, to give up traditions and ideals, but if Philopœmen deserves our sympathy, the policy of Callicrates was expedient. To invoke and then repudiate interference, to indulge in "tail-twisting," to parody the life of a free state when independence was impossible, was to waste power, to caricature patriotism.

Deaths of Philopœmen and Hannibal.—Trouble ensued in the Peloponnesus. The union of Messene and Sparta with the League resulted in revolutions and counter-revolutions, judicial murders, intestine strife, appeals and counter-appeals. Rome neither abstained from intervention nor acted with consistency and energy—a huge Gulliver watching with contemptuous amusement the antics of her Lilliputian allies. If she had meant the freedom she gave, she neither acted upon the declaration nor was Greece

capable of using it. In the end Sparta remained a member of the League, with special privileges; Messene was repressed by Lycortas, the worthy successor of the soldier and statesman, Philopœmen. The latter was poisoned in prison by the rebel Messenians. In the same year (183 B.C.) the same means, self-administered, delivered Hannibal from the treachery of Prusias, to whose court he had fled, and from the machinations of Flaminius, at the age of sixty-six (?), fighting, as he had sworn, to the last against Rome or the allies of Rome. Hunted down, in spite of the protests of the noblest Romans, he filled up the failure of his life, balked by fate and the folly of his colleagues and masters.

End of Scipio.—Possibly during the same year, still in the prime of life, in self-inflicted exile, died his proud and fortunate rival, his glories and his titles turned to bitterness by calumny and disappointed pride. The first man at Rome, the earliest precursor of the Princes, with all his fascinating personality, his brilliant fortunes, his powerful influence, self-conscious and sensitive, a little more than a Roman, a little less than a hero, his achievements and ideals ended in vanity and vexation of spirit. One ray of light gilded the setting, when, at the trial of Lucius for alleged embezzlement and corruption, with indignant pride, he seized and tore before the court the account-books put in as evidence, and led the people, in a burst of enthusiasm, to celebrate in the Capitol the anniversary of Zama. But Lucius was fined, and Publius retired to eat his heart in exile.

CHAPTER XXVII

FIFTY YEARS OF CONQUEST

THE FALL OF MACEDON AND GREECE

	B.C.	A. U. C.
Third Macedonian War breaks out	171	583
Battle of Pydna—Egypt accepts Roman Protectorate	168	586
Revolt of Andrisus put down by Metellus—Macedonia made a Province	149-148	560-606
The Achæans defeated by Metellus and Mummius—		
Destruction of Corinth	146	608

Philip.—Philip of Macedon had gained little by the war. Vexed by hostile neighbours, harried by Roman commissions, put continually on his defence before the Senate, and forced to

surrender his conquests in Thessaly, Ætolia, and Thrace, he stifled his resentment, and cloaking his purpose with submission, resolutely prepared for a decisive struggle. He reorganised his revenue, fostered population, founded colonies and towns, strengthened his frontier, and negotiated with the tribes beyond. In 183 B.C. a rupture was averted by the mediation of his son Demetrius, the



hostage and favourite of Rome. Through him Flamininus and the Senate worked to create a Roman party in Macedon, but the favour of Rome was fatal to the unconscious victim. He fell by the intrigues of Perseus, the elder son by an unequal marriage, and destined heir, who saw in him a dangerous rival. Unable to recall the dead or retrieve the past, defrauded of the fruit of

his labours, the victim of his own schemes and passions, the king died of a broken heart (179 B.C.), leaving to the detected but unpunished Perseus the inheritance of revenge.

Perseus.—Perseus, a "fine figure of a man," schooled by adversity, the pride of a loyal and warlike nation, the hope of Hellenic patriots, was sober, subtle, and persevering, with few passions and fewer scruples, with many kingly qualities, but, like Conacher in the "Fair Maid of Perth," his composition was crossed with a strain of weakness, narrowness, even cowardice. Penny-wise and pound-foolish, strong in preparation, weak in action, he was incapable of wise daring and generous expenditure. He lacked that rapid decision and unfaltering resolve that could alone have borne his enterprise to success. The resources of Macedon had been nursed for twenty-six years; his treasury and magazines were full; his army might amount, all told, to over 40,000 trained men. The administration had profited by the lessons of the last war. His policy was conciliatory, his rule unquestioned. But he had not the fortresses and influence of his father; the phalanx had lost some of its prestige; Rome's position in Greece was stronger. Abroad it was more difficult to win support. His marriage alliances with Syria and Bithynia promised as little as the probably fabulous intrigues of Carthage or hopes from Samnium. Nothing had come of his reported attempt to launch a horde of barbarians on Italy, through the passes of the



TETRADRACHM OF PERSEUS.

Eastern Alps, but the founding of the fortress of Aquileia and the destruction of the invading Bastarnæ in their retreat from Dardania. The chief of the Odrysians, the "brave and gentle Cotys," was a useful ally; in Dalmatia he secured the drunkard

Genthius, prince of Scodra. The eyes of Greece, moreover, were turning to Macedon. A native at least was better than a barbarian hegemony, and the action of Roman partisans irritated popular feeling. Eumenes was boycotted as a traitor, his gifts rejected, and his statues dishonoured. Several even of his subject cities, and politic Rhodes itself, recognised by striking demonstrations the growing power of Perseus. Except Peloponnesus, Greece was ripe for revolution, and Perseus made his market of the prevalent bankruptcy and socialism. His decrees of amnesty, his offers of sympathy, called to his banner the debtors, criminals, and exiles of Hellas. The banner of Macedon was the banner of plunder and patriotism, of liberty and revolution.

Rupture with Rome.—Rome was not without a *casus belli*, the encroachment on an ally or breach of treaty, nor was she slow to see the danger to her influence in Greece. The flame was fed by the assiduous complaints of Eumenes, who in 172 B.C. persuaded the Senate, in spite of Perseus' remonstrances, to prepare secretly for war. Nor was its temper softened by the firm language of the king's envoy. The rupture, imminent in 173 B.C., was however postponed. Senate and consul were still wrangling over the insubordinate action of M. Popillius Lænas in the Ligurian war, and the conflict of powers resulted in a complete deadlock. The struggle between traditional authority and the ill-controlled executive ended in the submission of the acting consul and his rebellious brother. Perseus took no advantage of this, although at the close of 172 B.C., by denouncing the treaty of Cynoscephalæ and claiming equal treatment, in answer to an imperious message from the Senate, he had made war inevitable. He suffered himself to be hoodwinked by Q. Marcius Philippus with a pretence of negotiation, while Rome prepared her forces and undermined his popularity in the East. The fruits of immediate action were lost. Lyciscus secured Ætolia for Rome, the Achæan League garrisoned Chalcis, while advanced corps occupied the route from Apollonia to Larissa.

Success of Perseus.—The king, still hoping for peace or adhering stubbornly to the defensive, shut himself up within his mountains. The day for which he had sharpened the sword so long found him dallying with the scabbard. His allies proved a broken reed; Rhodes, Syria, Bithynia, Byzantium, stood neutral or acted for Rome. For a time the blunders of the enemy saved him. In 171 B.C. P. Licinius Crassus landed in Greece. Besides the strong allied fleet under C. Lucretius, operating from Chalcis, he

controlled a force of nearly 50,000 Italians and Greeks. Leaving a large reserve in Illyria, and advancing, undisturbed by the dispirited Perseus, to Larissa, he was able to isolate the king and get touch with his fleet and his Greek supporters. Here he remained inactive till Perseus, having fortified the passes of Tempe, moved up to observe him from the slopes of Ossa. The consul was provoked, harassed, drawn out, and finally beaten with loss in a brilliant cavalry engagement at Callicinus, and retired behind the Peneius. But instead of pressing the success and reaping the fruits of Greek enthusiasm, Perseus sued for peace, which was at once refused. After a second and indecisive encounter at Phalanna he evacuated Thessaly, and proceeded, with the aid of Cotys, to clear his northern and western frontier, while the Romans leisurely secured their position in Thessaly and Bœotia, where the bungling and brutal colleagues, Lucretius and Crassus, by lax discipline and shameless outrage on friend and foe alike, demoralised their troops and kindled an outburst of fierce indignation. Epirus went over to Perseus.

The failures of Hostilius in restoring discipline and penetrating Macedon, and the scandalous cruelty and incompetence of the admiral Hortensius in the following year, branded on the Roman name a deeper stamp of military and moral corruption. Licensed robbery, libertinage, and free furlough had rotted the morale of the army—men and officers alike. The chronicle of plunder and blunder was crowned by the repeated disasters of Appius Claudius and the army of communication in Illyria. The ill-informed Senate attempted to interfere, and an admiral was condemned, but the allies gained little, and Perseus securely repelled attacks, and continued his work in the north and west. A lack of dash and energy marked the whole war on both sides; it was a war of mistakes and worse. Rome had lost all, even honour; the king had failed to use his chance. The consul of 169 B.C., Q. Marcus Philippus, hero of a disaster in a Ligurian ambush, shrewder diplomatist than soldier, succeeded by sheer luck and impudence, helped by the negligence of an outpost, in masking the strong forts of Tempe, turning the fourfold barrier by a flank march over mountain paths, and piercing the rocky wall of Macedon, only to find himself, like Cromwell at Dunbar, jammed in on a narrow plain between the enemy, the mountain, and the sea, and dependent on a still invisible fleet. The easy prey was rescued by the panic-stricken retreat of Perseus from his impregnable lines at Dium, closing the coast-road, along which alone could Macedon

he safely entered with the co-operation of a fleet, and within striking distance of the capital and Pella. But Philippos' advance was checked by failing supplies, and he was only saved once more from annihilation in his retreat by the timely fall of the forts and magazines of Tempe in his rear. Perseus still blocked the way along the Elpius, and the net result of the year's work was the capture of the gates of Macedon. The king, while he left no stone unturned to end the war, used his improved position to influence surrounding states. Genthius he was able to involve in strife; he negotiated secretly with Syria, Bithynia, and Rhodes; he hoped to obtain the mediation, or at least the benevolent neutrality, of Eumenes. But Syria had her Egyptian policy; mutual distrust and personal avarice shattered his dealings with Eumenes; Rhodes attempted intervention too late for her own safety. The services of a Gallic horde he declined as dangerous and burdensome; from Greece came no effective help.

Æmilius Paullus.—At length, in 168 B.C., public feeling rose. The Western army had been reduced to inaction, the fleet paralysed by desertion and disease; the consul was marking time in his precarious position; Macedon was intact. L. Æmilius Paullus, father of Æmilianus, son of the general of Cannæ, a man in the sixties, twice consul, a strict old-fashioned officer, with a creditable record in Spain and Liguria, poor, upright, noble, with real modern refinement to blend with his old Roman virtues, arrived with strong resolves and overwhelming resources. The Illyrian corsairs vanished from the seas; the prætor Anicius defeated Genthius and took his capital in thirty days. The army was rapidly reorganised, and the hopes and proposed mediation of the Greek states disconcerted and forestalled by the still more rapid collapse of Macedon. Occupying attention with a feint in front, he turned the line of the Elpius by a flank march through the pass of Pythium (or Gythium), compelling a retreat on Pydna. Here, on the 22nd of June 168 B.C., after a night marked by a lunar eclipse, foretold, as was said, by a Roman officer, a skirmish of watering-parties brought on the unexpected battle which was to decide the fate of Greece, and finally settle on Rome the supremacy of the world.

Battle of Pydna: Fall of Perseus.—Scarcely were the Romans formed in line when, out of the confusion of the fight in front, the phalanx burst upon them with its bristling forest of spears, striking awe into the heart of the veteran consul. In vain the brave Pælgian cohort impaled their bodies on the pikes. The whole

line shrank from that iron wall. There was hesitation, and finally retreat. The impending rout was changed to victory by the skill of the general, the tactical superiority of the maniple, and the cool head and brave hand of the Roman soldier. Renouncing resistance front to front, and profiting by the dislocation in the phalanx caused by the rapid advance and rush of battle, Paullus broke up his fighting line and thrust his maniples and cohorts into the gaps and intervals of its flanks and rear, avoiding its collective force and splitting it into its weaker elements. Well in hand and trained to independent action in open order, the legionary with his short sword dealt havoc in the shattered mass. The cavalry that should have covered the flanks fled, with their king to lead them. The phalanx as a fighting machine died, as it was born, in Macedon, whose power was broken with the force that made it. Macedon submitted within two days. Perseus, hunted down and forsaken, fell, with his treasures, into the hands of Rome, to point the moralisings and adorn the triumph of the consul. His rapid fall startled the Hellenic East. With the doubtful stigma of cruelty and cowardice, and the sure reproach of avarice and irresolution, he may be dismissed to end his days at Alba Fucens, where his son, the heir of Macedon, earned his living as a clerk.

Macedon and Greece.—The land was settled by the generous Roman, aided by the usual commission of ten. Rome was once more in a dilemma. Unwilling to overload the structure of the state, anxious to keep the forms and spirit of the Republic, warned as she was by example of the dangers of conceding that free hand to her officers which it was almost impossible to refuse, without the genius or the impulse to create new forms of government to meet the novel situation, she was even more unwilling to leave a chance of the restoration of a dangerous power. She tried to evade her responsibility, and by a temporary expedient to stem the flowing tide of annexation. At the Congress of Amphipolis (167 B.C.) Macedon was declared free; the national kingship and national army were abolished; except for a few frontier guards in the north, the country was disarmed. The compact state was split into four republics, isolated by restrictions on commerce, on reciprocal land-holding, and intermarriage; local government was thrown into the hands of the nobles. Otherwise the old institutions were retained; a tribute was imposed, as the price of the protectorate—*i.e.*, half the former land-tax, assessed on the new commonwealths, a fixed sum of 100 talents. For a time the gold and silver mines were closed, and the royal domains were kept

by Rome. This insidious constitution was guaranteed by the deportation of the civil and military officers of the crown to Italy.

But the date of independence was out for more than Macedon. Not only was Illyria broken up by a similar scheme, its fleet confiscated, and the land divided into three "free" states, paying tribute—a real boon to commerce—but the subservience of the independent states was everywhere, by fair means or foul, assured. In each the Roman partisans, Lyciscus, Callicrates, Charops, and their like, at least unpunished by Rome, carried on a campaign of informations, confiscations, and executions against the patriotic party. Those were more fortunate who were detained in Italy, escaping the reign of terror in Greece. Above 1000 Achæans, among whom was Polybius, together with the independent leaders in other districts, were selected for this purpose by a party commission, and all application for trial or release disregarded during at least sixteen years. It was a poor return for the loyal support of the Achæan government, whatever had been the outbursts of childish irritation on the part of the people. Callicrates, the friend of Rome, was boycotted in the public baths and hissed by schoolboys in the street. A worse fate befell Epirus. By the orders of the Senate, to satisfy an ancient grudge, seventy of its towns were sacked and 150,000 souls enslaved. Attolia lost Amphipolis, Acarnania, and Leucas; while Athens received Delos and Lemnos.

Rhodes and Pergamum.—Rhodes, the old and favoured ally, paid the penalty for its independent attitude, and for the one mistake in that consummate statesmanship which had hitherto secured her freedom of action and an honourable neutrality. Suffering in her commerce by the war and jealous of Pergamum, the pro-Macedonian feeling of her people encouraged by Rome's mistakes, she had allowed herself to be lured by her own vanity and the artifices of Philipppus into proposing, if not an armed intervention, at least a somewhat peremptory mediation. Rapidly as this outburst of Hellenism oozed away when Rome's weakness turned to strength, it was too late to avert the consequences. The Senate was not sorry for the chance, and the patriotic Rhodian leaders found that the civilised world was but the prison of Rome. Barely, by abject submission and the banishment or execution of her chiefs, did Rhodes evade a declaration of war; and when at last the cup of bitterness was full, and the Senate, to her humble petition, conceded an alliance, she had lost her valuable possessions on the mainland, while her commercial pre-eminence was ruined and her revenues

curtailed by trade restrictions and the establishment of the free port of Delos. Similar suspicions of intrigue with Macedon, true or fictitious, had rankled in the Roman mind about their own creature and instrument, Pergamum. Eumenes soon found himself no longer necessary, was bowed out of Italy, and undermined at home. Pamphylia and Galatia were declared independent, the attacks of the Celts covertly encouraged. Of the spoil he received no share, while Rome listened eagerly to complaints of the hated upstart. But it was not easy to destroy the astute prince, and in vain Rome practised on the loyalty of his brother Attalus. The cringing Prusias of Bithynia, "being so contemptible, received a reward."

Egypt and Syria.—In 168 B.C. Rome practically extended her protectorate over Egypt by her abrupt intervention in the Syro-Egyptian war. The quarrel had risen over Cœle-Syria and Palestine, which had been charged with the dowry of Cleopatra, the daughter of Antiochus the Great. On her death (173 B.C.) Egypt claimed the provinces, but Antiochus Epiphanes defeated the aggressor at Pelusium (171 B.C.). With his nephew, Ptolemy VI. Philometor, in his hands, he renewed his project of conquest. In spite of the temporary success of the resistance at Alexandria under Ptolemy's younger brother Euergetes, surnamed Physcon (the pot-bellied), he once more lay before the town (168 B.C.), opposed by both brothers, when he was met by the Roman ambassador, C. Popilius Lænas. Drawing with his vine staff a circle round the king, Lænas demanded an answer to his ultimatum before Epiphanes stepped from the circle. The king obeyed and withdrew, and his obedience set the seal to Rome's mastery of the East.

Position of Rome.—Zama, Cynoscephalæ, Magnesia, and Pydna, left the Romans nothing to do but organise, pacify, and defend their dominions, to convert their sphere of influence into administrative divisions, and so to construct a stable and compact empire. Amid the homage of kings and peoples, Paullus, the general of the transition, celebrated in solemn triumph the last great victory of the citizen army, typically due to the staying power of Rome and the sterling qualities of her troops.

But the temper of those troops, surly at the loss of Macedonian plunder, reserved for the state by the honesty of Paullus, and the disgraceful management of the first campaign, were full of omens for the future. The citizen soldier was soon to become as rare as the citizen general. Nor is it here alone that the transition is seen. Not only does subtle diplomacy take the place of force, but there is a growing tendency abroad and at home to reduce friends to

dependents and dependents to subjects. The force of circumstances, the methods of the conservatives themselves, played into the hands of the annexationists. It was the plain duty of Rome to put an end to the complicated and ruinous system of protectorates. It was the plain duty of the Senate to set up where she had thrown down, to substitute standing garrisons for enfeebled militias, and a civil organisation for a chaos of authorities worse confounded by her own position as referee. She must recognise the duties as well as the rights of supremacy. In her attempt to secure an unassailable position she had been drawn on from victory to victory. There was no stable power but her own to maintain peace, keep the seas, and guard the frontier of civilisation. Whatever the danger to her own form of government, the heiress of Carthage and Alexander must take up her inheritance, the liabilities as well as the assets.

Revolt of Macedon suppressed.—Some steps in the new direction we have already traced. Nor was it long before the unworkable arrangements in Greece collapsed. Nineteen years after Pydna (149 B.C.) a pretender appeared in Macedon. His name was Andris-cus, the son of a fuller of Adramyttium, and he personated Philip, son of Perseus and the Syrian Laodice, who had died a prisoner in Italy. His pretended uncle, Demetrius Soter, king of Syria, had sent the Mysian Warbeck in chains to Rome. He had escaped once and again from custody by the contemptuous negligence of the Senate, and now, with some support from Teres of Thrace, and even the Byzantines, favoured by the prevailing confusion and irritation, he invaded Macedon, routed the local militia, drew to his standard the malcontent loyalists, defeated a prætor, and recovered Thessaly. The rebellion, for which Rome and her commissions were directly responsible, was suppressed with energy. Q. Cæcilius Metellus, with a strong army and the fleet of Pergamum, crushed and captured the impostor, and thereby relieved a critical year (148 B.C.) of one source of anxiety. The blunder was not repeated; Macedon became a province, including Epirus, the Ionian Islands, and the ports of Apollonia and Epidamnus, with the general protectorate of Greece. The arrangements of Paullus were otherwise retained. Local institutions remained, as usual, fairly intact. For the defence of the North and East Rome had now to answer. Her work was inefficiently done, and continued inadequate till the era of Augustus; but to secure communications the Via Egnatia was constructed, from Dyrrhachium and Apollonia to Thessalonica, and later to the Hebrus. There was one

last struggle in 142 B.C., when the pseudo-Alexander was crushed by the quæstor Tremellius.


Greece and Rome.—As the reign of terror passed and the tools of Rome vanished one by one from the stage of politics, some measure of peace had returned to Hellas. But deeper sores remained; social democracy, the fruit of wild theory and wilder revolutions, was rampant in thought and act. Public and private bankruptcy, debt, brigandage, depopulation, marked the ruin of the country. There was war between rich and poor, faction and faction, city and city. Marriage was neglected, property insecure. Peloponnesus had become the recruiting ground of the mercenary soldier. The foul story of the plunder of Oropus by indigent Athens (156 B.C.) blots the page of history. To apologise for national burglary and avert its heavy penalty came the leaders of philosophy, Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus, tickling with sophistries the unpractised ears of Rome, and kindling the indignant fears of Cato for the morality of his countrymen.

The subservience of Callicrates and his party had preserved the integrity and independence of the Achæan League. Exhaustion and the lack of leaders secured a seeming acquiescence, in spite of latent discontent exasperated by the detention of the exiles. At length, in 151–150 B.C., the Senate conceded this point to the prayer of Polybius, the friend and instructor of the Scipionic circle, and the impatient appeal of Cato to “waste no more time in debating whether some old Greek dotards should be buried by Italian or Achæan undertakers.” In answer to a second petition for the restoration of their lost rights, Cato advised Ulysses not to return to the Cyclops’ cave to get his cap and belt.

Return of the Greek Exiles.—But the new policy was as little calculated to ensure peace and a union of hearts as the old. Rome understood neither the qualities nor the defects of her Greek clients; nor did she even attempt patiently to master the problem—almost insoluble by the wit of man—of reconciling her own ends with a stable Achæan Home Rule. The exiles of seventeen years—a wretched remnant—with their unsatisfied claims and their hatred of Rome, were a danger to the state. One of these restored hostages, Diæus, a violent and dishonest man, President in 149 B.C., raised a storm of patriotism to conceal his share in a dirty job. His attack on the privileges guaranteed to Sparta as a member of the League was a demonstration against Rome. Sparta appealed to the Senate; its ambiguous answers were sedulously perverted by both parties. At last the Achæans, disregarding express protests,

and relying on Rome's embarrassment in Africa, her tried complaisance, and their own recent services in Macedon, urged on the struggle, invaded Sparta (148 B.C.), and gained a decisive victory under Damocritus.

The Achæan League force on War.—Next year L. Aurelius Orestes met the Diet at Corinth. He demanded the renunciation of Corinth, Argos, Sparta, and the most recent acquisitions of the League. Its extension had been only reluctantly allowed. It had



TEMPLE AND ACROPOLIS, CORINTH.

become a nuisance, and the Romans had no further use for it. The demand was a sentence of extinction, brutal, but not wholly undeserved, and it raised a tempest of indignation, which scarcely spared the persons of the ambassadors, and fell heavily on the Spartan residents in Corinth. The Senate, however, whether from policy or lingering respect for the last relics of Greek freedom, was content to despatch Sext. Julius Cæsar (147 B.C.) to remonstrate with the Diet at Ægium. His attempts at conciliation were baffled by the

folly of the incapable demagogue Critolaus (*strategus*, 147-146 B.C.), who, inferring Rome's weakness from her mildness, frustrated the conference arranged at Tegea, insulted the Roman embassy, and stumped the country to preach a sacred war. He sought supplies by an attack on capital and a suspension of cash payments. The envoys of Metellus were hissed from the theatre at Corinth; the mob of the capital, controlling the assembly, intimidated the moderates and cheered the idle vapourings of their leader. War was declared with Sparta, and Rome requested to keep hands off. She was friend, not mistress.

Metellus and Critolaus.—With some support from Thebes and Chalcis, Critolaus marched upon Heraclea under Oeta, which had seceded in obedience to Rome; but on the advance of Metellus from Macedon, the Achæans retreated precipitately into Locris, abandoning even Thermopylæ. They were routed at Scarpheia, their supports cut to pieces, the sorry remnant vanishing over the isthmus. Metellus, anxious to end the business, acted with moderation, even mercy, but the criminal obstinacy of Diæus dragged on the war. By sheer terrorism, by the liberation of slaves and forced contributions, supported by the infuriated rabble, he collected forces, stamped out opposition, and hurried his country to ruin, amid mingled madness and dismay.

Mummius and the Fall of Corinth.—The Achæan vanguard had already slunk from Megara before Metellus, when Mummius, a *novus homo*, an upright, good-natured ignoramus, of little wealth or personal distinction, but not unpopular with the conquered Greeks, arrived, and greedily accepting battle, scattered their feeble forces to the wind.

Deserted Corinth, left open to the incredulous consul, was given over to plunder, its remaining inhabitants killed or sold, its buildings razed, its site cursed by the express order of the Senate. Its land was confiscated, together with some tracts in Eubœa and Bœotia, as *ager publicus*. Its place was taken by Argos, the Roman commercial headquarters, and Delos, the centre of the transport traffic of the East. Diæus fell by his own hand, while rude legionaries played dice on the masterpieces of painting preserved to adorn the towns of Italy and the temples of Greece. To ensure their safe transport, Mummius provided that any lost treasure should be replaced by one of equal value!

Settlement of Achaia: Polybius.—Thebes and Chalcis were reduced to villages and the leaders punished. On the whole, the conqueror showed striking moderation and still more striking

rectitude. The statesman and historian Polybius was actively employed in arranging the new system, and was able to improve materially the position of his countrymen. The confederacies, though they regained later a shadowy recognition, were suppressed. The communities were isolated, and restrictions on land-holding for the present enforced. But Achaia did not yet become a province. The states remained formally free, subject only, with some exceptions, to the payment of a fixed tribute,

L·MVM·M·L·F·COS·D·V·D
 AVSPICIO·IMPERIO·Q·VE
 EIVS·ACHAIA·CAPT·CORINTO
 DELETO·ROMAM·REDIEIT
 TRIUMPHANS·OB·HASCE
 RES·BENE·GESTAS·Q·VOD
 IN·BELLO·V·O·V·ER·AT
 HANC·A·E·D·E·M·E·T·SIGNV
 HERCVLIS·VIC·TORIS
 IMPERATOR·DE·DICAT

DEDICATORY INSCRIPTION OF L. MUMMIUS.

assessed on the several communities, and to the control of foreign relations by Rome. Power in each was thrown into the hands of the rich, and in respect of their mutual relations and of high judicial and administrative questions they were subject to the general supervision of the governor of Macedon. Like Massilia, in Gaul, and the "free towns" generally, they were formally excluded, virtually included in the province, or "command" of the Roman officer.

The destruction of Corinth was a dark deed due to commercial

jealousy, a mark of the growing selfishness of Roman policy. But the rapidity of her ruin saved Greece from the extremities of war and the furies of faction. The *régime* of fussy confederacies, of political hysterics, of social disorganisation and ceaseless Roman commissions, had ended. There was at least a chance of peace, security, and progress. Unfortunately, the confusions of the Mithridatic and civil wars cut short the work of regeneration. No doubt Rome had sown discord and reaped rebellion, but the true cause of the ruin of Greece is to be found in her political vices. By their narrow patriotism and incapacity for combination, by their lack of tolerance and their quarrelsome intrigues, at once invoking and despising the dreaded barbarians, her leaders pulled down destruction on their own heads.

CHAPTER XXVIII

INTERNAL HISTORY (266-146 B.C.).

General Characteristics—Actual Changes : (1) Religious Regulations ; (2) Reform of Comitia Centuriata ; (3) Administrative Changes—Growth of Power of Senate and Decay of Comitia—Growth of Oligarchy and the Great Houses.

General Characteristics.—The Republic had received its final form in 287 B.C., with the definite recognition of the Concilium plebis. In the present period is developed that glaring contrast of form and fact which stamps so strongly the political institutions of Rome. The germs of the revolution, which, by concentrating power in the Senate, resulted in the creation of an oligarchy, were doubtless contained in the original state-system. They only needed favourable circumstances to work out their true nature. The movement which destroyed the patriciate left in its place an aristocracy of office, a "nobilitas," faced by a growing aristocracy of wealth. The normal development of the ancient city-state was suspended, the orderly succession of broadening constitutions checked. The arrest of growth was due to the defects of the popular assemblies, which possessed none of the powers or the spirit of the Ecclesia or the House of Commons, to the various restrictions on their activity, to the absence of an organised party-system, to the conservatism of the people, and, above all, to the peculiar excellences of the Senate, favoured by the demands of continuous and

desperate war. In the preceding period change had succeeded change. The old democratic movement had swept away political disabilities and patrician privilege, had bridled an arbitrary executive, had dealt after a fashion with economic distress, and had secured for the once excluded plebeian a commanding position in the state. There was now a formal equality of rights and duties. Except for its social status and a few relics of privilege soon to disappear, the patriciate had ceased to exist. But here the growth of free institutions stopped. During 120 years of incessant fighting the government passed into the hands of a practically hereditary oligarchy, ruling under the forms of a moderate democracy. And yet there was no recognised order of nobles; the Senate and the offices were nominally open, the formal powers of the sovereign Comitia were actually increased, and the burgesses, enjoying full rights and large privileges, bore few but military burdens. New statutes were rare; no fresh principles were invoked; there were indeed few who perceived the drift of events, and for active opposition there was neither time nor inclination. A state cannot change front in the face of an enemy.

Beneath the surface, indeed, were maturing social and economical problems, which were destined to produce a fresh and more formidable agitation, while the rapid extension of territory, described above, by aggravating the difficulties of administration, led to the final revolution of all. But for the present these dangers were masked by the rapid rush and pressing interest of foreign affairs, and though we can detect grave symptoms of change, there are few domestic events to chronicle. The plebs was satisfied with its victory; the poor had not found out how little they had gained; all parties acquiesced in facts, and presented a united front at once to foreign foes and Italian outsiders. In the few points that remained the equalisation of rights was completed without difficulty, and the strife of patres and plebs became an anachronism. What is left is the story of a silent change.

Religion.—In 300 B.C. the Lex Ogulnia had admitted the plebs to the augural and pontifical colleges. In 253 B.C. a plebeian became chief pontiff, the most dignified permanent official at Rome, and with this is possibly connected a change in the method of appointing priests. Hitherto co-optation had been the rule to preserve the consecrated succession. But with the increasing influence exerted by the colleges on politics, it became of real importance to secure some form of control by the community. Hence about this time the selection of the Pontifex Maximus,

and, later on, by the Lex Domitia of 104 B.C., of all the more prominent priests, was transferred from the colleges to the minority of the tribes (seventeen out of thirty-five), chosen by lot. This compromise avoided a direct command of the people, and the



A ROMAN SACRIFICING.

consequent breach of divine law, while it gave a sort of veiled designation or *congé d'élire* which could not be disregarded.

The importance of these questions lay in the relation of the Roman state to its religion.

This religion was a peculiar one. It had no theological dogma, no moral code to inculcate ; it had none of the rich poetry, the abundant originality, of Greek mythology, nothing of the sombre gloom of the Etruscan, nothing of the passion and mystic emotion of Asia. The *numina* of Rome, shadowy deities indistinctly conceived, were represented rather by symbols than by images, manifestations of divine power, deriving their names from their functions, indeed with no distinct names, traits, or lives of their own, save those borrowed from the lively fancy of the Greek. It was a faith of little spiritual value, and afforded no scope for religious movements or pious fanaticism. A gentile, or family, or political rather than a personal matter, it had always a formal and ceremonial character. Closely related as it was to Roman civil law—a relation natural and peculiar to early times—there was always something of a contract about it, of obligations well understood on both sides. Religion was lost in worship ; the Church was merged in the state. There was no priestly caste to utilise, for the subjection of the secular power, the scrupulous piety and reverence of the people ; the priesthoods were filled by the warriors and lawyers and statesmen of the Republic. The details of the ritual were elaborated by the same series of men who worked out the details of civil jurisprudence. Here again Roman conservatism adhered closely to the letter of the law. The spirit and character of institutions might change, the consecrated word or form remained. The prosaic literalism of the Romans made piety consist in the exact performance of obligations undertaken, at the altars of the gods as in the prætor's court. With the gods also it was necessary to be strict and thrifty, to regulate accounts, to be cautious in stipulation and exact a rigorous return. Nor was all this without its value for conduct and character. The faith expressed the man, typified his grave dignity, his self-respect and power of discipline. Its minute formalism acted as a restraint on excess ; its gods were moral guardians of engagements, of treaties, of hearth and home. Its very vagueness and absence of dogma, its attention to ritual and the letter, made its forms expansive and left thought free. They enabled Roman civilisation, by bestowing the franchise of the city on foreign worshippers, to avoid shipwreck on the rock of intolerance. They made a respectable conformity possible. They left abundant loopholes for skilful interpretation and religious fictions, which did as much to relieve conscience and expand ideas as the legal fictions and equitable constructions of jurisconsults did to enlarge and humanise the

strict letter of the Roman code. But Rome had to thank its strong political sense, its reverent conservatism and power of adapting institutions, for the fact that the old worship of nature, the old homage to the dead chief, passed into a serviceable political instrument.

Religion and Politics.—It was this lay aspect of the Roman religion that made the question of the auspices and the religious colleges important. To the auspices the plebeian gained admission when he entered the gates of office, and in a short time only a few priesthoods remained the uncoveted monopoly of the patrician. The relation of the people to its national religion had two sides—the state, as an assemblage of *gentes* and *familia*, is a religious family, which owes worship to its protecting deities, and that protection is ensured by the exact performance of rites and ceremonies, by the state as by the citizen. The Romans set great store by piety, but they drove hard bargains with gods as well as men. The other side consisted in the attempt to find out the will of the gods as to some definite action—*auspicia*—and this practice of divination, exercised at the will of the government in the interest of the state and restricted to experts, passed into a cold and complicated science.

The Senate had a general control over the state faith. It kept an eye on foreign gods and rites, and upon unauthorised divination and oracle-mongering. In 186 B.C., by the S. C. De Bacchanalibus, it suppressed with a strong hand a dangerous secret society, which cloaked murder and lust with the garb of religion. After long investigations the licentious cult was stamped out in blood. Roman faith and morality, already sapped by the naturalisation of Greek and Asiatic worships, especially that of the *Magna Mater* of Pessinus (205 B.C.), was threatened by this uneasy craving for outlandish superstitions. Assisted by the various colleges, the Senate also dealt with omens of danger, with cases of sacrilege, with vows and thanksgivings.

The *ius auspiciarum* belonged to the magistrate, originally to the patrician magistrate, who consulted the divine will upon all important public acts. His power of reporting evil omens was used with effect to impede legislation. Of the three great colleges, the Pontifices¹ were the interpreters of sacred law. They arranged the calendar, whose movable feasts and general confusion were

¹ The pontifices probably derived their name from the special ceremonies necessary to appease the river-god, injured by the erection of a bridge.


utilised to restrict still further the scanty time available for the Comitia. They, too, built up the body of scientific jurisprudence. The Quindecimviri managed the Sibylline books; the Augurs could decide if a bill were in order or a magistrate duly created. It is

MARCIVS·LF·S·POSTVMIVS·LF·COS·SENATVM·CONSOLVERVNT·N·OCTOB·APVD·AEDM·
D·VELONAI·SCARF·M·CLAUDIM·F·VALERI·F·Q·MINYCI·CF·DE·BACANALIBVS·QVE·IF·FOIDERATEI·
ESENT·ITA·EX·DEICENDVM·KGENS·VERE·NE·QVIS·EORVM·SACRANAL·HABVISE·VELET·SEI·QVES·
ESENT·QVE·SIBI·DEICERENT·NECESVS·E·SE·BACANAL·HABERE·E·IS·VTEI·AD·PR·VRBANVM·
ROMANVM·VENIRENT·DE·QVE·E·IS·REBVS·VBEI·EOR·M·V·TR·A·ANDIA·ESENT·VTEI·SENATVM·
NOSTER·DE·CERNERET·DV·M·NE·MINVS·SENATOR·BVS·CADESENT·RES·COS·IERET·VR·
BACAS·VIR·NE·QVIS·ADIESE·VELET·CE·VIS·ROMANVS·NEVE·NOMINVS·LATINVS·VE·SO·QVAM·
QVIS·QVAM·NISEI·PR·VRBANVM·ADIESENT·IS·QVE·DE·SENATVS·SENTENTIA·DV·M·NE·
MINVS·SENATORIBVS·CADESENT·QVOM·EA·RES·COS·IERET·VR·IOVS·SENT·CE·
SATERDOS·NE·QVIS·VIRE·SET·MAGISTER·NE·QVE·VIR·NE·QVE·MV·IER·QVIS·QVAM·E·SET·
NEVE·FEE·VNIA·QVIS·QVAM·E·ORVM·COM·QVINT·QVIS·VELET·NEVE·MAGISTRATVM·
NEVEI·ROMAGISTRATVO·NE·QVE·VIRVM·NE·QVE·MV·IEREM·QV·IO·QVAM·FEE·CISE·VELET·
NEVE·POST·HAC·INTER·SED·CONIOVRA·E·NEVE·COM·QV·SE·NEVE·CONSPONDIS·E·
NEVE·CON·PROME·SISE·VELET·NEVE·QVIS·QVAM·FIDEM·INTER·SED·DEDISE·VELET·
SACRA·IN·DVOLTO·DE·QVIS·QVAM·FEE·CISE·VELET·NEVE·IN·POLICOD·NEVE·IN·
PREI·V·TOD·NEVE·EX·STRAD·VR·BEM·SACRA·QVIS·QVAM·FEE·CISE·VELET·N·SEI·
PR·VR·M·ADIE·SET·IS·QVE·DE·SENATVS·SENTENTIA·DV·M·NE·MINVS·
SENATORIBVS·CADESENT·QVOM·EA·RES·COS·IERET·VR·IOVS·SENT·GENS·VERE·
HOMINES·PLOS·V·QV·VORSE·IVIREI·ATQVE·MV·IER·S·SACRA·NE·QVIS·QVAM·
FEE·CISE·VELET·NEVE·INTER·BET·VIREI·PLOS·DV·BVS·MV·IER·IBVS·PLOS·STRIBVS·
RI·VISE·VELENT·NISEI·DE·PR·VRBANI·SENATVS·QVE·SENTENTIA·D·VTEI·SV·PRAD·
SCRIPTVM·EST·HACE·VTEI·IN·COVENTIONID·EX·DEICATIS·NE·MINVS·TRINVM·
NO·VNDINVM·SENATVS·QVE·SENTENTIAM·VTEI·SCIENTES·E·SETIS·EORVM·
SENTENTIA·ITA·FVIT·SEI·QVE·ESENT·QVEI·ARVORSVM·EAD·FEE·CISENT·QV·VIR·SV·PRAD·
SCRIPTVM·EST·E·IS·REM·CAPV·TALEM·FACIENDAM·GENS·VERE·ATQVE·IT·
HOCE·IN·TABOLAM·AHENAM·IN·CEI·DERETIS·ITA·SENATVS·AI·QVOM·GENS·V·
VTEI·QVE·EAM·FIERI·IOV·BEATIS·VREI·FACILV·MED·GNOS·QIER·TOTISIT·ATQVE·
VTEI·E·BACANALIA·SEN·QVAS·VNT·EX·STRA·QVAM·SEN·QVID·IBEI·SACRI·EST·
ITA·VTEI·SV·PRAD·SCRIPTVM·EST·IN·DIEBVS·X·QVIBVS·VO·BEI·STABELA·IDATAI·
ERVNT·FACIATIS·VIEI·DISMOTA·SIEN·IN·ACRO·TEVR·ANO

LETTER OF THE CONSULS TO LOCAL MAGISTRATES, CONTAINING THE
SENATUS CONSULTUM DE BACCHANALIBUS.

thus evident how necessary it was for the plebeians to share in the control of the religious machinery of the state. On the other side, it became equally necessary to place their assembly under those religious restrictions from which, as plebeian, it had been free. Secular in its character, it stood outside the old religious

system. In 156 B.C., by the *Lex Ælia Fufia*, a stronghold of the aristocratic party, power was given to the magistrates to apply to the Concilium Plebis the device of *obnuntiatio*; i.e., of dispersing the assembly by reporting unfavourable omens. This law was specially directed against tribunician agitators, and henceforward we find officials not merely announcing omens on the spot, but proclaiming their intention of observing the sky on every available day. The auspices thus became a species of religious veto, a trusted weapon of the Senate.



EXTISPICIA.

Centuriate Assembly.—In the year 241 B.C., with the addition of the two last created, the number of the tribes was definitely closed at thirty-five, and with this was in all probability connected the reorganisation of the *Comitia Centuriata*. There was also the fact that the government had been compelled for want of troops to reduce the minimum census required for service in the legions to 4000 *asses*, a minimum that was further reduced in the naval service; and in case of need even for the army. The change could not fail to be of political importance, when military service rather than taxation gave a claim to civil rights and privileges. Hence the position of the freedmen, who had also

been recruited, and the extension of popular liberties became prominent questions.

The organisation of the Centuriata had been military. Its grades and centuries had immediate reference to the tactics and armament of the phalanx. In every detail it pointed to the time when the semi-feudal royal army had passed into the citizen infantry of an agricultural and commercial state, formed as a phalanx in which the best armed stood in the front ranks or acted as cavalry on the flank, while the rearward units, with their slighter equipment, increased the weight of the wedge, the lightest armed skirmishing in front and flank. The arrangement, therefore, has a double reference to the results of the census and the needs of war. But since the original settlement, or rather since the time at which the amounts valued in land and cattle had been translated into cash (312 B.C.), the value of the *as* had sunk heavily. Meanwhile the phalanx had become obsolete, and with the introduction of the manipular army the old machinery was, from a military standpoint, useless. With the introduction of pay and the growth of booty, war became a profitable profession. The rich shirked service; the cavalry of the public horse became a farce; the obligation of the census was meaningless; tribunes even protected the shirkers and arrested the conscribing officer. The whole system would have perished but for the importance of the civil functions of the Comitia. But even for this secondary purpose the *exercitus urbanus* gradually became obsolete. The substantial middle class which had formed the bulk of the first division gradually disappeared. The census was cooked by aristocratic officials, and the poorer *classes* (*v. note*, p. 296) were swollen, apart from the natural increase in population, by the influx of ruined farmers and the swarms attracted by a capital. The lower centuries became fuller and fuller, the higher were steadily thinned. Increased wealth was more unequally distributed. Now the method of group-voting gave but one voice to each century, however large. The eighteen centuries of knights voted first, then the eighty centuries of the first class, and if these were unanimous the matter ended. The third class rarely voted, the fifth never. Thus the whole power fell into the hands of the few. Moreover, the working of the assembly was hampered by its cumbrous machinery and by religious obstruction. Hence political life and judicial business became concentrated in the more manageable, but, at the same time, more democratic, Comitia Tributa. Between a plebiscitum and a Lex Populi there was now no practical difference; nor was the formal distinction between the assembly of the tribes and the Con-

cilium Plebis of any serious value. In the more democratic assembly the influence and ability of the nobles, even of the few remaining patricians, could make itself felt ; its procedure was comparatively simple and rapid. Each tribe possessed a single suffrage, and within the tribe "one man had one vote." The mass of the proletariat, the landless freemen, and freedmen, were confined to the four urban tribes, a judicious restriction, which lost its effect later owing to the number of rural tribesmen who came to settle in Rome, where the conservative peasantry rarely appeared to vote. The immigrants apparently retained their original tribe.

Nature of the Reform.—The development of the republican constitution had been due to the action of this assembly and its leaders, and it became more and more the working organ of the Roman people. It even ventured, though rarely, to interfere in the conduct of war and finance. Yet it was too democratic entirely to supersede the military Comitia. Plebeian nobles could not ignore the claims of age, wealth, and rank, nor was it in the spirit of Rome ever to do so. It became, therefore, a problem of statesmanship to remove the flagrant anomaly of a scarcely veiled minority controlling the sovereign body, and, while retaining the conservative principles, to give them the maximum of democratic form. The change was managed so carefully and with so little friction as to leave but scanty traces of its character. Probably it excited little interest. It was apparently effected by running the lines of the local division by tribes across the lines of the classes distinguished by age and property. Thus thirty-five tribes, divided each into five classes, and again into two ages, produce 350 centuries, which with the eighteen centuries of Equites and that of the *capite censi* make up a total of 369 ; the centuries of engineers and trumpeters henceforth subsisting merely as guilds, or, if retained, swelling the total to 373. The application of the census and classes to the urban, as distinguished from the rural, tribes was made easy by the fact that land and cattle had long ceased to be the sole standard of wealth and basis of taxation. The census had been extended to include capital and cash, and indeed, with the disappearance of the war-loan (*tributum*) and the strict levy, had largely lost its financial and military importance, and become a matter of voting and social position. As for the *Equites equo publico*, their original military character was a thing of the past. The nobles, especially the senators, had kept their horse when their days of service had long been over, and the censor's periodic review was a mere ceremony.

They had become a close noble corps, whose *raison d'être* lay in their right of voting first. In the eighteen centuries voted the majority of the Senators ; for the rest, they were composed of young nobles who served as officers in the general's suite, acting occasionally as a sort of bodyguard. Their insubordination and special privileges made them a nuisance to a business-like commander.

By the present reform this body was deprived of the prerogative vote. The significance of this change was due to the weight of the first vote as an omen ; it lessened the impression made on the ignorant rural and suburban voters by the solid suffrages of the wealthier classes. The prerogative passed to a century chosen by lot out of the first class, the rest following by classes. The number of centuries in each class was equalised ; so that the numerical superiority of the Equites and the first class together disappeared, while an absolute majority implied a larger number of votes. Age and wealth still preponderated, but a distinct step had been taken in liberalising the old assembly. A later reform completed the equalising process, for all included in the census, by determining the order of voting for all the centuries by lot. The freedmen, in recognition of their services in war, were treated as free-born, a privilege cancelled by the democrat Flaminius,¹ who, as censor, in 220 B.C., again confined them to the four urban tribes. The restriction on the city proletariat remained. The whole reform, a clever stroke of the nobility to "dish the Whigs," had no practical value. It formally settled the equality of Roman citizens, except the *cives sine suffragio* and the paupers of the capital, and did nothing else. No tinkering with the Comitia, as things now stood, could impede the growth of political privilege and the power of the Senate. It meant nothing now that in 172 B.C. and 163 B.C. both consuls were plebeian.²

¹ In this year he also built, or rather extended, the Northern road—*via Flaminia*—from Narnia and Spolegium to Ariminum.

² Mommsen now holds—(1) that the 350 centuries, for voting purposes at least, were grouped so as to maintain the primitive number of 193. The votes of the first class, indeed, were reduced from 80 to 70, two centuries—senior and junior—being assigned to each tribe. But the votes of the four lower classes were restricted to 100, an increase of 10 only. It is difficult, however, to see how these composite groups could be distributed among the thirty-five tribes. (2) That the term "*classis*" only now began to be applied to the inferior grades, which were before "*infra classem*." (3) That the reform was the work of the democratic statesman Flaminius as censor (220 B.C.). This seems scarcely probable. (4) That the fall in value of the *as* did not affect the rates of the census, the traditional figures representing the value at this time of smaller sums in the older heavy coin. By 241 B.C. the *as* had sunk to two ounces.

Prætors and Quæstors.—The division of the prætorship between the Prætor Urbanus and Peregrinus in 243 B.C. was due to the block in the courts and to the growth of cases involving a knowledge of non-Roman legal principles. Although their main function was to settle the law of the case and the proper procedure, while *iudices* appointed by them decided the facts, their hands were full of work, without reckoning the administrative and military business which fell to them on an emergency or in the absence of the consuls. In 227 B.C. their number was raised to four, and in 197 B.C. to six, to provide for the increase in the provincial commands which could not be governed directly from the capital. In 267 B.C. there were eight quæstors, and their number also was probably raised to correspond with the number of new officers.

Law and Equity.—If there was little formal legislation, the sure and silent development of Roman institutions is the more to be marked. The transition in the army from citizen service to professionalism has been already noted. In the field of jurisprudence, the special Roman science, there was a great and continuous advance. The lawyers, by their official edicts as prætors or by their responses to applicants, created a body of legal doctrine, apart from statutes, incessantly revised, expanded, and improved. Alongside of the strictly Roman law, moreover, there grew with the growth of commercial and international relations a collection of universal principles, common to all civilised nations, Italian, Hellenic, or Phœnician, which was embodied in the edict of the Prætor Peregrinus and applied in dealings with aliens. The simplicity and universality of this system recommended it to the great juriconsults of the second century B.C., who grafted on to it the Stoical doctrines of the Law of Nature and the Equality of Man. Thus was created the famous *Ius gentium*, the Roman Equity, which, disguised as Natural Law, played a momentous part in later history.

Administration.—In the same typically Roman manner, the executive officers could, with the advice of the Senate, merely by their edicts, carry through far-reaching measures, opening or closing the franchise, reforming Comitia, manipulating elections. From hand-to-mouth ordinances sprang up the provincial system and the proconsular power. With rare interference from outside, the Senate arranged at will for the necessary prolongations of command and the requirements of finance and war. Emergencies were met as they rose. No organic statute settled the government of the foreign dominions. The old dictatorship again gradu-

ally lapsed. Its power had been broken in 217 B.C. Junius Pera (216 B.C.) was the last active dictator ; the last of the old sort at all just held the elections of 202 B.C. It had been an unpopular but useful office, which gave at a crisis that unity of command so sadly needed by the Roman executive. No doubt, while the Senate, as a sort of dictatorship in commission, could neutralise by its authority the checks and balances of the constitution, energetic action was still possible, but, when that authority was once sapped, its *decretum ultimum*, which armed the magistrates with dictatorial power, became a weak, and therefore dangerous, as it was always a legally dubious, expedient.

Senate, Comitia, and Magistrates.—Most striking of all is the growth of the power of the Senate. The logic of facts and Roman respect for government, its own merits and the feebleness of its competitors, had created out of this consulting committee and council of the magistrate a supreme and independent organ of state. Its resolutions, which had no binding power except by constitutional custom, became omnipotent decrees. Its name in the official title of the Republic precedes the symbol of the sovereign people (S.P.Q.R.). It alone was permanent ; it alone had deliberative power. It controlled the magistrate, on whose summons it depended, by sentiment, by interest, and, in the last resort, by the interference of his colleagues or the veto of the tribune. The magistrates came of senatorial families, passed by virtue of their offices into the Senate, and depended upon it for their provinces and their supplies. Elected on no common platform, they had no solidarity as a body. The division of functions and restriction of tenure made permanent resistance impossible. The various members of the different official colleges were often at daggers drawn ; consul quarrelled with consul, and censor degraded censor. A refractory officer could produce a deadlock ; of revolution as yet he did not dream. The tribunate itself was usually filled by young nobles in due course after the quaestorship. Having no special department, its wide powers could be used to coerce the executive, to control the Comitia, and enforce the decrees of the Senate. The tribunes acted as public prosecutors, and enjoyed a seat in the Senate-house. If one abused his power or broke the understanding, another could readily be got to act or obstruct as the Senate pleased.

The Comitia was reduced to an elective and legislative machine, worked by its presidents in the interest of the oligarchy. It was an "atrophied member" of the body politic, whose necessary co-

operation in government became daily more of an anachronism. Its days of meeting, casual to start with, were abridged by religion and amusement; it had no deliberative or executive powers; it was open to every form of obstruction. Unattended by the more solid burgesses scattered throughout Italy, it came to represent the starving bellies and clamorous throats of the city mob. It reigned, but did not govern. To rely on its shifting and selfish majorities was to court destruction, and yet its sovereign powers offered a ready weapon to any misguided idealist, plausible agitator, or bankrupt noble who might use the tribunate for purposes of revolution.

Strength of the Senate.—The Senate alone could deal with the grave problems of war, foreign relations, and the provincial empire. The management of finance drifted naturally into its hands, for the untaxed burghers had no interest in controlling expenditure. Nor was it unworthy of its high position; the Senate was the author of Roman greatness. Superior to the House of Lords, for it was not, in theory, hereditary or exclusive; superior to the Athenian Boulé in its independence and authority, it represented at first no one class, generation, or set of principles. As it consisted mainly of ex-magistrates, it was based indirectly on popular choice. It was, in fact, the fine flower of that great aristocracy which resulted from the fusion of the orders, and concentrated in itself the experience, the traditions, and the statesmanship of Rome. Its consistent and tenacious, if narrow-minded, patriotism had saved the state and built up the fabric of empire. Its members had served an apprenticeship in arms and politics, by land and sea, in the provinces and in the forum. They were called to their places by the selection of the censors from among the chosen officers of the Republic. Debarred from commercial pursuits (218 B.C.), restricted to the holding of land and the public service, they formed that professional governing class demanded at once by ancient political thinkers and the increasing complexity of national business.


Growth of Oligarchy.—But the aristocracy inevitably degenerated into oligarchy. The rich plebeians soon became even more exclusive than the old patricians. It was no longer a question of religious rights and antique privilege, but of office, wealth, and clique. The new nobility took over the existing tokens of honour, and, adding fresh badges to distinguish themselves from the vulgar citizens, became a compact body aiming at exclusive power. It monopolised office, controlled the Senate, filled up the

eighteen centuries. It enjoyed the *ius imaginum*, the purple stripe, and the gold ring, and since 194 B.C. the special seats in the theatre assigned by Africanus. Thus imperceptibly freedom and equality were undermined, the alternation of civil rule and obedience, true mark of the ancient republic, done away, and a new object defined for the attacks of the democrat. Popular election became a delusion. The *novus homo*, the man whose ancestors had filled no curule chair, however wealthy or able, was elbowed out of office; the mere man of the people was still more vigorously debarred. The *honores* passed in rotation among the members of the great houses by birth and seniority, and few new families could conquer a place in the fast-narrowing circle. Custom, formulated by the *Lex Villia Annalis* of 180 B.C., fixed the ages necessary for holding the different offices; there arose a *certus ordo magistratuum*, every noble youth expecting to succeed *suo anno* to each office in turn. The Senate, carrying out in its own interest an established principle (342 B.C.), first limited the possibility of re-election, as by a law of 265 B.C. affecting the censors, and by a later measure (*circa* 151 B.C.), entirely forbade it, in the case of the consulship. Again, by refusing to increase the number of available elected officers, it kept in its own gift the most profitable and important posts. Even the censorship, whose existence gave the Senate a useful certificate of character, found its freedom of action checked by the recognised claims of ex-magistrates, by the need of publicly specifying the grounds of exclusion from the lists of honour, and by the presence of a colleague.

The "**Cursus Honorum.**"—The public service was unpaid, and this, with the methods of election, led to a vicious circle of corruption and embezzlement. The long series of Bribery and Ballot Acts were useless. The young noble, after serving his time in the cavalry or on the staff, canvassed for the quaestorship. As quaestor he replenished his purse and gained an insight into financial and provincial business, generally in attendance on a magistrate. Thence he passed possibly to the tribunate of the plebs. In the military service, where a distinction had grown up between the officer and the common soldier, who rarely rose beyond first centurion (*primus pilus*), he would be created *tribunus militum*, by nomination or popular election, and this important office became a rung of the political ladder. The aedileship, with its shows and care of corn and markets, soon became a sure step to debt and popularity. As praetor or propraetor he drew from his province the means to pay his debts and the cost of the consulship. From

the same source the proconsul extracted his famous triple fortune (*vide* p. 547). Finally, he crowned his career with the censorship, the peculiar glory and stronghold of the oligarchy. The path to power lay in family influence, in a strong *clientela*, in the arts of the advocate, the showman, and the election-manager. The outsider must trust to these same arts, aided by noble patronage or popular agitation.

Extent of the Evil.—As it was necessary that the Senate should usurp authority, so no doubt the new conditions of life, public and private, were bound to create a race of consuls and prætors very different from the simple farmers of old Rome. Class distinctions were bound to arise. But the jealousy of individual eminence inherent in an oligarchy, fatal as it was to good



EPITAPH OF P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO, FLAMEN DIALIS, (?) SON OF AFRICANUS, WHO DIED YOUNG.

government, was equally fatal to the class. Lack of new blood destroyed, as the infusion of new blood had strengthened, the Senate. It sank from an assembly of kings to a cabal of selfish aristocrats, who confounded the welfare of the empire with the miserable interests of their own misgovernment. Yet these evils were only gradually developed. Though the Hannibalic war was largely directed by a small set of nobles, whose policy, favoured by the failure of the popular heroes, was justified by success, room was found for an able outsider like Marcellus, good generals were re-elected, and Scipio could rely on public feeling to back him in vigorous action. At the same time the existence of a virtual oligarchy aided Roman discipline and patriotism in curbing the ambition of individuals and the excessive power of a single family.

The extraordinary successes and brilliant personality of Africanus raised him to an exceptional position and enhanced the vast influence of his house, which had treated Spain almost as its private property. Flaminius controlled for years the Eastern policy of the Senate. Metellus succeeded Metellus on the curule chairs. The power and pride of the Claudii were proverbial. But Scipio himself, fifteen years princeps Senatus and first man in Rome, incapable of an idea of treason, as he was ill adapted for political manœuvres, frittered away his strength in family feuds and personal quarrels, and fell, with his whole house, in the great Asiatic trials (*vide supra*, p. 273, *infra*, p. 303), a victim to the dogged enmity of Cato and the rest, who attacked in him and his brother the predominance of an overweening house. Yet Scipio, apart from his personal claims, had no party, no projects of reform. He was a noble, and supported the nobility. The rivalries of the Roman houses or of individual senators must not be misinterpreted as the struggles of genuine parties.

CHAPTER XXIX

INTERNAL HISTORY (266-146 B.C.)—*continued*

Cato the Censor and the Conservative Reaction—Gaius Flaminius and the Popular Movement—State of Italy and the Provinces—The Army and Navy—Finance—The Ordo Equester.

Misgovernment.—Had the power thus transferred from the nominal sovereign and its officers to the governing nobility continued to be exercised for the public good, the usurpation would perhaps have been justified. But, with few exceptions, the members of the oligarchy aimed merely at the retention of their privileges and the aggrandisement of the family or the individual. The ill-protected provinces were plundered to pay the cost of games, buildings, and festivals, to feed the mob and bribe the electors. Neighbouring nations were harried to provide triumphs and titles. Italy, neglected in her agriculture, denied the franchise, and drained for recruits, was sacrificed to the prejudices and interests of the capital. The army, and, above all, the fleet, degenerated; the frontiers were undefended. Already the passion for distinction, the greed of big estates, the necessities of debt, leave

burning marks behind them in useless wars, savage evictions, embezzlement, and extortion. Already protests were raised against pride, luxury, and effeminacy, against foreign culture and strange worships, against monopoly of office and nepotism.

Cato the Censor.—The protest did not come solely from the excluded classes or their spokesmen. Its strongest voice was heard in the tirades of the great censor, M. Porcius Cato, a Sabine farmer who rose from the plough to the highest honours of the Republic. Born in 234 B.C., a soldier at seventeen, prætor in 198 B.C., and consul in 195 B.C., a veteran in the fields of war and oratory, he was the last representative of old-fashioned, middle-class conservatism, a bitter foe to new men and new manners, a latter-day Cincinnatus. He had served from the Trasimene to Zama, in Sardinia, Spain, Macedon, with skill, courage, and success. Accused forty-four times, accuser as often, the grey-eyed, red-haired man had literally fought his way up with his rough-and-ready wit, his nervous oratory, his practical ability and business habits. For thirty-five years the most influential man in Rome, he had acted in every capacity, as general, administrator, and envoy. He was a man whose virtues served his own ends, whose real but well-trumpeted austerity was a stalking-horse for his personal acrimony and ambition. Narrow, reactionary, and self-righteous as he was honest, active, and well-meaning, a good hater and a persistent critic, at once a bully and a moralist, he took up his text daily against the backslidings and iniquities of the time, against Hellenism, luxury, immorality, and corruption, especially as personified in the Scipios and Flamini of his day. At bottom he was a genuine man, but it was unlucky that the strongest reforming force should have taken shape in this political gladiator and typical Roman, this hard-hitting, sharp-witted, keenly commercial, upright, vulgar Philistine.

Work of Cato.—Cato led no reform-party. He fought for his own hand, and stalwartly defended Roman morality and husbandry, but he had no wide aims and was no opponent of senatorial government. Cato's quarrel with the spirit of his age was a quarrel within the senatorial body. His attack on the Scipios, useful as it was to the oligarchy, was largely an attack on personal opponents. In 187 B.C. he succeeded in forcing through the prosecution of Lucius Scipio for alleged embezzlement; he obtained a special inquiry, and secured the condemnation of the unfortunate Asiaticus, whose poverty demonstrated his innocence. Among the incidents of this obscure campaign, which was aimed at both the brothers, are recorded the famous speech of Scipio's enemy, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus the

Elder, for the defence, and the yet more famous appeal of Publius (*vide supra*, p. 273). Whatever may have happened, the power of the great house was broken, and Cato secured his coveted censorship, the prize of the struggle, in 184 B.C. In concert with Valerius Flaccus, he visited the sins of their order on the heads of the nobles, striking out from the lists of senators and Equites scions of the proudest families of Rome. The stalwart *novus homo* had played a strong and successful game, but his work as a reformer amounted to little. His measures, like his speeches and impeachments, were counter-blasts to public and private vices. But just as he had no fruitful political principles to champion, so his narrow and boorish ideals of a life devoted to public work and rural economy on the strictest lines of profit and loss, were powerless to touch hearts and inspire conduct. He defended the Lusitanians against Galba, and protested against the spoliation of Rhodes, but he destroyed Carthage. Yet this foe to culture took up Greek in his old age; and credit is due to him for his repeated efforts to secure justice and economy, to restrain aggression, and to protect the treasury and the provincials from fraud and extortion.

Symptoms of Opposition and Decay of People.—Here and there, however, can be traced the beginnings of a real opposition to the government on the part of the poorer classes, a resistance which becomes more definite as the new oligarchy makes itself more clearly felt. There is no party-system and no recognised programme as yet; but certain questions tend to recur in which opposite interests are apparent and the lines of the coming struggle are being marked out. The occasional attempts to interfere with the conduct of the Hannibalic war had ended in disaster, and the deadly nature of the struggle prevented further and more serious developments. Conscious of incompetence, the Assembly rarely interfered with imperial policy or finance. The Roman Commons had no need or power to use the control of Supply as a weapon of opposition. The nobles were as yet too loyal to manipulate the Assembly against the Senate. The Senate knew when to give way to public opinion. Already, indeed, the Assembly had demurred to the declaration of war with Macedon, and the ill-paid toils and disgraces of the Spanish campaigns had produced a crop of discontent and mutiny; but in the end the Senate got its way. For the bulk of the war-period the Comitia, with sober deference to wiser judgments, with large-hearted if narrow-minded loyalty, worked for the saving of Rome. But if there had been a danger even with the older body of solid, sensible farmers when the needs of a small

state were more easily judged, the defects of the Comitia came glaringly out with the extension of the franchise over Latium, Sabina, and Campania, and the diffusion of settlers and colonists over the whole peninsula. The tribes became more and more bulky, there was no organisation of the out-voters, and communications were slow. The sovereign Assembly tended to become a purely urban gathering, and many causes combined to ruin and corrupt the populace of the capital. The steady working of manumission, contempt for manual labour, the institution of clientship, and the agricultural depression, aided by the cheap living, largesses, and games, collected in the city an ever-growing mass of paupers and parasites. They swelled the retinues of the great, who held their votes in their pocket. The Forum began to swarm with slaves and freedmen, servile Orientals, and "starveling Greeks," carelessly registered in the falsified census, "stepchildren of Italy," whose shouts drowned the voices of Rome's genuine sons. As yet the forms of corruption were mainly indirect. Fed at the expense of allies and provincials, amused by the ædiles, flattered for their votes, and feared for their riots, at once corrupted and corrupting, these modern Romans formed the germ of that unstable mob, denounced by Cicero—in private—as the "leech of the treasury," "the dregs of Romulus," which with its clamorous wants and perilous prerogatives exhausted the empire, disturbed the streets, and baffled the statesmen of Rome. Of this great mischief there were at present but signs and symptoms. When Polybius dates the beginning of evil from the laws of Flaminius, he is giving the ideas of his friends rather than historical fact. Such symptoms have been found in the appointments of Flaminius, Minucius, and Varro, in the decay of the dictatorship, in the threatened appeal of Scipio, and the actual appeal of Flaminius, from Senate to people, and in the reform of the priestly elections. But these are merely isolated phenomena. They are indeed signs of the times; nor was the hour far distant when tribune and soldier alike would use the powers of a casual crowd to push their policy and secure their ends. As yet the changes made were due as much to the natural growth of existing institutions, to the conservative Cato, or to casual excitement, as to any "pernicious radical agitator."

Flaminius and the Land.—Once more it was an economic question which caused a serious, even passionate contest. There was the ordinary attempt to check usury in 193 B.C.—*Lex Sempronia de pecunia credita*—but the real struggle came earlier over the land-

question. In 232 B.C. the tribune Gaius Flaminius proposed the allotment of the Picenian and Senonian *ager publicus*, south of Ariminum. This raised again the question stirred by Cassius and Licinius, the question of the growing poverty of the poor. Things had gone from bad to worse during the long agony of the Sicilian war. Capital had accumulated in the hands of nobles and contractors; the small farmers had succumbed under the pressure of political and economical causes (*vide infra*, p. 316). The population of rural Italy had declined, and the perilous surplus of landless peasants, paupers, and adventurers was mounting up. The ordinary method of providing an outlet for labour, of re-peopling the wasted districts and depleting the city, had been by the assignation of allotments, and the creation of colonies. These measures tended to prevent the decay of husbandry and the monopoly of land by the rich and noble, while they helped to secure the position, extend the civilisation, and reward the veterans of Rome. Many settlements of this type were founded during the period, especially at the close of the Hannibalic war, in the Cispadane conquests and on the confiscated tracts in Italy. Allotments were distributed in 173 B.C. out of Gallic and Ligurian land, and in 165 B.C. the occupiers who had squatted on the Campanian domain were ejected with compensation, and the soil allotted in heritable leaseholds. These distributions, due partly to a sense of danger, partly to the conservative reformer Cato, anxious for the future of the yeomanry, owed most to the effect produced by the agitation of the detested Flaminius.

The evil Flaminius had to meet was serious. No acre of the Sicilian or Sardinian conquests had been divided; no new rural tribes, necessitating fresh allotments, could now be formed. The remnant of the *ager publicus* was still enjoyed by the rich in usufruct or leased out by the censors. Side by side with their vast private estates, the nobles held as occupiers large slices of the state-land, whose legal rent they neglected to pay. The small holder, bought out, squeezed out, and economically ruined, found no outlet in migration to newly annexed districts. With the yeomanry of Italy fell Italian agriculture and the Italian army; the structure of the state was being sapped at its foundation. Flaminius and his supporters saw the danger. Their remedy, which met but a portion of the problem, was to break up the land monopoly and restore the farmer to the soil, by the creation of small holdings on a large scale. The moment was favourable. There was space available for the experiment without confisca-

tion. But the government added to the error of neglecting to do a conservative and popular thing the error of bitter and futile obstruction. Flaminius appealed to the people. There was a



ROMAN IN TOGA.

sharp conflict between vested interests and the fair claims of the veterans. There were scenes in the Assembly, but the impassioned eloquence of the tribune, whom his indignant father attempted to drag from the platform, and public feeling for popular rights

carried the day. The Bill was passed without the previous approval or subsequent sanction of the Senate. Nor was the excitement soon allayed. The execution of the measure was obstructed, and partisan hatred persecuted in life and death the well-meaning and ill-fated reformer. Flaminius, if he was a poor strategist, was a brave man and a courageous statesman. But in this instance his impatience set a precedent that could not fail to be abused. The danger, no doubt, was largely due to the folly of the Senate, which permitted the popular leaders to discover their own power, and precipitated the first great revolt against its authority since the fusion of the orders. For hitherto measures brought before the Assembly had, by the spirit and custom of the constitution, come from the Senate, with which the tribunes had generally worked in harmony. Between them Flaminius and the Senate allowed a casual Assembly to tamper with high matters of state, and opened the door to future disorders. In his aims and means Flaminius was the political father of the Gracchi.

Result.—Thus, though we find no definite attempt in this period to alter the methods and traditions of government or to oust the Senate from its place, yet the old struggle of poor and rich, debtor and creditor, yeoman and capitalist, disengaged from the artificial distinction between patrician and plebeian, is becoming more prominent. The tribune is returning with added power to his old post of leader of a new type of "people." There are signs that the rift between form and fact in the constitution is widening to rupture, that the friction of jarring powers may produce fire. The questions at issue are not in themselves fraught with the gravest danger. The neglect to deal with them, complicated with the effects of social corruption, economic errors, and weak government, might prove fatal.

The Administration.—And there were signs that the strong and steady government which had conquered Italy, worn down Hannibal, and mastered the world, which had compensated loss of liberty with empire, was itself being eaten away by the solvents of wealth and luxury, and was incapable of grasping the problem which destiny and its own action had set before it. It was now that the defects of a narrow oligarchy resting upon sham elections, hedged round by jealous restrictions, and working by a system of checks and balances fatal to continuous and scientific administration, began to appear.

I. Italy.—In Italy the main questions were the state of agriculture and the position of the allies. Of the first, it is enough

at present to say that the same causes which had ruined the Roman farmer were aggravated for the Italians by the effects of war and the confiscations and conscription of Rome. Of the various classes of Italian communities, the *municipia sine suffragio* had either received the full franchise, or lost their status, like Capua, as the reward of rebellion. The Bruttians and degraded Campanians appear in a new and oppressive position as a sort of public serfs, deprived of civic freedom and the right of carrying arms. More independent, but formally excluded from the Roman franchise, stood the Celtic communities across the Po. Of the non-Latin allies, only those retained their old status absolutely who, like Neapolis, Nola, and Heraclea, had adhered to Rome. The position of the others steadily deteriorated. Even the Latins, whose loyalty had saved the state—Tibur, Praeneste, and the colonies—suffered in increased military service, especially for garrison duty and the Spanish wars, and, as in 177 B.C., in curtailed allotments and largesses. Moreover, there was a tendency to diminish their rights and liberties. In the case of Ariminum (268 B.C.) and all Latin communities founded later, the right of acquiring the *civitas* by migration was cancelled and in the case of the older states it was limited. In 187 B.C. and 177 B.C. (*Lex Claudia*) large numbers of Latins and allies were ejected from Rome, on the pretext of preventing the depopulation of their native places. The last Latin colony in Italy, Aquileia, was founded in 184 B.C. The new colonies were meant for Roman citizens, and not even the poorest Roman nowadays was willing to surrender the privileges of that franchise. For the same reasons the bestowal of the citizenship was the more jealously confined, as it was the more eagerly coveted. The policy of wholesale incorporation, dropped when Rome was strong and decentralisation appeared dangerous, was not resumed now that Rome was co-extensive with Italy, while the disappearance of the passive franchise and the limits set to migration closed the city to all but favoured individuals, and the magistrates of Latin towns who became citizens *ex-officio*. The old policy of graduated privilege and regular promotion fell into oblivion; exclusion was the order of the day. At home the oligarchy masqueraded as a republic; in Italy despotism masqueraded as alliance. Roman liberalism began and ended at home, and meant little enough even there. Hence the struggle against privilege passed from the plebeian to the Italian, as it passed later from the Italian to the provincial.

This conduct was as impolitic as it was ungenerous. It merged faithful allies with conquered subjects. It broke up the unity of

the Latin race, substituted a local for a national patriotism, and destroyed that use of the franchise for consolidating power which has been so justly praised. The proposal of Carvilius in the crisis of the great war, to give representative Latins seats in the Senate, was premature, but a wiser policy would at least have retained existing privileges. As yet the rights of self-government were respected and no taxation was imposed, but the expense of the contingents grew heavier, especially for the cavalry, while population steadily decreased. The restrictions on marriage and commerce hindered the circulation of capital, and impoverished the allies by concentrating business in Rome. The interference of Senate and consuls in local affairs became more frequent, and the Italians suffered from the severity of martial law, from the unfair distribution of rewards, and, last but not least, from the illegal violence of Roman troops and Roman magistrates.

2. **The Provinces: (a.) Organisation.**—But tyranny was worst where there was least restraint, in the government of the provinces. At first conservative Rome had avoided annexation, but, stimulated by trade and speculation, the appetite came with eating. At the close of this period she possessed Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, the Spains, Macedonia and Achaia, and Africa. Their organisation was a patchwork of existing methods and Roman additions. It was a system of makeshifts. As the provinces were acquired piecemeal, so no complete machinery was invented, no central offices created. The old Italian state-ideas were applied with a difference. The subject communities were neither admitted to the franchise nor reduced to slavery. With few exceptions they remained separate states, allies or dependents of Rome. The province, in fact, is an aggregate of different communities, with diverse rank and status, constituted as a department (*provincia*) under a special magistrate. Its organisation, laid down originally by a commission, and modified by laws and decrees from time to time, depended in each case on the history and character of the people, on the nature of its previous government, and on its earlier relations with Rome. Existing institutions were respected and municipal autonomy retained, but in the hands of aristocratic boards. Some states indeed, were technically free and *extra provinciam*, enjoying by treaty or decree exemption from taxation and interference. The rest were liable to the payment of tribute and subject to the jurisdiction of the governor. As in Italy, the supremacy of Rome was secured by division and isolation, and by the graduation of rights and immunities; but in Italy there was no

governor, no garrison, no taxation, and no disarmament. Taxation in the provinces was based on the old systems, and was in theory moderate. Sometimes, as in Sicily, it consisted mainly of tithes of produce (*decumæ*); in others, as in Spain, of fixed money-payments (*stipendia*). The tithes were farmed out to the highest bidder, on the spot, or, in later days, at Rome; the money-taxes were paid in by the communities. In Sicily the arrangements of Hiero were substantially adopted, and furnished a sort of model. There were, besides, customs, and requisitions for military purposes. Often the proceeds only covered, or even failed to cover, the cost of government, to provide for which may have been the original theory of taxation, but the revenue from Macedon relieved the burgess of the tributum, and the provinces became the milch-cows of the Roman nobles, and the *prædia populi Romani*, while the duties of defence and administration were shamefully neglected.

(b.) **The Governor.**—The hinge of the whole system was the resident governor, who at first was one of the magistrates, generally one of the prætors of the year. As business grew at home and abroad, the home and foreign commands gradually came to be separated, and the imperium was exercised in the provinces by proprætors and proconsuls. As a rule there was no special selection made, the available officials dividing the departments, as determined by the Senate, which filled up any deficiencies by combining or proroguing commands. In the end it meant that the great families passed the appointments round from hand to hand. To manipulate the rotation was even more easy than managing elections; the sacred lot itself could be worked with a little ingenuity. The tenure of office, limited by a ruinous principle to one year, was occasionally extended, while, to meet a special crisis, wider authority could be conferred by Senate or people on a single individual. The tendency was naturally to increase the independence of the governor, whose power, in spite of treaties, charters, and customs, stretched as far as his will. He possessed civil jurisdiction and military command; he controlled finance through his quæstor; his staff was responsible only to himself. Free from the checks that operated at home and safe of the favourable verdict of his peers, he could set at naught paper guarantees, ineffective laws, and appeals to the distant central government. The state might limit exactions, but the "great unpaid," inadequately furnished for ordinary expenses, with hungry creditors and dependents, and still hungrier *publicani* and *negotiatores*, tax-farmers and business-men, to satisfy, exhausted his province

with exactions. The province filled his purse, paid his debts, furnished for the mob its corn and wild beasts, and spent its last farthing in loading its tyrant with praises and presents. It was systematic extortion, rather than the unsatisfied aspirations of the provincials, which produced the occasional outbursts of smouldering resentment and the terrible reprisals of the oppressed Asiatics.

(c.) **General Result.**—In theory Roman rule was tolerant, moderate, and responsible ; in practice it was an irresponsible autocracy aggravated by annual changes. Moreover, the whole system reacted dangerously on national character and the home government. Exceptional power and the license of plunder spoiled the honest republican and destroyed Roman equality. The provincial empire was responsible for the rise of the formidable *imperium proconsulare* which stood outside the city-constitution, for the standing armies owing allegiance to their general, for the extension of slavery and the corruption of manners. Perilous, again, was the evidence it afforded of wholesale misgovernment. Yet in the age of Cato and Paullus the subjects were better off than they had been under their previous rulers, life was safe and commerce protected, the *publicani* were kept in order, the old integrity and discipline were not yet extinct.

It was this even more than her jealous policy, and the absence of any strong national feeling or military organisation among the subjects, that made Rome's dominion secure. The variety of method and the conservatism of the system had its merits. Specially marked is the difference of East and West. In the barbaric West the new civilisation had a free field ; in the East the protectors of Hellas shrank from imposing a strict *régime* on the peoples whose culture they adopted. On the other hand, the lack of unity and control was felt in every direction. It gave the proconsul a free hand, an army, and a base. It made a scientific frontier impossible. It left each province as a single unit to itself, and sacrificed efficient rule to the caprices of badly chosen officials. The influx of provincial wealth into the coffers of the state and the pockets of its rulers debauched the public conscience, created an appetite for empire as a source of profit, and ruined the sense of imperial responsibility.


(d.) **Attempts at Control.**—Individuals were sometimes called to account ; the Senate occasionally interfered, as in 171 B.C., when it regulated the price of supplies in Spain ; and the governor after resignation was liable to prosecution. But the courts were distant,

the routes difficult, and the alien plaintiff must seek justice from the defendant's friends and accomplices. Even the institution of public clientship, which protected the conquered¹ by the power of the conqueror's house, was humiliating to the *protégé* and dangerous to the state. The rapine and outrage described by Cicero belong to a later period, but corruption spread so fast that in 149 B.C. a standing court (*quæstio perpetua*) was created for the trial of extortion by the *Lex Calpurnia de pecuniis repetundis*. In this, the type of subsequent *quæstiones*, the people exercised jurisdiction indirectly through a delegated body, from whose sentence there was no appeal. The offence and its punishment were determined by law; a prætor or his deputy acted as president (*vide infra*, p. 352). It was a step to the formation of a criminal code; but the composition of the court soon became a political question, which impaired its judicial value. That the supervision of the home government was equally ineffectual may be inferred from the conduct of generals in Spain, Asia, and Macedonia. This independence of the proconsul was fatal alike to equality within the ruling class and to the subordination of the executive to the Senate, the two foundations of oligarchy. Hence the natural aversion of the older statesmen from annexation, and the attempts to limit the tenure of command and to control finance at least by the appointment of quæstors.

The Army and Navy.—That the army rapidly deteriorated needs no proof. The greed, cruelty, and incapacity of the average commander have been already abundantly illustrated. The demoralisation of the soldiery became no less apparent. There was cowardice in the field, mutiny in the camp; at the end of the period the insubordination and corruption of the Spanish and African legions called forth the stern rebukes and chastisement of Æmilianus. In truth, the Roman army had ceased to be a civic militia, without receiving the organisation and discipline of a standing army of regular troops. To meet the evasion of service by the upper and middle classes, candidates for office were in 180 B.C. compelled to show evidence of at least ten years' service. In 152 B.C. selection by ballot had to be substituted for selection by the officers in levying recruits. The ranks were filled by volunteers attracted by the hope of plunder, and veterans retained with the colours. Men were enlisted from lower and lower strata of society. The civic horse especially had ceased to be effective. On service

¹ *E.g.*, Allobroges and Fabii, Syracusans and Marcelli, &c.

the cavalry was composed mainly of Italians, supplemented by Numidians and Etolians. The drill, tactics, and organisation were all becoming obsolete. The art of war had developed. Long service in distant fields, garrison duty, pay and plunder, had produced the professional soldier. The staff, too, was becoming professional; veterans form the core of the legions, and veteran settlements abroad, *e.g.*, Italica and Carteia, begin to appear. But further disasters were needed before the facts were recognised and Marius



ROMAN SOLDIERS WITH SCUTUM (OF A LATER PERIOD).

began what the Cæsars completed, the reorganisation of the army on a purely military basis.

Navy there was none. The great fleet, mistress of the seas, to whose silent but effective action the defeat of Hannibal was largely due, fell into decay; the navies of conquered nations were destroyed; the police of the sea was left to the maritime allies. Pirates infested the trade-routes, and soon menaced the supplies of Rome and the safety of the coast-towns.

Revenue.—The revenue had materially increased. Tribute in kind or cash and huge war indemnities supplemented the internal

resources of customs, dues, rents, and royalties, together with the proceeds of the 5 per cent. tax on manumissions. The tributum was not exacted after 167 B.C. Against this income were to be set the *ornatio provinciae*,¹ the maintenance of the armies, and of public roads and buildings, the repayment of forced loans, the expenses of the corn supply and the salt monopoly, besides the cost of constant warfare. Half the items of a modern Budget were absent. Public service was unpaid; the administration of justice cost little; there were no estimates for education, local government, or police, and yet the financial results were not brilliant. Public honesty at Rome might compare favourably with the notorious dishonesty of the Greek, but, apart from actual embezzlement and mismanagement by the magistrates, they at least permitted state dues to remain unpaid and state property to be plundered. The method of collecting revenue through tax-farmers was at once expensive and oppressive. While expenditure on public works diminished, the reserve was slender in proportion to the receipts. There was no attempt to extend the census over the provinces, to balance expenditure and taxation, and to base the latter on plain and uniform principles. The dependence of the quaestor on the governor frustrated attempts at control.

Ordo Equester.—A new class had grown up. The eighteen Servian centuries of knights (*equo publico*) had been supplemented in the field by squadrons of volunteers of the necessary census serving with their own horse. As first the one and then the other disappeared from active service, the term *eques*, losing its military significance, came to mean primarily any person possessing an estate, valued later at a minimum of 400,000 sesterces, and therefore liable to the conscription as a cavalry soldier. For a time it would apply to the whole body of wealthy nobles in the Senate or out of it. Meanwhile the growth of speculation, of tax-farming and contracting gave rise to a moneyed as contrasted with a noble class. The Claudian law of 218 B.C., which excluded senators from the shipping trade, and the social taboo on commerce began the severance between the landed nobility and the capitalist. The severance was completed by a later ordinance of 129 B.C., which compelled an *eques equo publico* to surrender his horse on entering the Senate. These enactments created a plutocracy whose political influence is marked by the destruction of Carthage and Corinth and the attack on Rhodes. As tax-collectors and business men

¹ *I.e.*, money disbursed to the provincial governor for payment of troops and official expenses.

the Equites pervaded the provinces, to be restrained or connived at by the various governors according to their honesty. As a political body they offered an instrument to an able agitator. The existence of this class and the resulting division of interests were an additional problem for the government. The eighteen centuries continued to exist as voting divisions constituted and revised by the censors.

CHAPTER XXX

INTERNAL HISTORY (266-146 B.C.)—*continued*. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Slavery—Agriculture—Capitalism—Clientship—Society—Hellenism.

Slavery.—Without slavery the ancient state was impossible. It was the necessary condition of universal soldiership, of unfettered political activity, and of literary and artistic cultivation. It is presupposed by Plato and defended by Aristotle. But developed as it was at Rome, it injured every department of civil and social life. It allowed the capitalist to accumulate wealth without distributing wages, it supplanted free labour in its only honourable form (agriculture), made sound husbandry impossible, and vitiated the perhaps inevitable system of large-farming. In the lower forms of industry, it destroyed competition and cast a slur on all manual labour, while it filled up the minor offices and employments. The freedmen, usurping all the better berths, as agents, overseers, and tutors, transacted the bulk of commercial and domestic business. Useful as political dependents and bribery-managers, they swamped the Comitia and corrupted society. The slave-system, which depopulated the East, the main source of supply, by raids and man-hunts, helped to import foreign ideas of a low type, to break down the old family-life and strict morality. It filled Rome with intrigue, ruined the minds of the young, fostered despotism and vice, and menaced the state itself with dangerous insurrections. Its poisonous workings are, however, peculiarly traceable in the departments of agriculture and finance.

Agriculture.—Landed properties in Italy at this time were either (1) small holdings worked by the owner and his family with a few slaves; (2) large estates, as yet comparatively moderate in extent, whose proprietor commonly managed several by means of slave-

stewards and serfs, bought, worked, and kept on the least humane and most strictly commercial principles ; or (3) large cattle-ranches and sheep-walks, held by "occupation" and tended by armed and mounted slaves. There were few tenant farmers, and free labour was rarely called in. Rural economy had been rude enough, but frugality, thrift, and energy had enabled the small holder for a time to make head against his besetting difficulties, want of capital, the high rate of interest, and the severity of the law of debt. The oppression of the usurer had been diminished by the influx of wealth and the diversion of speculation to more profitable investments. But the natural tendency of small holdings to disappear, owing to subdivision among children, the improvement of agriculture, and the application of capital to farming, was intensified by vicious legislation and unfair competition. Corn paid as tithe, or supplied as a gift, or bought by the government abroad at low prices, fed the armies, glutted the markets, and was often distributed at cheap rates to the populace. With low freights and rapid transit Sicily could undersell the home-grower at any time ; when importation was favoured and the price artificially lowered competition became impossible. Yet agriculture was the staple industry of Italy. The flow of labour to the armies and the capital drained the country districts. At the same time the Claudian law drove the nobility to invest in land. Apart from violent evictions—a comparatively small factor in this problem—the wealth derived from extortion, speculation, and public plunder made it easy for the ruling classes to force the prices and buy up the small owners. Their holdings combined in large estates and worked by unmarried slaves, free from conscription, were developed into vineyards and olive-gardens, or fell, more often, into pastures, preserves, and parks. The natural results followed. Not only was the yeoman heavily handicapped and capital unfairly favoured, but the margin of useful cultivation receded, as the freeman was replaced, not by machines, but by the slave ; the area of pasturage increased ; the price of food rose, and was only checked by large importations at the cost of the exchequer, a remedy worse than the disease. On the top of the whole came the occupation-system and the monopoly of the public lands by the rich. A landless and labourless proletariat threatened the development of Italy. "The cost of Rome's growth fell on the people ; the profits went to a class." The valley of the Po and the central Apennines had suffered least, and Campania still flourished ; but Etruria, oppressed by its ancient lords and drained by requisitions, and Southern Italy, barely recovering from the Samnite wars

and Hannibal, were slowly ruined. Malaria invaded the lowlands; the census dropped; towns decayed; recruits fell off; the riots and risings of the slaves became a public danger. Rome had learned the economic methods of Carthage, and must now gather the fruits. Ignorance and neglect wrought more evil than all the wars and conscriptions, than all the usurpations and land-grabbing of the ruling classes. The urban assembly had no interest in the question; the Senate meant well, and showed its appreciation of affairs by publishing a translation of Mago's treatise on the management of slave-worked plantations!

Business.—The same tendencies pervaded business. The Romans had been always a commercial people, but the wealth of the great families rested not upon productive labour and legitimate exchange, but rather upon speculation, usury, and plunder. The world swarmed with Roman bankers, agents, and contractors, enjoying special privileges. Capitalist associations, in which everybody, even the nobles, shared as active or sleeping partners, contracted for the collection of taxes, for public buildings, for army supplies; and the system favoured by the state prevailed everywhere. Its basis, also, was the labour of slaves and freedmen. It not merely expanded with the empire, it preceded the flag. Rome supplanted Carthage as the moneyed centre of the world. The standard of wealth rose; luxury and extravagance undermined the strongest houses; the speculative spirit pervaded morals and politics. As yet punctuality, energy, and integrity were the rule, and business was comparatively solid, but land and capital were becoming congested, the middle and lower classes were slowly squeezed out, and the great fabric of wealth, resting on a rotten basis, was subject to sudden collapses. Satire and invective were as useless as the efforts of honest governors abroad and well-meaning reformers at home. The Senate had no love for the capitalist, but its own members were thickly tarred with the same brush, and the evil was too deep for the crude economics of the day.

Clientship.—The ancient legal and half-religious relation of patron and client had suffered a natural decay, but fresh forms of dependence appeared. The connection of conquered communities with Roman nobles has been noticed. Of similar type were the clientship of country people to local magnates, of suitors to advocates. Last and worst of all was the crowd of parasites and dependents who thronged the halls and formed the suites of their patrons. This new relation helped to destroy equality and emphasise class distinctions.

Society.—The patrons, too, were no longer the simple heroes of the Republic. Eager for distinctions, they manufactured triumphs,




LAMP WITH CIRCUS SCENE.

paid for their own statues, and coined titles of honour. New faiths and new ideas were the mode; the serious life of duty, the real if rude

dignity of the older time, were out of date. Celibacy and divorce increased, moral rules were relaxed; women began to emancipate themselves from the strict guardianship, *tutela*, and to take an open part in public and private life. Sumptuary laws restricted in vain the number of guests and courses at dinner. Display in dress, buildings, feasts, and funerals flourished in despite of Cato's protests. Prices and rents rose, leading in a vicious circle to a race for wealth. Expensive games and festivals were introduced for religious reasons, or more often to cater for the amusement and buy the votes of the mob. Such were the festival of Apollo (212 B.C.), the Megalesia (204 B.C.), the feast of Ceres (202 B.C.). Gladiatorial shows were imported from Campania and Etruria (264 B.C.), and the baiting of beasts and athletic contests in 186 B.C. More serious than the decay of Puritanism or the natural love of amusement was the innate vulgarity and depraved taste which held the prize-ring better than the drama and fastened on the poorest forms of entertainment.

Hellenism.—The first influence of Hellas upon Rome had been exercised in early days through Massilia and the Greek towns of South Italy. To South Italy again belong the first belated germs of Latin literature. So far it was the ordinary influence of a higher civilisation upon a lower. As intercourse increased with Sicily and Greece itself, and with the opening of the East, a new fashion of Hellenism arose. The upper classes eagerly adopted the philosophy, art, and literature of Hellas. The influence of Egypt and Asia Minor was felt in the inroads of Eastern luxury, and of those superstitions which filtered through the slave population into the life of its masters. In this time of expansion men felt the need of a wider life and a broader range of thought. They were deeply susceptible to the penetrating and subversive influences of this cosmopolitan culture, which came to them as a revelation. But with the exception of a few choicer spirits, such as the Scipios, Paullus, or the Gracchi, educated by personal contact with a Polybius or a Panætius, its power was not wholly for good. Roman vulgarity veneered itself with an imported polish that ate into the old wood. Literature, oratory, and jurisprudence gained vastly, but in politics Greek sympathies confused Roman judgment, and the attempt to apply Greek precedents to Roman problems was a disastrous failure. Even in literature the new learning was fatal to the growth of a national epic or national drama. In faith and morality it was an active solvent of the ruder Roman virtues. From the character of Roman

religion had resulted a natural indifference verging on scepticism. A Claudius could jeer at the sacred chickens ; a notorious rake, to purify his life, could be appointed Flamen Dialis, and the experiment could succeed ! Meanwhile a crop of superstitions native to the soil, divination of all kinds, and spiritualism, had sprung up, and both products, scepticism and superstition, were reinforced by imports from the East. On the one hand we find Chaldæan astrology, the sensual rites of Cybele, the fouler orgies of the Bacchanalia, condemned by Hellenist and Roman alike ; on the other hand, rationalism and Euhemerism (*vide supra*, p. 35) became the vogue, infinitely more popular than the grave doctrine of the Stoics which influenced so deeply for their good both Roman thought and Roman jurisprudence.



GLADIATORS.

(From a Pompeian wall-painting.)

With such fashions and movements government cannot deal. It was useless to expel Epicurean thinkers (173 B.C.), or teachers of rhetoric and philosophy (161 B.C.), or even the Chaldæans (139 B.C.). Only a healthy nation can throw off moral disease, and it must do so spontaneously. At first the inevitable outburst and emancipation of thought did as much good as harm. The great mischief lay not in the praiseworthy docility of Rome, but in the corrupted state of Greece and the intermixture with Hellenism of Oriental influences. There were many true Hellenic scholars who already went to the older and purer sources ; a later reaction attempted to develop the Latin spirit, while retaining the forms which Hellas invented.

CHAPTER XXXI

CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC

Introductory—Causes of the Fall of the Republic—Party Government—
Problems of Administration.

Senate and Empire.—The fall of the Republic dates from the ruthless destruction of Carthage. With no fear to curb her insolence, no centre of resistance to brace her energies, Rome staggered, with energies relaxed, under the weight of empire. Four centuries had been needed to secure the hegemony of Latium; a century of hard fighting had carried the champion of the lowlands to the headship of Italy; from the deadly wrestle with Carthage she had emerged mistress of her own seas and heiress to her rival's dominions, and thenceforward the logic of events and the lust of empire had carried her arms East and West in a promenade of victory. Fifty years from Zama nothing remained for the civilised world but to bow its neck to the decrees of Rome. The "thunder-cloud from the West" had indeed broken, and overwhelmed at once the rotten relics of the Macedonian monarchies and the jarring polities of Hellas. Rome was the centre of the world. To the capital of empire and civilisation were attracted the commercial riches, the artistic glories, the intellectual ability of the age. But the vast fabric of power bore in its defective structure manifest tokens of unpremeditated extension and the original absence of design (*vide supra*, p. 234). To this fact as much as to any original flaws in the constitution or any moral decay the fall of the Republic was due. The Senate, indeed, as we have seen, was dimly aware of the danger to a city-state involved in unlimited expansion. It had even shirked its plain duties as a predominant power, and clung to the narrow idea of an Italian hegemony, protected by buffer states. But its hand had been forced, and the destiny which had created the empire had made the Senate its supreme head. It had now, if we may repeat, to deal with the situation created by its own success. It was high time to recognise accomplished facts, accept responsibility fully, and to extend with a firm hand the direct sovereignty of Rome over the protected territories, restoring and reorganising what she had destroyed. Rome must expand her political system to take in the new elements as parts and members of herself, and prove

her title to govern by securing peace and prosperity, by combining .
imperium et libertas.

Growth of Monarchical Ideas.—It was the Republic, and not merely the Senate, that failed, by whatever party controlled ; failed even to grasp, much more to deal with, the problem. And the failure condemned the Republic as such, and led directly to the Empire. For the period of the revolution is the preparation of Cæsarism. All lines converge on a single point, the necessity of a new departure. All forces work inevitably in a single direction, the centralisation of administrative power. There is the pressure of the barbarian from without, the pressure of the provincial from within, the defects of the constitution, and the demands of extended dominion. The effects of these causes are disastrously augmented by the breathless rapidity with which Rome's difficulties came tumbling on her. Coming events cast their shadows before. From Scipio to Pompeius there is a growing tendency to place the single man above the state ; monarchical ideas develop unconsciously, and the trend of external events favours the development. The discomfiture of successive pretenders does but clear the way and set the precedents for the Cæsars, while the failure of each republican party and office is one more obstacle removed.

Conservatism a Cause of Failure.—One cause of this great failure lay in the character of the people and the nature of its polity. The tenacity of forms, the legalism, and conservatism of the Roman mind became a stumbling-block to progress. All the cleverness of all the lawyers and statesmen, in changing the spirit and maintaining the letter, in modifying institutions and multiplying fictions, was here inadequate. There is a lack of original statesmanship, as of every other originality, at Rome. Militarism did its work on congenial temperaments. Growth was arrested. Rome sacrificed to her empire the free play of national life and character :—

“ Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.”

Her horizon widened faster materially than it did intellectually ; stability became rigidity at Rome, as movement became restlessness at Athens.

Division of Classes.—Another important cause is to be found in the cleavage of classes and the resulting division of interest. For, with all its struggles, the old Republic had been strong in common feelings, common ideas, and a fair average equality of possessions. All this was gone, and the social contrast was

rendered still more perilous by the equally startling contrast between the actual position and theoretical powers of the discontented masses. The remaining causes lie in the political and social phenomena described in the previous chapter, which all contributed something towards the final result.

Reform and the Parties.—Reform was urgently demanded in every direction, and that reform must clearly begin at home. The need was already obvious. Accordingly we hear henceforth of government and opposition, of democratic and conservative parties, of optimates and populares. Such phrases and analogies, drawn from English politics, are misleading. Between Rome and England there is all the difference that divides a city-state from a modern nation. Language that applies to representative institutions and cabinet government does not apply to totally opposite conditions. At Rome the Assembly is primary, the legislative body is restricted, the deliberative council is permanent, the executive is an executive and nothing more, and finance plays a subordinate part. For modern party methods and party organisation the conditions were not forthcoming. Enough has been said of the conduct of Roman elections and the character of the Roman magistracy to make this clear. The see-saw of party administration would have been unintelligible to the average Roman. All sections were agreed as to the main forms and principles of government. No one dreamed of dispensing with Senate, magistrate, or Assembly. Hence so often an attack on the government appeared and was resisted as an attack on the state itself. All citizens being nominally equal, the main questions at issue were social and economic, and became political only by mismanagement; the rest affected merely allies and subjects. Where the wealthy classes devote themselves mainly to material interests, where there is no strong middle class, no intelligent industrial population, no permanent and powerful organ of the popular will, the politicians have it all their own way, party becomes faction, and popular government is a mere delusion. Hence opposition at Rome remains a mere opposition. The same grievances, the same methods recur, but there is no clear and continuous progress. Party movements mean generally changes in tactics, displacement of persons, and temporary shiftings of the centre of gravity from one constitutional faction to another. All moves in a narrow circle, partly because the reformers of all shades are destitute of fundamentally new ideas, partly because there is no possible basis for a continuous policy of reform in the magistracy or the Comitia.

If the Senate could not achieve the task the Republic became impossible.

Problems of Reform.—The necessary preliminary to any salutary measures was the reorganisation of the government. The Senate had owed the maintenance of its power to the loyalty of its officers, the acquiescence of the people; in a word, to its own ability and success. But these conditions were beginning to fail. Identified with a clique, the Senate lost its moral authority, the magistrates became restive, the people mutinous, or at best indifferent, while the opposition of the Equites and the independence of the proconsuls menaced it with new dangers. The obsolete sovereignty of the actual Comitia must be set aside, and if it was impossible to reorganise the Assembly with larger powers or an extended franchise, it remained possible either to reform the Senate or to introduce a new power into the constitution. In any case a vigorous central executive was needed which could feel and impose responsibility, which could emancipate itself from a narrow and purely Roman policy, which could control the proconsul and the army, which could be acceptable to the masses, and offer to the Equites a position and career, and all this without wholly breaking with the traditions and feelings of the past. It would be its duty (1) to restore the basis of the military and political system by reviving agriculture and replacing the yeomanry on the land; (2) to provide for the relief of the poor and the police of the capital; (3) to enfranchise the Italians and develop local government; (4) to consolidate the provinces by upright rule and gradual Romanisation; (5) to reorganise the army and navy on a professional basis, with adequate checks on the action of the officers; and (6), lastly, to establish a defensible frontier, a systematic budget, and easy communication within the empire.

The Empire a Necessity.—The issue of the long and bloody struggle which follows was a compromise which veiled a despotism. The Gracchi demonstrated the futility of Tribune and Comitia without an army, Marius the incapacity of the mere soldier armed with consular power. Sulla failed in his attempt at reaction, and with him perished the chances of the Senate, for Cicero's coalition of moderates was doomed from the outset. In Pompeius the power of that army which Marius created and Sulla utilised found clearer expression; he laid one of the foundations of the Principate in his indefinite *Imperium Proconsulare*. Julius Caesar in his administration and his campaigns worked out the ideas of Gracchus and the lessons of Sulla and Pompeius. Finally, the

civil wars cleared the way for Augustus, who gathered up the precedents of his predecessors in the masterly mixture of new and old, which, cloaking military autocracy under civil forms, combined in one person the necessary powers of the discordant magistracy, gave a centre to the system, a chief to the civil service, a head to the army, a sovereign to the subjects, a protector to the provinces, and peace to the world. The Principate was arrived at by a process of exhaustion; it was a military and political necessity. It solved for a time the more tangible problems of material organisation, and held in check the swordsmen of the North and the cavalry of the desert. The deeper economic and spiritual problems it could not solve. No marriage or sumptuary laws, no revivals of dead sentiment and dying faith, could mend these evils. Little enough could be done even for the money-market or the land. It was to other sources, or even to other times, that the world owed the new economic principles, the new moral ideas and religious enthusiasm, the new political hopes, that were needed to give a fresh impulse to human life. But for some of these things the empire made space and room.

CHAPTER XXXII

FOREIGN AND PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS (146-129 B.C.).

	B.C.	A. U. C.
Slave War in Sicily	135-132	619-622
Attalus of Pergamum bequeaths his Kingdom to Rome	133	621
Rising of Aristonicus	132-130	622-624
Province of Asia organised	129	625

BETWEEN B.C. 146 and 133 there is little external history to claim attention beyond the facts already mentioned. The Spanish wars dragged on till the capture of Numantia (133 B.C.). A Macedonian pretender called Alexander was crushed by a quæstor in 142 B.C.; a Macedonian proconsul was condemned for extortion in 141 B.C. About the same time Appius Claudius conquered the Salassi, seized the gold-washings of the Duria, and treated himself to an illegal triumph. There was fighting in Illyria in 135 B.C.; the Vardæi were reduced; the Scordisci chastised.

Slave War in Sicily.—In this year too the slaves of Sicily re-

belled to the number of 70,000. The rising bore grim witness to the watchfulness of the government, the tender mercies of the owners, and the advantages of the system. Sicilian slavery belonged to the worst type of agricultural serfdom. The oldest and most organised province of Rome, the chief source of its corn and wool, was the happy hunting-ground of the speculator. Not merely was the territory of Leontini leased to a few Roman absentees, but they and their Sicilian imitators covered the island with their estates, arable and pasture, worked mainly by imported slaves. It was not the kindlier system of indigenous and hereditary serfdom. The plantations were tilled on Punic principles by gangs of shackled and branded human cattle penned in underground barracks, while armed and mounted herdsman guarded the flocks and lived by sheer brigandage. Brutally treated as they were, left to feed and clothe themselves as they could, flung aside when useless through age or sickness, the waste of life was great. The supply was only kept up by slave-hunts and organised kidnapping in Western Asia, executed not only by Cilician and Cretan pirates, but by the Roman publicani. In the market of Delos 10,000 slaves were bought and sold in one day. In Sicily the demand had been stimulated by a period of peace; and cruelty and lust, inefficient surveillance, and a fatal sense of security, joined to the exceptional numbers, prepared a dangerous crisis. Troubles of the same kind broke out in Delos, Attica, and Asia Minor, even in Italy, and were stamped out in blood. In Italy, however, the worst evils of the plantation system had only appeared in Etruria, where it flourished; the condition of the ordinary slave was better, and free agriculture existed. Special peril in Sicily lay partly in the mounted slaves, partly in the superior qualities of many of the Orientals, who seem to have formed the bulk of them, but chiefly in the weakness of the military force and the utter failure of the government to control either the slaves or their masters.

In 135 B.C. the dire distress produced an outbreak. The rural serfs of a brutal proprietor surprised the fortress of Enna and massacred the owners. This was followed by a general rising, stained by similar atrocities. The insurgents elected as king a Syrian juggler, a prophet and impostor named Eunus—the self-styled Antiochus, king of the Syrians, whose officer Achæus, a Greek of genuine ability, roused the labourers to join the slaves, organised an army, and checked pillage and bloodshed. A Cilician bandit, Cleon, took Agrigentum; even Messana fell.

The leaders coalesced, and practically mastered Sicily. The king formed a court, and some sort of order was introduced. More than one Roman commander was defeated, notably Hypsæus the prætor and his local militia (134 B.C.). Aided by the cowardice of the soldiers and the incapacity of the officers, the war dragged on dubiously till 132 B.C., when P. Rupilius drove the insurgents from the open country, captured Tauromenium and Enna, took the king (131 B.C.), and closed the war. The slaves were crucified *en masse*, to the indignation of the masters. The country was reorganised, and the regulations of Rupilius remained the basis of Sicilian government. After this there was peace for thirty years. The material loss lit most heavily on the landlords, but the scandal and shame of such a war fell on the government.

The Province of Asia.—In the East there were fewer disasters than in Spain and Portugal because there was less fighting, but the state of things reveals that weakness and indecision in dealing with Orientals which had come over the foreign policy of Rome. The adroit Attalids had kept themselves by Roman favour on the throne of Pergamum in spite of Bithynian and Celtic aggressions and the intrigues of Greek rivals, had lulled the jealousy of their suzerain, and had interfered with effect in the troubles of their neighbours. But with Attalus III., a cruel and bloodthirsty diletante (whose uncle had acted for twenty years as king or regent for life), the line came to an end (133 B.C.). His testament was alleged to have left his kingdom and treasures, in default of heirs, to the Roman Republic, as if a people could be disposed of by will. But the document, whether a Roman forgery or authentic, gave effect to facts. Certainly the gift fell at an opportune moment like ripe fruit into a thirsting mouth. The inheritance was disputed by Aristonicus, a natural son of Eumenes II., the father of Attalus, who, though defeated by the Ephesians at sea, called to arms slaves and adventurers, and at the head of his band of socialist "Heliopolites," scattered the local contingents, mastered the greater part of Pergamum, and in 131 B.C. defeated and killed the consul, P. Crassus Mucianus, the orator and jurist, who, though Pontifex Maximus, had evaded the sacred law to claim a lucrative command abroad. M. Perperna defeated and captured the Pretender in 130 B.C., and the following year M'. Aquillius organised the new province as Asia. His arrangements, modified by Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompeius, remained the basis of the provincial constitution. A regular garrison was saved by entrusting the defence to buffer states. The subjects were treated with

moderation, but the mode of collecting the taxes rendered them oppressive, and the wealth of Attalus helped to corrupt Roman manners.

The Client Kingdoms of the East.—Bithynia retained its independence. Cappadocia kept its position as a friend and ally, and began to imbue itself with the vices and accomplishments of Hellas. Cappadocia by the sea, or Pontus, under Mithradates V. (Euergetes) received Great Phrygia as the reward of her services against Aristonicus, and of the king's judicious bribery of Aquillius. Mithradates, the future great king, succeeded his murdered father in 121 B.C., under the regency of the queen-mother. The Romans were masters of Asia Minor, but their careless supervision permitted the growth of dangerous enemies. It was the same elsewhere. Syria, which had evacuated Egypt (168 B.C.) in obedience to Rome and allowed Roman diplomacy to decide a disputed succession, set her at naught by the assassination of Cn. Octavius, the guardian appointed for the son of Antiochus Epiphanes (162 B.C.). The throne was seized by Demetrius, whom the Senate had set aside, and the usurper was actually recognised. In Egypt, Ptolemy Philometor, expelled by his brother Euergetes, was restored by Rome (163 B.C.), Euergetes receiving Cyrene. When they quarrelled over Cyprus, the Senate acquiesced in the retention of the island by Egypt in defiance of its original decision, and finally, in 146 B.C., stultified its own policy by allowing Euergetes II., a bloated tyrant, surnamed Physcon, to reunite the two kingdoms. Anxious to avoid a forward policy, the Senate left the East to stew in its own juice, but by doing so the Romans neglected their interests and responsibilities, and the Orientals treated them with contempt. Moreover, events were preparing in Farther Asia which needed vigilance.

Parthia.—After Magnesia Syria rapidly decayed, torn by intestine feuds, disintegrated by ambitious satraps and interfering neighbours, and pressed by the growing power of Parthia. Cappadocia and Sophene were free; the Maccabees had asserted the national and religious independence of Judæa against Epiphanes, who hoped by a policy of persecution and plunder to reduce to unity and conformity the various religious and political elements of his motley monarchy. Rome gladly recognised Jewish autonomy as a useful check on Syria, but confined her help to paper. Of far greater importance was the rise of Parthia under the alien Scythian dynasty of the Arsacidæ. The sixth Arsaces, Mithradates I. (175-136 B.C.), overpowered the weakened kingdom of

Bactria, one of the half-Hellenic fragments of Alexander's empire, took advantage of the dynastic broils and rotten organisation of Syria to annex its eastern provinces, and founded a national monarchy of the old Oriental type. The new state, however superficially Philhellenic, reacted distinctly in language, religion, warfare, and politics against Western ideas. The East with renewed vigour flung away the legacy of Alexander and pushed back retreating Hellas. Only internal strife in Parthia and the diversion caused by the attacks of the Scythians rescued the remnants of Syria. Rome neglected to support her vassal. Ignorant of the drift of events, she preserved a "masterly inactivity" whose bitter harvest was soon reaped in full. Behind the fringe of protectorates which concealed the movements of Asia, Armenia, Pontus, and Parthia were growing up from weakness to strength.

Piracy.—On the seas things were rapidly becoming worse. The fleets of Syria and Carthage were destroyed, Rhodes was exhausted, Egypt enervated. Rome ceased to maintain a regular navy, and relied on ships requisitioned from the allies when wanted. As a result, the pirates swept the waters, levied blackmail on the coast-towns, infested the trade-routes, and drove a brisk trade in kidnapped slaves. The headquarters of the buccaneers were in the island of Crete, the home of civil war, the recruiting-ground of mercenaries, filled with corrupt and quarrelsome democracies, and among the rocky fastnesses and secret inlets of Cilicia. Their depredations were connived at and even encouraged by Syrian pretenders and Roman slave-dealers. The Dalmatian and Ligurian waters were cleared earlier, and in 123 B.C. Q. Metellus occupied the Balaric Islands and founded Palma and Pollentia, but in the Ægean and the East the pirates were masters.

Roman commissioners appeared from time to time in the Levant. Æmilianus in 143 B.C., with a small party and a roving commission, visited Egypt and passed through Greece and the eastern dependencies, reporting, arbitrating, and reconnoitring the ground. A more vigorous action might have anticipated the inevitable. A strong force guarding a definite frontier would have ensured the peaceful development of the East, but recruits were scarce and the service expensive, and the policy of the Senate was one of drift. It had neither relinquished the old nor embraced the new principles earnestly. To leave everything to the caprice of its officers and the courage of local militias was to court failure and encourage attack. In Spain mole-hills were made mountains by irresponsible stupidity and treachery, and no serious penalties

were exacted. The interests of the subjects and of the government itself were sacrificed to the greed of the governor and the capitalist. The conquest of a Spanish village, of a Portuguese shepherd, or of a Syrian slave, these were the triumphs of Roman wars—triumphs stained by perfidy, assassination, and cowardice.

CHAPTER XXXIII

INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS (133 B.C.).

Decay of Rome.—In internal affairs, the tendencies already noticed went on unchecked. The Senate continued to govern, as being the only possible government, and custom, precedent, and necessity sanctioned its rule. Its power was the result of a true and genuine constitutional growth; a system of checks and balances can only be worked by the effective preponderance of the strongest element in the state. An exact balance of powers and a division of sovereignty are a theoretical delusion. The Magistrates remained ministers of the Senate. The people had practically lost its functions one by one to more competent and more active instruments. But as the days of struggle ended and the external restraint of foreign rivals ceased to act, as the antique virtues which had justified command were corrupted by the influence of wealth and power, with despotism rampant abroad and capitalism at home, it was time for a new and internal check to be created sufficient to arrest decay. Æmilianus prayed the gods to *save* the state. The need of some centre of resistance was as clear to Nasica, who for that very reason opposed the destruction of Carthage, as it was to the censor Cato. Where was it to be found? The ideas of Cato were obsolete. To put back the hands on the clock was impossible. Empire cannot be surrendered because it is burdensome; morality cannot be restored by sumptuary laws. It is absurd to attempt to reduce the standard of comfort or to check the march of intellect. To revive the Comitia were a still more dangerous expedient (the more so, perhaps, that it was legally and formally possible), unless its constitution and composition could be seriously modified in the interests of Italy and the subjects. Such an attempt, even if it could be made, would seem doomed to failure in the existing conflict of interests between capital and

country, the burgess and the Italian, the Italian and the provincial. In its actual state the Assembly could be made a weapon of annoyance, but not of serious resistance. The causes that had limited the activity of the magistrates made any effectual check by combination on their part equally impossible. The dictatorship was extinct. Hence, unless reformers could capture the Senate, nothing short of revolution could bring about any real change. Meanwhile there was a period of calm and prosperity, unmarked by political agitation. The Republic was waiting unconsciously for its malady to come to a head. So rare is the power of prescience in statesmen ; so slight is the influence of politicians on the course of events ; so difficult was it, between a "decaying oligarchy and a democracy cankered in the bud," to provide a remedy which should not be more dangerous than the disease. No help could be expected from the equestrian order whose whole policy as a class was one of material interests ; there was friction enough between the aristocracies of birth and wealth both at home and abroad ; but while the Equites would join the reformers to bring down Privilege to their own level, they were more likely to combine with the nobles for purposes of plunder. The peasantry had lost all influence and showed a growing indifference to urban politics.

No True Parties.—Nor indeed was there any distinct party of reform or genuine leaders of a popular movement. There grew up a party system with party names, but it had all the dangers and none of the merits of its modern counterpart. Individuals came forward to redress abuses, and even the Senate occasionally took up the work, but there is nowhere any definite programme ; the ideas and methods of the best men of all parties are at bottom the same, however different the aim and spirit of the worker. Speaking generally, there were partisans but no parties ; there were no large political principles at stake. There was, too, a notable absence of great men. The Senate identified the maintenance of its privileges, to the exclusion of outsiders, with the true interests of the country. The magistrates plundered and blundered, content with the duties and emoluments of office. The people accepted their share of the spoils. There was plenty of excitement at the elections, but the contests turned on purely personal issues, and roused no interest outside Rome. There was merely an energetic competition among qualified candidates, who in turn canvassed and bribed their way to office.

Scipio Æmilianus.—A typical figure of the time is the adopted grandson of the great Scipio, P. Cornelius Scipio Æmilianus (184–

129 B.C.). He was an honest and capable administrator, a good officer, a vigorous censor, and a polished diplomatist. Himself a man of taste and education, he was the friend of Greek statesmen and philosophers and the centre of a cultivated circle. An enemy of mob violence, a friend of the Italians, a moderate constitutionalist, averse from extremes, he was unfit for the stress and strain of angry politics. His healthy and refined life, his amiable and ingenuous character, the real distinction of his manners, his liberal ideas and dislike of sordid speculation, put him in touch with all the best elements of the time and marked him out as the leader of a national reform. He did indeed purge the army, cleanse the census, convict governors, and purify justice. His liberalism earned the suspicion of the oligarchs, his stern rebukes the dislike of the rabble, but he had neither the genius nor the courage to conceive and carry through a radical reorganisation. He deplored evils he felt unable to remedy.

Futile Reforms.—The Senate then, which still absorbed the available brain of the community, continued to govern, avoiding troublesome questions at home and complications abroad. The resistance, too, was slight. In 149 B.C. the law of L. Calpurnius Piso, already mentioned, superseded the action of the popular courts and the special commissions of the Senate by the creation of a standing court to deal with extortion in the provinces. The jurymen, however, were selected from the body of senators. A premature attempt to transfer the election of priests from the colleges to the people by a *Rogatio Licinia de Sacerdotiis* failed. Yet a series of laws introduced and extended the use of the ballot¹ for elections, legislation, and judicial verdicts. One of these, the *Lex Cassia*, was supported by Æmilianus to secure the administration of justice from the influence of intimidation and bribery. Such measures were resisted by the nobles, who preferred open voting to secret ballot, and a popular assembly to a properly constituted court. The laws were useless, and merely developed corruption into an organised business on a large scale. The decree of 129 B.C. which compelled a senator on taking his seat to resign his horse and his vote as an eques failed equally to emancipate the Assembly from undue influence. The public preferred exemption from taxation and military service, with cheap corn and games, to any reform.

Social and Economic Crisis.—Political changes sprang once more

¹ *Lex Gabinia Tabellaria*, for elections, 139 B.C.; *Lex Cassia Tabellaria*, for law-courts, 137 B.C.; *Lex Papiria*, for legislation, 131 B.C.

from economic causes. The story of the Roman revolution begins with a social question, and social questions in the old world were as regularly connected with land and usury as those of a modern nation with wages. The old democratic movement had begun with the assertion of personal liberties against the usurer and the landlord. A succession of agrarian and debt laws and contemporary re-enactments of the law of appeal show the persistence of the difficulty and the connection of economic and political questions. Political rights are primarily sought as a means to obtain social and economic benefits. Politically, the struggle had ended with the apparent destruction of privilege, but the essential questions of free labour and free land had not been settled. Only capital and landholding had received new and more fatal developments. Hence arose, with the growth of the new governing order, that ill-defined and irregular opposition which we see dimly through the dust of battlefields, and which grows in vigour with the decline of the oligarchy.

Ruin of Agriculture.—The strongest feeling had been shown over the agrarian question and the proposals of Flaminius. In the period of peace that followed things ripened fast, and the slackness of the government combined with the rash enthusiasm of idealist democrats, on whom its failure threw the burden of reform, to precipitate a crisis. The shock came once more over the agricultural question. The causes of the decay of agriculture have been already described. We may briefly repeat them : the natural decay of small holdings, the growth of capital and improved methods, the slave system, the competition of artificially cheapened corn, the constant drain of war, and the ill-judged legislation which stimulated the absorption of land by the senatorial nobility or associations of capitalists. Perhaps the least important part, as we see in the case of France, was played by the drain of war. No campaign does so much harm as a bad law. Moreover, land-grabbing was carried on by the nobles to such an extent that a prætorian edict was needed to restrain illegal evictions. The natural result had been the extinction of the yeoman farmer, especially in Etruria and South Italy, the spread of plantations and cattle-ranches, the immigration of the labourers into the towns, and the depopulation of the rural districts.

Corn was giving place to the olive and vine, cattle and game ; the laborious yeoman to the unproductive slave ; the true basis of the Comitia and of the army was being destroyed, industry demoralised, and civic equality annihilated. The veteran was left with no career

before him but that of brigand or beggar. The peasant, without capital, liable to conscription, with his family dependent upon him, could not compete with the imported corn which supplied the army and the capital, or with the big estate worked by cheap slaves, exempt from service and without family. Even Cato's model estate was worked by serfs. And yet no economy can be lasting that is not firmly based on the internal resources of a land and the industry of its people. The yeomanry was the backbone of Rome. Her military and political system had been founded on a fair and moderate distribution of land, and this foundation had been entirely sapped. The freeholders were sinking into *metayer* tenants, labourers or serfs, or drifting into the proletariat and the army, while Italy depended upon foreign supplies. Emigration, even if possible to Roman sentiment, would be no remedy. Redistribution of the soil spelled revolution. Land purchase was not feasible.

The Public Land.—The orthodox remedy had been to allot land in newly conquered districts to the poorer citizens and veterans. If such land were wanting, law and precedent allowed the government to reclaim the public land held on sufferance by squatters, and divide this among deserving claimants. Of this public land Rome possessed a large amount, confiscated after victory in Italy or abroad, arable, pasture, or waste. The arable land was rarely sold; occasionally, as with Capua and Leontini, it was let on lease, but the traditional method was to allot it in small freehold plots to the members of some colony or settlement then founded. The waste land, needing capital and slaves to turn it to account, was handed over to occupiers, who squatted at will on condition of cultivating the soil, and paid a fixed proportion as a rent to the state. They held their lands subject to resumption by the state, but were protected in their holdings by equitable injunctions. The state remained owner; the occupier enjoyed the usufruct. The defects of the system lay in the risk of encroachment, and in the tendency to evade legal restrictions and apply it to arable or unauthorised land. The government neglected to enforce the conditions, and allowed a sense of ownership to spring up by uninterrupted tenure. The districts suitable to pasturage in Apulia and Bruttium were mainly occupied by syndicates, who bred cattle on a large scale, and attempted to evade their dues, which in this case were more carefully exacted.

Occupation supersedes Allotment.—This simple and natural way of dealing with the land was upset when the allotment system,

which favoured the poor, practically ceased, and the rich man's occupations and pasture lands spread unchecked. The same state of things prevailed among the allies, partly because the wealthy Italians imitated their Roman brethren, partly because the restrictions on landholding favoured the transference of land to Roman citizens. Hence the struggle, which lasted till 111 B.C., between the rich and the poor man's method, an agitation directed to obtain a fair share of the land for those who had won it. The Licinian rogations had failed for want of machinery. Their regulations were set aside or evaded by putting in men of straw. The plebeian nobles had used these proposals as a stalking-horse for their own purposes. They were indeed a solemn imposture, and had sanctioned the evils they pretended to check. For some time the process of absorption was checked by the formation of colonies and the distribution of allotments, but after 177 B.C. the assignments practically stopped, as there was no new land to divide. Occupation went on till it monopolised the bulk of the public land, and thus the natural outlet for the impoverished farmer was closed. Foreign colonies were considered to endanger the position of Italy. The nobles, by not paying the dues, increased the burdens of the state, whose land they plundered and converted into private property. The census began to show a steady decrease during a quiet and prosperous period. Lælius, the friend of Scipio, expressed the ideas of his circle when he proposed to deal with the question, but, with characteristic timidity, withdrew his bill in deference to advice, and earned the title of "Sapiens."

The Parents and Teachers of the Gracchi.—So matters stood when Ti. Sempronius Gracchus took up the question in 133 B.C. The Gracchi were the sons of a distinguished plebeian noble, great-grandsons of the general who raised a slave-legion in the Punic wars. The father, a Roman of the old school, had served as a soldier and diplomatist throughout the world, had filled every office of the state, had enjoyed two triumphs, and had won the affection of the subjects and a high reputation by his pacification of Spain. In his consulship he reduced Sardinia (177 B.C.), as censor (169 B.C.) he restricted the franchise of the freedmen, and received a second consulship in 163 B.C. He was a man of chivalrous character and some cultivation. His wife, to whom he was deeply attached, Cornelia, the "mother of the Gracchi," a daughter of Africanus, is said to have refused the throne of Egypt for the sake of her children. She was a woman of real culture and liberal ideas, to whom her sons largely owed their careful education, their

eloquence, their skill in the Latin tongue, and, above all, their power of passionate sympathy with suffering and indignation with wrong. These tendencies were strengthened and stimulated by the democratic ideas and philosophic politics instilled by their Greek teachers, Blossius of Cumæ and Diophanes of Mitylene, and by the humanism of the Scipionic circle, whose dilettante ideas were translated into action by the enthusiasm of Tiberius and the passionate energy of Gaius. For the first time in Roman history the precedents of Greek legislators like Solon and Lycurgus, and the precepts of political theorists like Plato, influenced the course of politics, as they had already at Sparta inspired the reforming efforts of Agis and Cleomenes.

Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus.—The brothers were both brave, temperate, high-minded, and talented, both diligent in office and generous in their behaviour to the subjects and allies; but while Tiberius was more gentle and sedate, the younger man was more animated and impetuous. His oratory was marked by excited movement and gesture, his style was impressive and impassioned, his diction exuberant and persuasive. It is said that he employed a slave to sound a soft note when excitement was carrying him too far. The style of Tiberius was sweeter and more pathetic, his diction pure and exact, his reasoning acute and sensible. The same contrast pervaded their habits and character. Tiberius, first man on the wall at the storm of Carthage, was elected augur in early youth, married the daughter of the consular Appius Claudius Pulcher, and served as *quæstor* to Mancinus in Spain. The repudiation of the treaty (*vide supra*, p. 244) negotiated on his personal honour, however little it explains his action, sharpened his insight into the weakness of the government. It was the spectacle of the misery and depopulation of Etruria which fired a heart already penetrated with ideas of reform and indignant at the inaction of his circle. He was encouraged to proceed by the support of his father-in-law, a political opponent of the Scipios, and ready, like his ancestors, to gird at his own caste; by the great jurist, Crassus Mucianus, his brother's father-in-law; and by a still greater lawyer, P. Mucius Scævola, the consul of 133 B.C.; while the aims at least of the reformers were approved by that pattern of antique virtue, Q. Metellus Macedonicus.

Agrarian Law of Tiberius Gracchus.—Elected tribune (133 B.C.) in ordinary course, not on this particular platform, he could count on no party to back him. Scipio was averse from an open struggle; his supporters in the Senate were lawyers or family

friends. On the other hand, there was nothing revolutionary in the measures he proposed. Agrarian reform was not a party question. The class he would benefit had been always conservative ; the method to be employed was traditional. It was not the end but the means he adopted which, aided by the obstructive policy of the Senate, made this bill the turning-point in the fall of the Republic. Without securing the previous approbation of the Senate, he laid his proposal, contrary to the custom, but in accordance with the letter of the constitution, before the assembly of the tribes. The general aim of the Agrarian Law was to reclaim and redistribute the public lands now occupied by the wealthy possessors in excess of the limit permitted by the Licinian Law. He did not mean to resume the whole of the land of which the state was the legal owner, but (1) all occupations beyond the legal limit, (2) all common land enclosed *clani vi aut precario*, and (3) available pasture lands. By way of compensation for disturbance, the legal holdings were confirmed in ownership, *i.e.*, 500 *iugera*, with the addition of 250 for each son up to a maximum of 1000. Further proposals of compensation for improvement were dropped on account of the hostility shown to the bill. The reclaimed land was to be allotted to poor citizens in small holdings, which were not assigned in freehold, but as heritable leaseholds at a small rent, which might not be sold or disposed of. He hoped by these means to prevent absorption and to reimburse the state. The capital required for starting the new system was to be furnished out of the treasures of Attalus. The necessary machinery was provided by the creation of a commission with powers to determine the available land and to carry out the distribution. The allotments were probably limited to Roman citizens. For, although the Gracchi were favourable to the Italian claims, public opinion was not yet ripe for such an extension of privilege. These proposals were both legal and constitutional. They asserted an ancient right which had been the subject of constant struggle ; they enforced the sound legal maxim that prescription did not avail against the state—and in this case the men who pleaded prescription had created it by evading payments. The end proposed was the restoration of the yeomanry to the land. The only new features were the titles granted to the possessors, the inalienability of the lots, the imposition of a rent, and the attempt to secure the continuous execution of the law by a permanent commission.

Objections to the Law.—Tiberius was no common demagogue, but a distinguished soldier and orator belonging to the highest

society. His reform was well meant, and the moment chosen was not unfavourable. The slave war and the Spanish disasters were making the failure of the government clear to the meanest capacity. But it was impolitic to attack the Senate single-handed, with no organised party, with colleagues he could not trust, with no force behind him but a fickle and corrupted mob, from a position which lasted only for a year, without possibility of re-election. His action ignored the real nature of the constitution

VIA·FECIT·AB·REGIO·AD·CAPVAM·ET
 IN·EA·VIA·PONTEIS·OMNEIS·MILIARIOS
 TABELARIOS·QVE·POSEIVEI·HINCE·SVN⁷
 NOV·CERIA·M·MEILIA·↓·CAPVAM·XXCIII
 MV·RANVM·LXXIII·COSENTIAM·CXXIII
 VAL·NTIAM·CLXXX■·AD·FRETVM·AF
 STATVAM·CCXXXI■·REGIVM·CCXXVII
 SVMA·AF·CAPVARE·GIVM·MEILIA·CCC
 ET·EIDEM·PRAE·TOR·IN·XXII
 SICILIA·FVGITE·IVOS·ITALICORVM
 CONQVAE·ISIVE·I·REDIDEI·QVE
 HOMINES·DCCC·XV·II·EIDEM·QVE
 PRIMVS·FECIT·V·T·DE·AGRO·POP·LICO
 ARATORIBVS·CEDERENT·PAA·STORES
 FORVM·A·EDIS·QVE·POP·LICAS·HEIG·FECIT

MILESTONE SET UP BY P. POPILLIUS LÆNAS, IN LUCANIA, AS
 CONSUL, 132 B.C.¹

by its appeal to the formal powers of the Comitia against the authority of the Senate. Again, if it was proposed to confiscate land occupied by allies on sufferance or by treaty, without giving them a share in the redivision, the gross iniquity of the proposal would raise dangerous opposition. Economically the objections were also serious. In its disturbance of ancient claims and vested interests, the bill, in its final shape, took no sufficient account of

¹ This illustrates (a) roadmaking, *vide infra*, p. 553; (b) Sicilian slave-war; (c) Agrarian Law of Gracchus.

the change in the standard of landed wealth and in the methods of industry since 367 B.C., and of the proper compensation for permanent improvements, for *bonâ fide* investments and the displacement of capital. When Cato evicted the occupiers in Campania (165 B.C.), though the encroachments were recent and unauthorised, there had been at least compensation. The lapse of time made the resumption, in many cases, actual confiscation. It was a menace to all uncertain titles, and opened a ready way to vexatious prosecutions, a difficulty increased by the absence of exact registers, the lapse of payments, the working of sale and bequest. It would be hard enough even to get sufficient land, harder still to make farmers out of city loafers, while for the pasture land the system of allotment was unfitted. The clause prohibiting alienation was unworkable. The measure did not touch the real economic causes of depression in agriculture—slave labour, cheap corn, and bad laws. There is a curious mixture of legalism and youthful impatience in this impulsive attack on the landlord and oligarch.

Octavius deposed and the Law carried.—A storm of opposition followed, not merely from noble lords, who clung half honestly, half unscrupulously, to their privileges, but from the moderates, who feared revolution more than they loved reform, and later on from the spokesman of the exasperated Italians. There were crowded meetings, eloquently harangued by the impassioned tribune; the rural voters, on whom he depended, poured into the city. The Senate, the organ of the landowners, resorted to obstruction. M. Octavius, a friend and colleague of Gracchus, interposed his veto, to which Tiberius, equally constitutionally, replied by placing his seal on the treasury and blocking every executive act. He did more. Eager to avail himself of the presence of the country voters and the momentary consternation of the landlords, he declined to wait for the slow pressure of time and opinion, and pushed his proposal while the iron was still hot. The bill, once more moved, was again vetoed in spite of personal appeals to Octavius. Finally, after a fruitless negotiation with the Senate and repeated efforts to appease his colleague, he reluctantly proposed and carried the deposition of the refractory tribune. One or the other of them must go, he said; and when Octavius refused to allow such an alternative to be put, he asked the people to declare that a tribune who acted against the popular will, *ipso facto* forfeited his office. Octavius was deposed and dragged away. It was a *coup d'état*. A magistrate could only resign; he could not be deposed. In an

apology which he felt bound to offer later, Tiberius descanted on the right of the people to control their magistrate: it was mere sophistry. Government becomes impossible if the people can cancel their mandate for every passing whim. To defy the right of intercession cut the ground from his own feet. Moreover, the tribunate had been of late years a valuable instrument of government; to revive its earlier use as a weapon of opposition was a dangerous anachronism. A successor to Octavius was appointed, and the law carried by a single vote of the people. The two brothers and Appius Claudius were placed on the commission—a mere family conclave. The Senate amused itself by docking their allowance.

Fall of Tiberius Gracchus.—But Tiberius had to prepare himself for attack, especially for infringing the sacred rights of the tribunate. He must buy the favour of the urban electors, and ensure, if possible, his appointment for a second year, if he was to avoid impeachment and the ruin of his work. To this end he entered on a series of popular proposals, promising to extend the right of appeal, to shorten the term of service, &c. He meant perhaps to curtail the judicial and administrative prerogatives of the Senate, possibly in the end to give the franchise to Italy.

The charge of aiming at the kingship was a fabrication of the nobles to justify their violence, to meet which he had provided himself with a large retinue, but personal peril and the logic of necessity pushed him further than he meant. Re-election to the tribunate was unconstitutional, but surely the people might make their own precedents. On this issue the question was fought out. The elections were fixed for a time when his rural supporters were busy with harvest. The nobles were able to postpone them to the following day. For that day both sides prepared, and Gracchus appealed alike to compassion, gratitude, and force. Strengthened by popular sympathy, he met the tribes once more in front of the Capitoline Temple. The Assembly was tumultuous. Obstruction was followed by riot, and the partisans of the Senate were expelled. The wildest rumours circulated. A gesture of Gracchus was taken to mean a demand for the crown. Rumours reached the Senate, sitting in the temple of Fides, and when the wise consul Scevola refused indignantly to slay citizens without trial, the optimates, headed by the younger Nasica, who summoned all patriots to take the place of a consul who betrayed the state, rushed forth and, followed by a mass of knights, clients, and gladiators, flung themselves, with bludgeons and bench-legs in their hands, on the overawed and cowardly mob. Tiberius, as he turned to escape,

was felled to the ground with 300 of his associates : the bodies were thrown into the Tiber. Thus on this first day of wholesale murder in the streets of Rome the series of civil massacres was inaugurated by the party of order. The illegal executions were confirmed, in the following year, by the judicial execution of the Gracchans, of whom a large number, mainly of the lower classes, were condemned by a special commission under the consul P. Popillius. Nasica was rewarded with the pontificate in 130 B.C. The moderates acquiesced in the proceedings, and Æmilianus, when he heard the news before the walls of Numantia, cried in the words of Homer—

“ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ρέζου.”

Weakness of his Position.—The building collapsed with its architect. His aim was good, and approved itself to good men—the regeneration of Italy based on a restored yeomanry and an extended franchise. Thus he hoped to infuse fresh blood into the Comitia and army, to stem the tide of corruption and pauperism, and place an invigorated people as a check on the government. The measure he proposed as a first step was, under the circumstances, a natural one. If it was oppressive to the rich, they had their own greed and negligence to thank. But he failed because he tried a revolution without understanding that it was a revolution, and without the means to carry it through. A rash and impetuous idealist, who failed to grasp the true nature of the constitution and the degeneracy of the Comitia, he was hurried into false steps, struck down the platform on which he himself stood, and set in motion forces which would make a republican system impossible. He had no original intention of changing the form of government, aimed at no tyranny, was mainly interested in social questions. But by turning the tribunate against the Senate and ruling Rome by popular meetings, he put the feet above the head and pampered the riotous arrogance of the sovereign mob. The Comitia had neither the morale nor the organisation necessary to make it a genuine organ of popular government. Such a body had no right to control provinces, direct administration, and vote itself land and money. The precedent set by Flaminius and copied by Gracchus was a caricature and not a revival of older procedure, and its sure end was an oligarchic restoration or a saviour of society. For the present the nobles held their own and the storm passed by, its warnings unheeded. They gave their enemies' cause a baptism of blood, and raised by murder a mistaken enthusiast to the rank of a hero and martyr.

CHAPTER XXXIV

GAIUS GRACCHUS



	B.C.	A.U.C.
Death of Scipio Æmilianus	129	625
Fulvius Flaccus proposes to enfranchise the		
Italians—Revolt of Fregellæ	125	629
Tribunate of C. Gracchus	123-122	631-632
Deaths of C. Gracchus and Fulvius	121	633

THE interval between the tribunates of Tiberius and Gaius is marked on the whole by moderation. The violence of the ultras strengthened the hands of the more liberal members of the Senate, men like Metellus, Scævola, and Scipio, averse to either extreme of oligarchy or democracy. The optimates, half ashamed of their work, were not unready to adopt the dead man's law, and get what favour they could by its execution. The opposition was for the moment powerless; nor did the personal rivalries or divergences of opinion in the Senate amount to any real party division. But credit is mainly due to the sound sense of Æmilianus, whose real influence with all sections bears witness to his political honesty and independence.

The Agrarian Commission.—The commission of three went to work with the approval of the Senate, P. Crassus receiving the vacant place. After his death in 130 B.C., and that of Appius, their places were taken by the active agitators M. Fulvius Flaccus and C. Papirius Carbo, the latter of whom, a distinguished orator, passed over later on to the optimates. Their accession gave energy to the work. As to its extent and value opinions differ, but there is evidence of distributions in South Italy, and the rapid increase in the census, said to amount to 80,000, may be attributed to the number of poor citizens, hitherto carelessly enumerated, who passed from the *capite censi* to the register of men able to bear arms. But it caused great and natural irritation. Exact returns could not be secured; recourse was had to informations. The arbitrary decisions of a partisan court, empowered to define as well as to distribute the public lands, and acting often on imperfect evidence, disturbed not only recent and obvious occupiers, but *bonâ fide* possessors, even genuine owners whose titles were not forthcoming. The feeling of insecurity and resentment became general; and when, in 129 B.C., the commissioners began to deal with those lands which the Latin

or allied communities had occupied by express or implied permission of the people as a reward for their services or in default of sufficient citizens, it appeared high time to bring operations to a close. To assert in these cases the legal ownership of Rome was vexatious and impolitic.

Action of Scipio.—Africanus took up the cause of his old soldiers, and mainly by his influence the judicial powers of the commission were transferred to the consuls. Sempronius Tuditanus, to whom they passed, avoided the inevitable odium by betaking himself promptly to the army of Illyria. It was not the



TERMINI SET UP BY THE LAND COMMISSION IN THE LAND OF
THE HIRPINI, 130-129 B.C.

first time that Scipio had resisted popular feeling. In the heads of the commission the party of progress had found leaders whose ideas were visibly widening. Carbo in 131 B.C. not merely passed a Ballot Act, but attempted to legalise the re-election of tribunes and so remove the obstacle that had been fatal to Gracchus. Scipio, in a vehement speech, resisted the proposal, justified the execution of Tiberius, and silenced the howlings of the mob with bitter sarcasms. He at least was not afraid of the "stepchildren of Italy, these freedmen whom he had sent in chains to the slave-market." The Bill, rejected for the present, may have passed afterwards in a modified form.

Death of Scipio.—In 125 B.C. Flaccus, now consul, proposed that every ally should be allowed to petition for the franchise or for the right of appeal only if he so preferred,—a rather sweeping proposal. What Scipio would have said to this measure of relief on behalf of his *protégés* we cannot tell. Soon after his defence of their claims in the matter of the land law, when on the point of delivering a further speech on the question, he was struck down by a sudden and mysterious death, at the age of fifty-six, in the fulness of his vigour and influence (129 B.C.). The foulest rumours were current, and suspicion has fallen on the democratic leaders. At the time there was no inquiry, and the evidence is conflicting. The assassination, if it was such, was the work of a few malcontents. The esteem of the world followed the last great Scipio to the tomb, whither he was borne by the four sons of his personal enemy, Metellus. He was “the noblest Roman of them all,” this sober student of the simple wisdom of Xenophon, the friend of Polybius, Lælius, and Panætius; the patron of Terence and Lucilius; the proud, generous, and unselfish gentleman, who did his best for Rome, and, careless of popularity, steered clear of all her factions.

The Italians and the Franchise.—The idea of extending the franchise, already mooted by Carvilius, was in the air before Flaccus proposed his Bill. No doubt the very thought of it seemed treason at Rome, and the people were as unwilling as the Senate to share the rapidly increasing benefits enjoyed by the privileged minority. But the situation was becoming impossible; the allies were restless, and the longer heads among the reformers saw their way to remove the stumbling-block to the Land Act, to strengthen their party and counteract the urban voters by a just and generous stroke of policy. They were not supported. A law of the tribune M. Junius Pennus (126 B.C.) enabled the authorities to expel non-citizens from Rome, and so prevent an influx of Italians from usurping votes or intimidating opinion, and when Flaccus brought forward his Bill he met such universal resistance that he was as glad to take as the Senate was eager to give a military command in Gaul. But his proposal had brought the question into practical politics, and its rejection was followed by the revolt of Fregellæ, the loyal and prosperous Latin colony which commanded the passage of the Liris. When L. Opimius had captured it by treachery, it was dismantled and reduced to a village, and a Roman colony, Fabrateria, was founded on its confiscated lands. With its fall collapsed whatever

other agitation may have existed, but the fate of Fregellæ sank deep into the Italian heart, as its revolt was the forerunner of a more terrible rebellion.

C. Gracchus.—C. Gracchus was absent for the time. He had supported the Bill for the re-election of tribunes, had opposed the Junian Law, and had worked as a land commissioner, while he cultivated his natural gifts for rhetoric and business. In 126 B.C. he went, with the consul L. Aurelius Orestes, as quæstor to Sardinia, and distinguished himself by his integrity, humanity, and diligence. The Senate tried to keep him out of the way by twice prolonging his superior's command, but at the end of the second year he returned without his chief, and successfully defended his actions before the censors and the people. He had served in the army twelve years instead of the legal ten, and two years instead of one as quæstor. He had taken a full purse to the province, and had brought it back empty. Others filled with their plunder the empty casks which they had taken out filled with wine. He escaped the censor's brand, and when charged with aiding and abetting the Fregellan outbreak, once more foiled the attempt to discredit his candidature. In 124 B.C. he was elected tribune amid great enthusiasm, though the influx of country voters was unable to secure him the first place. He was a stronger man than his brother in gifts and character. Equally unselfish and idealistic, equally ardent and sympathetic, he had been disciplined by suffering and self-repression; with a clear eye and unfaltering purpose, aided by an extraordinary power of work and an attractive personality, he took up his brother's ideas undaunted by his brother's fate, with an almost superstitious feeling of his summons to serve the people, avenge his cause, and die.

Before coming to his measures, it may be noticed that there were two plebeian censors in 131 B.C., of whom Q. Metellus Macedonicus delivered a curious harangue against celibacy, just as Scipio, in his censorship, had attacked the fashion of dancing and the loose education of Roman children. Another sign of the times was the acquittal of at least two eminent governors, one of whom was the notoriously guilty Aquillius, by corrupted jurors in the court of extortion.


His Programme.—The usual storm of prodigies heralded the reforms of C. Gracchus. His active work extended over the two years 123–122 B.C. Of its drift and purpose it is easy to form a general conception; it is impossible to settle the details or determine the order of the several laws. Even of its drift divergent

views are possible ; it may be wilfully exaggerated into a tyrant's progress, and blessed or cursed as such ; it may be as easily belittled as exaggerated. It will be best to group his measures and proposals without regard to chronological order, and consider their general meaning afterwards. But this too is difficult, because to carry out his social programme and avenge his brother's death it would be necessary to secure a basis of power in and beyond the Roman populace, and to reduce the Senate to impotence by dividing and neutralising the strength of the upper classes. Hence there runs throughout a perplexing mixture of motives, reform and revenge, and the means he took must be carefully distinguished from the end desired.

Agrarian Law revived.—To take first the measures intended to relieve distress and to confirm his hold on the popular vote. He revived the dormant Land Law and restored to the commission its indispensable judicial powers. Sure of the sympathy of the allies, whose cause his party had espoused, he could include the Italian lands, whose wealthy occupiers would hope to be compensated by the franchise, while the poor, at least the Latins, were by a special clause to share as citizens in the colonial distributions. But as the bulk of the available land had been distributed, his real gift to Italian agriculture lay in the system of roads, whose construction, on improved methods, he personally superintended, and which were designed for the service of industry and commerce.

Scheme of Colonisation.—To this he added a large scheme of colonisation, but few of his foundations survived him. The proposed revival of Capua, now reduced to a shelter of shepherds, would have meant the resumption of public land, let by a new system on profitable leases, and would have roused bitter memories and jealousies. Neptunia was designed to restore Tarentum, hard hit by the competition of Brundisium, and to give an outlet to the Apulian allotments, as Minervia (Scylacium) would to those in Bruttium. The new colonies were no longer military outposts, but served to deplete the capital and restore the trade and population of the ruined south. To Gracchus also was due the first attempt at foreign colonisation, the first Emigration Act. To revive and repopulate the sites of Carthage and Corinth, to repair the injury done to the world's commerce in their destruction, to relieve the pressure of population, and, by Romanising the provinces, to pave the way to a unity of feeling and interest, was, if grasped by Gracchus in this large sense, an idea as imperial and

far-sighted as it was premature. Possibly he only meant to utilise two pieces of domain favourably situated for strong and compact settlements, lying waste under a special curse, with none but divine interests to disturb. The attempt was seriously made at Carthage, where, under the name of Junonia, he intended to form a settlement of 6000 Romans and allies, with large allotments. These allies were to become Roman citizens, exactly reversing the old custom. Its fulfilment was frustrated by religious prejudice and the fear of weakening Rome by establishing citizen centres



RUINS OF AQUEDUCT, CARTHAGE.

abroad, but the idea bore fruit later under the Cæsars. Junonia was of a different type from the ordinary fortress colonies or from the later colonies of veterans, different even from Narbo, founded by the democrats in 118 B.C., the oldest transmarine colony of burgesses, guarding the communications with Spain along the Domitian and Aurelian roads.

Lex Frumentaria.—As he had won the rural voters by the Land Law, and the artisans by his great works, so he attached the city mob to himself by the *Lex Frumentaria*. The supply of

necessaries like corn and salt at moderate prices was often considered the duty of government. Of salt the Roman state held a monopoly. A constant flow of corn from Syracuse to Ostia and the markets was secured by the arrangements with the Sicilian tithe-collectors, under the supervision of the aediles and the Ostian quaestor. Later on Egyptian and African corn poured into Puteoli. Free distribution by conquerors and candidates, or by the state in case of need, had been fairly frequent. On these precedents Gaius established a regular system by which every citizen who should apply personally in the capital would receive 5 *modii* ($1\frac{1}{2}$ bushels) of corn a month, at $6\frac{1}{2}$ *asses* (3d.) a *modius*, or not quite half of a low average price. The loss would fall on the treasury and the subjects; recent annexations enabled Gracchus and his successors to organise the supply, and large granaries were built. One hostile senator took advantage of its general terms to discredit the measure by applying himself—he wished at least to have a share if his property was to be plundered. But the Bill was fatally popular. Gracchus, who borrowed the idea from similar Greek enactments, may have justified it as a payment of the citizens for their work in government, which gave them a share in the spoils of empire, and was some compensation for the land they had lost. He hoped above all to make them independent of the nobles and their doles, secure a firm support for future action, and buy their consent to Italian franchise and agricultural reform. His hope was vain. The prejudices of the mob could be excited and its votes bought as easily as before. The additional value of the franchise tightened the voter's grip on it. Gracchus had just taught him to use his power for his own benefit. His gigantic system of indiscriminate outdoor relief fostered pauperism, drained the exchequer, stimulated the rush to Rome, and ruined the agriculture he sought to develop. The Roman plebs henceforth means the pauper members of the thirty-five tribes, whether rustic or urban, now resident in the capital, fed by the largesses and organised for electoral purposes. The country voters rarely appeared, and could not be counted upon.

At first it succeeded. To strengthen his hold on the Comitia, he carried out the reform of the Centuriata to its logical conclusion by directing the centuries to vote throughout in an order fixed on each occasion by lot. He lightened the condition of service by shortening the legal term, which constant warfare made oppressive, by providing for the free supply of clothing

to the troops without stoppages, and by extending the right of appeal to citizens under martial law.¹

The Jury-Courts transferred to the Equites.—Having thus secured the patronage of the plebs, he tried to find allies in the enemies' camp. Nowhere is the mixture of motives more obvious and more embarrassing. Hitherto the judices in all important processes, except the few that still came before the people, were taken from the body of senators, a course which tradition and their legal knowledge made natural. This privilege, when political and judicial functions were closely connected and party considerations decided legal issues, was a bulwark of senatorial authority, but collusion and corruption, especially in the court of extortion, in the interest of their order, had roused indignation and destroyed confidence. To transfer the courts to the people was absurd. Another class was available—that class of moneyed men which had gradually consolidated itself under the name of equites, *i.e.*, the rich men of the first class who were not senators. These, not yet formally constituted as a separate order by a distinct census, were separated by law and by interest from the ruling nobility. Between the two classes there was mutual antipathy for social reasons, besides the constant friction in the provinces. This division of feeling was utilised by Gracchus, who created out of these elements a new order, an intermediate and privileged class—judices, publicani, ordo equester—with honorary distinctions and probably a peculiar census—400,000 *sesterces*. To it he transferred the right of sitting as judices, registered in an official list or album, to the exclusion of senators, and thus at one blow placed it on the neck of the Senate and founded that wavering alliance of capital and democracy which proved so broken a reed to those who leaned upon it. The judices were practically identical in interest, if not personally, with the publicani, to whom the control of the courts was a great object. Politically, and for the moment, Gracchus gained his object; as a reformer he failed. Corruption and collusion went on as merrily as ever. Honest governors suffered; the dishonest, who connived at the extortion of the tax-farmers and business men, escaped. The whole Equestrian body strenuously resisted every attempt to make judicial bribery penal.

¹ The old limit for active service was seventeen to forty-five inclusive. The rule, however, arose that six years' continuous service gave a discharge, while twenty years in the infantry and ten in the cavalry gave exemption. Of the above arrangements, some, if passed, were not permanent.

The Taxation of Asia and the Equites.—He strengthened this alliance, while he struck at the administrative monopoly of the Senate by his arrangements for the taxation of Asia. Cancelling those made in 129 B.C. by which the communities paid moderate sums and the middlemen were restricted to the collection of dues and customs, he reimposed on the province the old Oriental system of tithes (*decumæ*), besides large indirect taxes, and ordered the right of collecting the revenue to be put up for auction at Rome, and not, as in Sicily and Sardinia, locally, thus excluding the wholesome competition of the provincials, and handing over Rome's richest province to the tender mercies of a gigantic association, uncontrolled by the governors or the courts. Further to restrict the discretion of the Senate, the conditions of the contracts were minutely fixed by law. So was established, at the expense of the nobles, a new order, a power to be reckoned with at home and abroad. The Republic became two-headed. Money and rank, capital and land, were thrown into collision. Under a colourable pretext of reform that imposed upon himself, the rash young man satisfied his political interests and his revenge. He divided to conquer, and even boasted of the dagger he had thrown down into the Forum with which his foes might cut each other's throats. But he sacrificed the prosperity of Asia to his Corn Laws and his Equestrian alliance, and plunged the courts deeper into the whirlpool of politics.

The Assignment of Provinces.—Setting aside the docked and curtailed Senate, the tribune, relying on the support of the people and the knights, proceeded to utilise to the full the rights of his office and the prerogatives of the Comitia, with the apparent acquiescence of his colleagues. He monopolised business and exercised an almost monarchical power. He interfered with financial and provincial and judicial affairs, distributed grain, selected jurymen, made roads, conducted settlements, guided the Assembly, led the dumbfounded Senate, with omnipresent and omnivorous industry. He limited the traditional right of the latter body to determine the *provincia* of the consuls for the ensuing year. Ordinarily this was done after the election, and the personal distribution was settled by the lot or by mutual agreement. This led to intrigue and jobbery, for the foreign command was the road to riches and triumphs. The disposal of this patronage was a stronghold of the Senate, and the appointments were decided largely on personal or partisan grounds. A *Lex Sempronia* directed the consular provinces to be settled before the elections, and, to prevent obstruc-

tion by the tribunes, forbade the use of the veto. But its only effect was to organise more perfectly the art of manipulating the polls; the slight check on jobbery was counterbalanced by the additional element of chance in the selection of men for important positions. Indeed, as the custom grew of detaining the magistrates of the year to do business in Rome, a man's province might be determined a year and a half before he became available.

Law of Appeal.—Another blow at the Senate was struck by the Law of Appeal, which, reaffirming and fortifying the *Leges Valeria*, the XII. Tables, and the Porcian Laws (198–184 B.C.), declared the indefeasible right of the people in the Comitia Centuriata to try and decide capital cases, enacting "*ne de capite civium Romanorum iniussu populi iudicaretur*." Primarily it was directed against the usurped jurisdiction of the Senate, which had arbitrarily and by decree appointed extraordinary commissions of treason, &c., in exceptional cases. As reasserting existing laws it applied retrospectively to Popillius, who went into exile. In the case of Tiberius Gracchus, the Senate had not merely summoned the consul to take the sword against citizens, but on his refusal had carried out a *coup d'état*, which it attempted to legalise by declaring the tribune a public enemy and executing his adherents without appeal. No doubt in a crisis demanding immediate action the executive needed to be armed with exceptional powers, and custom both before and after the Gracchi permitted the Senate to confer such powers as against subjects and allies, and in extreme danger against citizens, by the *ultimum decretum*, "*videant Consules ne quid Respublica detrimenti capiat*." But its employment against citizens was never legal, and the asserted right of the Senate to declare a domestic foe a public *hostis* remained a matter of political but scarcely legal dispute. The use of extraordinary *quæstiones* by the Senate stood abolished.

Permanent Courts.—About the same time the *Quæstio de Repe-tundis* was reorganised under the new judicial law, to be a scourge of senatorial governors, and possibly a new *quæstio* was provided to deal with miscarriages of justice—"*ne quis iudicio circum-veniretur*." This type of court, which soon took over the mass of criminal business, being a delegation of the people, admitted of no intercession or appeal. Hence its sentence did not go beyond exile or outlawry, and the accused apparently retained as a rule his power of avoiding sentence by voluntary exile. Thus, besides improving the administration of justice, Gracchus limited the

action of the popular courts, and indirectly the infliction of the penalty of death.

He had intended to punish the upright Octavius for his obstinacy by excluding from further promotion any official deprived of his functions by the people. His mother induced him to withdraw the measure dictated by personal revenge.

Proposed Extension of the Franchise.—So far his energy, eloquence, and honesty had carried him through. With bitter invectives he lashed the corruption of senators and diplomatists, and the cruelty of the magistrates to the allies and subjects. His passionate laments for his murdered brother moved the hearts of his opponents. He secured his own re-election for 122 B.C., with M. Flaccus, the consul of 125 B.C., as colleague, and the election of C. Fannius as consul. For all this mass of work a second year at least was indispensable, and the re-election was apparently unopposed, though the legality of the act is questioned. So far he had been able to combine various interests in an attack on an unpopular body and win support for his own schemes. The hardest question of all remained. The plan of regeneration and reform demanded the incorporation of Italy in Rome. Forgetting Fregellæ, he dreamed himself strong enough to propose a measure whose details are unknown, but which perhaps offered the full franchise to the Latins, and to the Italians the *Ius Latinum*. The Bill, if carried, would swamp the electorate, assist agrarian reform, strengthen his party, but it was also just and reasonable. Yet, in spite of all his appeals to patriotism and prophecies of peril, of all his startling stories of Roman tyranny, of magistrates flogged for a dirty bath or a peasant murdered for a harmless jest, the meaner instincts of the mob applauded the arguments of Fannius, and refused to be crowded out of their places at the games or share their cherished doles.

The Senate outbids Gracchus: Livius Drusus.—The Senate posed as the friend of the people, whose champion was whittling away the value of his own gifts. Nor were the knights prepared to share their privileges and profits with Latins and Italians. In defiance of the tribune's promised protection, all non-Romans were ejected by the consul, and when Livius Drusus, his senatorian colleague, threatened intercession Gracchus had to withdraw. The failure of the Bill opened the way for the manoeuvres of the Senate, who set up Drusus to outbid the enemy and play the Tory demagogue. The *Leges Livie* proposed (1) to remit the rent of lands distributed by the Gracchan laws; (2) to establish twelve colonies in Italy of 3000 settlers each, who were to

pay no rent and enjoy freedom of sale; and (3) to abolish the flogging of Latin soldiers by Roman officers. Drusus ostentatiously refused any personal share in their execution. It was a mere game of bluff. There was no land for the colonies, which were, in fact, not founded; the flogging law, a sop to the allies, was, if carried, repealed. But the clumsy dodge succeeded. The Bills were passed while Gaius was away in Africa and ill-represented at home by headstrong Flaccus. He could not hold together the discordant elements of his party, could not reconcile their interests in a common policy; least of all could he trust the wayward mob. In vain, on his return, he tried to recover popularity. He failed to obtain a second re-election, and his determined foe, Opimius, was elected consul. A handle against him was found in the matter of the colony at Carthage. He had gone to Africa as commissioner to arrange the settlement, and, after a short absence, had returned to select colonists, when the Senate was moved by the report of terrible omens to counsel the repeal of the Act which established it (*Lex Rubria*). The colony was not popular; it was far away; the land was accursed; the whole thing was new; the settlers were to be partly Italians. But it was a test case, and Gracchus was bound to fight it. After December 10, 122 B.C., he was a private citizen open to attack.

Death of C. Gracchus.—The end came after the New Year, but the story of his death is confused. Early on the critical morning, while Fulvius was haranguing the Assembly summoned on the Capitol, Gracchus with his armed adherents, himself unarmed, came to secure the rejection of the Senate's Bill. As he awaited the issue walking apart in the porch of the temple, he was accosted and apparently insulted by a servant of the consul, then officiating at the usual sacrifice, who, bearing the sacred entrails in his hands, bade evil citizens avaunt. Antullius fell, stabbed by a Gracchan. In the tumult that followed apology was vain. Gracchus only succeeded in giving a fresh handle to his enemies by interrupting the inviolable tribune. The Assembly dispersed in disorder. Opimius, calling on the senators to arm for the defence of the constitution, summoned them and the loyal knights to bring their slaves armed, and occupied the Capitol, Senate-house, and Forum. Next morning, by a stage-trick, the corpse was solemnly paraded before the Senate, and Opimius was duly empowered to save the state. Meanwhile the riotous Flaccus had armed a rabble with his Gallic spoils, and called the slaves to aid. Friends guarded the house of his saddened comrade.

When morning came Fulvius occupied the old popular stronghold, the Aventine, whither Gracchus followed, irresolute and without weapons. The Senate turned a deaf ear to negotiations and demanded unconditional surrender. A proclamation of amnesty



A CAMILLUS, OR ATTENDANT AT SACRIFICE.

thinned the rebel ranks, and, offering their weight in gold for the leaders' heads, the consul, with the veteran generals Metellus and Brutus, stormed the half-held height. Flaccus was hunted out and killed. Gaius fled reluctantly, defended by the heroism

of his friends, and when further flight was vain, within the sacred grove of Furina, fell on the sword of a slave, who slew himself on his master's body. One Septumuleius, a nobleman, earned the price of blood, doubled by the weight of lead with which he filled the skull. The body was flung into the Tiber.

The murder was followed, as before, by a special commission, under Opimius, which executed 3000 victims. The houses of the reformers were plundered, and from the proceeds of their estates the consul built that temple and basilica of Concord beneath whose dedicatory inscription the wit wrote, "The work of discord makes the temple of Concord." The city was purified of blood, but the memory of the murdered brothers was dear to the people they sought to serve, and an almost religious veneration clung to the spots where they fell.

Criticism of C. Gracchus.—The Senate was right to crush an armed revolt, and the conduct of Gaius shows that in this last scene he was acting with men whose methods he could not approve. He had rather die than fight his countrymen or fall into their hands. For this dilemma his own rashness was partly to blame, partly the Senate, which deliberately utilised a riot to crush a party. The ease with which he accomplished his work, and the equal ease with which its author was beaten down, bear witness to the uncertainty in all men's minds, as much as to the lack of any civic force behind either government or reformers. Gaius Gracchus had no idea of a constitutional revolution. We have no evidence that he meant to establish a tyranny based on plebiscites. He abolished nothing and introduced nothing. His aim was to reduce the Senate to something like its strictly constitutional position, and to make the sovereignty of the people a reality, while he gave the Comitia new blood by the restoration of the yeomanry, by the inclusion of the Italians, and by making the masses independent of their patrons. He meant to make the tribunate once more the ministry of the people, and, steeped as he was in Greek ideas, may have hoped to reproduce in his own person the government of Pericles, *λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία ἔργῳ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή*. An energetic administrator, with an insatiable appetite for work, he found fresh spheres of activity continually opening out before him, and, like the emperors later, he concentrated many offices in one person. In this, as in his attitude to the Senate, he set precedents for monarchy, while he handed down to his successors ideas that remained the common stock of reformers,

and from them passed to the Empire. He enforced the principle that the land of the subjects was the property of the state, to be utilised for the creation of colonies and the maintenance of the Romans. He founded the democratic alliance with the equites. Administrative reform, Italian franchise, foreign emigration, and possibly Romanisation of the provinces were Gracchan ideas. But his work was largely frustrated by his own vehemence and by his passion for revenge. If his end was patriotic, the means he used were dangerous, and indeed concealed a latent revolution. His Corn Law debauched the masses and ruined the farmer. He plundered Asia to buy a party. In raising up the equites against the Senate, he drove out Satan by Beelzebub. An idealist in a hurry, he failed to see facts as they were, and succeeded, in his ignorance of the true character of the constitution, in weakening the only possible government without creating a permanent substitute. The time was not ripe for monarchy; to a republican the idea of it was impossible. For his Periclean ideal the Comitia and the tribunate offered no sufficient instruments. The nett result of his work and that of his successors was to demonstrate the hopelessness of any genuine democracy.

The two Gracchi, in their effort to bring about a social reform, in their hope to regenerate Italy, were drawn on to attempt a political revolution whose nature they did not realise, whose difficulties they did not understand, and for which their means were inadequate. They pursued a chimæra. They were not revolutionists, but they were the fathers of revolution. They aimed at no tyranny and were the precursors of the principate.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE RESTORED OLIGARCHY AND THE WAR WITH JUGURTHA

	B.C.	A.D.C.
Agrarian Legislation	119-111	635-643
Fall of Cirta	112	642
Jugurtha at Rome	111	643
Metellus in Numidia	109-107	645-647
Marius conquers Jugurtha	106-105	648-649

The restored Oligarchy.—The Senate, having stamped out the Gracchan movement, resumed its old position with curtailed powers and a chastened spirit. It had been superseded, not destroyed, shaken but not shattered. The opposition leaders

were dead, and there was none to take their place. After all, the only solid and definite party, hammered together by attack and welded by common interests, was the party of privilege. The Gracchi and some few of their successors may have dreamed dreams of popular regeneration, but they failed to organise a genuine and lasting movement. The populares of the future, aiming vaguely at the limitation of the Senate and the humiliation of the ruling class, have at bottom no ideas of value to realise beyond their personal advancement. Between the factions there is little to choose, and for the present the chances are in favour of the more solid and organised party, which always emerges from the revolutions produced by its own incompetence safe if not sound, and somewhat the worse for wear. But the fabric of state was weakened by these continued shocks. Action and reaction destroyed all feeling of stability, impaired the Roman reverence for law and constituted authority, and, in the absence of any civil force to maintain order, brought about a growing disregard for constitutional methods.

The restored oligarchy behaved for a time with prudence, but otherwise had learned nothing by its fall. No attempt was made to reform the composition or change the policy of the Senate, or, on the other hand, to limit the powers of the tribunate and the Comitia, which still remained easy weapons for the popular agitator. It was content to keep the peace, humour the people, and out-manceuvre its opponents.

Fate of Gracchus' Measures.—The colonies of Drusus were dropped, but as the Senate had beaten Gracchus at his own game, it dared not repeal the Corn Laws or reclaim the allotments. The Corn Law particularly could be used to buy the loyalty of the mob, which cared for the gift and not the giver. The equites, too strong to attack, retained their control of the courts, their new insignia, and the Asian taxes. Popillius, however, was recalled, and when Opimius was impeached for the murder of citizens without trial, he was formally acquitted. The accused was defended by the renegade Carbo, and the verdict served as a valuable precedent for the use of the supreme decree to suspend the constitution in time of danger. Carbo, impeached on the same charge, committed suicide. The wider and wiser ideas of the Gracchi were thrown aside—the Italian franchise, transmarine colonisation, and Romanisation of the provinces. The assignments made, even at Carthage, were ratified, but the colony at Capua was cancelled, and the formation of new communities in Italy and abroad mostly suspended. Narbo,

founded 118 B.C., was rather a garrison, a fortress of the old type, and a centre of trade for the Roman business men, like Utica, Delos, and Argos, in rivalry to Massilia. For settlements at Carthage and Corinth the equites had no use.

Agrarian Laws.—As to the *Leges Agrariae*, the indemnity to the exchequer imposed by Tiberius had been abolished by Drusus, and soon after Gaius's death the clause prohibiting alienation of the new allotments was repealed. It was an impossible clause. It tied men, however unfit in means or talents, to the soil. But it was an essential provision in the original scheme, and its repeal, if it relieved the peasantry, favoured the reabsorption of the land by the rich. Purchase, mortgage, and land-grabbing went on merrily. Not long after, a moderate statesman could assert that there were only 2000 rich burgesses in Italy. In Africa, in later years, half-a-dozen men owned half the province. With regard to occupation, a law of 119 B.C. abolished the allotment commission, stopped all further distribution, and imposed a fixed rent on the possessors everywhere, who were henceforth to hold their land undisturbed. The money so obtained was to be used for the purchase of corn or land, or simply for distribution in cash, for the citizens. Finally, in 111 B.C., by what is probably to be called the *Lex Thoria*, the agrarian dispute as to the public land was terminated. By it all occupations became private property rent free, and the bulk of the public was converted into private land. There were excluded only certain tracts, e.g., the Ager Campanus, which were let on lease, and common pastures, on which cattle up to a low maximum could be grazed. The law secured the titles of all allotments and occupations granted in or since the year 133 B.C., and though it represents the final triumph of vested interests over the allotment laws, it was, on the whole, a wise statute. It removed a handle for agitation, it guaranteed the rights of the Latins and allies to their usufructs, it recognised titles acquired by recent legislation, and did away with the system of occupation for the future. Henceforward agrarian laws concern not the rights of the community to its own land, but the duty of the state to provide for its veterans and its poor. It is no longer a question of checking the growth of large estates by settling individuals on state domains, but of using public money to create a peasant proprietorship by purchase. The same law dealt with the public land round the sites of Carthage and Corinth, where similar causes produced a similar monopoly of the soil by the rich. Thus the attempt of the Gracchi to establish an

independent peasantry failed, but the failure was due more to natural forces than to adverse legislation.

In 115 B.C. Scaurus did something to restrict the freedmen ; in 119 B.C. the tribune C. Marius, as yet an honest soldier from the country, the client of the Herennii, who owed his position to the support of the Metelli, showed his integrity and independence by at once opposing the extension of the corn-doles and forcing through a law, against the earnest resistance of the Senate, to secure voters from corruption and intimidation by narrowing the passages which led to the polling-booths. Later on (106 B.C.) a *Lex Servilia* proposed to restore the judicia to the senators with dubious success (*vide infra*, p. 384).

Corruption of the Government.—Thus of the Gracchan constitution only the more questionable parts remained. Obligated to share its power with two uncertain allies, the equites and the populace, who were perfectly ready to owe their perquisites to any other donor, the Senate was as unable to carry out its own policy as it was unwilling to devise new methods. Its government is marked by corruption and vacillation at home and abroad. It had learned nothing and forgotten nothing ; it had been alarmed and embittered, but not reformed. Its ranks were more tightly closed, its treatment of the poorer classes and the subjects more arrogant than ever. Metellus succeeded Metellus as by destiny in the consulship, and noble officers primed with a hasty smattering of Greek tactics flung away their armies, and owed their triumphs to the talents of some low-born officer. A terrible picture has been drawn of the immorality and luxury of the upper classes, of the decline in faith and manners, of the foul and sordid crimes which defiled public and private life. The story of the foreign wars, the state of Italy and the provinces, the prevalence of piracy and servile riots, bear witness to the lack of statesmen and soldiers, to the weakness alike of government and opposition.

Numidia.—Among the worst fiascos of this period may be reckoned the Numidian war, which owes to the political issues raised and to the genius of Sallust its utterly factitious importance. An ordinary frontier war, of a type familiar to Englishmen, it was dragged out to a preposterous length by blundering and corruption.

The kingdom of Numidia had been consolidated by Massinissa during his long reign, and it now stretched from the Molo-chath, on the border of Mauretania, to the Syrtes and Cyrene,

surrounding with a girdle the Roman province of Africa. Its capital, Cirta (Constantine), standing in an almost impregnable position on a rocky promontory, round which the river Ampsaga flowed in a deep ravine, was a populous and prosperous centre of commerce and civilisation. There were several considerable towns, including the ports of Hippo Regius and Great Leptis. Massinissa had left a full treasury and a thriving country. The wilder districts supplied a good and numerous cavalry. At Massinissa's death Æmilianus divided the kingdom between his sons, but the convenient decease of his brothers soon left Micipsa sole ruler, who in a reign of thirty years was able to develop his country and propitiate Rome, while he devoted himself to the society of philosophic Greeks. In 118 B.C. he bequeathed his kingdom to his two sons Hiempsal and Adherbal, but joined with them their elder cousin Jugurtha, a natural son of his brother Mastanabal, whom he had adopted.


Jugurtha.—Jugurtha was a strong, handsome, active man, a keen hunter, a brilliant soldier, a clever ruler, greedy of power and popular with his countrymen. He had served with distinction at Numantia (134 B.C.), where Marius also won reputation, and had earned Scipio's favour by courage and dexterity. This opportunity he had used to gain friends among the Roman nobles, to study their character and learn the ways of Roman politics, a lesson whose value far outweighed the stern rebukes which his efforts drew from Scipio. There he learned *Roma omnia venalia esse*. On his return he became a trusted agent of his adoptive father, but when the heirs succeeded to the throne, quarrels broke out which made their joint sovereignty impossible. An attempt to divide the heritage led to a rupture, and amid the disputes the rash, high-spirited Hiempsal was assassinated by Jugurtha (116 B.C.). Civil war ensued between the remaining competitors, and Jugurtha, with his fewer but finer troops, ousted Adherbal, an easy-going, unwarlike man, who carried his complaints to the Senate. At Rome, which had hitherto ignored the wrangling princes, feeling favoured Adherbal, but Jugurtha, by a liberal use of gold, effected a rapid and even scandalous change of opinion. M. Scaurus, possibly retained by Adherbal, succeeded so far in his resistance to the job that the Senate, while it condoned the past, decided on a compromise and decreed the equal division of the kingdom (116 B.C.). The award was carried out by L. Opimius and a commission, who allotted to Adherbal the eastern part, including the capital, with the largest towns and ports, while Jugurtha

received the more fertile and populous west, with its warlike tribes. Opimius was afterwards condemned for bribery, but the division was not unfair, and protected Roman interests by removing the more dangerous Jugurtha from the frontier of the province. The award was accepted, and for three or four years there was comparative peace, while Jugurtha prepared for attack. Whatever were the rights and wrongs of this wretched business, Rome could scarcely interfere in every disputed succession among barbarians; and it must be remembered that the Jugurtha of the Roman historian is painted, like Hannibal and Mithradates, in the blackest colours.

Siege of Cirta.—At last, in 112 B.C., after tamely enduring constant provocation while he appealed to the protecting power, Adherbal was forced into war, defeated between Cirta and the sea, driven into his capital, and there besieged. During the siege appeared a Roman embassy, in answer to the earlier appeals, composed, as often, of young nobles serving their political apprenticeship. Politely but firmly baffled by Jugurtha, who was at no loss for excuses, refused admission to Cirta, and confronted by an unexpected situation, the young men returned.

Scaurus.—In the fifth month of the blockade an escaped messenger brought an urgent prayer for help, which produced yet another mission, headed by the eminent Scaurus, the son of an impoverished patrician, whose talents and birth had won him the consulship (115 B.C.). As consul he had defeated the Karni, an Alpine tribe at the head of the Adriatic, and was now *princeps Senatus*, and in 109 B.C. became censor. Orator, author, and builder, he figured as the pattern aristocrat and leading statesman of his time, and yet has been painted by an adversary as greedy, ambitious, and venal, skilled in steering near the wind, a man who knew and waited for his price. Him also Jugurtha amused to his face at Utica with protracted discussions, and when he departed, relied so far on his own strength in the Senate that, on the surrender of Cirta, he tortured and murdered his cousin with all and sundry his adherents. Among these he was mad enough, if our reports can be trusted, to massacre a number of Italian merchants who are said to have been the main authors of the defence. The whole story sounds suspicious.

Roman Intervention.—So far, whether it was due to that inexhaustible gold of his or to the lack of interest at Rome, Jugurtha had been left to work his will. The Senate was disinclined for African adventures, nor was the state responsible for the protection of combative traders. Jugurtha hoped that the Senate would acquiesce



VIEW OF CIRTA.

in accomplished facts. But the massacre of Cirta roused the merchants and the public to back up the minority in the Senate. Rome's orders had been defied, her flag dragged in the mire, her blood shed through the base intrigues of noble senators. A strong and united Numidia, under an active soldier, was a menace to the province. Suspicion was fostered by the obstructive tactics of the Senate. A storm broke out. Gaius Memmius, tribune-elect (112 B.C.), a bitter democrat, fanned the flame. The Senate, in alarm, permitted the declaration of war, Jugurtha's envoys were dismissed the country, and in 111 B.C. the consul L. Calpurnius Piso Bestia, a capable officer spoiled by avarice, with Scaurus as legate, and a staff of nobles chosen to screen his transactions, entered Numidia and gained some successes. The offered alliance of Bocchus, king of Mauretania, one of Jugurtha's fathers-in-law, was refused. The wily Numidian, however, who had apparently offered little resistance, soon secured, by liberal bribes to Bestia and Scaurus—a point neglected by the inexperienced Moor—not merely an armistice, but a treaty of peace. In return for a formal submission, a small fine, and the surrender of some horses and elephants, repurchased later from the corrupted army, he received his kingdom entire. When Bestia came back the storm broke out again. The war was popular, and it offered a prospect of slight risk and heavy booty from those famous treasures. Political feeling ran high. And yet, apart from the bribery, the treaty was defensible. There had been terrible disasters in Macedonia and the north: the Cimbri were at the gates of Italy; it would be something to be well out of this troublesome and possibly dangerous desert warfare against tough and patriotic tribesmen; Jugurtha's cavalry might be useful once more as allies. But Memmius, with inflammatory harangues, denounced the nobility, and demanded instant inquiry into the scamped and irregular negotiations.

Jugurtha at Rome.—The validity of the treaty was impugned in the Senate. It is said that Memmius procured the presence of the king himself at Rome, to be questioned publicly as a witness about the nefarious job; that the king appeared in suppliant garb, under safe conduct, before the maddened populace; was there and then indicted by Memmius, and advised to save himself by acting as informer; and, finally, that a hired tribune sealed by his veto the royal lips, and baffled alike his colleague and the people. Such is the effective scene depicted by the pen of Sallust. The king certainly came to Rome on business connected with the ratification of the treaty, and Memmius may have tried to use the occasion to obtain

startling disclosures. The attempt was foiled, but the discussion of the treaty went on. Jugurtha, who remained to watch events, might yet have succeeded, but a blundering stroke of craft and cruelty ruined his chances. He procured the assassination in Rome itself of a possible rival, Massiva, son of Gulussa and grandson of Massinissa, the candidate held in reserve by the opposition, through his confidant Bomilcar, whom he aided to escape from justice. It was the last straw. He was expelled from Italy, the peace was cancelled, and Sp. Postumius Albinus, the consul, who had attacked the treaty in the hope of getting the command, passed over into Africa (110 B.C.). The election for this year had been delayed by the attempt of two obscure tribunes to prolong their tenure of office.

Capitulation of Albinus.—As the king left Rome he looked back again and again, and at last broke into the cry, "*Urem tendem, et morture perituram, si emptorem intenerit.*" Albinus found a demoralised army, corrupted by its foes, and terrible only to its friends, an enemy inactive and ready for terms. He could do nothing; but when, fooled, bribed, or merely baffled, he returned for the elections, his brother and legate, Aulus, ambitious of conquest or urged by avarice, set off on a wild-goose chase in midwinter, to surprise a distant depôt named Suthul or Calama. The attempt failed owing to the difficulties of the situation and the season, and Aulus, lured out into the desert, was himself surprised by night, his camp taken by treachery, his troops scattered. Next day he was forced to surrender, to send his army beneath the yoke, and evacuate Numidia within ten days (beginning of 109 B.C.). The disgraceful treaty, while it kindled Numidian patriotism, roused to fury the indignation of the Roman public against the misgovernment of the nobility. Senate and consul might discuss the treaty, but the tribune C. Mamilius Limetanus, with the support of the equites, and against the secret resistance of the nobles, carried the appointment of an extraordinary court of inquiry into the corruption, collusion, and treason connected with the African business. L. Bestia, C. Cato, Sp. Albinus, L. Opimius, C. Sulpicius Galba, among others, guilty or innocent, unpopular at any rate and suspected, were swept into exile by the hasty sentences of a partisan commission, on which the judicious Scaurus contrived to find a place.

Metellus.—The Senate, having thrown overboard the most responsible men, was allowed to deal with what was now a serious scandal, so strong and so indispensable did that body remain. The

treaty was cancelled, as having been concluded without the consent of the Senate and people. The rebel king, who, deliberately refraining from offensive action, had left Africa unmolested, did not receive even the person of the repudiated legate. The command was given to the haughty aristocrat, Q. Cæcilius Metellus, nephew of Macedonicus, an honest governor, an upright man, a good disciplinarian, and a fairly capable officer, whose treacherous dealings with a mere barbarian are more shocking to modern than ancient notions. As chiefs of his staff he selected tried soldiers of lower birth, and, above all, P. Rutilius Rufus, the author of an improved drill, and Gaius Marius, the farmer's son of Arpinum, who had fought his way from the ranks.

Battle on the Muthul.—Metellus, with his new levies, appeared in Africa late in 109 B.C., and probably spent the rest of the summer in reorganising the dissolute bandits, whom Albinus had found, on his return as proconsul, unfit to satisfy his burning desire to wipe out his brother's disgrace. Jugurtha, genuinely afraid, proffered a real surrender to the man he could not bribe. The consul, covering his treachery with a pretence of negotiation, tried through the envoys to secure the person of the king alive or dead, as a murderer liable to justice, whose power and popularity made him dangerous to Rome. Meanwhile he advanced cautiously into Numidia (close of 109 or beginning of 108 B.C.), where he was received with elaborate submission, and occupied Vaga, a busy and populous town, frequented by Italian merchants, not far from the frontier, as a dépôt and garrison. At last Jugurtha awoke, and prepared for resistance. On the line of march to the enemy's objective, Cirta, somewhere by the river Muthul (? Rubricatus), he laid a skilful trap, a half-completed African Trasimene. As the Roman issued from the mountain pass, and debouched on the river-plain, his retreat was cut, his access to the water blocked, and as he advanced, his infantry was harassed by swarms of horse in rear and flank. The fight for the Muthul is a regular African desert battle, with its story of broken squares and thronging natives, the heat, the dust, the struggle for the stream, the victory snatched from disaster by the coolness of the chief, by the stability of the men, by the skill and courage of Marius and Rufus. Metellus had been outmanœuvred. Only the weakness of the Numidian infantry had spoiled the calculations of Jugurtha. Flying columns under Metellus and Marius now raided the country, while the king maintained an active guerilla warfare. The march on Cirta was clearly abandoned, and

Metellus, with small results for his labour, apparently retired on the province, and when next heard of is besieging the neighbouring town of Zama Regia, in the valley of the Bagradas, on the old Punic territory, in the hope of compelling a decisive action. But the besieged were so vigorously supported by the king that Metellus, unable to capture the town or force a battle, was compelled to retreat into winter quarters. Thus the campaign of 108 B.C. (109), in spite of triumphant bulletins and state thanksgivings, afforded some grounds for the complaints of Roman business men and the caustic if insubordinate criticisms of Marius. The general had again recourse to treachery. Through Bomilcar, whom he contrived to corrupt, he induced the king to capitulate, and then employed the old device of a gradually widening ultimatum to delude, disarm, and crush his enemy, whose person he intended finally to entrap. Jugurtha surrendered his elephants, horses, and arms, promised an indemnity, furnished hostages, and handed over deserters, but when summoned to surrender himself, suspected treason, discovered the plot, and executed the traitor Bomilcar.

Campaign of 107 B.C.—In the following winter (108–107 B.C.) Vaga, close as it was to the Roman frontier, revolted, and killed its garrison. The commandant, a Latin named Turpilius, who alone escaped, was scourged and beheaded by Metellus, and within two days the revolt was crushed. But the national feeling was unbroken, and Jugurtha, strong in his loyal tribesmen, had every means for irregular war. In the desultory fighting that ensued (107 B.C.) the Romans gained some successes, after one of which Jugurtha fled, with his family and treasures, to the stronghold of Thala, situated on an oasis south of the province. Hither Metellus pursued him, hoping to end the war by a surprise; but though Thala fell, the bird was flown. The war extended itself; the Gætulians of the desert responded to the king's call; and Bocchus, the rejected, in alarm for himself, received his son-in-law, abandoned his neutrality, and took up the cause. With a swarm of horsemen the princes advanced on Cirta, the impregnable city, which had apparently fallen into Roman hands.

Marius.—In the meantime Metellus had been superseded. His legate, C. Marius, had been elected consul, and appointed general in Africa by special decree of the people. The son of a day-labourer, born at Cereatæ (Casamare), then a dependency of Arpinum, in 155 B.C., he passed from the plough-tail to the camp. He was inured to fatigue by his country training, and schooled in war under the stern command of Scipio, whose respect he earned

by his soldierly qualities. By soldiership he had forced his way up, assisted by lucky speculations and the connections gained by marriage. In 115 B.C. he had been prætor, and as proprætor had done good work in Farther Spain. He had failed to obtain the ædileship, and hitherto had not ventured to sue for the consulship, which the nobles defended with bitterness from the "pollution" of an able parvenu. Yet his wife Julia, aunt of the dictator, belonged to the patrician house of the Julii. At length the consciousness of merit and favourable prophecies pushed the ambitious and superstitious man to make good his claims. He was indeed peculiarly fitted, by his integrity and industry, by his powers of discipline and organisation, by his strict but sympathetic attitude to the common soldiers, his thorough knowledge of their needs, and of the defects of the system, for the work of restoring the military prestige of Rome and asserting her superiority to African and Gallic barbarians. He was a popular commander and a leader of the first rank in the age of the second-rate. A plain, blunt soldier, with a great knowledge of war, and an equal ignorance of politics, as free from the vices as he was untouched by the elegances of his time, as unfitted for the Forum and the courts as he was for the *salon*, his sound qualities were marred alone by a fierce and fatal ambition. It was his misfortune to become the figure-head and instrument of a party; it was the fault of the nobles to drive into opposition a character essentially conservative and commonplace.

Marius made Consul.—When he asked Metellus for leave of absence, to push his candidature, his patron, indignant at the presumption, warned, scolded, and finally detained him to the last moment. "*Satis mature illum cum filio suo consulatum petiturum,*" he sneered.¹ The legate retorted by bitter criticisms of his superior's generalship. His boasts and promises were transmitted to Rome by his partisans in Utica and the camp, and a cry was raised for the transference of the command. When at last permitted to leave, twelve days before the elections, in spite of his shortened canvass he was elected by an enormous majority, and received the appointment by exceptional decree, 107 B.C. (108). This result was due to the dissatisfaction of the mercantile class, to the prostration of the nobility by the Mamilian commission, and to the combination of all the malcontents, who at last had a soldier to lead them. Amid popular enthusiasm Marius proceeded to levy troops. He treated his consulship as the spoils

¹ "It would be soon enough for him to stand with Metellus' son," *i.e.*, Metellus Pius, ccs. 80 B.C.


of war, and inveighed bitterly against these "men of antique race, with their Greek culture, their banquets, play-actors, and cooks, with many *imagines* and no campaigns, who, as soon as they became consuls, read up the deeds of their ancestors and the military manuals of the Greeks, and took for tutor in the field some soldier from the ranks."

In selecting troops he set a new and important precedent. He not only called up a large number of veterans, but to avoid the hated conscription, and to secure men on whom he could depend, he enlisted recruits mainly from the *capite censi*, i.e., from those who possessed less than the minimum of the lowest class, and who had hitherto been drawn only on an emergency or for service as marines. The full bearing of the changes which he effected now, or in the creation of the army of the North, will be pointed out in connection with the Cimbric war (*vide infra*, pp. 379, 380).

Marius in Numidia.—Meanwhile nothing had happened in Africa. Metellus, with almost childish annoyance, refused to act. Bocchus, who held the key of the situation, would not commit himself. Marius arrived, 106 B.C. (107), trained his army, chastised the Gætulians, proceeded to attack such cities as remained untaken, and, among others, captured the stronghold of Capsa, situated on an oasis, after a march of immense difficulty, undertaken in the hope of eclipsing the exploit of Metellus at Thala. Having thus cleared Eastern Numidia, he entered on a long and difficult expedition to the Molochath, and took, by a lucky surprise, a certain treasure-hold of the king. Here he was joined by the quæstor L. Cornelius Sulla, with a reinforcement of cavalry. It was Sulla's first campaign, but under so good a master the Roman dandy rapidly learned the elements of war. From his advanced position Marius began a difficult and dangerous retreat. Possibly Bocchus had deluded him by assurances of friendship. Now he joined Jugurtha in force. Twice were the Romans enveloped; twice through the hostile swarms of cavalry the way was opened by a pitched battle. On the first occasion, surprised in column of route, they were only saved by the military instincts of the soldiery and the negligence of the foe. On the second their safety was due to the brilliant manœuvres of Sulla.

Jugurtha betrayed to Sulla.—From winter quarters at Cirta negotiations were resumed with Bocchus, without whose aid the war was interminable. Envoys passed secretly between Bocchus, Marius, and the Senate. Finally the Moor sent for Sulla to seal the treaty and take over the prisoner. He accepted the perilous

commission, and boldly traversed the camp of Jugurtha, his small



PLAN AND SECTION OF THE MAMERTINE PRISON.
(From Middleton's Rome.)

- A. Opening in floor over the Tullianum; the only access.
- BB. Solid tuffa rock.
- CC. Branch of Cloaca.
- DE. Position of modern stairs and door.
- FF. Front wall of prison.
- G. Probable original top of Tullianum.

escort lost in a Moorish host. Sulla's firm bearing decided the

waverer. Deluded by the hope of conference, Jugurtha was entrapped by his kinsman and ally, and carried in chains to Rome, where he adorned the triumph of the conqueror, January 1, 104 B.C., and was starved to death in the foul dungeon carved in the Capitoline rock. "How cold is your bath!" he cried as he fell into his living grave. He had been caught at last, after the long struggle. He had furnished two generals with a triumph, and Metellus with the title Numidicus. The credit of his capture belonged largely to the cool and resolute Sulla; the people lauded Marius, the Senate praised its own heroes, and the African war began the rivalry that ended in the proscriptions.

Results of the War.—With the king's death the war closed. No province was formed. Bocchus received, as the price of blood, the western half of Numidia; the remainder was given to Gauda, a grandson of Massinissa. The Gætulians were declared free allies of Rome. The Senate was reluctant at this crisis (105 B.C.) to maintain a standing army in Africa.

The political results were more striking than the military. Corruption and incapacity had given the democrats their chance. A fairly successful commander had been superseded by a popular vote, and the Senate's control of the military command infringed. There had been bitter war between the equites and the people on the one hand and the Senate on the other. The ground of opposition had shifted from home to foreign policy, and the military power had come to the front. On January 1, 104 B.C., Rome's only general entered on a second successive consulate in a panic caused by disasters in the North.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE WARS IN THE NORTH

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Defeat of Allobroges and Arverni—Province of Narbo	121	633
Wars in Macedonia	112-110	642-644
The Cimbri defeat the Romans in Gaul	109-107	645-647
Battle of Arausio	105	649
Marius Consul	104-100	650-654
Battle of Aquæ Sextiæ	102	652
Battle on the Raudine Plain	101	653

HOLDING, as Rome did, Spain, Italy to the Alps, and Macedonia, it was her plain business to provide for the defence of the frontiers, the protection of the subjects, and the security of her communications. In Spain she was bound to chastise the Celtiberian and Lusitanian

tribes, and to hold the passes of the Western Pyrenees ; in Gaul to protect Massilia and the coast route ; in North Italy, to clear the Alpine passes on the west and east and check the invaders from the north ; in Macedonia and Illyria, to defend the ports of the western coast, and act as warder of the Balkans and of Rhodope. No doubt the effective control of the great ranges would precipitate conflict with the wandering hordes which ebbed and flowed behind the barriers, but of this danger Rome was scarcely aware, and nothing was gained by delay. Of all this little was done.

Spain.—Of Spain, after the work of D. Brutus (136 B.C.) and the capture of Numantia, there is nothing to record except Marius' success in checking brigandage (114 B.C.), the repulse of the Cimbri by the warlike Celtiberians (103 B.C.), and the insurrection of the Celtiberians and Lusitanians, excited by the shameful defeats in Gaul, which was crushed by Didius and Crassus between 97 and 93 B.C. Under Didius served with distinction the famous Sertorius. There was hard fighting and some butchery, and Didius occasionally removed the troublesome highlanders to peaceful settlements in the plain.

North Italy.—Here Roman ideas and habits had spread to the foot of the Alps. The Ligurians in the west had been severely handled and the coast route secured. In 143 B.C. Appius Claudius reduced the Salassi ; in 100 B.C. Eporedia was founded as a citizen colony to control the entrance of the north-western passes. No province was formed as yet and no tribute exacted, the communities retaining their national institutions under the supervision of the consuls, furnishing contingents, especially the light Ligurians, and providing for their own defence. It was the inroads of the barbarians and the extension of the franchise to Italy which first compelled the creation of a distinct command in North Italy, whose necessity only ceased with the conquest of Gaul and Switzerland.

Gaul.—Beyond the Alps, the route to Spain, whether by land or along the coast, from Pisæ, Luna, or Massilia to Tarraco, had been secured partly by the fleet, and, after its decay, by the chastisement of the Ligurians, by the aid of friendly tribes, but mainly by the ancient alliance with the faithful Massilia, whose naval stations stretched from Nicæa and Antipolis to Agatha and Rhoda. In return for her help, Rome protected Massilia against the barbarians. In 154 B.C.¹ Opimius defended Antipolis and Nicæa

¹ About this time occurred the attempt to protect the export of wine and oil from Italy, by the prohibition to cultivate the vine and olive in the Massilian dependencies (Cic., *De Rep.* iii. 9).

against the Ligurians of the Maritime Alps, the first Transalpine war. In 125 B.C. Fulvius Flaccus, the democratic consul, his head full of Gracchan ideas, a true precursor of Cæsar, laid the foundation of the future province by his victories over the Celto-Ligurian tribes—the Salluvii near Aix, and the Vocontii by Vaucluse.

War with the Allobroges and Arverni.—The area of war rapidly expanded. The chief tribe in South Gaul was the Arverni (capital, Nemossos, near Clermont), who had risen to great wealth and power and a fair civilisation under the magnificent Luerius and his son Betuitus. Their available force amounted to 180,000 men. Their rivals for the hegemony were the weaker Ædui round Bibracte (Autun). The Belgic league of the north-east, with their leading clan, the Suessiones, just enter our horizon. In the south-east, however, the Romans came at once into contact with the strong clan of the Allobroges, in the valley of the Isère, who, coming to aid the Salluvii, were defeated (123 B.C.) by C. Sextius Calvinus, near the modern Aix. In 122 B.C. Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus entered their land, and the attack upon them brought the Arverni as suzerains into the sphere of action. The refusal of their mediation led to war. The Ædui at once embraced the Roman alliance, a useful support in the enemies' rear. Ahenobarbus was reinforced (121 B.C.) by Q. Fabius Maximus, grandson of Paullus, who severely defeated the united armies (August 8) at the confluence of the Rhone and the Isère, earning the surname Allobrogicus. The Allobroges submitted, and the Arvernian king, Betuitus, who had thought the Roman soldiers too few to feed his dogs, was entrapped by Domitius, figured in the triumph of Fabius, and was interned at Alba by the Senate, which censured the thief, but took the stolen goods. At some date before or after this battle Domitius gained a victory at Vindalium, above Avignon, due in part to the awe created by African elephants.

Province of Narbo.—From the land of the Allobroges, who sank into a mutinous, heavily indebted tribe, was founded (121 B.C.) the province of Gallia Braccata or Narbonensis (*the province*, Provence). It took its later name from the capital, Narbo Martius, an old Celtic town on the Atax, not far from the sea, henceforward the rival of Massilia for the inland traffic and headquarters of the *negotiatores*. Aquæ Sextiæ, founded 122 B.C., famous for its hot and cold springs, was the standing camp of the west. The new acquisition, while it realised to some extent the colonising ideas of the Gracchi, was mainly designed to protect the communications with Spain and tap the trade of Gaul. Between the Alps and the Rhone

the tribes paid tribute to Rome or Massilia; the Arverni ceded enough land between the Cevennes and the coast for the making of the great Domitian road from the Rhone to the Pyrenees; the westward limits included the rich and ancient city of Tolosa and the upper waters of the Garonne. The country rapidly assimilated the language, habits, and ideas of its conquerors, and remained at peace till the Germanic invasion.


The Balkan Peninsula.—In Illyria, Rome possessed Istria, Scodra, and part of Epirus, but had no effective control over the tribes of the "Hinterland," or of the rugged coasts and rocky isles between Epirus and Istria. In consequence of bitter complaints from the subjects and allies, the rude and insolent pirates of Dalmatia were chastised by P. Scipio Nasica, who took Delminium (155 B.C.), and taught the confederacy "to concern itself about the Romans" for the future. The district was placed, like Cisalpine Gaul, under the consular control, and remained so even after the formation of the Macedonian province. No attempt was made by a regular and combined attack from Italy and Macedon on the mountain tribes from Gaul to Thrace to secure the line of the Alps and Balkans or push the frontier to the Danube. The country was mainly occupied by Celtic clans, remnants of the great wave that spread itself from Spain to Galatia, passing on either side of the Alps, and penetrating alike to Rome and Delphi. In modern Switzerland, and beyond into Germany, along the Upper Rhine, dwelt the Helvetii, who had not yet come into contact with Rome; next to these, the Boii still held Bavaria and Bohemia; in Styria and Carinthia dwelt the Taurisci or Norici; the kindred Karni inhabited the hill-country at the head of the Adriatic. In the Tauriscan country, the mines of iron and gold about Noreia (near Klagenfurt) attracted Italian capital and labour. The indigenous Ræti pushed their forays and levied blackmail from the heights of Eastern Switzerland and the Tyrol, whither the Celts had driven them; the Euganei and Veneti lived peaceably round the modern Padua and Venice, a wedge between the Cenomanian and Karnian Celts. Along the Balkans and in the basin of the Danube dwelt, first, the half-Illyrian Iapydes, in Croatia, then the restless and roving Scordisci, above the Illyrians of the coast, in Bosnia and Servia, along the Save, plundering their neighbours from their stronghold of Siscia. The Thracians harried Macedonia on the east. Behind, fermented the obscure masses of the ever-moving north.

Fighting can be dimly discerned going on round the Roman

territories, whose sole frontiers were the swords of the legions. In 118 B.C. the Stœni, above Verona, were reduced by Q. Marcius; constant raids paid back in kind the inroads of the mountaineers. There were conflicts in Thrace in 103 and 99 B.C. The piratical Vardæi were deported from Dalmatia into the interior (135 B.C.), and the Scordisci attacked and defeated. Tuditanus in 129 B.C., helped by the Spanish veteran D. Brutus, repressed the Iapydes, and secured a temporary peace in Illyria. But in 119 B.C. Cotta had to move on Siscia, and L. Metellus cheaply earned the name Dalmaticus by capturing Salonæ (119 B.C.), which became the Roman headquarters in those parts. But Metellus was shrewdly suspected of manufacturing a triumph from a sham campaign. From about this time dates the commencement of the *Via Gabinia* from Salonæ to the interior. Scaurus in 115 B.C. defeated the Karni, crossed the eastern range, and opened up commercial relations with Noricum. But these successes in the Illyrian district were badly balanced by the extermination of the army under the censor's grandson, C. Porcius Cato (consul 114 B.C.), entrapped by the Scordisci among the mountains. Cato was condemned later, on a convenient charge of extortion. The praetor M. Didius was able to check the victors' raids into Macedon. The war was continued with fair success till 109 B.C. M. Livius Drusus, the anti-Gracchan tribune, is said to have been the first Roman general who reached the Danube, in 112 B.C.; but if he did indeed drive the Scordisci beyond the river, it was left for M. Minucius Rufus (110 B.C.) to complete their destruction. Henceforth the Dardani take their place as leading tribe.

The Cimbri.—These new connections and the thinning down of the barrier clans soon brought Rome face to face with a more terrible enemy. Beyond the mountains had been wandering to and fro for some years a tribe of unsettled Germans, driven by pressure from behind, by natural convulsions, or by migratory instinct from their homes about the Baltic and the North Sea—a people on the march, women, children, and waggon-houses. Gathering fresh forces from the tribes they traversed, especially from the powerful Celtic Ambrones, the Cimbri, tall, fair-haired, blue-eyed men, with women as strong and tall, and children flaxen-haired, poured on towards the sunny South, by capricious onsets, harbingers of the final floods which drowned the later Empire, appalling the smaller-statured Romans with their huge forms, their long swords, and their terrific cries. They were rude and rough, brutal even and savage, when they poured the blood of

captives for their white-clad priestesses to prophesy the issues of war ; yet they were chivalrous after a sort, fond of single combats,



ROMAN SOLDIER.

tourneying with the foe at a chosen time and place. In their copper helmets and coats-of-mail, with their heavy missiles, narrow

shields, and Celtic swords, they formed in a deep square phalanx, the front ranks, it is said, tied man to man with thongs through their girdles.

Defeat of the Romans.—On they came, a strange and motley host, breaking through the thin barrier whence hitherto the Celts of the Danube had repelled them. In 113 B.C. they appeared among the Taurisci. To protect the clients of Rome and cover the passes of the Alps, Cn. Papirius Carbo, brother of the renegade, who was then in Illyria, marched on Noreia, and when the Cimbri offered to evacuate and leave the friends of Rome alone, attempted to mislead and surprise them, but was defeated with great slaughter. Leaving Italy unmolested and passing peaceably through Helvetia, they entered Gaul by the land of the Sequani and harassed it with devastating raids. In 109 B.C. they reappeared on the borders of the Gallic province, and being refused settlements and employment as mercenaries, they destroyed the army of the consul M. Junius Silanus, who had taken the offensive to protect the Allobroges and the Roman frontier. But so far from pursuing their advantage and pressing the Roman government, embarrassed as it was with the African war and at its wits' ends for recruits, the Cimbri contented themselves with harrying the prosperous Gallic tribes. Their place was taken by their Celtic imitators and allies, the Tougeni and Tigurini, from Helvetia, who had penetrated into the valley of the Garonne as far as the modern Agen, under Divico, and in 107 B.C. decoyed and annihilated the army of the consul L. Cassius Longinus, who fell with his legate L. Piso. The remnant passed ignominiously beneath the yoke, but C. Popillius, who signed the capitulation, was subsequently convicted of treason. His condemnation was ensured by the passing of a *Lex Caelia* extending the ballot to trials for *perduellio*.

Disaster at Arausio.—This series of disasters shook the credit of Rome, and the rich town of Tolosa, on the western frontier, revolted and seized its garrison. Q. Servilius Cæpio (consul 106 B.C.) recovered the city by a night surprise and sacked the treasures of its ancient sanctuary. What became of these famous treasures no one knew. On the way to Massilia they were seized by robbers, and the consul was accused of connivance. If it was true, he had indeed gained, as the proverb said, "the gold of Tolosa." Disaster overtook the sacrilegious thief. Remaining on the defensive during 106 B.C., he was acting next year with a half-independent command on the right bank of the Rhone, under the consul Cn.

Mallius Maximus, when the Cimbri and their allies returned under Boiorix. The first to fall was M. Aurelius Scaurus, with a detachment of the consular army. His proud warning to the king to keep his hands off Italy cost him his life. Reluctantly Cæpio obeyed his superior's orders and entreaties and crossed to the left bank. Here, possibly at Arausio (Orange), not far from Avignon, the powerful Roman army was concentrated, but its leaders were at discord, immovable by remonstrance even from the Senate. Cæpio declined to concert action, and when Mallius accepted the negotiations offered by the Cimbri, apparently ordered a separate attack. Taken in detail, with the river in rear, the divided armies were murderously defeated; 80,000 men were reported dead, and the infuriated savages, in obedience to a vow, hung their prisoners, burned their booty, smashed the armour, and pitched the horses into the river.

The 6th of October 105 B.C. recalled the deadly day of Cannæ. Five armies had now been swept successively away; the passes were open, the Gauls at the gate. In the panic that followed, able-bodied men were bound on oath to remain in Italy. All exemptions were suspended. The allies gathered in alarm round Rome, and at the elections, in spite of law and custom, the precedent of the Punic wars was revived, and Marius, the victor of Africa, was re-elected in absence, and appointed to Gaul, to be continued in office, like a new Valerius Corvus, four years in succession. Rome's luck did not desert her: again the capricious hordes failed to push their victory, and passed westward to attack the strongholds of the Arverni and break their teeth on the warlike tribes and rocky fastnesses of Spain. There was breathing-time for reorganisation and revenge. Cæpio, stripped on the spot of his proconsular command by decree of the people, was in 104 B.C. driven from the Senate by a special law, providing this penalty for those deprived of imperium by the people, an enactment of doubtful validity. Probably in the following year (103 B.C.), in virtue of a plebiscitum, moved by the tribune C. Norbanus and supported by L. Appuleius Saturninus, a commission was appointed to try the treason and embezzlement connected with the Gallic command, which ended in the condemnation, among others, of Mallius, and of Cæpio, whose property was confiscated and who barely escaped death, to end his life in beggary and exile.

Marius reorganises the Army.—Meanwhile Marius, who had finished his work in Africa in 105 B.C., to which year must be as-

signed the capture of Jugurtha, had returned to Rome. He busied himself for two years in organising a new army in North Italy and the south of France, where he remained on the defensive. He now completed the military reforms begun in his first consulship and made doubly necessary by the dearth of troops and the demoralisation that follows disaster.

These disasters had emphasised all the tendencies which were irresistibly creating a professional army. Political, military, and social causes had produced a gradual change from conscription based on property to enlistment of paid volunteers, supplemented by contingents from Italy and abroad. The census ceased to be the basis of the army, and there was no need to enforce an unpopular service when there was a sufficient supply of eager and willing recruits. Moreover, the old tactical division into three lines was becoming as obsolete as the Servian institutions themselves, and the loose arrangements of the maniples clearly needed revision since the recent failures. As to the cavalry, it was notoriously formed of Italians, Thracians, and Numidians, while the Ligurians and Baliares supplied the light-armed foot and slingers. The reforms connected with Marius gave full expression to these changes. Whatever might remain of the old forms of the civic militia, its methods and principles, was now swept away. Though the legal obligation of service remains, the army henceforth is filled by veterans, volunteers, and large drafts of allied troops. All non-military distinctions in equipment and in the line of battle disappear. There is no question of age or of property, only of service approved by the commanding officer. While Marius was still in Africa, Rutilius, the colleague of Mallius, had brought in his new method of training, derived from the masters of the gladiatorial schools. The excellence of the remodelled army was based on the skill and coolness of the individual swordsman. The care of Marius, an old ranker himself, improved the weapons, the kit, and comfort of the rank and file. His experience also decided him to make the cohort, which already existed, the main tactical division instead of the maniple, though, of course, the maniple was retained. Ten strong cohorts combined the advantages of solidity and independence to resist the rush of the Germans. Company ensigns were abolished; the cohort, with its six sections of 100, had its battalion colours; the legion, 6000 strong, received the famous eagle. The three lines no longer represented separate corps; military rank went by the numerical order of the cohorts and centuries. The velites dis-

appeared as the equites had gone, and the only distinct corps was the cohorts prætorias, originally created as a company of personal friends by Æmilianus in Spain, now a select and privileged guard, retained at headquarters for special service. The rank and file of the army was thus formed mainly of proletarians and the poorer classes, who rarely rose above the rank of centurion, the upper classes acting as officers or serving on the bodyguard. The military tribunes are gradually superseded in the command of



COMBAT OF GLADIATORS: THE VANQUISHED COMBATANT APPEALING
TO THE AUDIENCE.

(To illustrate gladiatorial swordsmanship, p. 379).

the legion by *legati*, generally men of senatorian rank, serving as generals of division.

The change had been gradually brought about by military necessities. It created a soldier class because the conditions of that class existed. It was no device of an aspiring soldier, and yet we have here all the elements of the imperial army. The basis of the military republic was gone with its civic militia. Attached by his oath to the general, for a war, not for a campaign, rewarded and punished by the general, with no state system

of pension or even poorhouse, the soldier, Roman or allied, owed his allegiance henceforth to the colours, the comrade, and the chief.

Marius in Gaul.—Marius proceeded to Gaul with his legate Sulla, an experienced staff, and his Syrian prophetess Martha, with his contingents summoned far and wide, his raw levies and African veterans. There, by strict discipline and sturdy impartiality, he got his masses in hand and attached them to himself. During the months of waiting he kept them employed by great military and civil works, especially by cutting a transport canal (*Fossæ Marianæ*) to improve the navigation of the Rhone. From a strong camp near the junction of the Rhone and the Isère he overawed the Tectosages and restored confidence, while he guarded the passage of the Rhone and covered the routes to Italy. To secure his re-election for 102 B.C. he was compelled to come to Rome and form an alliance with the popular tribune Saturninus, who forced the appointment in face of the growing discontent at this unconstitutional continuation of power. But the country needed a disciplinarian and a soldier, and though there were other officers available, the government was too unpopular to resist, and, at this crisis, acquiesced in the breach of a fundamental law of the Republic. Marius went through the farce of a pretended reluctance. The full peril of this unlimited power wielded by the general of the democracy at the head of a popular army was not realised till the danger was past. Public opinion enjoyed the defeat of the Senate. At last, in 103 B.C., the Germans reappeared on their way to Italy, their ranks swelled by adventurers and reinforced by the Tougēni and Tigurini, and by the Teutones from the Baltic, under Teutoboduus, whom they had met somewhere in Gaul. Their Gallic raids, repulsed by the Belgæ alone (103 B.C.), had filled their hands with plunder. This they now left under a powerful guard, which subsequently became the people of the Aduatuci, on the Sambre. On their way south they divided their forces, the Teutones Tougēni and Ambrones taking the road by Roman Gaul and the western passes, while the Cimbri and the Tigurini were to cross the Rhine, skirt the Alps,^o and enter by the eastern defiles which they had surveyed in 113 B.C. The divisions would rejoin in the valley of the Po.

Battle of Aquæ Sextiæ.—In the summer of 102 B.C. the Teutones crossed the Rhone unresisted, while Marius, still uncertain of his troops, watched his opportunity from his camp. For three days

he repelled the assaults of the barbarians, and, it is said, refused to attack, though the enemy for six days, defiling past in long column with their vast baggage-train, offered an extended flank. Unmoved by their bitter taunts, as they asked if the Romans had messages for their wives at home, he waited till they were gone, and followed cautiously in their rear. At last, by *Aquæ Sextiæ*, on the road to Italy, twelve Roman miles from *Massilia*, Marius encamped on a range of hills destitute of water. A skirmish among the watering-parties brought on a regular engagement, in which the *Ambrones* were defeated. During the anxious night and following day, enveloped by the yelling barbarians, the Romans strengthened their lines and both sides prepared for action. On the third day Marius offered battle. In the night he had posted a small force, with the grooms and camp-followers mounted on baggage-horses, in the enemy's rear, invisible among the hills and trees. His main body was drawn up on the crest. The *Teutones* anticipated the attack, charging up the slope. The charge was checked at close quarters by a volley of javelins; the infantry fell at the sword's-point on the blown and staggered Germans, while *Marcellus* burst from the ambuscade. Alarmed for their rear, broken by the severe struggle in the unwonted heat, the *Teutones* gave way, the king was captured, the army annihilated, many of the women slew themselves in despair. This decisive battle was fought in the valley of the *Arc*, on a range of hills still known as *Mont St. Victoire*. Marius' idea had been to secure the most favourable conditions, by inducing the enemy to take the long and difficult coast road, wedged in between the mountains and the sea, where they would be encumbered by their waggons and unable to utilise their numbers. Accordingly he had hung on their rear, harassed their march, and waited for a convenient position on ground that he had previously surveyed, to intercept and destroy them. The names in the district still recall the famous fight which saved Rome.

Battle on the Raudine Plain.—The victor, re-elected consul for a fifth time, refusing a triumph, sent on his army to North Italy, and proceeded from Rome against the *Cimbri* in 101 B.C. They had traversed *Helvetia*, and descended into Italy by the pass of the *Brenner* and the valley of the *Adige*. On the *Athesis*, *Q. Lutatius Catulus* (consul 102 B.C.) had posted himself to stop their passage somewhere near *Verona* (neglecting the upper defiles above *Tridentum*), but was forced to retire by the cowardice of his troops, whose retreat he secured with difficulty. To do this he sacrificed a detachment, which was only saved by the heroism of a centurion

and the chivalry of the Cimbri. He brought his army with difficulty across the Po, and left the enemy to make themselves comfortable in the prosperous land he had so shamefully evacuated. Catulus, who took great credit to himself for his performance, remained in command as proconsul (101 B.C.), and on the arrival of Marius the two generals crossed the Po with 50,000 men. They met the Cimbri, who had marched up-stream to find a crossing, at Vercellæ, not far from the Sesia. The story runs that, on the challenge of Boiorix, Marius consented to appoint a time and place for battle—30th July 101 B.C., on the Campi Raudii, half-way between Turin and Milan. The plain would be serviceable for the superior Roman cavalry, an arm in which the invaders were throughout deficient.

Marius, placing in the centre, which he drew back, the demoralised troops of Catulus, distributed his veterans on the flanks. The Cimbric infantry is said to have formed a square $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles each side. Their horse, surprised in a morning mist, was forced back on the advancing foot. The heat of summer told on the Northerners; the wind, dust, and sun were all in their faces; but the victory was decided by the trained discipline of the Roman infantry and the ability of Marius. Driven back to their waggons, where the women fell upon the fugitives with knives and axes, the Cimbri were annihilated. Their wives and daughters preferred death by the enemy's sword or self-destruction to the doom of Roman slaves. Catulus claimed the chief merit, but to the consul commanding belonged the title of "Saviour of Rome." With his victories closed the first act of the struggle of the Roman and the Teuton. Marius contented himself with a single triumph, which he shared with Catulus, but the rivalry of



DENARIUS STRUCK 101 B.C.—TRIUMPH OF MARIUS; THE GODDESS, ROME.

the generals became a political antagonism between the popular and senatorial champions. Catulus, a convinced aristocrat and bitter enemy of Marius, an elegant and accomplished memoir-

writer, orator, and dilettante, was a strong foil to the rude soldier, who had the shocking taste to step from his chariot to the Senate-house without changing his robe of triumph. It was an omen of his fate. He brought to the field of politics a mind and character as unfit for subtle party manœuvres as it was incapable of the broad strokes of policy needed at this moment.

CHAPTER XXXVII

SATURNINUS, MARIUS, AND THEIR TIMES

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Lex Domitia	104	650
Slave War in Sicily	103-99	651-655
Coalition of Marius and the Demagogues—Laws of Saturninus—Death of Saturninus and Glaucia—Fall of Marius	100	654

Party Struggles.--During the wars party struggles had been bitter at Rome. The populares, supported by public wrath at the failures of the government, had again made head, and matters were fast approaching a crisis. We have mentioned incidentally the judicial commissions and convictions which followed the scandals and disasters in Africa and Gaul, and the popular movement, which, with a wave of indignation, swept Marius to the top. For the failures in Gaul, as in Africa, only more so, public opinion made the Senate and its officers responsible. In each case the storm discharged itself upon the wretched scape-goats, who suffered for the sins of their order as much as for their own incompetence and treason. The system was left unreformed, perhaps because there was no way to reform it, and with an instinctive certainty men turned to the one strong man who, they hoped, would manage better. Party power oscillated a good deal. In 106 B.C. Q. Servilius Cæpio, "patron of the Senate," and possibly leader of an anti-democratic movement, proposed a law restoring the judicial power wholly or in part to the Senate, a measure which, if carried, was swept away on his fall by another *Lex Servilia* of the tribune Glaucia. The same year saw the birth of Cicero and the great Pompeius. But for the internal history of this time we have even less authority than for the external. The abundant literature of the period has left but the merest outline and most meagre abridgment behind it. Laws

were passed and repealed, but no man of mark came forward on either side with a strong policy. There was a growing tendency towards violence, which left no room for constitutional growth.

Lex Domitia.—The deposition of Cæpio by popular decree (though not illegal, for proconsular power was not a definite office) was a marked interference with the Senate's prerogative. Equally noticeable is the tribunician *Lex Domitia* of 104 B.C. (*vide supra*, p. 289), which transferred to the people the right of nomination to the religious colleges. A proposal to this effect had been defeated in 145 B.C., when it formed part of an abortive attempt of the tribune C. Licinius Crassus to anticipate the democratic reforms of the Gracchi. On this occasion it was carried by a noble ancestor of the Emperor Nero, a candidate who had been blackballed by one of these exclusive clubs. Co-optation, which placed the ordination of priests, under the protection of heaven, in the hands of its ministers, was obsolete now that these ministers formed part and parcel of a government machinery. The priest had become politician; henceforth the politician would be priest. This new development, however, swept away one more restraint upon hasty and ill-considered legislation, carried through in a single chamber of the most unpromising elements.

Superstition at Rome.—Little indeed remained of the old faith now but its form and the superstitious terrors of the masses. During the Cimbric alarms there occurred a hideous scandal, followed by a cruel outburst of religious panic, not unmixed with meaner political intrigues, to which the sacred and high-born vestals and many noble Romans fell victims, and which only ended in a human sacrifice of two Greeks and two Gauls, to pacify the incensed deities—a relic of primeval barbarism forbidden later on by a *Senatus Consultum* of 97 B.C. There was a special commission under the Peducaean law, presided over by the aged and severe Cassius. Prosecutions grew in this ancient version of Titus Oates' plot; the meanest evidence was raked up. The trial of the noble maidens by a secular court, while it set aside the religious jurisdiction of the chief pontiff, was also an indirect attack on the upper classes. The sad and disgusting story is equally symptomatic of inner rottenness, whether the gross charges were proved indeed or were merely the result of diseased imagination, party rancour, and vulgar panic. Such things at least were credible of the highest society at Rome.

The void of faith was filled more and more with the passionate rites and mystical beliefs of the East, whose frantic ceremonies

and self-deluded impostors and fakirs found welcome with the gaping mob. The influx of degrading superstitions was at once a cause and an effect of the declining respect for the old religion. The customary remedies of strict censorships and sumptuary



PART OF A STATUE OF A VESTAL.

legislation were applied with the usual result. Cynical sermons on the duty of marriage and restrictions on the price of dinners were as unavailing to mend morals and hinder extravagance as the condemnation of schools of rhetoric and modern education

by the cultured orator L. Crassus, censor 92 B.C., was to prevent the new ideas from leavening the lump of Roman rudeness. The most salutary feature in the new movement was the spread of the Stoic doctrine among thoughtful men.

Saturninus.—The main incidents in the political struggle were, after all, the attacks on the Senate involved in the appointment of the two commissions of inquiry. The first belonged to the story of the Jugurthan war; the second is connected with the first tribunate of L. Appuleius Saturninus. This notorious man, a sensitive and aspiring nature, as a speaker vehement and vigorous, who had been superseded by the Senate in the office of corn-questor at Ostia, in favour of Scaurus, the Princeps Senatus, had in his mortification reformed his careless and irregular habits, and flung himself into political life as leader of the opposition. He was not precisely the dangerous and turbulent demagogue he has been painted, but for the next three years he was a most troublesome thorn in the side of the Senate. The acts of his two tribunates are not easy to disentangle. He supported the fourth candidature of Marius (103 B.C.), and apparently proposed, and possibly carried by means of violence, an abortive law for distributing land in Africa in large allotments to Marius' Roman and Italian veterans.

Lex de Maiestate.—To this year also may have belonged the *Lex Appuleia de Maiestate*, which was largely the work of his colleague Norbanus. It was primarily directed against the persons responsible for the fiascos and scandals in Gaul, and from it arose the commission which condemned the generals of Arausio. Cæpio, contrary to precedent, was actually arrested, and would have suffered death, in spite of the stoutest resistance of his friends, but for the self-sacrifice of a loyal tribune. He, indeed, owed his fall as much perhaps to the anger of the equites, who afterwards acquitted his enemy Norbanus, as to his misconduct in Gaul. Norbanus was brought under its provisions by a reaction in 94 B.C.; for, though not intended as a general law, its loose wording could readily be stretched. He was defended by the great orator Antonius on the ground that his violence was excused by the necessities of the time. The expression *maiestatem minuere*, to impair the honour or diminish the power of Rome, was as elastic as the modern phrase, "conduct calculated to bring the government into contempt." Republished by the *Lex Varia* of 91 B.C., and extended by the *Lex Cornelia* of Sulla, this law was the foundation of the imperial statute of treason. But it may have been con-

nected, not with the Gallic commission, but with the Appuleian Corn Law of uncertain date ; and the Cæpio impeached may have been the urban quæstor who, as Secretary of the Treasury, had opposed the measure in the Senate, and, when that body resolved that the law was dangerous to the state, attempted by violence to stop the voting in the Comitia. In that case the law would be designed to fortify the power of the tribune and the party of the populares.

Glaucia.—In the interval between Appuleius' two tribunates the censor Metellus Numidicus (102 B.C.) tried to remove from the Senate, on the ground of immorality, Saturninus himself and the favourite street-speaker, C. Servilius Glaucia, denounced by Cicero as a vulgar, shameless, and witty fellow, a sort of Roman Hyperbolus, but obviously a capable orator and a clever politician. His popular gifts had brought him to the top, with the support of the knights, pleased by his abrogation of the law of Cæpio. But the attempt to exclude the opposition leaders, frustrated by his colleague, recoiled on the head of its author. Set upon by Saturninus in his house and besieged on the Capitol, Metellus was only rescued by the aid of the equites of the eighteen centuries. Another scandal arose when Appuleius attacked the envoys of Mithradates for bribery, and incurred serious danger by his imprudent revelations.

Marius as a Politician.—The elections for 100 B.C. were marked by grave disturbances. Marius had discharged the army, which he had no idea of using to overthrow the constitution. For that the time was not ripe. He relied on his popularity and the votes of his veterans to gain his ends. Forced into opposition by the aristocracy, circumstances made him the natural leader of a party. The great man of the hour, popular as much by his defects as by his virtues, his head turned by his success, he was called to a part for which he was unfit, and became the instrument of men whose aims he scarcely understood. Accustomed to command, and yet incapable of civil eminence, he clung to his seven predicted consulships, when there was no longer room for him in the state. The frugal plebeian, without tact or taste, was out of his element in Roman society ; the plain soldier had no talent for intrigue, no gift for oratory. Hence, like Pompeius, when he took the constitutional path to his wishes he placed himself in the hands of his party managers. He allied himself with Saturninus and Glaucia. The interests and aims of the three men coincided. The result was a squalid version of the Gracchan

movement. For the popular party had fallen to pieces. The bottom had been knocked out of many ideals, and the more moderate men were afraid of revolution. Apart from brilliant speakers like Memmius and Crassus, who won their spurs in opposition and passed with place to the government, the only leaders were mortified nobles and noisy obstructionists. Power was now in their grasp and public feeling behind them, but the coalition failed; the popular idol lost his self-possession on the hustings. Like Pompeius again, he had no political courage; he wanted to secure a prominent position and rewards for his veterans by constitutional means, a loyal dull man, led astray by ambition and his associates. Only once, on the field of Vercellæ, had he shown a disposition to transgress the law, when he promised the franchise to some brave Italians, saying afterwards that in the din of battle he could not hear the voice of the laws. He was in a dilemma between his honesty and his ambition, pushed on faster than his ideas could grow, and in the crisis which followed he cannot be acquitted of a duplicity and dishonesty foreign to his nature. His associates, again, with all their skill in party intrigues and mob violence, were too wild and impetuous to conceive or carry out a consistent programme.

The Laws of Saturninus.—By canvass and bribery, Marius secured his own election, thwarted the senatorial candidate, Metellus, and received a harmless colleague in L. Valerius Flaccus. Glaucia was elected prætor. At the tribunician elections there was an uproar. Saturninus only succeeded in getting the tenth place by the murder of the government candidate, Nonius. The coalition had obtained office by hook or by crook. Their first measure, in itself reasonable, was an agrarian law, which proposed to distribute all the land conquered by the Cimbri, which, on Roman principles, became public land by the defeat of its conquerors, and all available soil in Sicily, Achaia, and Macedon, mainly no doubt for the benefit of the veterans. It opened a side-door to the franchise by including a certain number of Italians in each of the burgess colonies to be founded. Marius was to carry out the assignments and the necessary military work, probably by means of continuous consulships, and would thus enjoy a position of indefinite power. Thus the Gracchan ideas of trans-Alpine extension and colonisation, of the limitation of the Senate, and Italian franchise were resumed, but instead of successive tribunates we have successive consulates and the rise of the military power. The equites were at first inclined to favour their ancient allies and to support

the soldier who promised to secure vigorous government and commercial expansion. They were never unwilling to curtail the powers of the Senate. The coalition bid for the favour of the people by lowering the price of corn to a purely nominal sum, a measure whose date and fate are, it is true, a little uncertain, but the people remained indifferent or hostile. Saturninus' real support lay in the Marian veterans, for whom the agrarian law provided, and who carried it by violence in the teeth of the omens, the populace, and the nobles. There was a riot, in which the rustics and veterans dispersed the urban mob, and even the obstructing tribunes were insulted. To the announcement, as an omen, of an impending thunderstorm Saturninus replied by bidding the Senate beware of the hailstones. The Bill contained a clause designed to enforce its execution, by which the senators must, within five days, swear to observe it on pain of fine and forfeiture of their seat—an insulting provision, which, precisely reversing the constitutional practice, prevented any discussion or amendment. Marius behaved in a strange way. At first he refused compliance, and was followed by the Senate; but when the appointed time had almost lapsed, he summoned the Senate, declared that he was afraid of the people, and took the oath to respect the law "in so far as it was legal," hoping by this device to satisfy the veterans and leave himself a loophole of escape. The Senate accepted the oath with the same proviso, with the solitary exception of Metellus, who alone maintained his self-respect and left Rome to study philosophy in exile. The action of the Senate in taking the oath and sacrificing their leader was fatal to its authority.

Failure and Death of Saturninus.—To carry out the law meant the re-election of the coalition. Saturninus, indeed, was elected to a third tribunate, and with him a pseudo-Gracchus, an impostor, who, in spite of Marius himself, was released from prison and raised to office by the people. But the consular elections ended in confusion. The orator Antonius had been chosen for one; for the second place, C. Memmius, the renegade, was illegally opposed by Glaucia, who, as prætor of the year, was ineligible. Memmius was publicly murdered by bravos, and the next day there was an appeal to arms. On the one side stood the rustics and veterans, whipped up from the country, with whose aid Saturninus and Glaucia seized the Capitol, at the same time opening the prisons and summoning the slaves. On the other were the optimates, with their clients, and the equites of the eighteen centuries, with their armed slaves. The Senate summoned Marius to interfere,

and empowered the magistrates to use force. Reluctantly he prepared to attack his friends. They had gone too far, and the consul must either stamp out riot or proclaim revolution. The Senate turned out *en masse*; the tottering Scaurus, the aged augur Scaevola, donned their disused armour. The city was guarded within and without. There was a battle in the Forum, the first fought in Rome; the rebels were driven to the Capitol, and when Marius cut off the water, finally surrendered. Hoping to save them, he placed them in the Curia Hostilia, but when the young nobles stormed the roof and pelted the prisoners to death he was forced to let them perish.

Fall of Marius (Dec. 10, 100).—In the massacre fell four officers of the Roman people, with other men of note, and with them fell the power and credit of Marius. The cause of the disaster lay partly in the vacillation and incompetence of Marius, who could neither control nor support his associates, partly in the reckless and riotous conduct of Saturninus and Glaucia, which alarmed the wealthier classes and consolidated the opposition. Men were ready to support a strong and upright man in cleansing the administration, but not to sacrifice material interests to military rowdiness and mob rule. Marius himself was half afraid of his allies, and wished to gain his own ends and wash his hands of the consequences. He is even said, on one occasion, to have passed from room to room of his house, like a man in a comedy, negotiating alternately with senators and conspirators. In the end his colleagues went on without him. They were not prepared to work without wages. For them to resign was destruction. But the murder of Memmius was a blunder; it forced Marius' hand. Outmanœuvred by his opponents, and compromised by his friends, he was forced to cut away his own supports, and fell at once, unhonoured, unregretted, unattacked. The coalition had been smashed. The equites drew towards the Senate as the sole hope of order; Metellus returned in triumph; a protesting tribune was murdered by the crowd; the victor of Vercellæ, afraid to stand for the censorship, withdrew to the East, and came back to find himself a nonentity, to nurse ambition and meditate revenge in his perverted soul. The populares were scattered; some fled even to Pontus to join Mithradates. The Appuleian laws were cancelled, and when the tribune Titius, a paltry ape of Saturninus, attempted to revive the Agrarian Bill in 99 B.C., not only was it annulled on religious prettexts, but the tribune and other democrats were zealously convicted by the equestrian courts, Norbanus

himself barely escaping because he had punished the hated Cæpio.

Slave-rising in Sicily.—The fall of Marius left the government in a strong position at home. Abroad there was little to do, and that little was more efficiently done. A rising in Spain was vigorously suppressed (97–93 B.C., *vide supra*, p. 372), and the year 99 B.C. saw the end of a dangerous insurrection in Sicily. It had resembled its predecessor in all its incidents except its immediate cause. Once more there had been a general ferment among the slaves. Serious riots had occurred at Nuceria and Capua, and at Thurii an enamoured and indebted knight, T. Vettius, to gain his love and escape his creditors, raised a revolt, called himself king, and required the arts and arms of a prætor to crush his mad outbreak. In Attica the slaves and convicts who worked the silver-mines mutinied, and, above all, in Sicily the old causes, lax police, cruel masters, and the excessive numbers of the slaves, produced the old effects. Feeling first found vent when P. Licinius Nerva, the governor, in obedience to a decree of the Senate (B.C. 104), took measures to release free men kidnapped and sent to the plantations by pirates or publicani. This decree was due to a statement of Nicomedes II. of Bithynia, in reply to a demand for auxiliaries, that his able-bodied men had been mostly kidnapped. The Senate directed the governor to see to the matter, and Nerva had in consequence set at liberty 800 men. But, frightened by the remonstrances of the aggrieved slave-holders and the excitement among the slaves, he suspended action, with the result that the expectant and defrauded suitors fled from Syracuse to sanctuary. But the rising was nipped in the bud with the aid of an escaped convict and popular brigand who betrayed the runaways.

Tryphon and Athenio.—Suppressed for the moment, it broke out in another place. The defeat of a detachment from Enna gave the insurgents arms and encouragement. Once more there were no effective troops, and the wretched and ruined labourers supported the slaves, the miserable instruments of their own decay. Once more a juggling prophet called Salvius was declared king by the Syrians, and took the name of Tryphon, after the slave who had usurped the crown of Syria (142 B.C.). Order and discipline were introduced, and with a powerful force the king took the offensive, fell upon Morgantia, and defeated a relieving army, dispersing the Greek militia, who flung away their arms to save their skins. The town was rescued by the courage of the domestic slaves, whose promised freedom was afterwards refused. In the west, Athenio, a Cilician

brigand chief, repeated the part of Cleon. A skilful soldier, a star-reader and dealer in the supernatural, he headed the revolt, organised an army, enforced discipline, and by his ability and clemency earned popularity and success. To the disappointment of the Romans, he submitted to the king. The rebels fortified their headquarters in a strong position called Triocala, in the centre of the island, where Tryphon paraded his royalty as an Eastern despot with Roman insignia. They failed in their attacks on the towns, notably at Lilybæum, but with the help of the free labourers they controlled the plains and spread famine and misery through the land. Even in the towns, with the aid of African contingents, the masters, cut off from their estates, barely controlled the slaves inside. In 103 B.C., in spite of the Cimbric disasters, the government scraped together a mixed force, containing few Italian troops, under L. Lucullus, who gained a victory near Scirthæa over an enemy 40,000 strong. But his negligence or his losses prevented his following it up. He was forced to retire from Triocala, and was afterwards condemned on a charge of peculation. He was succeeded in 102 B.C. by Servilius, who did nothing, and received the reward of his predecessor. Tryphon appears to have died; but Athenio, who had been left for dead at Scirthæa, revived, and ranged the island unimpeded, nearly capturing Messana by surprise. At last, in 101 B.C., M'. Aquillius, the consul, defeated and slew Athenio in single combat, stormed the strongholds, and after two years' hard fighting, pacified the island.

The Pirates.—There had been five years of misery, outrage, and anarchy. Sicily, stripped of its labourers, desolated by ravage, slowly recovered under a short spell of liberal government; but the old evils were not cured. The administration of the provinces, with rare exceptions, remained what it had been, while the state of the seas was so bad that even this government was obliged to deal with it. In 103 B.C. M. Antonius, the prætor, was sent out with proconsular powers, and a fleet raked together from the allies, to Cilicia, where he destroyed the ships and castles of the buccaneers. By the occupation of certain positions in the rugged Western Cilicia along the coast, a beginning was made of a province in that region; but the solitary effort was ill sustained, and the pirates reasserted their sovereignty of the sea.

The East.—In the East, as in Spain, the Senate was acting with rather more vigour. Ptolemy Apion, natural son of Physcon (Ptolemy Euergetes II.), who had received Cyrene in 117 B.C., on the death of his father, as a separate appanage, died in 96 B.C. and be-

queathed his kingdom to Rome. The Senate accepted the legacy, but while exercising a nominal supervision from Utica, declared the Greek cities, Cyrene, Ptolemais, and Berenice free, and did not create a regular province till 75 B.C. This curious mixture of intrigue and negligence, which evaded the responsibility of annexation, while it checked the aggrandisement of Egypt, handed over the important commercial district to intestine strife. It was a more vigorous act when, in 92 B.C., Sulla, the rising man of the senatorial party, was sent, as governor of Cilicia, to check the pirates and settle the affairs of the East. By his resource and audacity he restrained for a time the aggressions of Mithradates and imposed respect on Parthia.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE LAWS OF DRUSUS

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Lex Cæcilia Didia against Tacking	98	656
Lex Licinia Mucia alienates the Italians	95	659
Tribunate and Murder of Drusus	91	663

Lex Cæcilia Didia.—The failure of Saturninus was naturally followed by a strong reaction. The spectre of anarchy had frightened the capitalists and broken up the purely political alliance invented by the vindictive genius of C. Gracchus. In 98 B.C. the government was strong enough to carry through the *Lex Cæcilia Didia*, proposed by the consuls Q. Metellus Nepos and a *novus homo*, T. Didius, designed to prevent hasty legislation and the combination of different measures in a single Bill. Itself an example of the abuse it aimed at checking, it provided for an interval of a Roman fortnight between the introduction and passing of a Bill (*trinundinum*=seventeen days), which, however inadequate for the discussion of a complicated statute, would at least prevent the scandalous surprises sprung on an ignorant assembly, while it forbade the so-called practice of tacking—*legem per saturam ferre*—which compelled a legislative body to accept what it did not want, under pain of losing what it did. But the improvement came too late and was indeed too slight to affect the increasing oscillation of power and contempt for law, which were the results of weak government, of the degradation of the Comitia, and of the statesmanship of party manœuvre.

In the same year Aquillius was acquitted of manifest extortions in Sicily, saved by his services and the rhetoric of Antonius.

The Italians and the Lex Licinia Mucia.—In 95 B.C. the consuls were the great orator L. Crassus, who failed to scrape a coveted triumph by harrying the Alpine glens, and the great lawyer of a family of lawyers, Q. Mucius Scævola, Pontifex Maximus, an able, upright, legally minded man. To these two distinguished persons was due the blunder of a mistimed and severe re-enactment of the old laws against aliens, intended to prevent the irregular voting and undue influence of Italians in the Comitia. The *Lex Licinia Mucia* created violent irritation among the allies by prohibiting non-citizens from claiming or exercising the franchise, by inquiring into the status of resident aliens, and probably by expelling those who usurped the right. Natural as it may have seemed, useful even to the depopulated townships of the allies, legal as it undoubtedly was, and favourable as the moment appeared, the law came as a cruel shock after the patriotic exertions of the Cimbric war, after the hopes so often raised, after the use made of the Italians by both parties in turn. It ended every expectation of a liberal policy. Its explicit provisions reduced Rome's faithful allies, without distinction, to the status of aliens, and strictly punished all transgressors.

Crassus, the popular accuser of Carbo, the supporter of the colony at Narbonne, the independent and moderate optimiate, the ally of Drusus in his attack on the equestrian courts, a respected and cautious statesman, and Scævola, the honest governor, the pattern of rectitude, thoughtful and temperate in policy, no doubt hoped to purify the elections, and, as constitutional lawyers, saw the inevitable results of civic expansion, and meant to maintain existing forms. But the indignation caused by this law was one of the most important antecedents of the Social War. As yet its effect was not apparent.

Quarrel between the Senate and the Equites.—Attention was absorbed by the imminent struggle between the Senate and equites, which broke the nine years' interval of peace. The alliance of equites and democrats being dissolved, and the mob, if duly humoured, being at the disposal of the Senate, it only required some scandal exciting public indignation to sweep away the judicial privileges of the knights, who, through the court of extortions, controlled the governors abroad and hampered the Senate at home. It was this which the majority of that body proposed to themselves in supporting the reforms of Drusus—

freedom from blackmail and vexatious proceedings, and the restoration of their privileges. The opportunity arose from the condemnation (in 92 B.C.) of the able and upright administrator P. Rutilius Rufus, adjutant and friend of the lawyer Q. Mucius Scævola, the exemplary governor of Asia. Both had earned the deadly hatred of the publicani and the approbation of the Senate by their defence of the provincials and punishment of outrage; but vengeance fell alone on the less well-friended soldier, the plain Stoic, who despised the artifices of the advocates, and died in honoured and lettered exile at Smyrna. This gross miscarriage of justice, an infamous conviction on a charge preferred by an infamous informer, filled the cup of equestrian misconduct. All who were indignant at the plunder of the provinces were ready to join in an attack which promised at the same time to restore independence to their order.

Livius Drusus.—The assault was headed by M. Livius Drusus, tribune of 91 B.C., an enigmatical character whose policy and actions remain a mystery. Emphatically a noble of a conservative family, the son of Gracchus' opponent, a man of good position and large fortune, proud, earnest, ardent, direct, lavish of public and private resources, respected indeed for his high aims and strong personality, but popular neither with weak-kneed senators nor lazy paupers, he had no political tact, no skill in party manœuvres, and little capacity for guiding men or controlling movements. Among his supporters were Scaurus, the orator Crassus, the augur Scævola, the reformer Sulpicius Rufus, and generally the moderate conservatives of the Senate. He was bitterly opposed by the shifty consul L. Marcius Philippus, once spokesman of the democrats, and author of a confiscatory land law, now the voice of the equites, destined to be a democratic censor, and finally a Sullan renegade; by the violent, reactionary Q. Cæpio, son of the Tolosa man, and by all the ultra-Tories. His programme of conservative reform on Gracchan lines was borrowed from both parties; he meant to trump the enemy's cards by utilising their measures for the benefit of the Senate. His main ideas were two—the reconstitution of the Senate and the extension of the franchise to the Italians. To carry these through, and possibly with a hope of checking pauperism, he was prepared to bribe the populace with corn and land, and, while steering clear of assassination and riot, to use, if necessary, the strong hand.

The Leges Liviae.—Therefore, keeping for the moment the franchise in the background, he brought forward a *Lex Frumen-*

turia, probably increasing the doles (covering the expense by depreciation of the coinage), and an Agrarian Law, perhaps providing for the establishment of the colonies promised by his father in 122 B.C. To these was tacked a *Lex iudiciaria*, involving a sort of compromise between the Senate and the equites. He proposed to institute a new *Album iudicum* of 300 senators and 300 knights, possibly at the same time raising the selected knights to the dignity of senators to recruit the now emaciated ranks of the order. He also provided a court for the investigation of judicial corruption.

This law, if intended to conciliate interests by the creation of senators and the division of powers, was not likely to succeed. The equites lost at least half their privileges, were bitterly opposed to the clause that made jurors amenable to justice, and were not appeased by a concession which they regarded as a snare. The new senators would be popular with neither order. Contrary to the law of 98 B.C., and in the teeth of the equites and their agent Philippus, the laws were carried *en bloc*, with the lukewarm support of the irresolute Senate. There were violent scenes in the Forum and violent discussions in the House, which refused at first to desert its leader and annul the laws. Philippus, who had publicly declared that with such a Senate government was impossible, and that "he must look out for other advisers," was vehemently arraigned by Crassus, who died with suspicious suddenness after his great effort, and censured by a formal resolution. In the Assembly both he and Cæpio met with rude handling from the city mob and the poorer Italians, who flocked in to support their known friend by intimidation and irregular votes.

Failure and Death of Drusus.—But Drusus, with his tatters of borrowed policy, had no force behind him, and when he tried to carry through his great measure of Italian franchise his allies failed him. Uneasiness had already shown itself; his power dwindled as the year went on. The mob, fickle in its attachments, was consistent in its refusal to lower the money value of its franchise. In the Senate the majority was keen for privilege, ready to bribe, readier still, in the tribune's words, to leave nothing for an agitator to divide but *cælum aut cænium*, by doing his work for their own profit; the minority was not unfavourable to enfranchisement as a measure of safety, which brought allies and evaded dangers at a trifling cost, but no one was prepared for a serious political struggle on behalf of a man whom they suspected perhaps as much as they respected. Gradually were spread about sus-

picious rumours—possibly canards—based on the known Italian sympathies and connections of Drusus, rumours of a far-reaching Italian conspiracy, whose partisans were bound to the Roman tribune by a solemn personal oath. The cuckoo-cry of treason was raised. Only the honour of Drusus had prevented the murder of the consul at the Latin games. An armed band, marching on Rome to coerce the Senate and co-operate with the tribune, had been with difficulty turned back. The form of oath was circulated. At once the old exclusiveness was up in arms; the timid progressives rattled; Senate and consul were reconciled. With stern disdain Drusus acquiesced in the annulment of his illegally passed laws by the body he sought to defend. The loss and the danger were theirs, and theirs the responsibility. They were making their own beds. In the same spirit he cried, when he fell at the door of his house, struck by an assassin's hand in the dusk of evening, "*Ecquandone similem mei civem habebit respublica?*" Indeed, the failure of the unpractical, large-hearted man in his attack on capitalism and civic prejudice, while it shattered the last hopes of the foiled and frustrated allies, drove one more nail in the coffin of senatorial government. The weakness of his friends more than the strength of his foes was too much for him, as had been the case with the Gracchi, between whom and their conservative successor there is little to choose in singleness of purpose, in political tactics, and reforming ideas, save that the one acted as the patron of a decaying Senate, the others as champions of a decayed Comitia. His supporters had more credit than power, more discretion than courage; the forces of selfishness and *laissez-faire* were against him; even the Italians in each community were divided in interests, the Romanising aristocracy of landowners against the patriotic but needy and half-suppressed populace. As to himself, we cannot decide if his ultimate aim was the reconstitution of the Senate, or if he bought up all forces to support his Italian policy; nor can we reconcile his refusal to protect his laws with his apparent readiness to use physical force, and even civil war. He was a man clearly of better intentions and larger ideas than he had political ability or good fortune.

The mysterious death of their hero was felt deeply by the Italians, who now prepared in earnest for the war which Drusus hoped to avert. The usual reaction followed at Rome. A tribune, Q. Varius, an agent of the equites, carried by intimidation a *Lex de Maiestate*, from which issued a court of inquiry into the alleged conspiracy. Whether the moderates had or had not been tamper-

ing with the Italians, the bare suspicion of intrigue afforded an excellent handle for removing opponents and punishing the Senate. The report of ferments in Italy and the outbreak of the revolt sharpened the edge of the charge. Trials of eminent men went on through 91 and 90 B.C. Bestia and C. Cotta were exiled; Antonius the orator and Pompeius Strabo were attacked; old Scaurus, impeached once more, was content with the triumphant sally—"A Spaniard accuses Scaurus, Princeps Senatus, of treason. Scaurus denies the charge. Romans, which do you believe?"

By a not uncommon irony, Varius, informer and suspected assassin, perished later by his own law.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE SOCIAL WAR

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Outbreak at Asculum	91	663
North: Defeat of Rutilius Lupus—Retirement of Marius—		
South: L. Julius Cæsar driven from Campania—Lex		
Julia	90	664
Pompeius Strabo puts down the Insurrection in the North		
and settles Cisalpine Gaul—Sulla defeats the Samnites—		
Lex Plautia Papiria—The Varian Commission restored—		
Economic Crisis and Murder of the Prætor Asellio . . .	89	665
End of the Social War	88	666

Importance of the War.—The Social War was perhaps the most dangerous conflict in which Rome had as yet engaged. No Gallic *tumultus*, not even "*dirus Hannibal*" himself, brought her power so low or forced from humbled arrogance a recantation of policy, while a victorious enemy yet held the field. The allies had they succeeded finally, would scarcely have been content with the exaction of their just claims. The separatist spirit, exasperated by an obstinate struggle, would have undone the work of centuries and broken up with the power of Rome the unity of Italy. At best it would have substituted a loose federation, incapable of preserving the provincial empire and the widespread influence of Rome. As it was, its effects were deeply felt in the history of Italy and the world, and in this lies the interest of the war, of whose course and events we have scanty and fragmentary information utterly disproportioned to its deadly nature and real importance. To the statesmen and leaders who brought it to a successful close, and above all to the commanding genius of the

.. soldier Sulla, Rome owes a debt whose magnitude is concealed by the veil with which time and natural feeling have shrouded a calamitous and unnecessary schism.

Occasion of the War.—The immediate causes of the war lay no doubt in the failure of the plans of Drusus, which destroyed the last hope of constitutional agitation, in well-founded alarms for the future due to the Varian Commission and to the restoration of the equites and reactionaries to power, in the negligence of the unsuspecting Senate and the explosion of popular feeling at Asculum in Picenum. Thither, when the Senate, vaguely aware of restless movement and unwonted intercourse among the allies, had caused secret inquiries to be made by its agents in the various communities, came the Roman prætor Servilius with proconsular power and attended by a legate. He had been informed that the Asculans were exchanging hostages, and now, happening upon a meeting of the people in the theatre to celebrate the games, by a vehement reprimand he so kindled the passions of his audience that they tore him and his suite to pieces, and sealed the declaration of war by the murder of resident Romans. The hands of the leaders were forced and the revolt spread like wild-fire. Whatever conspiracy may have existed in the name of Drusus and the franchise, the deep disappointment of his death at any rate must have strengthened everywhere the faction of the secessionists against the moderates. Mutual understandings became definite treaties; old associations were revived; old tribal connections, reduced by Roman policy to religious formalities, sprang again to life. Even wider alliances were contemplated;



DENARIUS OF THE CONFEDERATES—TAKING THE OATH; AND
HEAL OF ITALIA.

armed and drilled troops the allies possessed in the contingents liable for Roman service. The movement, some time in progress, was only precipitated by the revolt of Asculum.

Causes of the Social War.—For the real causes of the war lay far deeper. The strength of the Roman organisation of Italy had been in its skilful combination of the principle of autonomy with the ascendancy of the paramount state. The commercial and political isolation of each city from its neighbours was compensated by its direct connection with Rome, as an immediate ally. By a dexterous use of the franchise and a wise graduation of privileges she had secured a divergency of interest between communities of different status, thus creating no uniform level of servitude, but an ascending scale of subjection. This system was fortified in a political sense by the maintenance of aristocratical governments in each city, whose members were attached by various privileges to Roman interests, and in a military sense by the formation of roads, protected at strategical points by powerful fortresses, whose citizens possessed Latin rights and were doubly bound to allegiance by the ties of interest and personal danger. At the same time the enjoyment of national languages and customs, of local rights and liberties, was ensured, peace maintained, the barbarian repelled, and commerce protected, while Roman conquest opened fresh fields for speculation and enterprise. In earlier times free admission to a foreign franchise, involving the loss of local rights, could be no object to any community, but only to those individuals who should migrate to Roman townships. But when the value of the franchise rose with the rise of Rome and relative decline of the allied states, and there came a growing disinclination to admit new-comers, friction was set up. It was not so much the civic as the material advantages that were in question. In the city-state, with the principle of direct voting in collective assemblies, the extension of the franchise over a wide area was useless to its recipients, who could only vote on the rarest occasions, and added to the difficulties of good municipal government. The gain in new blood was small. But the decay of local politics inevitably drove the more ambitious spirits in Italy to covet a share in imperial business; their restricted career in the local contingents galled the hearts of able soldiers. To men familiar with Rome the closing of the franchise and expulsion from the capital were a bitter grievance. The middle and lower classes resented their increasing burdens, the costly cavalry service, the enlarged contingents of infantry, the severity of martial law, the unfair distribution of land and booty, the exclusion from cheap corn, salt, and allotments.

The Senate and people, instead of carrying on the work of gradual assimilation, had unwisely obliterated the distinction of

Latin, ally, and subject, had closed the doors of the franchise and expelled resident aliens, had permitted their officers to lord it over the Italians in defiance of law and right, and suppressed all protests with contumely and violence. Terrible stories of outrage circulated from town to town. The claims of the allies, acknowledged as just by the best men of all parties, had been a tool in the hands of each party in turn. Every scheme of reform had been shattered on the short-sighted selfishness of reactionary nobles, jealous capitalists, and grudging paupers. Hope had been raised to the highest by the conversion of the majority of the Senate. The failure of this hope meant insurrection.

Division of Feeling.—But among the subjects there were divisions of interest and feeling. Those districts whose position made the exercise of the franchise possible would be satisfied with this concession; the wealthy landowners of Etruria and Umbria, where the agricultural depression had effectually destroyed the yeoman farmer, secure in their lordship by the favour of Rome, checked the first movement of revolt among their serfs. In Samnium and Lucania, less penetrated by Latin language and ideas, retaining still the old traditions of farmer life and civic equality, the national spirit, enkindled by the war, turned the demand for equal rights into a battle for national independence. In the particular states, again, even where there was most unity of feeling and action, there are traces of party struggles. Here and there a town like the Vestinian Pinna, or a corps like that of Magius of Æclanum, did yeoman service for Rome. The ruling nobilities must often have nursed pro-Roman sympathies, and divided counsels weakened the forces of insurrection. The Latin fortresses remained, in the first instance, loyal. Campania, with Capua as a magazine, served as a second basis and source of revenue and supplies. Neapolis, Rhegium, and the other Greek cities would not sacrifice their favoured position to support their ancient enemies. They provided the nucleus of a fleet, and secured the communications by sea of the Southern armies.

From the provinces Rome drew light infantry, archers, and cavalry, ships and supplies. She had the advantage of a central position, an organised constitution, and the tradition of victory. She fought on inner lines, with a power of concentrated action, against a hastily improvised confederacy, without coherence or established form. It was only the sloth of her government and the incapacity of her generals which dissipated her strength by



London, New York, Bombay & Calcutta.

W & A. K. Johnston, Limited, Edinburgh & London.

division and delay, and by her defeats hammered together the loose structure of the federal union.

Organisation of the Confederates.—Roughly the allies fall into two divisions, Northern and Southern. In the north the smaller tribes—Picentes, Pæligni, Vestini, Marrucini, Frentani—centred round the Marsians, who gave their name to the “Marsic war.” In the south the Samnites and Lucanians, with closer ranks and sterner purpose, followed a deeper policy. As their headquarters they selected Corfinium, a town strong in its seclusion on the river Aternus (Pescara), in the Pælignian land, and a convenient centre for the northern cantons. Italia, as it was renamed, became the seat of the federal government, an artificial creation, existing merely for military and political purposes. The central executive was closely modelled on the Roman pattern. There was a Senate of 500, two consuls, and twelve prætors exercising a full imperium. But how these were selected we cannot say; nor do we know what relations precisely the communities in the various groups bore to each other, nor how the central government was constituted. The Italian stocks were not politically inventive enough to develop at once a full-fledged federalism, with a representative Senate and Assembly. Nor did they merely mean to create a new and fictitious city-state, with an Italian franchise and direct assemblies, reproducing the worst vices of the municipal polity of Rome. They just improvised a war organisation on the most available plan, selected a place of congress, and left the question of Centralisation *versus* Separation for later settlement. Their state was therefore a loose federation. A coinage was necessarily established, and Latin and Samnite were no doubt used indifferently for official purposes. Italia never appears as a sovereign-state; the headquarters are shifted as occasion arises, and the armies of the league acted naturally in two main divisions.

Strength of the Combatants.—In the number of their troops the opposing forces were roughly equal, the active armies amounting at first to 100,000 a side. Man for man, the hardy mountaineers, drilled in the Roman wars, were better than the Roman levies; while the rebel officers showed from the outset superior ability, audacity, and resource. Geographically, they surrounded Rome from north-east to south-east in an elongated semicircle, occupying the range of the Apennines and the plains of the Lower Adriatic, the bulk of Central and Southern Italy. A few successes in Etruria and Campania would complete the circle to the sea. Rome could be alarmed on three sides at once by forces issuing at will

from the innumerable defiles of their well-defended mountains. But their action was hampered by the faithful Latin fortresses, judiciously planted in commanding situations, whose reduction and relief provided for each side respectively the first object in this desultory war. In the north or Latin-speaking districts, from Picenum to Campania, commanded the "consul" Q. Pompædus Silo, a Marsian. His colleague, the Samnite, C. Papius Mutilus,



DENARIUS OF MUTILUS—SAMNITE BULL GORING WOLF; HEAD OF BACCHANTE.

acted in Samnium and Campania. Each had six prætors as subordinate leaders of divisions.

Preparations at Rome.—At Rome, when once the need was realised, desperate preparations were made. The envoys who came at the last moment from the insurgents to demand the franchise were summarily dismissed, business was suspended, expenditure curtailed, contingents summoned from abroad. The consuls L. Julius Cæsar and P. Rutilius Lupus divided the active forces. Among their legati, five to each consul, served officers of every shade of politics. With Cæsar in the south were Didius, Crassus, Catulus, and Sulla; with Lupus in the north the veteran Marius and Pompeius Strabo. The offensive lay with Rome; the allies, secure in their mountains, would naturally keep on the defensive, at least till they had freed their flanks and rear from the pressure of the Roman strongholds. But as she had been slow to prepare, so now Rome failed to act with decisive force in any direction, frittering her strength away in inconclusive isolated engagements.

Roman Fortresses.—The more important of the fortresses in question were, in the south, Venusia, watching the Apulian plain and the road to the southern ports; Beneventum, guarding the communications between Capua and Apulia, by the Volturnus and Calor, or by the Appian road, at the gate of the Samnite hills; Æsernia,

in the heart of Samnium, holding the approach by the main stream of the Volturnus. In the north, Carsioli and Alba Fucens guarded the cross-road (Via Valeria) to the Adriatic, holding the issues of the Marsian heights and the basin of the Fucine lake; Narnia and Spolegium, on the Via Flaminia, secured Umbria; Nepesin and Sutrin held down South Etruria and protected Rome on the left. In Picenum, Firmum supplied a check on Asculum, the author of the revolt. Communications with Campania were guarded by Fabrateria, at the passage of the Liris, and Cales, where the Latin road falls to the plain, and by the Roman colonies and Greek cities of the coast. Of the Campanian præfectures and allied towns, which were at once garrisoned for Rome, Casilinum, Nola, Acerræ, and Venafrum, held important positions.

Success of the Insurgents in South Italy.—Rome's delay enabled the allies to assail the more immediately dangerous of these posts. Silo, for instance, invested Alba; Mutilus besieged Æsernia. In an attempt to relieve the latter by the old Volturnus route, Cæsar was defeated by P. Vettius Scato, and driven back with loss. The fall of Venafrum, in his rear, and a second and disastrous defeat by Marius Egnatius compelled a hasty retreat to Teanum, where the consul halted to recruit his shattered forces. Æsernia, after a stubborn resistance, relieved for a moment by an exploit of the bold and subtle Sulla, fell by the end of the year. A similar fate to his own befell Cæsar's lieutenants. Crassus, in Lucania, was shut up by Lamponius in Grumentum. The road into Campania was clear for Mutilus. Nola fell by treason; and one by one, except Nuceria, the towns of South Campania went over, the prisoners and slaves being incorporated in the insurgent army. The Samnite was already besieging Acerræ, when Cæsar, alarmed at this sudden collapse and threatened loss of revenue and material, advanced to prevent the fall of Capua and the completion of the circle which would cut the capital from the south. He achieved some success, but in spite of a seasonable repulse inflicted on Mutilus, which the Senate used as a pretext for discarding the military dress and dispelling the deep despondency at Rome, he could only maintain his ground in front of the enemy at Acerræ. His Numidian horse deserted to Oxyntas, son of Jugurtha, a state prisoner who had fallen into the hands of the allies at the capture of Venusia. He could not prevent the surrender of Æsernia and the loss of Canusium and other towns in the south stormed or reduced by the active leader Judacilius. In fear for their communications, the Romans formed a fleet and levied a

large force of freedmen to guard the line of the Latin and North Campanian coast.

Defeat of Lupus.—In the centre and north the natural objective was the relief of Alba and the punishment of Asculum. A rapid and decisive advance would have created a powerful impression and cleared the ground in the neighbourhood of the capital. Accordingly Rutilius Lupus, however hampered by the dilatory counsels of Marius, whose policy of patience proposed to train the raw troops and exhaust the enemy's strength, had taken the offensive and marched on Alba along the Valerian road, when his advance was checked by the bloody defeat of his legate Perperna, followed only too soon by his own disastrous defeat and death at the crossing of the Tolenus (June 11, 90 B.C.). Vettius Scato, aware that the enemy was about to pass the river in two divisions, dexterously masking the cautious Marius with a small force, fell with his main army from ambush on the consul, who crossed the stream, confiding in his legate's support. Eight thousand Romans fell.

Marius.—Marius, enlightened by the bodies coming downstream, occupied indeed the Marsian camp, but despair was deep at Rome when they knew the consul dead and Alba not relieved. A victory of S. Sulpicius over the Pæligni, and the tactics of Marius, compelled the Marsi to draw back their lines; and after Q. Cæpio, Drusus' opponent, joined with Marius in the command by the Senate, had been cut to pieces in a trap laid by the resourceful Silo, the veteran, now sole commander, maintained a victorious defensive, and is said to have inflicted severe defeats on the Marsi and Marrucini. In one of these Sulla, we are told, with a detachment of the southern army was able to co-operate. Characteristic stories are told of this campaign. When Pompædius Silo challenged Marius, "If you are a great general, come down and fight," he replied, "If you are a great general, Silo, make me come down and fight." On another occasion we hear how the troops, ancient comrades in arms, fraternised between the lines, while the Roman and the Marsian chiefs walked and talked together on the field. At the close of the year Marius, old, fat, and heavy, unequal or deemed unequal to the work, retired from the command in something like disgrace, to brood once more on that seventh consulate he had failed to achieve.

Picenum.—In Picenum, Cn. Pompeius Strabo, driven by the combined forces of Scato, Judacilius, and Lafrenius from Asculum—a strong city desperately defended—fell back on Firmum, where Lafrenius held him besieged, while Judacilius hurried to Apulia.

From this position Strabo was released by the victory of S. Sulpicius, who now advanced to Firmum. His assailants, taken in rear and front, were driven into Asculum, with the loss of their leader, and the siege began in earnest. It was the first genuine victory of the war, and helped to restore a little confidence at Rome.

Results of the First Campaign.—Thus far the record of the war had been, on the whole, disastrous for the city. The confederates, welded together by success, had organised victory, and were taking the offensive. The consular armies had been "beaten, bobbed, and thumped" by their own contingents. The south was gone, Campania was half lost, Rome herself was threatened in the north, her communications with the southern division endangered. Nola and Venusia had gone over, and there were symptoms of revolt among the Latins. In Umbria and Etruria, though L. Porcius Cato and A. Plotius repressed rebellion, it was necessary to maintain corps of observation. The circle of steel was becoming perilously complete. There were menacing signs abroad, in Gaul and Spain, and above all in Asia, where Mithradates threatened the eastern frontier. Supplies of men and money were exhausted. In spite of the victories of Firmum and Acerræ, the spirit of Rome was broken; there was no longer the power of resistance in Senate and people that broke the conquering swords of Pyrrhus and Hannibal; nor was the stake worth the struggle. The tide of feeling changed. Forced by this new Secession once more to abandon her obstinate attitude to reasonable reform, Rome surrendered the whole principle of the war, reversed her policy, and took her annoyance out in the punishment of the leaders of the war party. It was the happy moment for concession.

Concession of the Franchise (1) to the Italians.—The *Lex Iulia* of the consul Cæsar, passed at the close of 90 B.C., which conferred the full franchise on the Latins, and on all the allies not actually in arms, checked the spread of rebellion, secured the Latins, and satisfied the wavering Umbrians and Etrurians. The *Lex Plautia Papiria* of 89 B.C., passed at the beginning of the tribunician year, struck at the root of trouble, and by offering the franchise to every Italian ally domiciled in Italy who should apply personally to a Roman magistrate within sixty days, gave the moderates and Roman partisans a pretext for returning to allegiance, sowed sedition in the enemy's camps, and without entirely sacrificing the dignity of Rome by capitulating to the separatists, afforded in the shape of a free gift satisfaction to their original demands. As to the authors of the war, the enemies of

Drusus, and the creators of the Court of Treason, they were punished by the reorganisation of the Varian Commission, through the tribune M. Plautius Silvanus, at the end of 90 or beginning of 89 B.C. A body of judices was selected *ad hoc* by the tribes, a solitary example of this mode of appointment. The power of the equites was for the moment broken, and the exiles were restored.


(2) **In Cisalpine Gaul.**—The franchise was further extended in the course of 89 B.C. by a *Lex Pompeia* of the consul Strabo, dealing with Cisalpine Gaul, which was now practically a part of Italy. The Latin colonies of the Cispadane had shared of course in the earlier concession, together with the allied towns on the right bank. Thus the Italian municipal system extended henceforth to the Po, though the later administrative province of Cisalpine Gaul ran down to the Rubicon. On the left bank Pompeius organised civic communities on the Italian model, making adjacent villages depend on the towns, and endowed them with Latin rights, a step to the full franchise given by Cæsar in 49 B.C. The Celtic tribal system, which still subsisted along with the Celtic population, was rapidly assimilated to the Roman municipal type.

Asculum.—The new departure, if it left the Samnites and the separatists still in the field, prevented the consolidation of the revolt, cut the supplies of the insurgents, and poured into Rome fresh and eager recruits. The effects were felt at once, and, supported by a greater display of skill and energy, put a new face on the war. Early in the year Strabo, in Picenum, intercepted and destroyed a Marsian army of 15,000 men marching to raise Etruria and Umbria. The other consul, Cato, who, having superseded Marius, co-operated with his colleague in the attack on the northern positions, fell, it is true, after some successes, near the Fucine lake; but Pompeius foiled an attempt by Judacilius to relieve Asculum, defeating the concentrated allies in a great and bloody battle, with a loss of 21,000 killed or captured. This, the biggest battle and perhaps the real turning-point of the war, decided the fate of Asculum. The siege was pressed both for strategical reasons and for the sake of example. At length the town fell, after Judacilius, who had forced his way in and massacred his opponents, had died by his own hand on the funeral pyre. The battle and fall of Asculum, however, were possibly later events.

Meanwhile the Roman generals had penetrated the Marsian, Pælinian, Marrucian, and Vestinian territories; the resistance

of the northern confederacies gradually collapsed, and Corfinium . itself surrendered.

Success of Sulla in South Italy.—In the south Sulla's energy soon retrieved the situation. Cæsar's successor, assisted by a naval force and enjoying a free hand, overran Campania ; with the aid of Didius and the loyalist Magius he recovered Stabizæ, Herculaneum, and Pompeii, inflicted a series of crushing defeats on L. Cluentius, who tried to relieve Pompeii, and drove him beneath the



SLING BULLETS FROM ASCULUM.

(After Duruy.)

walls of Nola. Pushing his success, the "Imperator," as his troops had hailed him, advanced against the Hirpini, sacked Æclanum, surprised and defeated Mutilus in the passes of Samnium, and stormed Bovianum, the new centre of the league, near the source of the Tifernus, in the heart of the Samnite hills. Cosconius, in Apulia, had reduced Salapia and Cannæ, had after a serious struggle conquered and killed Marius Egnatius, and was now master of the south-east. The advance from Campania had felt its way to the sea, and the division of the southern insurrection

was complete. Only in Lucania, Gabinius, after some successes, perished in an assault on the enemy's camp.

The Samnites hold out.—So the year closed favourably for Rome. The war in the north was ended. The coasts were clear; the mountains of the centre and the mass of Apulia and Campania had been recovered, and the rebellion in the south cut in two by the surrender of the Hirpini and the reduction of Bovianum. The confederation had been broken up, and the war localised in Samnium; and all these results were due, in the main, to the policy of conciliation, seconded by the vigour and skill of Strabo and Sulla. The Samnites, humbled but persistent, led by the Marsian, Silo, and their own Mutilus, maintained the struggle, which simmered also in Lucania and Bruttium, raising as if by magic from the ground 51,000 free soldiers and emancipated slaves. Henceforth the revived nationalism of Samnium, centred in its new capital, *Æsernia*, stands in opposition to the actual government of Rome, and plays its own game among the conflicting parties.

End of the Social War.—Sulla, Rome's ablest general, received the consulship for 88 B.C., and was destined for the command against Mithradates, who, though he had neglected the invitations of the insurgents to co-operate with them, was nevertheless preparing for war. Favoured by this diversion, hostilities dragged on. Strabo, in 88 B.C., went on with the pacification of the more northern cantons, while Metellus Pius, successor to Cosconius, recovered Venusia. Silo recaptured Bovianum, only to fall shortly after in a lost battle. Sulla cleared Campania and besieged Nola. The insurgent Lamponius, in Lucania, after defeating Gabinius, effected nothing further. The remnants of the war might soon have been finished, Nola stormed, and the Samnites reduced before the Asiatic campaign began, had not the insane struggles of the parties, recommencing with the first lull in the storm, given a new turn to affairs, and threatened to sacrifice the whole results of the year. But henceforward the conflict is complicated with Roman faction-fights and political intrigues. The Social War as such is at end.

Demoralisation of Rome and Italy.—Materially it cost Italy, first and last, the wealth and prosperity of her fairest regions, though Sulla was yet to complete the work by the harrying of Etruria and Samnium. The scarcity of money, a terrible hindrance to the allies, was bitterly felt at Rome, where the old strife between rich and poor revived with fiercer feeling, caused by deeper cleavage and greater extremes. In 89 B.C. a financial crisis, enhanced by the declining revenue from Asia and the unsound basis of Roman

wealth, led up to a desperate conflict of debtor and creditor. The chronic cry of anarchic socialism, "*Novae tabulae*," the cancelling of debts, was raised. When, under the stress of a tightening market, debts were called in with interest, the urban prætor A. Sempronius Asellio, an injudicious man, tried to revive, for the protection of the debtors, the laws controlling or forbidding interest on loans. These useless, and now obsolete, laws had been as constant a feature of Roman history as the abuses they were designed to meet—exaggerated usury and a stringent law of debt. The debtors now claimed as penalty fourfold the amount of the illegal interest already paid. The highest judicial officer of Rome was murdered by the infuriated creditors as he sacrificed in the Forum, and no one was called to account. But the loss of men was worst of all; 300,000 of the flower of Italy fell in this useless warfare. To the scarcity of soldiers the enlistment of freedmen and slaves bears witness. Terrible too was the demoralisation of the troops, which went on from bad to worse in the wars which follow. When a Roman admiral fell by the hands of his mutinous marines, they were merely warned by Sulla to purge the offence by valour in battle.

Reorganisation of Italy.—In the end, when Sulla had finished the work (82 B.C.), the whole of Italy became Roman up to the Po. Instead of a series of more or less autonomous states connected, in various degrees of dependence, with Rome, we find a number of urban communities of Roman citizens, gradually approximating to one type of organisation, under various names due to their various histories, but with few and slight differences in status and privilege. The old Latin towns, such as Tibur and Præneste, the Latin colonies, the old municipia, the allied towns, which accepted the offered franchise, and the old præfectures, at least for the most part, become Roman country towns or municipalities, and gradually receive a definite constitution. The system took time to build up. Here and there towns like Neapolis and Heraclea might hesitate to surrender their favoured position without more precise conditions and advantages, or some luckless places paid for a time the penalty of past disloyalty. But by the time of Cæsar nearly all the towns in Italy proper, and after 49 B.C. in Transpadane Gaul also, enjoyed the franchise, and all, in fact if not in title, were practically municipia, with local self-government, as defined by the series of municipal laws. This local self-government, no doubt variously modified, with its city council, magistrates, elections, arrangements, and powers settled

and regulated by law, spread over the Roman world. The central authority would interfere in cases of difference between localities or of military necessity, as the central jurisdiction took cognisance of treason, conspiracy, and crimes of special gravity. For the rest, Italy remained the ordinary consular department, the only special *provincia* being Cisalpine Gaul, constituted by Sulla, after whose legislation military commands in Italy proper were irregular.

Further Results of the War.—A second result of the war was, that when once the new citizens were equalised with the old—for in the first laws, in fear of swamping the Comitia, they were restricted to eight of the thirty-five tribes—the absurdity of the Comital system became glaring. Only those near Rome could be serious voters; except on special occasions, the bulk of the Italians abstained, and showed a total indifference to urban politics. This paved the way for a new system which made Italy, not Rome, the mistress of the world, which might make Italy in turn a province, and Rome, if still the capital, a mere municipality among the rest.

Again, old Italian customs, ideas, and dialects decayed under the complete Romanisation. More immediately, the inclusion of the Italians furnished in its restrictions a handle for agitation to the populares, while later on it reinforced the class of moderate politicians, bringing into activity a large number of solid men, who form a new section of the so-called equites.

CHAPTER XL

SULPICIUS, MARIUS, AND SULLA (88 B.C.).

State of Rome and Italy.—The troubles in Italy, which had been almost extinguished by the concessions of the government and the ability of its leaders, assumed a new and still more dangerous character, owing to the outbreak of revolution at Rome, coinciding with the alarming attack by Mithradates on the Roman power in the East. For the crisis in Italy and in Asia the democrats were immediately responsible, but the stupidity of the optimates was even more to blame. The folly which flung the new citizens into the arms of their opponents by the galling restrictions attached by jealousy to concessions wrung by fear, was as dangerous to the state as the mortified ambition and crazy vindictiveness of Marius, who hoped to retrieve in Asia the failure of the Social War. The

restriction on the citizenship destroyed the little value it still possessed in politics, and placed the honest Italian on a level with the emancipated slave. Only the merest perversity or pedantry could care at this time of day for the purity of the franchise or the swamping of the electorate. It would have been wiser to give with a full hand, to have spread the Roman rights from Lilybæum to the Alps, and to have extended the benefits of the Plautio-Papirian law at once to all insurgents who had laid down their arms after the appointed time, and as *dediticii* now lived on sufferance without the status of ally or citizen.

Plentiful material for trouble was left. There were the friends of the exiles under the last commission, plotting to procure their recall; the capitalists, exasperated by Asellio and their losses in Asia; the debtors, broken by the economic crisis. There was the army, debauched by civil war, detached from civic interests, ready for mutiny and murder, its discipline sapped by personal and political intrigues. There was a spirit of bitterness and discontent abroad, a tendency to resort to extreme measures in all parties; nor were there wanting turbulent spirits to use these troubles for their own purposes.


Marius and Sulpicius Rufus.—Marius, eager for command, exercised his unwieldy carcass with the younger men in the Campus Martius, and used his solid fortune to buy up an able agent in the talented and indebted tribune Sulpicius. P. Sulpicius Rufus was a politician more enigmatical perhaps than Drusus, a distinguished soldier, an orator warmly praised by Cicero for his powerful voice, his graceful gesture, his tragic style, his vehement yet not unbridled eloquence. His birth was of the highest, his politics hitherto moderate. His recorded acts betray no particular partisanship. If he impeached the democrat Norbanus in 95 B.C., he obstructed as tribune the illegal election of the ædile C. Cæsar to the consulship, and vetoed a proposal to repeal judicial sentences by popular decree. As a moderate and a friend of Drusus, he meant perhaps to complete the latter's programme of Italian enfranchisement and conservative reform, but carried too far, either by his connection with Marius, by the difficulties of his own position, or by his personal feud with the Julii and their friends, he became the representative of a democratic revolution which used the name and played the cards of Gaius Marius. Sulpicius now supported the recall of the Varian exiles, which he had at first opposed, brought forward a measure to distribute the new citizens and freedmen through all the thirty-five tribes, and is said to have proposed

that all senators owing more than a certain amount of debt should forfeit their seat, an impractical proposal, and inconsistent with his own financial position.

The Measures of Sulpicius.—The consuls Sulla and Pompeius Rufus, to suspend the voting, proclaimed an extraordinary festival; but Sulpicius, who had surrounded himself with a guard of 3000 roughs and an "anti-Senate" of 600 knights, raised a riot in which Rufus' son was murdered, and Sulla only escaped, it is said, by Marius' back-door. The feast was countermanded, and Sulla went to the army at Capua. The laws were carried. In themselves they were not revolutionary; the franchise law was, as regarded the Italians, necessary; while the relief to the freedmen earned by recent military service could not be dangerous to the great families on which they depended. The law of insolvency, honestly carried out, might have purged the Senate of venal men whose votes their creditors carried in their pockets. The recall of the exiles was a measure of amnesty, favourable mainly to moderate men. But they had been carried by violence, and, under specious pretexts, certainly played into the hands of the opposition leaders. Hence the strenuous resistance not merely of the Senate, but of all who disliked the extension of the franchise, and of all who disapproved of legislation by an armed mob. The next proposal, however, brought a more formidable opponent into the field. Sulpicius, by decree of the people, now transferred the Asiatic command, with supreme proconsular power, from the duly appointed consul Sulla to C. Marius, a mere *privatus*. It was a dangerous and unconstitutional proceeding. Possibly it was a counsel of despair, and he may have hoped to gain the Campanian army, and anticipate a march on Rome, by the use of the still popular name. More probably it was a part of the original programme. The party of reform was powerless without an army, and Marius was their only leader. He was still capable of even disastrous energy, and those who advised the fat old man, with a sneer, to cure his rheumatism at Baïæ learned too late the dangers of sarcasm.

Character of Sulla.—L. Cornelius Sulla was the right man for the work in every sense. The impoverished scion of a noble but latterly somewhat obscure house, a man of genuine cultivation, of some taste and scholarship, a worldly spirit addicted as well to the humours and pleasures as to the refinements of life, he perhaps, as reluctantly gave up the pursuit of amusement for the toils of active life as he readily resigned the burden of affairs which the times compelled him to assume. A boon companion,

passionately fond of wine and women, an indulgent friend, a lover, of Bohemian life, careless of conventions, capable of vehement emotion and outbursts of passion, with his choleric and sanguine temperament, and that fair face that flushed so readily, he brought, for all that, to political life a mind destitute of illusions and a strong power of self-restraint. On every side he contrasted with the old-fashioned and boorish aristocrat. As markedly was he above



TEMPLE OF FORTUNA (?) AT ROME ; (SO-CALLED FORTUNA VIRILIS).

the ordinary aimless pleasure-seeker of the day. Though he did not take life too seriously, he could be terribly in earnest ; to him life was a supreme ironic game, in which *Fors Fortuna* held trumps. He claimed, indeed, to be the object of the special favour of Aphrodite, the goddess of chance, and, in the spirit of his time, paid attention to dreams and prophecies. His strong character was quaintly crossed by the whims and freaks of a truly Roman vanity. He had won his spurs as soldier and diplomatist in the

Jugurthan campaign, where he gained the useful friendship of his future client and paymaster, Bocchus ; he earned favour as praetor (93 B.C.) by the magnificence of his games, and credit as governor by his vigour in the East (92 B.C.). The military art learned under Marius in the African and Cimbric struggles he had turned to the best account in the Social War. He had rivalled and effaced his master ; and now, with all his knowledge of the field of war, his army trained to his service and attached to a leader who humoured its instincts and handled it well, he was called on to give up the prize of valour and the reward of his labours to his ancient enemy, the vengeful and unserviceable democrat C. Marius.

Sulla marches on Rome. — The two military tribunes who claimed the troops for Marius fell victims to the fury of the mob. An army of volunteers serving for pay and plunder, drawn from the lowest ranks, caring more for persons than principles, had even less respect for political authorities than it was apt to show for unpopular generals. Sulla, a typical Italian, a convinced oligarch, with a profound contempt for popular assemblies and radical shibboleths, as clear-headed, hard-grained, and self-reliant as he was ironical, sceptical, and indifferent, with that trust in his star which is the superstition of a great man, that attention to the needs of the moment, that will to get business done, that clear grasp of the end and reckless use of the means, which characterise the strongest, if not the most moral, statesmen, was not sorry for the opportunity to clear the stage at Rome and settle accounts with the Sulpicians before he started on the Eastern war. He followed the lead of his soldiers, clamouring for Sulla and the loot of Asia, on the road that led a Roman army for the first time to the gates of Rome. His officers held back, but the general, marching from Capua with 35,000 men, joined his colleague Rufus, and pushed on, setting aside the praetors who tried to block the road. The consuls occupied the main entrances to the city, and crossed the sacred *pomerium*. There was no garrison on the neglected walls, no plan of defence against this novel stroke. But in the narrow streets a severe struggle took place as the legions tried to force their way up. At first they fell back beneath the storm of missiles from the lofty roofs and windows, till a turning movement took in rear and scattered the ill-armed force of freedmen and loafers. In vain the democrats appealed to the people, and finally to the slaves ; they were forced to flee.

But more than the democrats had been conquered. It was the final and formal victory of force over law. The army and its

general appear as the decisive factor in political struggles. The work begun by Marius was unconsciously completed by his rival, and the *coup d'état* of the conservative party set a precedent dangerous for itself and the Republic. The march of Sulla on Rome is the turning-point of the revolutionary movement.

Death of Sulpicius : Escape of Marius.—For the rest, Sulla behaved with some moderation, and maintained the stringent discipline that he alone in these days could keep. The Sulpician laws were of course annulled ; and twelve persons, including Marius and Sulpicius, were formally outlawed. The head of the orator was stuck, in ghastly mockery, on the *rostra*. Marius was more fortunate. The story of his escape has grown into a romance : how he fled to Ostia, found a ship, and was landed at Circeii, baffled by adverse winds ; how he wandered by the shore faint and half-starved, and just evaded his pursuers by wading and swimming towards two ships that hove in sight along the coast ; how the skippers refused to obey the summons of the horsemen to surrender him, and yet, in their fear, abandoned him in his sleep on the land by the mouth of the Liris ; how he hid in the marshes by Minturnæ, sunk to the neck in mud, was discovered and dragged to prison, and there abashed the Cimbric executioner by the thundering demand, "Slave, darest thou slay Gaius Marius?" how the magistrates set him on ship and sent him away ; how he barely escaped with life from the prætor of Sicily, and landed in Africa hoping aid from the Numidian king ; how the outcast hero sent back the message to the governor who bade him quit the province, "Tell your master that you have seen Marius an exile, sitting among the ruins of Carthage." Finally, he found refuge in the island of Cercina, off Tunis, where he was joined by his son, the younger Marius, who owed his escape from the doubtful dealings of Hiempsal to the favour of a royal wife.

Laws of Sulla.—Having cleared the field, Sulla wanted to restore and strengthen the government of the Senate, and to restrain the powers of the tribune and the Tribal Assembly as they had been developed by the action of the Gracchi and their successors. He proposed to fill up the gaps in the Senate, caused by the Social War and the strife of factions, by the election of a certain number of *optimates*, though it is doubtful if this was carried out. He took away the initiative of the tribunes in legislation, enacting that laws proposed by them must receive the previous sanction of the Senate. Beyond this, he is also said to have abolished the legislative functions of the Tribes, which had since the Lex Hortensia

of 287 B.C. superseded the Centuriata as the working organ of government, and with regard to the latter body, to have abolished the voting arrangements of 241 B.C. (*71. s.*, p. 295-6) and more recent reforms, restoring the older so-called Servian method which assured the absolute predominance of the highest property-class. Thus the election of the chief magistrates would be entirely in the hands of the wealthy. It may again be questioned how far such a sweeping reaction was, under the circumstances, possible or probable. The Servian arrangements had been so long and so deeply modified as to be almost objects of antiquarian curiosity. At the same time he carried some measures for the relief of poverty and debt.

Thus Sulla hoped to establish on a formal basis at last the power of the Senate in the constitution, and of the upper classes in the Senate; to curb the caprices of the tribunes and the Comitia, and reduce the former by law to the position they had held by custom during the war-period as the instruments of aristocratic government, while he did something to propitiate the needy proletariat. His proposals, indeed, appear more "thorough" than they really were. The Senate was not only a necessary, but in fact the leading, element in the constitution. No one dreamt of abolishing it. Without its control the jarring powers of the divided magistracy and the sovereign rights of the degenerate Assembly would have made the Republic impossible. Under the circumstances, the only alternatives to personal rule were tribunician anarchy or the formal recognition of the *de facto* power of the Senate. The old understandings, the old respect for *auctoritas*, were gone; the checks imposed by the veto and by religion were disregarded; it remained to put things down in black and white. So, too, we may justify the reactionary attempt to reform the Centuriata. The standard of wealth had risen, and the practical exclusion of the poorer classes from the electorate might place some check on corruption, while this body, however modified, had never been genuinely democratic. The proscriptions even, which were probably authorised by the people, were no novelty, and, compared with the Gracchan executions, both formal and moderate. But Sulla must have seen how essentially shallow and temporary his work was. The decline of the Senate had been due as much to the vices of the nobles as to the acts of the demagogue. It was as impossible to restore political health by juggling with the constitution as it was to meet economic evils by usury laws and emigration. It was to mend old garments with rags. He did nothing for the equalisation of rights, nothing to remove the extremes of wealth and poverty, or to reduce the

bitterness of faction. The Senate, the equites, and the rabble, remained as they were, and he himself had shown a contempt for constitutional cant and a belief in physical force which were likely to influence the future more than his reactionary legislation.

Sulla goes to the East.—Nor could the author of the reform stay to watch over its working. Duty called him to the East, where the situation had been aggravated by delay. And yet there were dangerous symptoms in Italy. The Samnites kept the field; Nola held out; Lucania and Bruttium were still unsubdued. The new citizens were exasperated by their disabilities, and many communities were still uncertain of their fate. Even at Rome the restricted electorate had placed alongside of Cn. Octavius, a brave and upright, but pedantic aristocrat, the notorious and vulgar democrat, L. Cornelius Cinna. The army of the North mutinied, and killed its new general, Sulla's trusted colleague, Pompeius Rufus. Nor did Sulla venture to remove the suspected instigator of the mutiny, Pompeius Strabo, who resumed the command and condoned the outrage. Indeed he himself, yielding to the necessity of the time rather than to the repeated pressure of Cinna, was content with exacting a public oath from the consuls that they would be loyal to the constitution, left his legate, Q. Metellus Pius, with proconsular power to deal with the Samnites, while Appius Claudius was to carry on the siege of Nola, and embarked for the East in the beginning of 87 B.C. Cynic or patriot, who shall say? he left the factions to fight it out while he marched against the public enemy. His departure was followed by the collapse of his work.

CHAPTER XLI

THE FIRST MITHRADATIC WAR

	B.C.	A. 17.C.
Aggressions of Mithradates repelled by Sulla	92	662
Mithradates occupies Asia, and massacres the Italians there	88	666
Sulla and Archelaus in Greece	87	667
Sulla takes Athens—Battle of Chæronea	86	668
Battle of Orchomenus	85	669
Sulla makes Peace with Mithradates and crushes Fimbria	84	670

State of the East.—For some time Rome, absorbed in domestic politics or more immediate dangers, had neglected Eastern affairs. The fate of Cyrene and the expedition to Cilicia have been already mentioned. Egypt, after the death of Euergetes II. (117 B.C.), was

allowed to become the prey of dynastic feuds. Similar factions convulsed the kingdom of Syria, which was rapidly falling to pieces. While Rome had obtained a footing in Cilicia, the Parthians annexed Mesopotamia, and every town and tribe that could, Jew, Arab, Greek, or pirate, asserted its practical independence. In Asia Minor generally there had been little change. It remained a congeries of dependent kingdoms, principalities, leagues, cities, and cantons, in more or less intimate relation to Rome. The province of Asia, organised by Aquillius in 129 B.C., had been handed over by C. Gracchus to the publicani in 123 B.C., and its condition, between their exactions and those of the officials, had steadily gone from bad to worse. Occasionally an honest Scaevola protected the subjects, but average Roman rule had been marked by cruelty, confiscation, and plunder; exactions had induced usury, and usury bankruptcy; freemen were kidnapped as slaves, and the land exhausted. These benefits of Roman government had spread over the adjacent countries till the name of Rome stank in the nostrils of the East. And yet the garrison was slender; there was no fleet to keep the seas, and the venality of Roman officials was so notorious that when Aquillius had sold Phrygia Major by auction to the father of Mithradates, Gracchus divided Roman agents and senators into three classes—those who had been bribed by Nicomedes, or by Mithradates V., or by both. On account of this bribery Phrygia had been detached from Pontus and loosely connected with the province.

Parthia and Pontus.—But the most salient feature in Eastern politics had been the growth of three kingdoms—of Parthia, Armenia, and Pontus. Parthia, which had deposed Syria from the hegemony of Asia, and stretched from the Oxus and the Hindoo Koosh to the Euphrates, lay as yet beyond the political horizon of Rome, save so far as its relation to the rising power of Armenia inclined it to maintain a friendship with the Western Republic. The principality of Great Armenia, independent since Magnesia (190 B.C.), sprang into importance under the dynasty of the Artaxiads, and attained its zenith under its present ruler, Tigranes, who shook off the Parthian suzerainty and claimed as Great King the supremacy of Asia.

Most dangerous, however, to Rome was the development of Pontus, or Cappadocia by the sea. This district, which, owing to its remote position and rugged character, had been conquered neither by Persian nor Macedonian, had maintained its independence against the successors of Alexander, under a line of native

princes, who boasted their descent from the royal house of ancient Persia, from Darius, the son of Hystaspes. It grew unnoticed till the capture of Sinope (end of second century B.C.) gave it a capital and a naval basis on the Euxine. In the third Punic war Mithradates V. (Euergetes) had earned by his support the title of Roman friend and ally. In 131 B.C. he had received for his services against the pretender Aristonicus, and for cash down to Aquillius, the district of Phrygia Major, which he did not, however, long retain. Murdered in 120 (121) B.C., he left the kingdom to the boy Mithradates VI. (Eupator), aged from eleven to thirteen years, under the regency of the queen-mother.

Mithradates.—A halo of Eastern legend surrounds the childhood and youth of the great king, as a mist of Roman slander obscures




TETRADRACHM OF MITHRADATES VI.

the actions and death of Rome's persistent and detested enemy. The comets at his birth, the treacherous guardians plotting against his life, his course of poisons and antidotes, the adventures of the homeless hunter in his seven years' wandering, the recovery of the stolen throne, the sudden disappearances of the king, and his journeys in disguise through Asia Minor studying the manners of men and the ways of their lands, his dramatic return to punish the treason of his queen and ministers, belong to the romance of history. He has all the traits of the Eastern hero. We hear of him as a wearer of gigantic armour, as a swift runner, an audacious horseman, a mighty Nimrod, a hard drinker, a vast eater, a royal lover, a master of twenty-two languages, dealing justice to the tribes of his kingdom. Born at Sinope, he received a Greek educa-

tion, which gave him indeed but a smattering of culture, a veneer of accomplishment, through which the inner barbarism was bound to break out, yet made him a patron of literature and art, and taught him, above all, the value of Greek political and military science, helped him to organise kingdom and army, and made him select as his agents and generals the ablest and most instructed Greeks. His nature and training made him cruel, cunning, and treacherous, and in the crisis of his career his worst qualities were most conspicuous. He found everywhere what he expected to find, treason, and practised freely himself what he most suspected in others. In his passionate fits cruel to ferocity, he spared neither friend nor kin, and was capable of atrocious outrage. Yet through the darkest shades painted by his foes we can discern the lineaments of a great and even heroic character, however defiled by superstition, vindictiveness, perfidy, and lust. He was a strong king, an energetic organiser, a brave soldier, who could devise large schemes, appreciate good service, and employ able ministers. At times he could even show generosity and moderation. The heart and soul henceforth of Eastern resistance to Rome, he fought in turn with her ablest generals, and sprang with fresh strength from defeat. He created a disciplined army and a numerous fleet, collected vast treasures, and welded into a strong power the discordant elements of his empire. He conquered Asia Minor, invaded Europe, allied himself with every element of discontent, rebels, pirates, democrats, and almost united the Hellenic and Oriental world against his enemies. He was aided, of course, by the disintegration of the Roman state, by the folly of Roman parties, and the neglect which alone permitted his rise to power ; but something is left for praise to the ever-active, never-despairing king which may induce us largely to discount the malignity of hostile criticism.

Historically, whatever parade Mithradates might make of Hellenic sympathies and Hellenic culture, however much he might pose as the defender of the liberties of Hellas, he stands out as in every respect essentially Eastern, in his personal character as much as in the military and political organisation of Pontus. In himself he represents no cause but his own, with no aim but personal aggrandisement ; historically he is the successor of the Persian, the precursor of the Parthian and Arab in the struggle between East and West.

The Kingdom of Pontus.—The kingdom of Pontus, as he received it, running from Colchis to beyond the Halys, included the



important towns of Sinope, Amisus, and Trapezus on the coast, but had no inland towns to speak of. Scattered forts throughout the land guarded the royal magazines and treasures, and served as refuges to the numerous but primitive population, little affected by Western ideas. Mithradates began by enlarging his dominions to the east and north. He subdued Colchis, won Dioscurias, invaded the Scythian steppes, annexed the Tauric Chersonese (Crimea), and pushed his arms almost to the Ister, within touch of Thrace. The warlike nomads, of all the various races that ringed the Euxine round, Scythians, Taurians, Roxolani, Bastarnians, fled before his Greek generals and conquering phalanx, paid him homage, and furnished him recruits. The Greek colonies of the coast, hard pushed by barbarians, and now neglected by Greek and Roman alike, hailed him as the protector of their corn-markets and fisheries, their lands and lives. In Chersonesus (Sebastopol) and Panticapæum (Kertch), in Theodosia and Phanagoria, he found the basis for the new kingdom of the Bosphorus. Hence he drew a large revenue, huge supplies of corn, and a serviceable Cossack cavalry. By sea and land he was master of the Euxine. This, of course, was the work of time, but good progress had been made before the war with Rome and without interference from her ill-informed and preoccupied government. His ideas widened. He annexed Lesser Armenia, and formed with Tigranes, to whom he married his daughter Cleopatra, a compact of mutual support which left Tigranes free to extend his conquests south and east, while Mithradates pushed his designs in Asia Minor.

Paphlagonia and Cappadocia.—His first enterprise was naturally directed against Paphlagonia, which, on the death of the last Pylæmenes, became a bone of contention between Pontus and Bithynia. Mithradates claimed it by right of an alleged bequest; Nicomedes put up a pretender. In the end, as a result of the rivalry or by a concerted partition, Mithradates kept the part he had occupied, and even cut off a slice of Galatia in defiance of Roman remonstrance. Of the two claimants Rome naturally favoured her client Bithynia, but was too much occupied by the Cimbric war to act with effect. The rival kings next intrigued for the possession of Cappadocia, where Ariarathes VI., brother-in-law of Mithradates, had been murdered by Gordius, a suspected agent of the Pontic king, to whom the assassin fled for refuge. In his place Mithradates set up his own nephew, Ariarathes VII., with Gordius as guardian, an arrangement which led at once to quarrels, and then to war. But the uncle murdered his kinsman

with his own hand, and crowned a fresh puppet, opposed by Nicomedes, who married the widow of the old monarch, and pushed a puppet of his own. Finally, Tigranes came in to support his wife's father, and buy his aid against the Parthians. When Sulla came first to the East as prætor of Cilicia in 92 B.C., a sham Ariarathes was governing Cappadocia, with Gordius as minister, in the interests of Pontus. The ancient royal house was extinct.

Sulla as Pro-Prætor.—Sulla found a formidable problem. The Senate had permitted a strong and organised state to grow up on the Roman frontier, with an army 100,000 strong, with a fleet that, resting on Sinope and Chersonesus, made the Euxine a Pontic lake, strong in alliances, stronger in the absence of any serious fleet or army of Rome, pushing its aggressions right and left over countries in alliance with the Roman people. It had been warned already by Nicomedes and the Tauric princes, and now that Cappadocia had fallen, it was forced to act with some show of vigour. Luckily the Roman name was still terrible. With a few regulars and auxiliaries, backed by the memories of Magnesia and Pydna, Sulla drove Gordius and his Armenian allies headlong from Cappadocia. Mithradates disowned his agents and withdrew his pretenders, promised to evacuate Paphlagonia, which was declared free, and to reinstate the Scythian chiefs. The Cappadocians, by free election, summoned Ariobarzanes to the throne.

Sulla was the first Roman general who reached the Euphrates. Here took place the famous interview, when he assumed the place of honour between the newly elected prince and the ambassador of the King of kings, sent by the Arsacid to knit a friendship with Rome, in view of the encroachments of Armenia.

New Aggression of Mithradates.—But the settlement was merely apparent. The events of 91 B.C. paralysed Rome, and Mithradates, always well informed in Roman politics, instigated Tigranes to expel Ariobarzanes, omitted to evacuate Paphlagonia, and continued his Crimean wars. This might have been borne; but when, on the death of Nicomedes II. of Bithynia (91 B.C. ?), the younger son, Socrates, supported by Pontic troops, evicted the rightful heir, Nicomedes III., the removal of this important buffer state brought the danger something too close to the frontier of the province. Mithradates had, however, committed no overt act of war; nor, indeed, could an army have been spared to chastise him. In answer to the appeals of the expelled kings, M'. Aquilius, son, probably, of the conqueror of Aristonicus, colleague of Marius in 101 B.C., and distinguished in the Servile war, but bearing a name

notorious in the East, was sent as a special envoy to settle affairs. Again a mere demonstration was enough; the princes were restored (90 B.C.), and Mithradates, though he evaded the call for contingents, offered no resistance, disowned and executed Socrates, and sheltered himself behind his agents, Gordius and Tigranes. A true Oriental, persistent as pliant, he recoiled before an earnest front, waiting his time to pursue his projects by fraud, force, or corruption. In spite of the chance offered by the Social War, he was not prepared for an open struggle, and the Senate, as he knew, was bound to content itself with this demonstration of Roman supremacy. Neither could make up their minds to the inevitable.

Aquillius forces on War.—Aquillius, true type of a “prancing proconsul,” forced the hands of both, at the worst time possible for Rome. He pushed on the young Bithynian king, his client and debtor, to enforce the evacuation of Paphlagonia. Nicomedes closed the exit of the Euxine, threatened Amastris, and advanced towards the Pontic frontier. When Mithradates modestly demanded his recall, or liberty of action for defence, Aquillius sternly forbade him to resist the aggressor, and collected three corps under Cassius, Oppius, and himself, mainly composed of Asian auxiliaries, in support of the Bithynian advance, on the frontiers of Pontus and Cappadocia. The only possible answer was the mobilisation of the Pontic fleet and army. Once at bay, the king took up the work with thoroughness and energy. He had the prospect of the most complete revenge and the expulsion of the hated Westerns; even the invasion of the West itself seemed not impossible at this time and with these resources. His rear and flank were covered by Armenia, which promised active co-operation; he disposed by now of a force of 250,000 foot and 40,000 horse drawn from the fighting tribes of Asia Minor, the Caucasus, and the steppes, together with a powerful fleet, manned and officered by sailors from Egypt, Crete, and Syria. His generals, Archelaus, Neoptolemus, and the rest, were the ablest Greek soldiers of fortune. His envoys were seen in all the Eastern courts; they penetrated into Thrace, Numidia, and Samnium. The bold piratical cruisers acted as privateers, harassing the transports and cutting the communications of Rome. To strengthen his ill-assorted and motley hosts, he had enlisted a legion of Roman deserters and Italian refugees; he expected contingents from the Greek cities whose protectorate he assumed. Above all, there fought for him at first the deadly hate of Greek and native alike for the foreign oppressor,—usurer,

merchant, governor, collector,—whose tyranny seemed worse as yet than the wildest caprices of an Oriental despot.

Mithradates occupies Asia.—When a last mission to Aquillius failed, Mithradates took the offensive in the spring of 88 B.C. The Roman power collapsed at once under the rapid succession of disasters. The Bithynian army was the first to be scattered; its camp was stormed, and the kingdom fell at a blow. The Asian militia dispersed in panic; the small corps in Cappadocia was crushed; Cassius, the governor of Asia, was forced to retreat on Rhodes; Oppius, shut up in Laodicea (Phrygia), was surrendered, exhibited in derision as a show, and only later given up to Sulla. The thunderstruck Aquillius was overtaken in his retreat, routed, and driven first into Pergamum, and thence to Mitylene, where he also was handed over by the people. Chained and mounted on an ass, or tied to the stirrup of a horseman, he was paraded through the towns of Asia as a laughing-stock; and finally, if the tale be true, “his thirst was stilled” for ever with molten gold poured down his greedy throat by order of the king. Mithradates, like Hannibal, dismissed the native prisoners, and by his clemency and exploits so roused the enthusiasm of Hellenes and Asiatics alike that all the towns, with few exceptions, hailed him as a conquering god, deliverer and friend, and placed themselves at his disposal. Rhodes, generously forgetful, remained a refuge and asylum, and with her stout fleet and strong walls withstood the Pontic power by land and sea. Magnesia, with the Carian and Lycian leagues, and the princes of Paphlagonia, alone besides were loyal. Asia was lost; what fleet there was surrendered. The Romans had begun the war with inadequate forces, and were compelled from the first to act on the defensive. Even in 89 B.C. there was scanty hope of men or money from exhausted Italy; and, to crown all, in the course of 88 B.C., the Sulpician revolution had diverted the army of Asia from Brundisium to Rome.

Massacre of Italians.—Mithradates crowned his successes by a crime and a blunder. A decree from Ephesus (88 B.C.), backed by the vengeful malice of an infuriated population and executed with Asiatic atrocity, threw to the dogs and vultures the bodies of 80,000 to 150,000 Romans and Italians, men, women, and children, massacred on a single day. No sanctuary was sacred, no age or sex spared. Debts of money and debts of vengeance were washed out in promiscuous bloodshed. The goods of the victims were shared between the assassins and the king. The story of the Asian fury, like the story of Aquillius’ fate, has been no doubt

over-coloured, and the crime was possibly due as much to popular feeling as to the king's order, but ghastly crime it was, and if Mithradates hoped to cement by blood the fickle loyalty of the Asian Greeks, he was doomed to disappointment. His own cruelty and their mutinous cowardice ruined the plan. Moreover, it was the one thing needed to stiffen public opinion and unite all parties, senatorian, democrat, Roman, Italian, in the pursuit of the murderer.

Invasion of Europe.—Meanwhile his fleet, in the winter of 88–87 B.C., had forced the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, and entered the Ægean under the command of Archelaus, and, in the absence of a Roman navy, commanded the seas. The islands, including the great port of Delos, were successively occupied and the scenes of massacre renewed. From his new capital, Pergamum, the king organised his dominions, created satrapies, and distributed the plunder. The confiscations which filled his treasury enabled him to remit the taxes. Master of Asia Minor and inebriated by easy success, he now contemplated the invasion of the West. Already, possibly at his instigation, the Thracians and other tribes had raided Macedon and Epirus (90 and 89 B.C.), which had been defended by Sentius, the governor, with some success. Delos, with its temple-treasures, had been restored, soaked as it was with Roman blood, as an act of grace to its ancient mistress, Rome's favoured ally, Athens. Eubœa fell, and Athens herself, her fickle mob beguiled by gifts and promises, received Aristion, ex-slave, courtier, rhetorician, and Epicurean professor, with his Pontic guard, as agent of the king and virtual tyrant. The Roman party perished or fled. Athens and the Piræus then became the Pontic basis in Europe.


Greece joins Mithradates.—Simmering discontent in Greece found a last outlet in this revolt. Even a barbarian liberator was welcomed as a relief from monotonous Roman supremacy, which weighed like a nightmare on the spirit of the people. But the nation was too rotten to the core, economically as well as spiritually, to put real heart into any movement. The best men held aloof. When Archelaus' expedition appeared the Achæans, Lacedæmonians, and Bœotians went over. The legate of Sentius, Brutius Sura, with his small Macedonian garrison and a few ships, saved Demetrias and Chalcis, recovered Sciathus, and, advancing to relieve loyal Thespiæ, fought gallantly but indecisively with Archelaus for three days in Bœotia, but he was finally forced to fall back (88–87 B.C.). The king's son, Ariarathes, occupied Thrace, entered

Macedonia, and secured Abdera and Philippi as naval bases. With the army now approaching by land, his Greek levies, his fleet, and the reinforcements arriving by sea, Archelaus was master of the situation. Mithradates, certain of his Eastern game, saw no reason to bring the aid demanded by the Italian insurgents, though his control of the sea made it possible.

Sulla lands in Epirus.—When Sulla landed, in the summer of 87 B.C., on the coast of Epirus, it was to find Asia and Achaia gone and Macedon half lost. He brought with him but five legions—in the absence of the Italians barely 30,000 men. War-ships he had none, and never did Roman general feel more keenly the value of sea-power to an imperial people. He had no money in his chest, no prospect of support from home; he was risking his life, his career, and the fortunes of his party to maintain the power and authority of his country. Militarily the task was difficult enough; for, if the huge armies before him lacked unity of organisation and equipment, they were drilled and led by experienced soldiers, and rested on the resources of a powerful state. But when, in the course of the next year, he was himself deposed and outlawed, threatened even with attack by an army of Romans led by his legal successor, it may well have seemed impossible. From all these difficulties he emerged successful, and he owed his success as much to his own coolness and self-possession, his own strategy and tactics, his own courage and foresight, as to the devotion and valour of his veterans. He was the greatest and most original general that Rome had yet produced; possibly, with the exception of Cæsar, the greatest in the history of the Republic; and his services as a soldier in maintaining the dominion and government of Rome far outweigh his famous work as a constructive statesman.

Sulla takes Athens.—His appearance rapidly altered the ideas of the Greeks, who promptly seceded from their Pontic alliance. His demand for the restoration of the *status quo* being rejected, he advanced into Bœotia, and there defeated Archelaus and Aristion at Mount Tilphossium. From Thebes, whither he summoned Ætolian and Thessalian auxiliaries, he pushed on to attack Athens and the Piræus, held respectively by Aristion and Archelaus. His communications were secured by camps at Megara and Eleusis, his operations covered by Hortensius in Thessaly and Munatius at Chalcis, while the Greek cities redeemed their mutiny with men, money, and stores. Failing to carry the fortresses with a rush, he settled down to a siege in form, while

Archelaus conducted the defence in the most approved style and with considerable success. There was fierce and almost desperate fighting under the walls, when Sulla and Murena defeated the relieving army of Dromichætes. But, without ships, to blockade the Piræus was hopeless. To obtain them, in the winter of 87–86 B.C. he sent L. Licinius Lucullus to Rhodes, Syria, and Egypt. Lucullus ran the gauntlet of the enemy's cruisers only to meet evasive answers from governments afraid to supply the oligarchic general, or made contemptuous by the failures of Rome. Once more Sulla tried to storm the Piræus (spring of 86 B.C.). Archelaus, building wall within wall, disputed his ground with desperation inch by inch. In the end, and after months of fighting, when he had retired on the impregnable Munychia, Sulla was compelled to leave him there masked by a sufficient force, while he proceeded to meet the invading army in Bœotia. Athens itself, not so easily supplied or so well defended, yielded finally to the blockade (March 1, 86 B.C.). Famine and disease had done their work; the storming party sacked and massacred unresisted. Aristion and the leaders of revolt were caught and killed, but the city, saved by its past, retained its full rights; nor was even Delos taken away.



TETRADRACHM STRUCK BY SULLA IN ATHENS—ATHENA AND THE OWL.

Position of Sulla.—Meanwhile Chalcis had fallen into the hands of Mithradates, with Amphipolis, and probably Demetrias, the keys of Greece; Munatius and Hortensius were retiring before the enemy's advance. Sulla's position was critical. So far from recovering Asia, he had lost Macedonia; he had not yet captured the Piræus, he had suffered severe losses, and a valuable year was gone. To fill his exhausted chest he had "borrowed" the treasures

of the gods, with a promise to repay, fulfilled later with the confiscated lands of Thebes, and cynically interpreted the alleged sign of Apollo's wrath in his own favour. The sound of the lyre from the sanctuary declared the god's approval of the loan. At Rome his constitution had been wrecked, his friends massacred, himself proscribed, and the new consul, Valerius Flaccus the younger, Marius' successor, was expected every day to supersede him. Without a fleet he was tied hand and foot.

Battle of Chæronea.—Luckily, Mithradates, unaware of his chance, or despising a waiting game, ordered Taxiles, now in command of the land army of 100,000 foot and 10,000 horse, to advance into Bœotia, where he was joined by Archelaus, who had evacuated Piræus. It was a motley crowd, magnificently set up, blazing with Oriental pomp, but without unity or cohesion. Sulla, glad of the opportunity, broke up his camp in Attica, joined Hortensius, and with a strength barely one-third of the enemy endeavoured to force an action. Against the advice of Archelaus, who preferred the wiser policy of patience, Taxiles pressed on. The result was the crushing defeat of Chæronea, in the swampy valley of the Cephissus (March 86 B.C.). Sulla had occupied the town, intercepted their march, and cut their connections with the sea, and now, before the long columns had well got clear of the hill-land, compelled battle on a ground fairly favourable to his smaller force. To protect his flanks from the superior cavalry he dug deep trenches and threw up earthworks, while his centre was fortified with palisades, fixed between the first and second lines. The rush of the war-chariots was broken on the stockade; their retreat in disorder broke up the phalanx of Greek recruits and the foreign legion, a confusion utilised by the Roman foot. To cover a reorganisation, Archelaus threw his cavalry in masses on the Roman left and rear, and when Sulla, hurrying to the relief of the struggling squares, laid bare his right, attempted to assault the weakened flank. Hastily returning, Sulla flung himself in turn upon the enemy's left, now denuded of its protecting cavalry. The battle raged along the whole line, till gradually the Pontic infantry gave way. As the legionaries pushed their advance, the retreat became a rout, the rout a *saute-qui-peut*. The gates of the camp were shut to check the fugitives, but the Roman infantry poured on with irresistible force. The camp was stormed, and the scanty relics of the massacre—some 10,000 men—found safety at last in Chalcis. With mendacity as consummate as his skill, Sulla reported his loss at fifteen. The want of ships and the arrival of Flaccus robbed him of the fruits of victory.

Archelaus commanded the sea, and could even venture to attack Zacynthus.

Flaccus had arrived in Thessaly with two legions : but when Sulla marched to meet him, so far from withdrawing his rival's troops from their allegiance, he could scarcely restrain his own from desertion. Unimpeded by Sulla, he sheered off to the north, with the intention of taking Mithradates in the rear by way of the Hellespont, and gaining credit for the ended war—a happy solution of the problem.

Battle of Orchomenus.—In the spring of 85 B.C. a huge army under Dorylaeus crossed to Eubœa, and taking up Archelaus as commander-in-chief, entered Bœotia. Sulla, eager for a decision and confident of victory, dared to meet them in the plains of Orchomenus, and inflicted a second disastrous defeat in a pitched battle, marked by his own desperate valour. His troops were wavering under the weight of the cavalry, when Sulla leapt from his horse, grasped a standard, and rushed into the throng, bidding his soldiers tell their friends that they left their general at Orchomenus.

The victory of Orchomenus compelled the evacuation of Europe. Macedonia and Thrace were reoccupied, and the Roman commander had leisure to settle the affairs of Greece and build the necessary ships.

Mithradates was in difficulties. He had lost two armies, and was threatened on two sides. In Asia his exactions and conscriptions, and his appalling acts of cruelty, had caused a strong reaction. Each community feared for itself the fate of depopulated and plundered Chios, or of the murdered Galatian chiefs ; many were actually in arms. Suspicion bred conspiracy, and 1600 men perished in the reign of terror that followed. The maddened king decreed the abolition of debts, the division of lands, the enfranchisement of slaves and metics. Revolution and violence were rampant.

Flaccus and Fimbria.—Moreover, Lucullus, aided by the victory of Chæronea, had now raised a small fleet, which he had dexterously used to obtain some valuable successes at Cnidos, Colophon, and Chios. Flaccus, indeed, who had crossed from Byzantium to Chalcedon, had been murdered by his mutinous troops, egged on by his legatus, the Marian assassin and mob-orator, C. Flavius Fimbria, who was elected general, and displayed, for all his crimes, distinct capacity as a leader. The mutineers were loyal to their chosen chief, and Fimbria, successful in several encounters, managed to drive the half-ruined despot from Pergamum, and would have captured his person, the prize of the war, if Lucullus,

true to his principles and his party, had not refused the aid of his ships to his master's enemy while that master was treating with the king. Leaving the disappointed Fimbria and his demoralised ruffians to mark their path by plunder, murder, and outrage, and vent their sacrilegious spite on Ilium, Rome's reputed mother, Lucullus sailed away to win fresh victories at Lectum and Tenedos, which gave him, when reinforced by Sulla's fleet, the mastery of the Hellespont.

Peace.—Meanwhile negotiations had been going on, whose slow progress gave Sulla time to reorganise Macedonia and chastise the frontier tribes. Both parties needed peace, and were ready to treat; neither wished to lose the advantages of their position. With wonted sagacity, Mithradates, a careful student of Roman politics, preferred to deal with the outlawed Sulla, though he tried in vain to use Fimbria's existence to beat down the terms of Sulla's ultimatum. As idle was his hope to bribe the indignant Roman with the offer of his help against the democrats; Sulla, in the face of the enemy, was no partisan, but a patriot. At length, under pressure of the continued march to Asia, the king was induced by the astute but incorruptible Archelaus to accept, however reluctantly, the proffered conditions. Proposed first at a conference at Delium after Orchomenus, and ratified at a personal interview at Dardanus, on the Hellespont, but never reduced to writing, they amounted to the original demand by Sulla for the restoration of the *status quo*. The conquests of Pontus, and especially Cappadocia, Bithynia, and Paphlagonia, with all prisoners, deserters, and eighty ships of war, were to be surrendered and the expelled princes recognised; in addition, a considerable indemnity was of course exacted. Archelaus, by his conduct of the negotiations, won the peculiar, and perhaps ostentatious, regard of the Roman general, and therewith the suspicion of the royal court, which drove at last the man whom Sulla had failed to corrupt, as an honoured guest, into the Roman camp.

Fimbria crushed and Asiatic affairs regulated.—The terms were moderate enough, but, under the circumstances, substantially secured the dignity of the Republic. The general of the oligarchy had other work to do; he had no time to dally in Asia, and must perforce let slip the favourable hour for breaking the power of Pontus and avenging the Ephesian decrees. The easy task remained of crushing the brigand Fimbria. As Sulla approached, the Fimbrians began to desert, and refused to attack when ordered. Their desperate leader, disdaining the door of

escape opened by the man he had just failed to assassinate, fell on his sword. With the reorganisation of Asia, Sulla's work was ended. The anarchical decrees of Mithradates were cancelled, the agents of his murders executed. The arrears of taxation were called in, and a fine of 20,000 talents (£5,000,000) wrung from the wretched and guilty communities, a burden which hung round their necks for years a millstone of debt. The few faithful states were recompensed, and order was restored in Bithynia and Cappadocia. The provincial system was remodelled, and L. Licinius Murena, with the Fimbrian soldiers, was left as legate to carry out the settlement. For the rest, it was hard, no doubt, to sacrifice the easy triumph, hard to balk the troops of well-earned booty, and hardest of all to shake hands in public with this colossal murderer. But the position in Italy was critical, and Sulla (84-83 B.C.) conducted his rested and recruited veterans in a powerful fleet from Asia to Greece, whence, for the first time, he sent a report of his actions in regular form to the Senate, blandly ignoring his own deposition. Among the treasures which he was bringing with him were the original writings of the philosopher Aristotle, which formed a part of the library of Apelleon, a wealthy disciple of the Peripatetic school, seized after the capture of Athens. The army, concentrated at Dyrrhachium, was transported without difficulty to Brundisium.

CHAPTER XLII

THE CINNAN REVOLUTION AND THE CIVIL WAR

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Cinnan Revolution and Marius' Reign of Terror	87	667
Death of Marius—Government of Cinna	86	668
Sulla's Overtures rejected—Cinna killed in a Mutiny	84	670
Sulla lands at Brundisium, and gets the better of Norbanus and Scipio in Campania	83	671
Battles of Sacriportus and the Colline Gate—Siege of Præneste—End of the War in Italy	82	672

Troubles at Rome.—Hardly had Sulla turned his back on Italy when trouble broke out at Rome. The elements of mischief were numerous, but the opposition had neither cohesion nor policy. It was a "syndicate of the discontented," whose figurehead, for want of a better, was a pinchbeck saviour of society, called L. Cornelius

Cinna, a man without aims or principles, a mere soldier of moderate gifts, pushed forward by stronger heads and fiercer passions than his own. The death of Rufus had cost the Senate its strongest army. Strabo sat carefully on the fence, a man whose adhesion, when bought, was of doubtful value to either side. The fanatic democrats thirsted for revenge, while a powerful clique was working for the recall of the exiles. The equites were out of humour. The effects of the financial crisis were still felt; there was a sore feeling among the defeated insurgents, and the stupidity of the Senate, by resisting the demands of the new citizens, justified at once the action of the agitators and the stubborn attitude of the armed Samnites. The strongest forces behind the new consul were Cn. Papirius Carbo, orator, organiser, and general, and Q. Sertorius, the ablest soldier and most attractive personality of his party. Unfortunately for all, the latter was kept in the background; among these aimless and ferocious fanatics, the man of genius, moderation, and mercy was out of his element.

Cinna deposed.—The first symptom of reaction was the effort of Cinna, with the aid of the majority of the tribunes, to remove the disabilities of the new citizens and freedmen and restore the exiled Marians. To meet the influx of Italians and the attempt to intimidate the Comitia, Octavius armed his supporters against his perjured colleague. In the fighting through the Forum and the streets on this bloody "day of Octavius," 10,000 victims are said to have fallen. Cinna was deposed, contrary to the law of the constitution, and he and all his associates were declared public enemies. It was a bad precedent set by a weak government, which once more put itself in the wrong. For, if Cinna broke his oath and disregarded the veto of the senatorian tribunes, the conservatives anticipated force by force, and illegally deposed a duly appointed magistrate. Justifying their action in this case by a piece of the ordinary religious jugglery, they unwisely elected the priest Cornelius Merula, a good, weak man, unfit for stormy times, to take the vacant place. But the exiles, far from quitting the country, flung themselves on the support of the new burgesses, whose rights they had championed, and to whom the unwisdom of the senatorians had given for the moment a keen interest in Roman party politics. They could rely on the Samnites and Lucanians above all; old soldiers and fugitive slaves flocked to their standards. Cinna could pose as the victim of oligarchic persecution, the defender of the rights of citizens. As such he presented himself, with the veteran Sertorius and the younger Marius, to the army at Nola, which,

having no special conservative sympathies, promptly recognised the deposed consul, and as promptly marched on Rome, strengthened by contingents of new citizens and allies.

Return of Marius.—Meanwhile Cinna had invited Marius to return, and the vindictive old man had landed at Telamon, in Etruria, with a band of armed slaves and Numidians, which the magic of his name and a feeling of shame and sympathy for the oppressed hero soon raised to an army. He inflamed the public emotion by a parade of mourning and squalor, and swelled his legions by loosing the slaves chained in the rural *ergastula*. With this force and the ships he had collected he blocked the Tiber, captured Ostia and the neighbouring ports, and gradually cut the supplies of the city from the west by sea and land. In spite of Sertorius' protest, Cinna officially recognised him. The name was indispensable to him, though Marius at Ostia and elsewhere had given a foretaste of the coming butchery. As Metellus was occupied in Samnium, the Senate called Strabo to Rome; but Strabo, for his own ends, permitted the investment of the city, which he was well able to prevent, by the combined forces of the revolution, and preserved his doubtful attitude, though, when attacked by Marius, he defeated him, with the aid of Octavius, severely in a bloody street-fight.

Rome invested.—The Senate fortified Rome, raised the citizens, and tried to recruit troops by extending the benefits of the franchise-law of 89 B.C. to those who had submitted after the appointed date. The tardy concession availed it little, and when it authorised negotiations with the Samnites, the demands of the latter were such as no patriot could accept. In spite of their rejection, Metellus was summoned to Rome, a movement which evacuated Apulia, set the insurgents free, and drew the net of investment closer round the doomed city. The fall of Ariminum cut away all hope of help from the north; four armies surrounded Rome; the demands of the Samnites were conceded in full by the democrats as the price of alliance. In this juncture it is said that the Senate swallowed its obstinacy and granted the equalisation of the franchise. But it was a war no longer of principles, but of passions and persons; the only living cause was that of the independence of Samnium. There was severe fighting under the walls; famine and disease decimated the crowded defenders; Strabo himself, whose selfish policy was largely to blame for the situation, perished by the pestilence, and his mutilated corpse was dragged in fury through the streets. The efforts of Metellus, the only soldier left, were

marred by the pedantry of Octavius. Merula was a nonentity. The despondent and demoralised troops, when Metellus refused to supersede the consuls, began to desert in crowds. On either side, Octavius and Marius stubbornly obstructed compromise; a conference with Cinna effected nothing, and Metellus withdrew in despair to Africa. The slaves accepted the emancipation promised by Cinna, the populace was starving, and of relief there was no prospect. Capitulation became inevitable, Merula resigned his office, some legal pedantries were raised and swallowed, the outlaw was recognised as consul, and Rome submitted without conditions.

Massacre of the Optimates.—The verbal promise of Cinna that there should be no bloodshed was heard by Marius in gloomy and sarcastic silence. He too, when his colleague entered the gates, waited with bitter irony for the decree of outlawry to be solemnly annulled, and then rushed to enjoy his carnival of revenge. For five days and nights the butchery of the optimates went on, and the example of Rome was followed throughout Italy. Clad in consular robes, Octavius met his death like a senator of the Gallic days. The orator Antonius, L. Cæsar and his brother Gaius, P. Crassus, Catulus the consul of Vercellæ, and the poor priest Merula were among the victims. With the last two, by way of irony, legal forms were observed, and they avoided sentence by suicide. The bodies were left unburied, the heads fixed on the *rostra*; the whole city was one scene of plunder and outrage. Sulla's wife and children escaped, but his houses were wrecked and his goods confiscated.

Death and Character of Marius.—Marius and Cinna are said to have declared themselves consuls for 86 B.C., without election—a curious sample of democratic practice; but scarcely had the conqueror of the Cimbri and of his own country won his long-sought seventh term and avenged him of his adversaries and their gibes, when he died of fever, brought on, we are told, by the debauchery with which he deadened the stings of conscience. Poetic justice was complete; but it hardly required this to bring down to the grave the over-strained nerves and worn-out frame of the hitherto temperate old man. For all this massacre, over-coloured beyond question by Sullan annalists, he and his butchers were responsible. Cinna dared not, Sertorius could not, stop him. There is no sadder picture in history than the moral downfall of Marius. In his earlier days an upright, simple-minded, honourable man, who had saved the state by his soldiership, he had fallen into the snares of political life. Devoured by ambition, the spoiled child of fame had become

a tool where he meant to be master. Soured by failure, irritated by sneers, sick with craving for a place he had not the capacity to fill, maddened at the last by persecution and indignity, he wiped out the record of his services in blood, and died the horror of Rome, of which he had been in turns the glory and the jest (January 13, 86 B.C.).

Equalisation of the Suffrage.—His place was taken by L. Valerius Flaccus; his band of assassins was extirpated, to the number of 4000, by Sertorius; and the Terror came to an end. The sole persons who had profited were the slaves who had won their freedom, and the equites who bought at auctions the property of the dead. The laws of Sulla were at once repealed, but the only other legislative acts of the new government were a dangerous law for the relief of debtors, which cancelled three-quarters of their obligations, and an Act for the equalisation of the suffrage, which distributed the Italians through the thirty-five tribes. This time the Act was duly executed by the censors, of whom one was the same shifty Philippus who had opposed the measure of Drusus. Their proceedings were confirmed by the Senate in 84 B.C. Sulla having been deposed and outlawed, the insignificant Flaccus was sent to take over his army.

Failure and Death of Cinna.—For the next three years Cinna remained in supreme command. They were years of peace, for the country was exhausted. His power was unresisted, for the Sullans were dead or fled, and the democrats and new burgesses supported their leader, while the moderates acquiesced, dreading another reaction more than they disliked the revolution. The Samnites, still in arms, were friendly, and the majority of the provinces accepted the situation—Sicily, Sardinia, the Gauls and Spain, Africa too, secured through the quarrels of the oligarchs—and Sulla's hands were full. Yet Cinna and his colleagues, content with unquestioned authority, appear to have governed merely from day to day, without thought for consolidating their position. Their total lack of political plans, of any effort to reorganise the government upon democratic lines, is the final proof that the democratic party so called had no genuine programme and could provide no real alternative to senatorial misrule. Their failure exhausted one possibility of republican reform, as Sulla exhausted another in his failure to restore the Senate. In their security they even neglected the formation of a proper army and fleet and the defence of the ports. Even the discomfiture of Flaccus and Fimbria failed to rouse them. At last, early in 84 B.C., came

Sulla's announcement of the finished war and his proposed return. He promised to recognise the equalisation of the suffrage, and to confine his vengeance to the revolutionary leaders. The elder Flaccus, the leader of the Senate, tried to effect a compromise. Sulla was, of course, to disband his army and come to Rome, under a safe-conduct if necessary, and all levies meanwhile were to be stopped. But Cinna and Carbo, roused at last, scouting the proposals of the Senate, pushed on their preparations. Cinna, in fact, had already transferred to Greece some of the troops he had collected at Ancona, when he met his death in an attempt to quell a mutiny among the rest, who feared to cross the stormy seas. Carbo brought back the advanced detachment, and retired into winter quarters at Ariminum, abandoning the idea of meeting Sulla in Greece (84 B.C.).

Sulla and Carbo.—To the Senate, Sulla replied that, with his loyal army, he needed no guarantees; he could offer them to the Senate and his friends. He demanded only the restoration of the exiles, and hinted at the punishment of the guilty. The Senate had shown some firmness and independence in opening negotiations at all—indeed the crisis was its opportunity; but the efforts of the moderates to bring about an understanding and a general disarmament were shattered by the vigour of Carbo and the firmness of Sulla. The indefatigable consul, by hook or by crook, prevented the election of a successor to Cinna, acted as sole consul for the rest of the year, and raised a large force mainly of new citizens, amounting in the first instance alone to 100,000 men. It is clear that it was no longer a question of a small and discredited party; Italy as a whole, and the majority of the existing Senate, a Roman Rump Parliament, purged of the oligarchs, was hostile to the inevitable reaction, and, in default of a peaceful settlement, was ready for war. Men dreaded, and with reason, a second Terror. None of the regular Marian leaders were elected consuls for 83 B.C.; nor did Carbo nominate himself once more. The new officers were the moderate L. Cornelius Scipio, a feeble creature, but an anti-oligarch, and the uncompromising C. Norbanus, abler demagogue than general.

Sulla and his Army.—Thus Sulla at Brundisium, with his five legions, confronted a practically united Italy, and his enemies wielded the authority of the constitution and the resources of the state. The tables had been turned. He was now the revolutionary outlaw attacking the established order. He had on his side a devoted and experienced army, strong in its *esprit de corps*,

without a vestige of civic feeling, loyal only to flag and chief, a chief who condoned all vices but cowardice and indiscipline. To fill his chest the veterans gave their savings. He trusted in his army and his star. But to conquer he must divide; he must conciliate the moderates, disarm suspicion, attract the waverers, and propitiate the Italians. Accordingly he proclaimed an amnesty to all who should abandon the democrats, guaranteed the rights of the new citizens, promised to observe the strictest discipline, and swore his troops on oath to treat the Italians as burgesses of Rome. As a fruit of his moderation Brundisium received him with open arms, Messapia and Apulia submitted. The main army of the government was still (spring of 83 B.C.) at Ariminum, and the south-east coast was unprotected. Counsels were clearly divided. Except Sertorius, who had no influence, and was soon sent off to Spain, the only strong men were Carbo and the younger Marius.

Sulla's Adherents.—From Brundisium, Sulla marched unresisted into Campania, where he met and defeated Norbanus at Mons Tifata, and drove him into Capua. He had been joined already by Metellus Pius from Liguria, whither he had fled, driven from Africa by the prætor Fabius Hadrianus, and by M. Licinius Crassus, who had escaped from Rome to Spain, and helped Metellus to fail in Africa. L. Philippus turned again at the right time, and was sent by Sulla to take Sardinia. But of all the recruits the most important was the young Cn. Pompeius, Strabo's son, trained in a good school at once of military science and political insincerity. He had served under Cinna, had been attacked on account of his father's supposed peculations in Picenum, had barely escaped by the friendship of Carbo and the eloquence of his advocates, and now, with rapid decision, chose the Sullan side, raised a force of tenants, comrades, and clients in Picenum, soon amounting to three legions, with which the general of twenty-three beat and baffled the leaders sent against him, joined his commander in the south, and earned from him the style and title of Imperator.

Scipio's Army deserts to Sulla.—Leaving Norbanus shut up in Capua, Sulla pushed on to meet Scipio, now advancing by the Appian road, too late to aid his comrade. He encountered him at Teanum, and induced him to conclude an armistice, while Scipio consulted Norbanus, whom he found in no humour to treat. Apparently by the fault of the democrats, the truce was broken, but Scipio's troops, who in the interval had fraternised with the enemy, refused to recognise their leader's action, and passed over

en masse. Sulla dismissed the officers unharmed. Carbo, indeed, said of him that he was made up of a lion and a fox, and that the latter was the more dangerous animal of the two ; and it may well be that these repeated negotiations were the snares of a wily Italian. However that may be, from the breach of the truce of Teanum dates the implacability of the oligarchic general.

Preparations at Rome.—Sulla and Metellus now took up their winter quarters in Campania, content with the year's results, and preparing for a dash on Rome. It was to be no easy task. The new consuls, illegally elected, Carbo and Marius, raised large levies in Etruria and Cisalpine Gaul, especially among the Marian veterans. The Samnites and Lucanians promised energetic support, and amply redeemed their word. At Rome the war party got the upper hand, directed throughout by the violent and vigorous Carbo. Sulla's partisans were outlawed by decree of the people, and the war entered on a new and deadlier phase, which gave no hope of quarter or compromise. So far as it was not a mere struggle of persons, it was a battle between the Latin and the Etruscan and Samnite nationalities. On July 6, 83 B.C., the great temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, the patron of the Roman people, was burnt to the ground.

Battle of Sacriportus.—When the campaign of 82 B.C. opened, Sulla, moving upon Rome, was opposed by the younger Marius, a true son of his father, brave, persistent, and ferocious, who was covering the capital ; while Metellus, in Picenum, confronted Carbo, who from his base at Ariminum kept his grip upon Gaul and Etruria. Pompeius had apparently accompanied Metellus northward, and was threatening Etruria from Spolegium. At Sacriportus, near Signia, Sulla came up with Marius as he retired on Præneste, and drove him headlong back on the great stronghold, whose impregnable walls became henceforward the centre of the struggle. This decisive action uncovered Rome, which was evacuated by the prætor L. Brutus Damasippus. He signalled his departure by a supplemental massacre of the remaining optimates. The aged Q. Scævola, who had barely escaped the dagger of Fimbria, was one of the victims. Leaving Ofella to blockade Marius, Sulla entered Rome, and passed on to Etruria, to join in combined operations against Carbo. He utilised his short stay to seize the government and turn the legal machinery against his opponents.

Campaign in North Italy.—Carbo, who had checked the successful advance of Metellus, on learning the news of Sacriportus, retreated to Ariminum, and thence moved into Etruria, leaving


Norbanus to hold the valley of the Po. Sulla attacked them on three sides at once. Metellus, passing by sea into Cisalpine Gaul and pushing on to Faventia, cut Ariminum from the Po and threatened the enemy's rear while his legate Lucullus moved on Placentia. Pompeius, who had already harassed Carbo's march, advanced with Crassus through Umbria; Sulla himself proceeded from Rome direct. An indecisive battle was fought at Clusium, which so far brought Sulla to a halt that Carbo could detach Carrinas to relieve Præneste. But the expedition was defeated by Pompeius and Crassus, and its leader shut up in Spolegium, whence he escaped with difficulty. A second attempt in force, under Marcius, was once more baffled by Pompeius. Norbanus, too, after defeating Lucullus, was himself utterly routed at Faventia by Metellus. This decisive victory was followed by the break up of the democratic cause in the north. There had been serious desertion before; now even the Lucanian contingents went over, and one commander bought his own acceptance by murdering his colleagues in his tent. The army of the north was scattered, and the road to Etruria was open. Norbanus fled to Rhodes, where he only avoided extradition by suicide. Carbo, threatened on all sides, despatched two legions under Damasippus to delay Sulla by a combined effort at Præneste, but when this also failed, abandoned hope, and fled to Africa. Such of his troops as were not destroyed or dispersed marched with Carrinas to relieve Marius. Here, at Præneste, the plot was thickening. The Samnites and Lucanians, under Pontius of Telesia and Lamponius, reinforced by the garrison of Capua, in all 70,000 men, had come up from South Italy with the same object. Sulla, leaving a corps to contain Carbo, hurried off to support Ofella, and arrived in time to baffle the attempt.

Battle at the Colline Gate.—Unable even with the aid of Damasippus to dislodge their dogged opponent, and now aware of their discomfiture in Etruria and the north, the democrats thought to copy the strategy of Hannibal, and force Sulla to raise the siege before the arrival of Metellus and Pompeius, by a sudden rush on the "wolves' lair." Success might secure everything; failure would at least ensure revenge. Strategically it was a rash move; they ran the risk of being caught and crushed between Metellus and Sulla; but the possession of Rome was all in all, and Marius, set free, would guard their line of retreat. With sudden resolve they broke camp, and marched swiftly and fiercely forward. Sulla heard it with dismay, and followed by a forced march on parallel lines. It was

a race for life and death. The insurgents, marching by the Latin way, had scattered a sally of volunteers from Rome and pitched their camp by the Colline gate, ready for the assault, when Sulla, whose cavalry had preceded him at full speed, arrived on the scene towards noon, and leaving short space for rest and food, flung his weary troops, in defiance of all advice, with obstinate decision on the foe. The battle began in the late afternoon of the 1st of November 82 B.C., and lasted well into the night—the bloodiest and most desperate wrestle in Roman history. The frenzied hate of the Samnite pushed the veterans of Sulla's wing to the walls of Rome, the general hacking and hewing, like a common soldier, in peril of his life, till the closed gates forced them back to the fight. When darkness closed the struggle for a while, Sulla stood on the field half despairing of victory. It was only in the course of the night that he learned the success of Crassus, who had routed the enemy's left. In the morning he pressed the now retreating Samnites. The end came when 3000 deserters turned their swords against their friends. The Samnites were exterminated; the prisoners, even the deserters, were butchered by masses in cold blood within earshot of the appalled Senators, sitting in the temple of Bellona to hear the victor's harangue. He bade them attend to his discourse; the noise they heard came from a few malefactors whom he was chastising.

End of the War.—Præneste fell; Marius died by his own hand; the garrison and its officers, with the majority of the citizens, were put to the sword; and the ancient and loyal ally of Rome, so vainly proud of its cherished independence, was almost destroyed. The remaining strongholds were gradually reduced—Norba, Neapolis, Nola, and Æsernia. The doom of destruction went out against Samnites and Etruscans. The "curse of Sulla" still rests on their wasted lands, the worst visitation falling on ravaged and depopulated Samnium. Nola, indeed, held out till 80 B.C., and Volaterræ stood a two years' siege, but the country was rapidly pacified, the fortresses garrisoned, and the embers of rebellion stamped out. As for the provinces, Sardinia surrendered to Philippus, Gaul soon came in, and Perperna, who commanded in Sicily, evacuated it on the appearance of Pompeius with six legions and 120 ships. Pompeius, having executed the democratic leaders captured at Cossyra (Pantellaria), with scant generosity to his protector, Carbo, passed over to Africa, defeated Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (81 B.C.), drove out the usurper, Hiarbas of Numidia, restored Hiempsal II., and re-established the authority of the Senate

in forty days. On his return he was ordered to dismiss his army and was denied an illegal triumph, but Sulla yielded to the murmurs



ETRUSCAN ARCH AT VOLATERRÆ.

of the troops and the discontent of the young general, permitted an equestrian to triumph for the first time, and added to the

honour the title of Magnus. The man who warned the optimates against Caesar, *ut male præcinctum puerum creverent*, and spared his life reluctantly, knew as well the character as he recognised the services of Caesar's future rival. In Spain, Q. Sertorius was obliged for the present to give way, and left the country with uncertain aims. In the East, Murena, to gain credit and keep his Fimbrians employed, picked a quarrel with Mithradates, who was occupied in restoring his power in Colchis and the Crimea, reopened the war in defiance of the king's complaints and Sulla's remonstrance, crossed the Pontic frontier, plundering as he went, and was promptly defeated by the still powerful king (83 B.C.). The Roman garrisons were driven from Cappadocia. Sulla again interfered, and peace was re-established. Only Mytilene gave trouble till 79 B.C., when it was taken and destroyed. In the storm the young Caesar earned the civic crown.

So the wars were ended; the democracy and its allies lay prostrate; Rome, saved by the soldiery of Sulla and his army in that last grim battle of the Colline gate, was ready for the statesman's hand. Sulla had not trusted his star in vain.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE PROSCRIPTIONS AND THE NEW DICTATORSHIP

81 B.C. A.U.C. 673.

Sulla's Executions.—Sulla's original programme had been to reward his friends and punish his enemies, and to give security to the government of the Senate. The Romans found him in both respects a man of his word and a man of method. The hour of compromise was past; the failure of 88 B.C., the severity of the campaign, the unexpected toughness of the democratic resistance, and that moment of the Samnite terror had taught him a lesson. It was no longer a question of mere retaliation and punishment. It was necessary to clear the ground thoroughly for his proposed reconstruction. He meant, in his cool, ironical way, to stamp out, so far as blood and iron could, all democratic ideas, to smash and pulverise the democratic party, to annihilate its supports, and to leave no chance for a counter-revolution. His was a dangerous, not a vindictive or an irritable, temperament; he set no value on

human life, yet for his time and race could show comparative moderation. The rejected overtures, the broken truce, the repeated massacres, might well have palliated a fierce outburst in the hour of victory. But, making every allowance for vengeful passions, for all indulgence to friends and connivance at unwarranted executions, the solid part of Sulla's bloody work remains due to deep conviction of political necessity. Modern sentiment, unfamiliar with ancient doctrines of the rights of war and the ferocity of ancient political revolutions, when death, exile, and confiscation were the constitutional methods of resigning power, stamps the proscriptions unfairly as mere atrocities. More to the point was Cæsar's censure, when he called Sulla a tyro in politics; but Cæsar died a victim to his clemency, Sulla peacefully in his bed.

Proscriptions.—In pursuance, then, of a fixed purpose, he ordered the promiscuous execution of all the leading revolutionaries who had been in active opposition since the truce of Teanum. Public horror was enhanced by the uncertainty, which was turned to purpose by unscrupulous partisans, until, in response to appeals from Metellus and Catulus, Sulla issued definite lists of the proscribed. Hasty and ill-considered as the lists were, their issue made Sulla personally responsible, and substituted a sort of system for indiscriminate murder. Even so, they were grossly abused, and indeed falsified, to satisfy private grudges or mere greed. No plea, no sanctuary, availed. The victims were cut down without the barest form of even a drum-head court-martial. Throughout Italy the work went on; Sullan emissaries and local partisans out-heroded Herod; debtors murdered their creditors; this man fell a victim to his baths, that to his palace or gardens. "Wretch that I am," said a curious gazer who found his name on the list, "my Alban villa pursues me." Private friends and informing scoundrels perverted the criminal indulgence of the master, and the vilest names of the following epoch are to be found among the Sullan executioners. The worst punishment fell upon the equites, who, as jurors and speculators, had combined the business of condemning senators and purchasing their estates. Sulla gratified an ignoble malice by tearing the bones of Marius from their grave and breaking his monuments in pieces. Gratidianus, the adopted nephew of Marius, was tortured to death by the younger Catulus at the tomb of his murdered father. While all who aided the proscribed were punished, the casual assassin received indemnity and a fixed reward; the heads were numbered and accounted

for—a gruesome work which Sulla is said to have supervised in person. As he surveyed the exposed head of the younger Marius he sneered at it with the quotation from the Greek poet, “Before one seizes the helm one ought to have pulled at the oar.” The agony of suspense was prolonged by the successive issue of supplementary lists, till the proscriptions closed, on June 1, 81 B.C., the outside limit for Italy; for in Rome the business was got over earlier. The death-roll, as we are told, of 4700 names included forty senators and 1600 equites. But later writers gloated with rhetorical exaggeration over this loathsome mass of cold-blooded butchery.

Confiscations.—The effect was deepened by the confiscation of the property of the victims and the disqualification of their sons and grandsons for the privileges, while they were left liable to the burdens, of their birth and position, a measure extended to the relatives of the fallen. The forfeitures produced a financial revolution, not only by the change of ownership, but by the depreciation of estates in an overloaded market, and were, besides, scandalously turned to profit by Sulla’s immediate friends and dependents. It was thus that M. Crassus, a skilful fisher in troubled waters, laid the foundation of his famous fortune. Nor was this unnatural or wholly inconsistent with ancient ideas, especially as the Sullans had themselves suffered the extremity of sudden impoverishment, and in the old world the “spoils system” in party victories was carried out at the expense of the individual. In spite of all the laxity and depreciation, the auctions brought in to the exchequer an immense sum. The fall in prices and the appreciation of gold was counteracted by the pressure put on the wealthy to support the government by liberal purchases. Indignation was deep if not loud, but the disqualification of the children, an essential point of policy, left a more rankling sore behind.

Punishment of the Hostile Italians.—Such was the Sullan fury, differing from its various predecessors more in its extent and policy than in its illegality or cruelty. There was no protest, no movement of revolt; terror lay too heavy even for speech. It was a crime, but it was no less a blunder. A few years showed how vain was the hope to build a constitution upon blood, or to destroy a party in a whirlwind of persecution. Along with these measures may be taken the various punishments inflicted after searching inquiry, and in accordance with a special decree and the laws of war, on the revolted communities who had refused Sulla’s original terms, more particularly those in Lucania, Etruria, and, above all, in Samnium. On these, who had dared to dream of the destruction

of Rome, the tables were turned with a vengeance. They were loaded with burdens, their walls razed, their rights annulled, their lands forfeited. "Now it was Rome indeed, and room enough," in Italy. In his earnest centralising policy Sulla sacrificed to Romanisation all that was left of the local laws, languages, and customs, even of the prosperity of rural Italy.

Colonies of Veterans.—With the *ager publicus* thus acquired Sulla carried out a vast scheme of colonisation, settling troops to the number of 120,000 in Etruria particularly, but also in Latium and Campania—Sannium was deliberately excepted—providing at once for his veterans, for repopulation, for the restoration of small holdings, and, as he fondly hoped, for the security of his new constitution. These settlements differ from the old maritime bourgeois colonies of soldier-citizens and the socialistic foundations of the Gracchi, as the arbitrary work of a single man, and in the strictly military character he meant the settlers to retain as the Senate's army of reserve. They approximate rather to the foundations of Pompeius, Cæsar, and the Empire. But as the lawyers disregarded the acts of disfranchisement, so the colonies failed to effect their purpose. Among the most troublesome elements of later years must be counted these Sullan soldiers, who, trained in the license of the camp and the luxury of the East, refused to labour on a small allotment. The impracticable prohibition of alienation was speedily set at naught. Meanwhile the homeless, helpless, evicted exiles, endowed with a mockery of the lowest Latin status, swelled the ever-growing army of beggars and banditti.

Sulla Dictator.—These measures, so far as they were not acts of war, were subsequently sanctioned by, or were done in virtue of, special powers conferred upon the hitherto unauthorised saviour of society. The proconsul had no idea of just handing back the government to Senate and magistrates as if nothing had happened; still less did he mean to be hampered in his work by a perverse colleague and a merely reactionary council. He wanted more thoroughness than would commend itself to the lawyers, opportunists, or Tory politicians who were left alive in the well-thinned nobility. He restored the oligarchy as the one possible system; for the average oligarch he had little use and less respect. Accordingly he had sent a suggestion, which amounted to an order, by letter to the Senate, that to meet the crisis a dictator should be appointed, with supreme power, for an indefinite time, and declared his willingness, if elected, to accept the post. With such formality as was possible L. Valerius Flaccus, as *inter-rex*, proposed,

and the people readily ratified, welcoming this mockery of a free choice, the appointment of L. Cornelius Sulla as dictator, without limit of time, powers, or appeal, *legibus faciendis reipublice constituendæ*. His measures, past, present, and future, were sanctioned *en bloc*; he received supreme authority, legislative, executive, and judicial; he was set firmly in the saddle of the state, and left to dismount when he pleased. The dictatorship had been the traditional means of concentrating executive power to deal with a temporary crisis; but the old office had long been dead, and the present revival was one only in name. Elected for a definite purpose, the old dictator was limited in time and in prerogative, as well as by the right of appeal (449 B.C.) and the co-existence of the regular magistrates. Sulla was in effect a monarch. He wielded his power indeed in the spirit of a Roman aristocrat, used it, as he was expected to use it, in the restoration of the Republic, and duly resigned when his task was finished. Yet forgetful Rome was startled by his four-and-twenty lictors, his absolute rule was branded as a *Sullanum regnum*, and his abdication was wondered at and admired. It was one more precedent for the empire, one more proof that the constitution was becoming unworkable, and that in the failure of the Senate the only resource was the single man. Hence his *régime* was as unacceptable to the moderate conservative as it was to the democrat, whose political machinery it borrowed for reactionary purposes. To destroy democracy by the army was once more to drive out Satan by Beelzebub, and Sulla's failure only precipitated the alliance of the kindred elements. His despotism was a precedent for Pompeius and Cæsar.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE CONSTITUTION OF SULLA

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Sulla, as Dictator, frames his Constitution	82-80	673-674
Sulla resigns the Dictatorship	79	675
Death of Sulla	78	676

WITH his new powers, Sulla could put his acts of destruction on a legal and systematic footing, and then proceed to constructive work.

The People.—He retained as a basis the extended and equal-

ised franchise, rendered harmless by the results of the war and the elimination of disloyal allies, and by so doing completed, with some exceptions, the abolition of privilege and the unification of Italy. Hence followed in rapid course the assimilation of the Italian towns to a single municipal type, organised with a gradually developed system of local government, the disappearance of local distinctions, and a growing uniformity in law and administration. Only the reasonable disqualification of the freedmen was revived. But neither Sulla nor the new citizens themselves could get rid of the ancient view that the franchise must be directly exercised. To give the new votes their value demanded a representative system. What power the *Comitia* had, remained with the urban electors; rural and conservative Italy drifted away from Roman politics. Sulla himself took no trouble even to revise the burgess-roll; to secure a majority, strong with votes and fists, in the fickle and badly attended assemblies he swamped the electorate with 10,000 emancipated slaves of the proscribed, endowed with the proper qualification and the name of *Cornelii*. It was a sneer and an insult to the people, as it was a satire on the constitution. No good was to be got by jerrymandering the constituencies.

The *Comitia*.—Since he neither wished to mend nor end the *Comitia*, with their obsolete sovereignty, it remained to reorganise them in a reactionary sense, to degrade and utilise them. Thus the legislative functions of the Tribes were once more curtailed, and the *Concilium* reduced to nullity by subjecting the tribunes again to the *auctoritas* of the Senate, and removing at least their freedom of initiative, if not indeed their power of proposing *plebiscita* altogether. With this restriction, though it was not enforced against the curule magistrates in the *Comitia*, vanished for a time the interference of this Assembly and its leaders in executive and judicial business. But a more searching reform was really needed to prevent parliamentary intrigues, capricious decrees, and votes snatched by chance or violence from the fluctuating majorities of this ignorant and unwieldy mass. As to the *Centuriata*, probably Sulla did not attempt to revive the proposals of 88 B.C. and restore its ancient organisation and obsolete privileges. Certain rights this form of assembly had always retained, such as the election of the higher magistrates, the decision of peace or war, the trial of capital cases on appeal. Of its legislative powers it had never been actually deprived; nor was it necessary to give them back. It gained indirectly by the limitation of its popular rival, and consular laws may have superseded to some extent the *plebiscita*.

In spite of democratic changes it had kept a certain property qualification and a certain regard for age and rank. Representing as it did the whole people, it differed from the plebeian body only in this particular and in its organisation. It is highly improbable, especially after his experiences in 88 B.C., that Sulla should have tampered with the existing arrangements of the centuries and the census. To raise the property qualification would merely favour the capitalists. It is doubtful again if he subjected legislation in this assembly also to the previous sanction of the Senate. Taking the outside of what he did, Sulla threw the legislative function into the hands of the Senate, and the right of ratification into the hands of the more aristocratic and conservative *Comitia*, which elected the higher magistrates. In the elective function no direct changes were made. There was no formal disfranchisement or repeal,¹ but obsolete powers were revived, and the predominance of the Senate in legislation and administration at last legally secured. The choice of priests by the seventeen tribes was, however, cancelled, and co-optation by the colleges completely restored, while, to assuage social rivalries, these distinguished and exclusive clubs were enlarged. The corn largesses, the original sin of the democrats, and now the common bribe of both parties, were discontinued. But as no attempt was made to substitute any organisation of industry for this pauperising and wasteful system of relief, the law scarcely survived its author.

The Tribune.—The Romans transformed, but rarely abolished, an office or an institution. Thus the tribunate, the especial weapon of Gracchus and the democracy, was reduced from the strongest force in the state to its position in the war-period, as the instrument of the Senate in controlling recalcitrant officials and managing the popular Assembly. Its unconfined powers of veto, indictment, arrest, and legislation, exercised as they had lately been, led straight to anarchy or monarchy, according as they fell into the hands of an all-powerful individual or were exercised by different holders for conflicting purposes. The members of the college were now not merely deprived of at least their free initiative in legislation, but were at the same time disqualified at once for holding any higher office, a regulation intended to exclude ambitious men and degrade the office in general estimation. The abuse of their privileges of obstruction, fine, and arrest was subjected

¹ The distinction between *Concilium plebis* and *Comitia tributa*, presided over respectively by Tribunes and Curule magistrates, is practically obsolete.

to penalties. The tribunate was left "a shadow without substance," *sacrosanct* indeed, and enjoying its old rights of vetoing executive acts and protecting the individual plebeian, but under strict limitations, debarred from free access to its own Assembly, placed in the hands of nobodies, and carrying an exclusion from the curule chairs which went back to the old days of the struggle of the orders. In this conservative reform there was an element of sarcasm.

The Magistrates.—In dealing with the mode of election and the prerogatives of the magistrates it was Sulla's aim to secure the authority of the Senate alike from the whims of popular caprice and the insubordination of the individual. Here also the reform was thoroughly conservative in character. The re-enactment of the *Lex Villia Annalis* of 180 B.C. and the law of 342 B.C. enforced an interval of at least two years between one office and another, and secured a proper order and limit of age in the succession to magistracies. Ten years at least were to elapse between two tenures of the same office. The ædileship, an office now possible only to the rich, ceased, if indeed it had ever been such, to be a necessary step in the career of *honores*.

To meet the increase in special functions and departments of public business, actual and contemplated, Sulla raised the number of prætors from six to eight, and of questors from an uncertain number to twenty. But even this was inadequate. Hitherto the Senate had dealt with any press of affairs, outside the special departments of the prætors and the ordinary business of the supreme magistrates, either by uniting several civil functions in a single person (*cumulatio*), or by proroguing the military command, the general or governor continuing to act *pro prætore* or *pro consule* pending the arrival of his successor. The duty of defining and providing for the various *provinciae*, special or ordinary, fell by prescriptive, not by legal, right to the Senate. With the growth of special functions—governorships, military commands, and judicial commissions—unaccompanied by any adequate increase in the number of officials, the system grew up by which the Senate filled the vacancies at its discretion. Thus the people, the nominal source of supreme power, lost all direct control over the most valuable appointments, while the originally annual magistrates enjoyed, as a rule, a second term of office. The city magistrate, whom his work detained at Rome, looked, at the expiry of his service, for a lucrative provincial command to recoup his electioneering expenses and gain his triumph, and for this purpose his imperium could be readily prolonged.

Separation between Civil and Military Authority.--This usage played into the Senate's hands, and Sulla had only to make it regular and formal. It was he who practically, and it may be legally, established the rule that consuls and prætors should discharge civil functions during their year of office at Rome, except in case of a special decree of the Senate, and should then proceed to the provinces as pro-magistrates with military authority. The arrangement of the departments was now definitely vested in the Senate. Thus was completed the separation between the home and foreign command, the civil magistrate and the military pro-magistrate, a separation, as Sulla himself had shown, fraught with danger to the Republic. Hitherto the *pomerium* had been the local limit between the exercise of the civil jurisdiction and the full imperium of any single officer; now a deeper division was set up. These regulations, together with the inclusion of Italy in Rome, led to the administrative separation of civil Italy, extending from the Straits to the Rubicon, from Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, which, being mainly composed of non-Italian elements and needing a military force, became a province in the ordinary sense. Italy, under the general supervision of Senate and consuls, was withdrawn from the sphere of the military imperium, and stood as a whole in strong contrast to the dependent territories. The *pomerium* was, so to speak, advanced to the Rubicon. Thus the senatorial control of the home officers was assured; it remained to enforce responsibility abroad and limit the freedom of action enjoyed by the provincial governor. Hitherto the traditional obedience to the ruling board had been supported only by the existence of a vague and ancient law of treason (*perduellio*), and by the *Lex Calpurnia de Repetundis*. These were now reinforced by a *Lex Cornelia de Maiestate*, reviving, defining, and modifying previous laws, and designed to curb the license and control the actions of men who, like Sulla himself, were but too apt to turn their independent and ill-defined authority against the liberties of the subjects, the rights of neighbours, or the government of their own country. They were now forbidden to declare war, invade a foreign state, or transgress the boundaries of their province without permission, or to remain within the boundaries more than thirty days after their successors' arrival. The well-meant and necessary law lacked only some power to enforce its provisions.

These business-like and practical arrangements brought a clear and orderly system into the government. They provided at once for the continuous administration of Rome and Italy by the

resident consuls, of the civil courts by the urban and peregrine praetors, and of the now reorganised criminal courts by the six other praetors, while the ten great foreign commands were held by the same officials in their second year. The Senate gained by the division of functions, and by the restrictions upon tenure and re-election and upon irregular prolongations and cumulations of office. Its authority both over the people and the individual was strongly fortified when it received the legal right to dispose of the military appointments. It could dismiss as it could appoint an extraordinary official, when to depose a consul or praetor would have been illegal. Checks were placed in every direction on irregularity, ambition, and intrigue. Sulla, taught by his own example and that of Marius, attempted earnestly, if in vain, to capture the military force for the governing body.

The censorship was allowed to fall into abeyance; the quaestorship, by a law of Sulla, carried a seat in the Senate, and this automatic method of filling vacancies rendered a part of the censors' work unnecessary. The revision of the census was of no real importance now for army, Comitia, or taxation; for the purity of the equestrian list Sulla had no care. The financial duties of the office could be, as they often had been, transacted by the consuls. If its disappearance removed the crown of the official career, yet the Senate as a body was delivered from the caprices of its odious supervisors.

The Equites.—The equites, a Gracchan creation, and the object of Sulla's especial dislike, were as a middle order abolished. With temporary disturbances, they had kept their places in the courts till now, and had turned their position to immense advantage as a means of intimidating the Senate and of levying blackmail. All this was now lost. Their special honours and privileges were for the time taken away, together it may be with the farming of the Asian taxes. The blow was not undeserved. The essentially selfish policy of the capitalists, directed mainly towards monetary interests and class privileges, and their maladministration of justice, robbed them of all sympathy, whether from the democrats with whom they had coquetted, the Italians whose claim they had resisted, or the nobles on whose prerogatives they had encroached.

NOTE.—If the collection of the tithe was taken from them, as Mommsen holds, it was soon restored. More probably Sulla established the principle of fixed payment as against tithe, not for taxation but only in the case of the war indemnity imposed by him on the province. In any case Asia remained the happy hunting-ground of the usurer and speculator.

The Senate.—The position of the Senate, the keystone of the Sullan fabric, may be inferred. By a new and striking departure its ranks were filled by the special election in the tribal Assembly of 300 men of equestrian fortune, mainly, no doubt, agents and adherents of the new *régime*, nominated by the dictator. As the quæstors also were elected in the Comitia Tributa, the Senate, filled by a self-acting arrangement, would rest for the future on a basis of indirect popular appointment. The new method was the natural development of existing usage and of the Ovinian law, which had practically confined the censors to the revision of a list constituted by the public choice. The lapse of the censorship, however, made the senator irremovable. The number of members was roughly doubled, from a variable 300 to about 600, not too many to meet the increase of judicial functions. Thus recruited, and emancipated from censorial revision, strong in a life tenure, and resting indirectly on popular election, the Senate received the legal gift of supreme control in legislative, executive, and judicial affairs alike. Its prerogatives were not merely restored, they were placed on a formal footing, and strengthened at the expense of Comitia, tribune, eques, and general.

The Courts.—To complete his work Sulla thoroughly reformed and reorganised the courts of criminal justice. The popular courts and the ordinary civil procedure remained as they were, except that the single judges, who decided civil cases under the directions of the prætor, were now drawn from the Senate, and their action was limited by the institution of new tribunals. The extraordinary procedure, whether in the shape of special or standing commissions (*quæstiones*), underwent reform. The *quæstiones perpetuæ*, of which several had now been created, and which were taking over the judicial business of the assembly of the people, were increased in number, their procedure and competence were carefully regulated, and additional prætors provided to act as presidents. Here again senators were substituted for knights as jurymen. Apart from the temporary political purpose served, this was the soundest part of Sulla's reforms. It was the beginning of a clear distinction between civil and criminal jurisprudence, a first attempt to codify criminal law and procedure. Since only the people could condemn to death or imprisonment, and since there was no appeal from these standing delegations of the people, the direct sentence of death for treason and crime was practically abolished. The dangerous special commissions were rendered unnecessary, and the rough methods of popular justice set aside. But it was im-

possible at Rome, in the total absence of the judicial spirit, to deliver the administration of criminal justice from party bias and social prejudice.

Finance, &c.—The financial situation was improved, apart from temporary but severe measures of taxation and confiscation at the expense of rebels, subjects, and allies, by the abolition of the grain largesses and the resumption of the Campanian domains. With the usual inconsistency of Roman debauchees, the dictator attempted to restrain extravagance by sumptuary legislation.

Summary.—Such were the institutions of Sulla. To the modern critic it may seem that he lost a great opportunity. If he would neither grasp himself nor permit another to grasp the crown, an act for which the time was scarcely yet ripe, it was in his power to reform the Assembly, to secure the loyal interest of Italy, to give the Senate, recruited with new Italian blood, a less official and more directly representative character, while he relieved the executive of some of those checks and balances that paralysed strong and responsible government. The criticism is beside the mark. Sulla was essentially a Roman and a noble. Of radical reform he had no notion. He had started with no ideals, and now, profoundly convinced of the danger of existing tendencies, bent on making the best of what was there, and perceiving that the constitutional defect lay in the ill-defined position of the Senate and the weakness of its safeguards, he saw no remedy but to put back the hands upon the clock, and to bolster up in the most legal and formal way the power of the only strong republican institution. The Senate had made Rome great; by setting aside its authority the tribunes and the Comitia had made wreck of the old system. The democratic leaders had failed in their self-appointed task; they had proved to the hilt their incapacity for reform. Sulla saw the danger of government by opposite factions bidding hungrily for the support of the hungry mob, and found the only alternative in the reconstruction of the Senate. What it had been *de facto* he would make it *de jure*. Like all conservatives, his mind went back to a half-ideal past, and thus he parted with no historical institution. He neither abolished the tribunate nor did away with the Comitia; possibly, in the face of existing ideas, he had not the full courage of his convictions. With the means at his disposal and the ideas of a reactionary he did all it was possible to do, and carried his work through with unswerving resolution, with consistency and success. He armed and fortified the Senate against the capitalist, the proletariat, and the proconsul, but his work was doomed to

failure. He could not educate his party, could not give it vigour, morale, and policy. He built his constitution with blood and iron, which are rarely durable materials. Above all, he worked with worn-out ideas. He attempted to make dead bones live. He contended against Destiny, the one goddess of his belief, when he tried to stem the advancing tide of republican corruption and military despotism. There is nothing new in Sulla's constitution. As a soldier, indeed, he rescued the empire of the East, he broke the rebellion of Sannium, he saved the city itself; as an administrative and judicial reformer he did some sound and permanent work. It was he who settled the Italian question and centred the power of united Italy in Rome. But his constitution is a tissue of revivals and restorations of ancient usage and existing prescription. He left behind him no problem solved, and all parties discontented. The populace had kept its vices and lost its aliment; the equites were at daggers drawn with the optimates; the moderates and lawyers were thoroughly dissatisfied. The army had learned its power; the proconsul could study Sulla's precedent. The social and economic sores were unhealed; nothing had been done for the provinces; the fairest regions of Italy lay waste; town and country were full of dangerous exiles and discharged soldiers. The Sullan régime is a parenthesis in a continuous development. In ten years the forces he fought against met to destroy it; in twenty the patchwork was rent to rags. But the fault lay less with Sulla than with the vices of the age, in which he shared himself, and the weakness of the men to whom he left the government. He exhausted the possibilities of senatorial reconstruction. To him and to his work of consolidation is due, after all, the very existence of Rome, and of any material or opportunity for future progress.

For the moment the constitution was universally accepted. Only in Spain, Sertorius, who had returned to try his fortune once more, headed a Lusitanian insurrection, and began that eventful and romantic war by which his name is best known. Moreover, Sulla knew how to maintain it against his own lieutenants. If he yielded ironically to Pompeius, and stomached the impudent reminder that men turn from the setting to the rising sun, yet when Ofella, the besieger of Præneste, presumed on his services and persisted in disregarding the laws relating to candidature, he had him cut down in the open Forum, and silenced the murmurs of the mob with the significant fable of the countryman, the coat, and the troublesome parasites. Yet these ambitious officers remained a force to reckon with in the future, and the events of the war, in which

six generals had been murdered by their troops, and which had been marked by notorious treachery and desertion, had accentuated the dangerous qualities of the professional fighters they commanded.

Resignation of Sulla.—Meanwhile Sulla had conducted the home and foreign administration of B.C. 81 and 80, making as little use as might be of his exceptional powers. Senate and people, in their different spheres, were duly consulted, and the ordinary magistrates appointed for 81 B.C. In 80 B.C. he took the consulship with Metellus Pius, and thus paved the way for the restoration of the republican order. He refused re-election for 79 B.C., and at the beginning of the year resigned his dictatorship. Whatever share indifference and the desire of ease may have had in his determination, this act was the logical outcome of his ideas. Enigmatical as it seemed, it was politically necessary if he was not to stultify his own legislation. More than this; unless he accepted permanent office he could not accept office at all; he was too big a man for the machine he had created. Calling the people together, to their surprise and admiration, he laid down his power, dismissed his lictors and guard, offered to give a reckoning for his acts, and passed away unchallenged to his home, a private citizen, amid the breathless wonder of the crowd. Not long after, he retired from Rome to his villa near Puteoli, where, in the following year, he died. Rome's "iron Chancellor" retired of set purpose, satisfied with his creation, interested in its success, ready to return to its rescue, but clear that, if it was to go at all, it had better go without leading-strings. He could not remain in power but not in office, or expose himself to be slighted and ignored as an ordinary private politician.

Sulla in Retirement.—In spite of all the bloodshed, the personal feuds, the harassed interests, he left the scene of the proscriptions without fear or hesitation, relying on the terror of his name, the reserve of veterans, the new interests he had created, with contemptuous self-confidence and indifference to events. The remainder of his days were spent in his quiet country villa at Cumæ, surrounded by his family and friends. His beloved wife, Cæcilia Metella, mother of his twin children, whom he had named Faustus and Fausta, in honour of his fortune, died, and was buried with unlawful splendour. But he married again, for the fifth time, a young and coquettish maiden called Valeria, drew round him a circle of literary men and artists, and amused his leisure with the writing of his famous memoirs. While he gratified to the full his lifelong love of pleasure, and the scandal of

his day accused the "mulberry-faced dictator" of every form of sensual indulgence, he found time and strength for field sports and regulated the municipal affairs of Puteoli. His passionate masterfulness broke out once more in the murder of the Mayor of that town, an outbreak which was fatal to him, though a later legend declared that the man of blood was eaten of worms. He died in his sixtieth year (78 B.C.), still vigorous in mind and body, fortunate, as ever, in the moment of his death. Successful in his well-considered schemes, more so, as he said, in his impromptu actions, he assumed the title of Felix, and fortune, faithful to the last, did not falsify the assumption. His one failure, deeply felt, was the failure to complete the restoration of the burnt temple of Jupiter, undertaken in his latest days.

Funeral and Character of Sulla.—His body was brought to Rome in solemn, ever-lengthening procession of friends and veterans and awe-stricken spectators. With sombre pomp the funeral was celebrated; the ashes were honoured with burial in the Campus Martius. Vainly the consul Lepidus opposed the demands of public feeling and private loyalty; awe of the dead man and his living soldiers kept the peace about his corpse. Senate and magistrates, priests and priestesses, equites and people, were there. Hatred, revenge, and calumny were silent for a moment, as the greatest man in Rome, the reorganiser of the state, the one bulwark of order, crumbled to dust on his pyre, while the soldiery, whom he alone could rule, defiled around the body of their chief. But the passions suppressed for the moment broke out again soon after, and pursued the name of Sulla with vindictive exaggeration of his vices and crimes. To his character, as we have described it, he was true even in last hours. The small ambitions of his circle did not touch him. It was his aim to get the most out of life. The force of circumstances and his position provoked and compelled the man of fashion and pleasure to put out his powers, to be a great general and a great statesman. He did the business of the moment as it came, trusting the future to fortune, and gave up power and place with the same indifference that he took them. His leading characteristic, perhaps, was just this ironical cynicism, this cool, frank nonchalance. He has been censured, with reason, for his lax morality, his self-indulgence, his connivance at the malpractices of friends, his breach of his own laws, his carelessness of human life. He was no more a moral hero than he was a political idealist; he combined the vices of his time and nation with the constitutional ideas of a bygone age.

CHAPTER XLV

THE RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Lusitanian Rising under Sertorius--Despatch of Metellus		
Pius to Spain	80	674
Death of Sulla--Democratic Proposals of Lepidus	78	676
Defeat and Death of Lepidus--Pompey sent to Spain . . .	77	677
Insurrection of Gladiators under Spartacus	73	681
Murder of Sertorius--End of the War in Spain	72	682
Crassus ends the Slave War by the Defeat and Death of Spartacus	71	683
Pompey and Crassus, as Consuls, repeal the Constitutional Measures of Sulla	70	684

Opposition to the Sullan Régime.—Sulla had re-established the Roman oligarchy in a strong position, but he had failed to heal the disorders of the state or to infuse a new spirit into the government. Within the camp of the aristocrats all was confusion when their champion was gone; outside its narrow bounds numerous secret or open enemies were gathering their forces for an assault on the dictator's organisation of the Republic. Many and various were the elements of discontent grouped together and covered by the vague name of the popular party. The strict adherents to the party programme of the past demanded the restoration of the tribunician power, which Sulla had shorn of its chief prerogatives.

Cæsar.—In their ranks was numbered one man, C. Julius Cæsar, who was destined to see the emptiness of partisan watchwords. Already men looked forward with hope to his career, but at present he was a mere youth (born 102 B.C.), a leader of fashion rather than of politics. Though of the bluest patrician blood, he was bound to the democrats by family ties, for his aunt was the widow of Marius and his wife the daughter of Cinna. Rather than divorce her at the bidding of Sulla, he fled for his life, and wrung from the dictator the saying, "In that young fox there are hidden many Mariuses." In the next ten years he proved his mettle by his services against Mithradates at Mitylene and elsewhere in Asia.

Cicero.—Another young man of promise, the eloquent advocate, M. Tullius Cicero, first made his mark by daring to oppose the great dictator. In defending Sext. Roscius of Ameria he laid bare the iniquities of Sulla's freedman, Chrysogonus, and covertly censured the carelessness of the too indulgent master. After the

trial he thought it wise to retire to Rhodes and study rhetoric for two years, but his speech had done its work. It had given voice to the general hatred among the men of law and order for the violence which characterised the Sullan régime. In the same spirit the strict jurists refused to recognise the validity of the Cornelian laws depriving several Italian communities of the franchise. Lovers of peace and quiet stood aghast at Sulla's proscriptions and confiscations, and at the atrocious injustice and cruelty perpetrated in his name.

The Ordo Equester.—With these moderate men went the whole equestrian order. The merchants and bankers of the Roman world were by turns irritated by the inefficiency of senatorial government into giving their support to the opposition, and frightened by democratic excesses into the arms of the aristocracy. The leaders of the order were the farmers of the provincial taxes, who for half a century had used the position of their class on the jury-bench to make the magistrates in the provinces their humble servants. The knights had also contrived to secure for themselves immunity from accusations both of provincial extortion and of judicial corruption. Even Sulla had acquiesced in this monstrous exemption. But the dictator had decimated the knights by his proscriptions and degraded them by his laws. They were expelled from their seats of honour in the theatre, and from their more profitable position in the jury-box. At the same time their ranks had been recruited from the substantial burgesses of the Italian towns and the landholders of the country districts. These men were made Romans by the enfranchisement of Italy, they shared with the financiers of the capital their dread of violence and their jealousy of the nobles, and thus were ready to follow the leaders of their order in opposition to the Sullan men and the Sullan measures.

Again, many of the country towns, especially in Etruria, resented or dreaded the confiscation of their lands. Between the Alps and the Po there was a continual agitation for the coveted boon of the full Roman franchise. Nearer home, the freedmen repined at their confinement to the four urban tribes, and the city populace grieved over the loss of the dole of corn. Finally, the children of those whom the dictator had proscribed saw no hope of restoration, save in the overthrow of that society which had made them outcasts. The agitation found a fruitful soil in a land disorganised by ten years of war and violence. Ruined nobles and poor plebeians looked to another revolution as their one hope

of salvation. Even Sulla's veterans, the garrison whose mission it was to defend the new constitution, were now, in their eagerness for fresh opportunities of plunder, ready to follow the banner of rebellion.

The Aristocratic Clique.—The aristocrats were in no state to meet the forces of disorder. Their ideal of government was a close hereditary oligarchy. Election to office was secured by open and organised bribery of the people, immunity from punishment by no less shameful corruption of the senatorial juries. Subdivision and frequent rotation of offices were, as in old days, adopted as safeguards against unrepublican pre-eminence of individuals. But these precautions, without securing their object, enhanced the difficulty of governing the wide provinces of the empire, and showed most clearly how incapable the narrow clique of oligarchs was of guiding the destinies of Rome. In their camp there were indeed able officers, such as Metellus Pius and Lucius Lucullus, and men of high culture and character, such as the solid and respectable Q. Lutatius Catulus. But their political creed was a blind belief in oligarchy, which led them to regard narrow and obstinate partisanship as the only true patriotism. And even to the service of faction they only devoted what time they could spare from the pleasures of the table and the patronage of literature.

Crassus.—Two of the most powerful men in Rome were at present pledged to neither party. M. Licinius Crassus, a man of high birth but without loyalty to his caste, a soldier of no mean capacity, as he had proved in the service of Sulla, and an orator whose undoubted success was due rather to persistence and insistence than to any rhetorical gift, had become by adroit speculation the richest man in Rome and a power in the state. As the representative of the moneyed classes he aimed at political preponderance by mercantile means, and would sacrifice the pre-eminence of his order to the interests of the capitalists and a vague personal ambition. A vein of vanity and a desire for military renown crossed his more material projects. His crooked policy is the natural result of a crooked character drawn in different directions by diverging aims. Oratory and wealth alike he used to build up power; he shrank from no useful associates, readily consorting even with anarchists, and formed a political connection by lending money to statesmen of all parties. No leader, however reckless, dare provoke "the bull of the herd," as Crassus was called. And now the great speculator was prepared to make a daring bid for the prize of power.

Pompey.—If the moneyed interest put their faith in Crassus, the popular voice was for another rising young Sullan officer, Cn. Pompeius. While still too young to enter on the career of office, Pompeius had raised an army and won victories for Sulla, from whose half-ironical admiration he had extorted a triumph and the surname of Magnus. The unbroken success of his military career won the hearts of the soldiery, and the respectability of his private life the esteem of the citizens. But for political leadership he had none of the necessary talents. He wished to be the first man in the state, and yet to avoid the responsibility of leadership. Unable to escape from the domination of ancient ideals and traditions of whose existence he was impatient, he was a man in a false position, neither the true champion of constitutional liberty longed for by Cicero, nor the miserable poltroon, letting "I dare not wait upon I would," portrayed by Mommsen. While he shrank with horror from appealing to force, he could not see that the deference he expected was incompatible with true republicanism. Inconsistent in his ends, he was still more unhappy in his choice of means. Ignorant of men, shrouded in self-conceit, without tact, taste, or affability, with no comprehension of the drift of events, or even of his own true position and power, he was incapable of an independent and consistent policy, unable to act, and unwilling to remain obscure. At one time he would strive to mask his indecision under the guise of a deep and subtle policy; at another he would snatch at any assistance which promised to relieve him from his immediate difficulties. Throughout his life men looked



HEAD OF POMPEY ON A COIN STRUCK CIRC. 38-36 B.C.

to him for guidance in their perplexities and deliverance from danger, and found too late that there was neither light nor leading in the idol which they had set up for worship.

Revolt of Lepidus.—Pompey's first interference in politics was in the support he gave to M. Æmilius Lepidus in his canvass for

the consulship. Sulla in vain warned him of the levity and rashness of his new ally, from whom Caesar wisely stood aloof, but did not live to see the fulfilment of his predictions. Before the dictator was buried, the consul Lepidus had begun to agitate for the overthrow of the constitution with all a renegade's ardour. The distribution of corn was revived, and the restoration of the tribunician power and of confiscated lands, as well as the recall of the proscribed, openly advocated. A revolt at Fesulæ terrified the Senate into the absurdity of entrusting Lepidus as well as Catulus with an army. It thus provided the insurrectionary leader with a regular force, and when it decreed his recall, he met the order with a demand for the reinstatement of the proscribed and his own re-election to the consulship. Fortunately the ensuing war was brief and decisive. Pompey, convinced of error or alarmed at revolution, forced M. Brutus, the lieutenant of Lepidus in the valley of the Po, to shut himself up in Mutina, and eventually to surrender at discretion. Lepidus himself attempted to surprise Rome, but was met and vanquished by Catulus on the field of Mars, near the Mulvian bridge. He made good his retreat to Sardinia, but died before he could secure the island. The remnant of his troops found their way to Spain, under the command of the prætor M. Perperna (77 B.C.).

The Insurrection in Spain.—Spain had for some time been the refuge of the partisans of Marius. Q. Sertorius, despatched to that province in 83 B.C., and chased thence by the officers of Sulla, had, after taking Tingis (Tangiers), returned to Spain, and accepted the command of the revolted Lusitanians. Covering his hastily organised legion with swarms of Spanish irregulars, he routed L. Fufidius on the Batis (Guadalquivir), and despatched his own lieutenant, L. Hirtuleius, to the Iberus (Ebro), where he destroyed, in succession, the armies of Hither Spain and Southern Gaul. Meanwhile the best senatorial general, Metellus Pius, had penetrated into Lusitania, only to find himself baffled and outwitted at every turn by the rebel leader. Sertorius, refusing to risk a pitched battle and scorning the pedantry of scientific warfare, by a series of ambushes and surprises so harassed his methodical opponent that he could call nothing but his camp his own.

Sertorius.—Sertorius was now supreme in Spain. In the attainment of his power he had shown himself a general; in its employment he proved himself yet greater as a statesman. He strove, not unsuccessfully, to reconcile Roman rule with the national aspirations of the Spaniards. In one aspect he was the Roman

governor, distinguished from others only by the gentleness of his rule over the provincials and the strictness of his discipline. In another, he was the national leader of Spain, the hero of the chivalrous nobility, and the favourite of the goddess Diana, who sent him her counsels by a milk-white fawn. But his final aim was to Romanise the provincials, and for that purpose he had the children of the nobles educated at Osca in the learning of Greece and Rome. Had time been granted him, the great democratic adventurer and soldier of fortune might have forestalled in Spain the work of the early emperors.


Pompey and Metellus in Spain.—But the fall of Lepidus set Pompey and his legions free for service abroad. Unwilling as the Senate was to violate in his favour the established rules of precedence, it had no alternative. No general but Pompey was willing to match himself with Sertorius, and Pompey demanded the post with scarcely veiled threats. The command in Hither Spain, with proconsular authority, was irregularly conferred on the young eques by the Senate. One summer was spent in suppressing the disturbances excited by Sertorius in Gaul, during which time Hither Spain passed into the hands of the rebel leader. In the next campaign (76 B.C.), Metellus, who had maintained himself in Bætica, drove Hirtuleius from that province by the victory of Italica, while Pompey forced the passage of the Ebro and captured Valentia after defeating the lieutenants of Sertorius. But when that general took the field in person, he completely outmanœuvred Pompey and took the town of Lauro before the eyes of the relieving army. In 75 B.C., however, Metellus routed Hirtuleius at Segovia, and marched towards Valentia to join Pompey. With inexcusable jealousy the young commander accepted battle on the Sucro, without waiting for his colleague, and was only saved from disaster by his opportune arrival. "If the old woman had not come to help him, I should have whipped this stripling back to Rome," said Sertorius, with grim humour. One more pitched battle was risked by the rebel chief, and once more Metellus retrieved the half-lost day. The Spanish levies dispersed, and never again faced the legions in the field, but Sertorius clung obstinately to his strongholds on the Ebro, and still harassed the Roman generals by a guerrilla warfare. In the next two campaigns Metellus recovered Southern and Central Spain, while Pompey steadily wore down Sertorius' strength.

Death of Sertorius.—In his perplexity that statesman was driven

to look round for help among the enemies of Rome. He allied himself with the pirates whose galleys swept the Mediterranean, and with Mithradates, king of Pontus. But even so he would cede to the demands of the Eastern sultan only the client kingdoms on the frontiers, not a foot of Roman soil. In return for this concession and for the promise of Roman troops and an officer to lead his armies, the king agreed to send forty ships and 3000 talents. But this coalition came too late to save Sertorius. The discontent which was spreading among the hard-pressed Spaniards was aggravated by the execution of the chieftains' sons whom he had held as hostages at Osca. At last a conspiracy was formed against the general's life by the members of his own staff. The severity with which he punished detected conspirators only inflamed those who escaped discovery. The heroic soldier and far-seeing statesman, whom his own party had feared and distrusted, whom the Sullan Senate had made a rebel and a menace to Rome, was assassinated at a banquet by his own officers (72 B.C.). Their leader, Perperna, gained little by his base treachery. He was routed and taken prisoner by Pompey at their first encounter. A craven attempt to save his life by surrendering the correspondence of Sertorius was frustrated by the prudence or magnanimity of Pompey, who burned the letters unread and executed the traitor.

The Gladiatorial War.—While the armies of the Republic were engaged in Spain, a dangerous outbreak took place almost at the gates of Rome. A band of gladiators escaped from the training school at Capua, and took refuge on Mount Vesuvius. Their leaders were Spartacus, a Thracian, and two Gauls, Crixus and Ænomaus (73 B.C.). They dispersed the division of militia sent to blockade their stronghold, and evading the prætor Varinius, retired into Lucania, the ancient home of brigandage. Here Spartacus routed the raw legions of Varinius, and raised the herdsmen-slaves of the South Italian pastures in revolt. The open country was given up to the insurgents; even considerable towns were stormed and sacked. In the following year, though a detachment under Crixus was cut to pieces near Mount Garganus, Spartacus himself defeated both consuls and the proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul. It was his aim to force a passage over the Alps and secure for his followers a return to their homes in Gaul and Thrace. But his undisciplined banditti, unworthy of their far-sighted leader, could not bear to leave Italy unplundered, and while they roamed about the country, gave M. Crassus time to collect a force of eight

legions. By wholesome severity he taught his raw troops to face the rebels, and driving Spartacus before him, blockaded him in the extreme corner of Bruttium. In the hope of rekindling the servile war in Sicily, Spartacus bribed the pirates, who then were masters of the Sicilian waters, to transport his troops across the straits. The faithless corsairs broke their word, but Spartacus, still unconquered, pierced the strong lines with which Crassus



GLADIATORS—COMBATS OF SECUTOR AND RETIARIUS.

had hemmed him in, and reappeared in Lucania. Only the disunion and insubordination of his followers saved Rome from disaster. The Celts and Germans again broke off from the main body, and were slaughtered to the last man. Yet once more the undaunted Spartacus inflicted a defeat on his cowardly enemies, but his victory was fatal to himself. His followers, elated by success, insisted on fighting a decisive battle in Apulia,


and suffered a defeat made crushing by the loss of their gallant leader.

Crassus, who had been appointed to the command in the hour of danger, and had vindicated the honour of the Roman arms, was the true conqueror of Spartacus. But Pompey came home from Spain in time to cut to pieces a division of 5000 fugitives, and to join in hunting down and crucifying the rebellious slaves. With characteristic egotism he claimed for himself the honours and rewards of victory as the man who had ended the gladiatorial as well as the Spanish war.

Pompey and Crassus adopt the Democratic Programme.—The conquering generals lay with their armies before the gates of Rome. Within the city the democrats had long been agitating for the restoration of the full powers of the tribunate. Already, by a law of the moderate C. Cotta, the holding of the tribunate had ceased to be a disqualification for higher office, but, in spite of the zealous efforts of Licinius Macer and Cæsar, the tribunes remained without independence, bound hand and foot to the service of the Senate. The opposition also demanded a searching reform of the governing corporation. They asked for the displacement of the venal and unfair senatorial jurors in favour of the knights, and for the revival of the censorship to purge away the corruptions of the Senate itself. These old cries gained new strength and significance in the altered state of affairs. Pompey, officer of the Senate and partisan of Sulla as he had been, could only hope to gain the objects on which his heart was set by open force or by the aid of the democrats. A jealous Senate might perhaps have granted to his youth and victories the illegal triumph and the curule chair; it would never have confirmed his supremacy by giving lands to his veterans, or the coveted command in the East to himself. Crassus, the typical financier, was not inclined to risk his fortunes in an unequal contest with his popular rival on behalf of the Senate. The democratic leaders adroitly turned the discontent of the generals to their own ends. Pompey and Crassus, smothering their jealousies for a time, agreed to adopt the democratic programme, and in return were promised the consulship. Pompey was also to receive a triumph and allotments of land for his soldiers; Crassus, the inferior partner in the alliance, had to content himself with a simple ovation.

Overthrow of the Sullan System.—Pompey and Crassus were elected consuls for the ensuing year (70 B.C.) without opposition,

and at once began the task of reversing the ordinances of Sulla. The tribunes received again their old prerogatives, and in particular the right of initiating legislative proposals; once more the censors revised the list of the Senate, and justified their appointment by erasing no less than sixty-four names from the roll. The senators, whose corrupt perversion of justice had been branded by Cicero in the orations against that prince of pillagers, C. Verres, the scourge of the Sicilians, were not, however, entirely excluded from the jury-box. The praetor L. Cotta, a moderate politician, effected a compromise known as the Aurelian



HELMET OF A GLADIATOR.

Law, under which the jury in criminal cases was composed of three pannels, one of senators, one of knights, and one of *tribuni æarii*.¹

The overthrow of the oligarchy set up by Sulla was now accomplished. All that was left of the great dictator's work was

¹ The *tribuni æarii* were originally responsible for the payment of the troops, and derived their name from this function; but whether they are to be identified with the *curatores* of the 350 centuries (*vide supra*, p. 295 f.), who succeeded to the presidents of the old Servian tribes, or were at all times merely private men of substance, whose name is a survival from a long-obsolete function, is much disputed. In Cicero's time they were reckoned at least by courtesy with the equestrian order.

the new system of criminal procedure, with a few minor business arrangements. The fall of his political institutions, which all his proscriptions and massacres had maintained for ten years only, was an apparent triumph for the popular party. The tribunate, restored to life and vigour, found employment in passing a series of laws which prohibited loans to provincials in Rome or to envoys of foreign states, and in restoring to the knights their seats in the theatre (67 B.C.); but the real strength of the new coalition lay in the armies, which their leaders kept outside the gates of Rome during their consulate. The true alternative to senatorial oligarchy was not democracy, but military monarchy. The fact was already dimly seen, and the people paid Pompey willing homage. When the censors made their review of the knights, Pompey appeared at their head leading his horse. To the question whether he had served all the campaigns required by law, he proudly answered, "I have made them all under my own leadership." This haughty reply was greeted by the crowd with thunders of applause, and the censors, taking the hint, rose and escorted the young consul to his house. All seemed to point to the absolute rule of Pompey. Crassus, inferior both in popularity and in military reputation, had the will but not the power to oppose the elevation of his rival to empire.

Refusal of Pompey to grasp Supreme Power.—The dreaded catastrophe was averted by Pompey's loyalty and want of insight, and by the tact of the popular leaders. They induced Crassus to make advances to his colleague, and to offer to disband his army. Pompey was obliged to accept his overtures and follow his example, or else to seize supreme power by force. From the latter alternative, if indeed he realised its existence, he shrank with honest abhorrence. The decision to discharge his veterans flung him back into political obscurity. With an army at his back he was the greatest power in Rome; without it he was a *quantité négligeable*. Too proud to accept an ordinary province or to endure the petty routine of public life in the capital, he retired from politics, waiting for an occasion worthy of his military genius, and for a call to arms from his fellow-citizens. After two years the discomfiture of the Roman forces on sea and on land led to the reappearance of Pompey as the saviour of his country.

CHAPTER XLVI

THE WARS WITH THE PIRATES AND MITHRADATES—
POMPEY IN THE EAST

	B.C.	A.D.C.
L. Lucullus and M. Cotta given Command against Mithradates, M. Antonius against the Pirates	74	680
Relief of Cyzicus	73	681
Victory of Cabira—Conquest of Pontus	72	682
Capture of Tigranocerta	69	685
Capture of Nisibis	68	686
Defeat at Ziela—Mithradates recovers his Kingdom—Lex Gabinia—Pompey conquers the Pirates	67	687
Lex Manilia—Victory of Nicopolis—Submission of Tigranes	66	688
Death of Mithradates—Settlement of the East	63	691

IN the East as well as in the West the empire of Rome was shaken to its foundations through the negligence of the Sullan oligarchy. In the Balkan peninsula, it is true, the raids of the robber tribes were checked by a combined attack from Dalmatia and Macedonia, which ended in the conquest of Thrace by M. Lucullus (73 B.C.). But the two powers which threatened serious danger to Rome, the corsairs of the Levant and the sultans of the East, Mithradates of Pontus and Tigranes of Armenia, were provoked by ineffectual opposition to further aggression.

The Pirates.—The pirates were now no longer isolated gangs of freebooters and slavers, but formed an organised state of buccaneers. Their dominion was the Mediterranean, which was absolutely under their control. They had harbours of refuge commanded by rock castles wherever its jutting capes and sheltering islands offered them safe shelter, but, above all, in the island of Crete and the craggy fastnesses of Cilicia. The supporters of lost causes, the refugees of all nations, joined a state which promised them revenge on their oppressors and freedom for themselves. The decayed Roman navy was utterly unable to cope with their light galleys; the forerunners of the Algerine corsairs, and left the trade of the Mediterranean to the tender mercies of the pirates. The towns and cities of the coast, such as Cnidus, Samos, and Colophon, were plundered outright, or suffered to redeem themselves by paying heavy ransoms. Sulla himself saw Clazomenæ and Iassus pillaged before the eyes of his victorious army, but was powerless to avenge the insult. As a state the corsairs made treaties with Mithradates

and with Sertorius, but had not the judgment or the courage to throw themselves heart and soul into the struggle against Rome.


Campaigns in Cilicia.—At length the Senate was goaded into action. Publius Servilius defeated the pirates' fleet off Patara, and destroyed their strongholds in Lycia, Pamphylia, and Cilicia. Not content with subduing the brigands of the sea, he crossed the Taurus and captured the mountain fastnesses of the Isaurians. Three severe campaigns (78-76 B.C.) proved the valour of the general and gained him the honourable title of Isauricus; but the beaten corsairs betook themselves to their old haunts in Crete, and laughed at the empty triumph of their conqueror.

Failure of M. Antonius.—At last, in 74 B.C., the Senate saw the necessity of operations on a large scale, but unfortunately M. Antonius,¹ the admiral entrusted with the task of clearing the seas, proved incompetent. After driving the pirates from the coasts of Italy, he was defeated by the Cretans off Cydonia. The Senate resolved to avenge this disgrace to the Roman arms, but instead of strengthening their fleet, despatched Metellus with an army to subdue Crete (68 B.C.). The much-abused Cretans fought bravely in defence of their liberties, and it took the proconsul two campaigns to reduce their cities and earn the title of Creticus. Meanwhile the pirates scoured the waters of the Mediterranean unhindered. Italy itself was no longer safe. A Roman fleet was burnt in the roads of Ostia, two praetors with their retinue were seized; worst blow of all, the corn-ships, on which the very life of Rome depended, could no longer cross the narrow seas. Famine and riot stared the rulers of the Republic in the face.

Tigranes of Armenia.—The incapacity of the government displayed itself with equal plainness in its management of the affairs of the East, though its errors were in part covered by the brilliant successes of its general. For several years Tigranes had been suffered to prove himself king of kings by a career of conquest. In Media Atropatene, in Corduene and Northern Mesopotamia he made himself over-lord in place of the Parthian. To secure his hold on the Euphrates he seized Eastern Cappadocia and passed on into Cilicia. The distracted house of the Seleucids could offer no serious opposition to his assumption of the Syrian crown.

¹ The power given to Antonius (*imperium infinitum æquum*), that is, an authority equal to that of a provincial governor, but not limited to a single province, is interesting as a precedent for the Gabinian Law (*vide infra*, p. 477).

Tigranes aspired to play the part of the old Babylonian and Persian monarchs : like Nebuchadnezzar, he would build a great city, Tigranocerta, and carry thither the captives from his frontier



COIN OF TIGRANES STRUCK IN SYRIA BEFORE 69 B.C. — (1) HEAD OF TIGRANES; (2) ANTIOCH SEATED ON A ROCK.

provinces. Like Xerxes, he never appeared in public without all the pomp and show of royalty.

Mithradates.—Mithradates, who had learnt by experience the power of Rome, studiously refrained from all aggression. He strengthened himself in his new kingdom by the Bosphorus, and made his fleets and armies ready for the coming struggle. Rome, far from acting on the offensive, would not even take up the challenge of Tigranes or assert the rights over Egypt and Cyprus given her by the will of the last legitimate king, Alexander (81 B.C.). The outbreak of war was due in the end, not to any schemes of conquest, but rather to mutual distrust. Rome feared that, while her energies were distracted by civil war, Mithradates would fall on Asia Minor; the Eastern monarch, with justifiable alarm, suspected new aggression when Rome took over Bithynia under the will of its last king, Nicomedes (75 B.C.).¹

Third Mithradatic War.—Mithradates, once aroused, strove with characteristic energy to unite all the enemies of Rome against her. With Tigranes his envoys had no success. But Sertorius sent him Roman officers to drill his troops, and the pirates, who flocked to his aid, enabled him to raise a large fleet. In 74 B.C. the great Pontic army poured down on Roman Asia. One corps was sent to Cappadocia, another to Phrygia, but the main army, sup-

¹ These political testaments recur with suspicious frequency (*u. s.*, p. 328).

ported by a large fleet on the Euxine, marched along the north coast into Bithynia. To meet these vast forces L. Lucullus had only one fresh and four veteran legions, two of which were composed of Fimbria's disorderly troops. Many of the Greek cities, weary of Roman exactions, massacred their oppressors once again, and hailed Mithradates as a deliverer. The wilder tribes, the Pisidians, Isaurians, and Cilicians, joined his standard. Had not Deiotarus, a Galatian tetrarch, made a gallant stand against the Pontic generals, the whole province might have been lost. Nor was this widespread revolt the only danger which menaced Lucullus. His colleague, M. Cotta, shut up in Chalcedon by the main Pontic army, risked a naval battle in which he lost his whole fleet, and forced Lucullus, who was in Galatia, to hasten back to his rescue (74 B.C.).

Mithradates did not allow himself to be shut up in the peninsula of Chalcedon. But, with short-sighted strategy, he neglected the enemy in the field, and after securing Lampsacus, sat down to reduce the island town of Cyzicus. He succeeded in seizing the bridge that joined it to the mainland, and even in establishing himself on the heights close to the town. But the citizens defended their walls stoutly, while Lucullus occupied a strong position in rear of the Pontic host and cut off its communications. Mithradates, shut in between an impregnable city and an immovable army, was dependent for supplies on his fleet. Famine and pestilence decimated the helpless and demoralised soldiery; storms destroyed the siege-works. When spring began even the self-willed sultan was convinced of the hopelessness of prolonging the



GOLD STATER OF MITHRADATES VI.

siege. He sought safety on board his fleet, and sailing to Lampsacus, picked up there such remnants of his great army of invasion as escaped from the swords of the pursuing Romans.

Lucullus now, leaving his lieutenant to complete the conquest of Bithynia, took the command of a hastily collected fleet, and destroyed the Pontic squadron which had ventured into the *Ægean*. At length, uniting all his forces for a combined attack on Nicomedia, he drove the king before him in solitary flight to Sinope.

Invasion of Pontus.—In the autumn Lucullus invaded Pontus, and pursued the retreating enemy far over the old limit of the Halys. Compelled by the return of winter to stay his advance, he still blockaded the principal towns, Amisus and Themiscyra. Next spring the weary and discontented legions were urged forward once more to meet the fresh levies of the irrepressible Mithradates. Near Cabira the long struggle was at last decided. The three legions of Lucullus were compelled by the strong Pontic cavalry to keep their station on the hills, but the flower of the king's army was cut to pieces in an attempt to seize the Roman convoy on its way from Cappadocia. The king's preparations for further retreat spread a panic in his army, which was butchered almost without resistance as it turned to flee. Mithradates sought refuge in the dominions of Tigranes, who, after refusing the alliance of the king of Pontus, now provoked victorious Rome by granting protection to the homeless exile.

Lucullus spent two years in reducing the Greek towns on the coast, which were heroically defended by their citizens with the aid of the pirates. Sinope, Heraclea, and Amisus had nothing to fear from a blockade while the sea was open, and their scientific fortifications rendered an assault difficult. They surrendered only when all hope of the restoration of Mithradates seemed at an end. A more serious task for Lucullus was the reorganisation of his province, which had been desolated no less by the tax-gatherers of Rome than by the armies of the enemy. With imprudent firmness, Lucullus limited the exactions of the creditors to 12 per cent. a year, without compound interest, and thus mortally offended the powerful financiers of the capital and earned the useless gratitude of the oppressed provincials.

War with Tigranes.—Heedless of the murmurs of the Roman capitalists, and of the weak desire of the government to avoid further intervention in the East, Lucullus pressed forward to the completion of his great work, the deliverance of the Greeks from Oriental dominion. This was still unfinished while Tigranes ruled in Syria and claimed sovereignty over the whole East. But the commission given to Lucullus was limited to the war against Mithradates, so the proconsul sought and found formal justifica-

tion for his wider schemes by sending Appius Claudius to the Armenian king to demand the surrender of Mithradates under pain of war. Tigranes at once accepted war, and ordered a general levy of his troops. On his side, Lucullus, after providing for the occupation of Pontus, had only two legions left for the invasion of Armenia. Further, these were composed of Fimbria's veterans, who hated the aristocratic pride and stern discipline of their general, from whom they not unreasonably demanded their discharge earned by thirteen campaigns and numerous victories.

Victory of Tigranocerta.—In spite of these difficulties, Lucullus, in the following spring, marched straight on Tigranocerta, the new capital of the Armenian Empire. By negotiations with the princes of Cappadocia and Sophene, he secured a safe passage over the Euphrates. His vanguard dispersed the regulars and Bedouins who tried to bar his path, and advanced swiftly into the heart of the country. Before the grand army of the king of kings could be gathered from the distant provinces of his empire, Lucullus had laid regular siege to Tigranocerta. Refusing to raise the blockade on the approach of the relieving army, he advanced to meet it with only 10,000 men. Tigranes was amazed at the little band of Romans, who seemed to him too many for an embassy and too few for an army. Scorning the advice of Mithradates to starve out the enemy, he attempted to crush them beneath swarms of mail-clad lancers. But Lucullus seized a height which commanded the position of the enemy's cavalry, and by a sudden charge threw them back in confusion on their infantry, and thus rolled up the Armenian line of battle at a blow. We need not believe that but five Romans fell in slaughtering a hundred thousand of the enemy, but, beyond all question, the battle cost Tigranes his newly won dominions. The princes of Syria accepted the suzerainty of Rome; the very capital, Tigranocerta, was betrayed by Greek settlers to the conquerors.

Failure of Lucullus owing to Mutiny.—Tigranes passed from overweening confidence to the depths of despair, till his fainting courage was revived by Mithradates. The old monarch felt that his only hope lay in resistance, and made a last effort to unite the nations of the East against Rome. But Phraates of Parthia preferred to secure the recovery of his lost provinces on the Euphrates by negotiations with Rome rather than risk further losses in a war. The wild border tribes proved more willing, and from their levies Mithradates formed a picked body of infantry, drilled by Pontic officers. The plan of campaign adopted was to avoid

pitched battles and draw the Roman army farther and farther into the mountains of Armenia, while the king's strong force of cavalry cut off their supplies. Lucullus resolved to force a battle by an attack on the ancient Armenian capital, Artaxata. In the summer of 68 B.C. he made his way on to the high plateau of Armenia, but his march had been delayed by continual skirmishes, and was interrupted by the snowstorms of a northern winter. The Roman legions refused to advance farther into the realms of snow and ice, and compelled their general to lead them back to the plains. Lucullus turned the enforced retreat to good account by storming Nisibis, where he wintered. But in his absence the weak detachments left to hold his conquests were defeated by the two kings. Tigranes kept L. Fannius shut up in a fort near Tigranocerta; Mithridates defeated the Roman troops in Pontus, and wintered at Comana.

Defeat at Ziela: Retreat of Lucullus.—In the ensuing spring, Lucullus was forced by the entreaties of his hard-pressed lieutenants and the discontent of his troops at Nisibis to turn his march westward. He came in time to relieve his Armenian garrison, but found Pontus all but lost. His legate, Triarius, had been forced to give battle at Ziela by the clamour of his soldiers, and had lost the pick of his troops in a defeat which led to the capture of the Roman camp. The pusillanimous refusal of Q. Marcius to send help from Cilicia, and of the consul M'. Acilius Glabrio to assume the command to which he had been appointed in 68 B.C., forced Lucullus to confront the enemy at the head of a mutinous soldiery. Instead of marching to meet the Armenians, the troops retreated into the province of Asia, and left Mithradates in undisturbed possession of Pontus. Thus the fruit of the many victories of Lucullus was wasted by the insubordination of his soldiers; all that his masterly generalship could secure was a safe retreat, glorious to the leader alone. Rome had undertaken to curb the license of the pirates and to humble the pride of the monarchs of the East, and in both instances had courted disaster by the inadequacy of her preparations, and had met with defeats ignominious for a great nation.

The Gabinian Law.—The hour of his country's necessity was Pompey's opportunity. For two years he had lived in retirement, waiting for a summons from the people to take up the work to which the senatorial government had proved itself unequal. And now (67 B.C.) the tribune Aulus Gabinius proposed the appointment of a new high admiral to clear the sea of pirates. But the wide powers

and unparalleled character of the proposed office stamped the measure as revolutionary. A private individual was to be given supreme command for three years over the whole Mediterranean, and co-ordinately with the provincial governors over the coasts for fifty miles inland. He was authorised to levy a fleet of 200 sail and an army of 120,000 men, and for this purpose to dispose of the state treasure as he pleased. He was allowed to nominate twenty-five lieutenants, whom the law invested with praetorian powers. In fine, magistrates, Senate, and people were all to divest themselves of their old prerogatives and bow down before a new military authority, the germ of imperial monarchy. Though the Senate had been granted the right to choose the general from the whole body of consulars, only one choice was possible—Pompey. The democrats might secretly fear him; honest aristocrats, like old Q. Catulus, might openly oppose him; but the voice of the people was decisive in his favour. In vain did one tribune, bolder than the rest, L. Trebellius, interpose his veto; Gabinius instantly took a vote of the people on a motion to dismiss him from office, and so compelled him to give way, when seventeen tribes out of the thirty-five had declared against him. The people with one voice demanded the appointment of their only general.

Success of Pompey.—And the general justified their choice. In forty days, while his lieutenants, each in his appointed district, were chasing the pirates from the coasts of Spain and Gaul, Pompey himself swept clean the Sicilian, African, and Sardinian waters, and reopened the main routes of the corn trade. Then he sailed eastward with sixty of his best ships. Off Coracesium the bold Cilician sea-kings met with a decisive defeat in the one great battle of the war. With wise clemency, Pompey granted life and liberty to all who would submit. The great majority of the corsairs gladly consented to yield their fastnesses in Lycia and Cilicia, and were permitted to settle in the deserted towns which the victorious general refounded. In ninety days Pompey had crushed the pirates, and had restored commerce to the seas and abundance to the capital. The only dissentient voice amidst the triumphant applause which hailed the conqueror came from Crete. There the optimate governor, Metellus, refused to recognise the right of Pompey's lieutenants to accept the submission of the Cretan cities (though Crete was undoubtedly within the province assigned to Pompey by the Gabinian Law), and actually fought against the troops sent by Pompey to the island. But this colli-

sion with an ill-tempered aristocrat in no way sullied the fame of Pompey's achievements.

Manilian Law.—Greater triumphs awaited the conqueror of the pirates. To undertake the war with Mithradates and the settlement of the East had long been his cherished ambition. And now he was on the coasts of Asia with an army, just when Lucullus' retreat had thrown all into confusion and dismay. A complaisant tribune, C. Manilius, proposed to recall Acilius Glabrio from Bithynia, and Marcius Rex from Cilicia, and entrust these provinces, together with the whole care of the Pontic-Armenian war, to Pompey. The financiers were led by their interest in the taxes of Asia, and the moderates by the necessity for ending the war, to support this extraordinary Bill. The democrats dare not break with Pompey; only Catulus and Hortensius protested against handing over to an individual the empire of Asia. Pompey at once assumed the functions of captain-general in the East. He made alliance with Phraates, who was induced to support a son and namesake of Tigranes in his intrigues against his father. He prepared a force of 50,000 men for active service in the ensuing spring, and proceeded to Danala, in Galatia, to take over the command from Lucullus. A bitter quarrel took place between the mortified aristocrat and the egotistic hero, destined, as usual, to wear the laurels won by the victories of others. Pompey's unworthy jealousy annulled the acts of his predecessor subsequent to his own arrival and threw obstacles in the way of his well-earned triumph.


Final Defeat of Mithradates at Nicopolis.—In the spring of 66 B.C. Pompey invaded Pontus. A futile demand for the unconditional submission of the king led to a desultory campaign. At length, on the arrival of his Cilician legions, Pompey contrived to blockade Mithradates in his camp near the Upper Euphrates. Flight to the unknown wilds of the east was the king's only resource. But Pompey forestalled the manœuvre by secretly occupying a defile on the line of retreat. The unsuspecting Asiatics encamped under the heights held by the legions. A surprise by night threw them into hopeless confusion; trodden down by their friends or put to the sword by the enemy, the last levies which Mithradates led against Rome melted away.

Submission of Tigranes.—The king himself fled, with a few faithful followers, to Armenia. But Tigranes, who had with difficulty repelled the assaults of the Parthian army headed by his rebellious son, was in no mood to imperil his negotiations with Rome for the sake of Mithradates. The exiled king, finding that

a price had been set on his head in Armenia, fled northward to his principality on the Cimmerian Bosphorus. Pompey turned aside from the pursuit to dictate peace with Armenia. As he lay encamped near Artaxata, the king of kings rode up and begged for admission into his presence. In token of submission, he threw himself down at the feet of the victor, and placed his diadem in Pompey's hands. He was graciously reinstated on the throne of Armenia, at the price of a war indemnity and the surrender of all his conquests. The great king was reduced to a serviceable Roman vassal.

Conquest of the Caucasus : Death of Mithradates.—The brave nations of the Caucasus, the Iberians and Albanians, were not disposed to bow down before the new lords of the East. But two decisive defeats compelled them to submit to the will of the conquering general. Pompey passed on in pursuit of Mithradates, but when he had reached the mouth of the Phasis he shrank from this difficult and dangerous expedition, and after a fresh victory over the Albanians returned to Pontus. In truth, further pursuit of the vanquished sultan was needless. Mithradates did indeed reach Panticapæum and deprive his renegade son Machares, who had submitted to Rome, of his kingdom and his life ; but his larger schemes miscarried. His plan for invading Italy by way of Pannonia, at the head of wild tribes of Scythians and Gauls, alienated the affections of the army which he had raised. The suspicions and cruelties of the old king led to desertion and insurrection. His favourite son Pharnaces put himself at the head of the insurgents, and was joined by the army. Shut up in his palace, Mithradates in vain begged for the mercy he had never himself shown. At last, in the true spirit of Eastern despotism, he resolved to perish with all his house. His wives and daughters died of the poisoned cup, but the king himself found poison unavailing, and owed his death to the sword of a Gallic attendant (63 B.C.). His body was sent by Pharnaces to Pompey in Palestine, and was by his orders laid in the tombs of the kings at Sinope. The great leader of the East against the West, the man who had proved no unworthy opponent of Sulla, of Lucullus, and of Pompey, was dead, and his death was a greater gain to Rome than many victories.

Syria and Judæa.—Pompey had still to establish order in the East. In Syria, Arab emirs at the head of Bedouin tribes, robber chiefs in Mount Lebanon, like the modern Druses, and the Nabatæans from the desert round Petra were tearing to fragments the kingdom of the Seleucids. One stable power, the Jewish monarchy,




TOMBS OF THE KINGS OF PONTUS.

founded by the Maccabees, had for a time promised to restore order in the south. But after the death of the able Alexander Jannæus the Jewish nation was split into contending factions. The Sadducees, headed by Aristobulus, a son of Jannæus, made the temporal power their object, and hoped to re-establish the kingdom of David; the Pharisees, whose nominal leader was Hyrcanus, another son of Jannæus, regarded Judaism as a spiritual force, and aimed at the religious reunion of Jews throughout the world. Worstcd by their enemies in civil war, the latter called in the aid of Aretas, the Nabatean chieftain, who kept Aristobulus and his Sadducee partisans shut up in Jerusalem. Pompey, who had sent forward various lieutenants to reconcile, if possible, all these jarring elements, reached Syria himself in the winter of 64 B.C. The all-powerful master of the legions chastised the robber chieftains and drove back the Arab sheiks into their native deserts. But the stubborn fanaticism of the Jews could not brook the command to renounce the monarchy and conquests won by the Hasmonæan princes. Aristobulus himself was undecided whether to submit or fight, but his adherents defended the Temple for three months against the Romans. When at last the legions effected an entrance while the besieged were resting on the Sabbath, Pompey insisted on entering the Holy of Holies, but otherwise treated the Temple and religion of the Jews with respect; politically he carried out the ideas of the Pharisees, making Judæa a Roman dependency under the rule of its high priests (63 B.C.).

Reorganisation of the East. — The organisation of the new territories was the last and greatest of the tasks imposed on Pompey. New provinces were formed (1) from Bithynia together with a part of Pontus, (2) from Syria, and (3) from the island of Crete. Cilicia was enlarged by the addition of Pamphylia and Isauria, so that the coasts of Asia Minor were now directly governed by the Romans. The interior was still left in the hands of dependent princes. Foremost among them were the king of Cappadocia, to whom was entrusted the district of Sophene and the guardianship of the passages of the Euphrates, and Deiotarus of Galatia, whose fidelity was rewarded by the grant of the Eastern Pontus, or Lesser Armenia. But the great and distinguishing merit of the Roman reorganisation of the East was the encouragement of city communities. As the champion of Western ideas in opposition to the feudal despots of the East, Rome everywhere in Asia promoted urban civilisation and commerce. Already Lucullus had rewarded Cyzicus, and repopled Sinope and Amisus. Pompey now under-

took the work of colonisation on a large and generous scale. The subjugated pirates were allowed to settle in many places in Cilicia, and in particular at Soli, now named, after its second founder, Pompeiopolis. Including these settlements, Pompey founded no less than thirty-nine towns, the most noted of which were on the



GOLDEN GATE OF TEMPLE AT JERUSALEM.

battlefields of the late war, at Ziela, at Cabira (Diospolis), and at Nicopolis, where his invalided veterans formed a settlement to commemorate the last and crowning victory over Mithradates. Nor were the claims of existing Greek cities forgotten. Autonomy was granted to Antioch and Seleucia in Syria, and to Mitylene in Asia Minor. There was nothing original or striking in the

reorganisation of the Roman rule which made Pompey's a name to conjure with throughout the East. Just as his victories were won by careful attention to the plain maxims of the military art, so in his administrative achievements honesty of purpose and conscientious study of details are his principal merits. The greatest problem in the foreign policy of the day, the relation of Rome to Parthia, he did not attempt to solve. He had not the courage to go to war, nor the wisdom to establish peace on firm foundations. He wounded the vanity of Phraates by refusing him the empty title of king of kings, and aroused his suspicions by refusing to respect the boundary of the Euphrates. For the moment the Parthian king submitted to the loss of Northern Mesopotamia, but he was simply waiting for an opportunity for revenge. The half-hearted policy of Pompey was to bear bitter fruit for Rome on the field of Carrhae. But when all deductions have been made, the achievements of the conqueror of the pirates and of Mithradates were considerable. He had restored peace to the Mediterranean and in the East; and peace was a priceless blessing alike to the Roman merchant and the sorely distracted provinces.

CHAPTER XLVII

CICERO AND CATILINE

	B.C.	A.U.C.
First Conspiracy of Catiline (?)	66	688
Crassus (Censor) proposes Enfranchisement of Transpadanes and Annexation of Egypt	65	689
Election of Cicero—Conspiracy of Catiline begins	64	690
Renewed Intrigues of Populares—Cicero defeats Rullus' Agrarian Law—Trial of Rabirius—Popular Election to the Priesthood—Cæsar Pontifex Maximus—Second Defeat of Catiline for Consulship—Outbreak in Etruria		
Arrest and Execution of Conspirators at Rome by Cicero	63	691
Defeat and Death of Catiline	62	692

It is a hopeless task to unravel the complicated tissue of intrigues which goes by the name of the Catilinarian conspiracy. It is easier to accept an *ex parte* statement and dismiss the affair with a conventional account. The evidence is tainted throughout by political purpose and party prejudice, by rhetorical exaggeration, and by literary adjustment. Apart from the light thrown on the state

of society and politics at Rome, the sole points of historical interest lie in the relation of the plot to the undoubted manœuvres of Cæsar and Crassus for power, and the opportunity it afforded to the great parvenu, M. Cicero.

Party Struggles.—The absence of Pompeius in the far East seemed for the moment to leave the field clear for statesmen at Rome to bustle in. At once the old party names and divisions, the old contests in the Forum and in the law courts, revive. But there is no life and reality in the traditional opposition of the democrats to the senatorial oligarchy. Besides the essential hollowness of the Roman party system, the fate of Rome, as all men felt, lay in the hands of the absent soldier. Neither Cæsar nor Cicero, but Pompey, is the man of the hour, the centre of the political situation. If Pompey should follow in the footsteps of his master, Sulla—as he threatened to do at a later day—there was no party and no leader at this time who could stand for a moment against him. Accordingly, beneath the open warfare of the parties there runs a dark undercurrent of plot and counterplot, parliamentary and other, dimly discernible after the lapse of years. The leaders of both parties are awaiting the return of the great captain with mingled fear and hope—fear that his reorganisation of the East may be the prelude of a reconstruction of the central government, and hope that they may be able to turn his notorious irresolution to their own purposes and use his prestige in the interest of a faction. Both sides were casting about for means to strengthen their position. The populares in particular were acutely conscious of the fact that the Assembly could not now overthrow the military dictatorship whose aid it had invoked. The democracy, like Frankenstein, had made a monster whose giant strength was utterly beyond its control. Hence throughout these years (66–63 B.C.) Cæsar and Crassus are engaged in fruitless efforts to win for themselves a power and position which would enable them to meet Pompey on equal terms. This purpose, veiled under the cloak of an attack on the oligarchy, may be detected both in the measures they openly advocated and the secret encouragement given to the designs of extreme politicians. For in truth the populares, as ever, are leaders without a party, and the so-called parties are groups and factions connected with individuals rather than definite organisations with a definite programme. The Senate alone represents a clear purpose—the maintenance of the *status quo*. In the coming conflict its object is threefold—to discredit the populares, to acquire a commanding position, and to give Pompeius no reason for armed

interference. Even within the Senate we must distinguish the extreme conservatives, led by Catulus and Metellus, the personal enemies of Pompey, and by the independent and impracticable Cato, from the moderate constitutionalists, directed, half against their will, by Cicero, to whose skilful tactics the Senate owed its temporary triumph. Under the rough heading of populares—a union of malcontents—are lumped the anarchists, the few remaining democratic idealists, and individual statesmen like Gaius Caesar, pushing their own interests and policies, and followed by the more restless members of the young nobility. Pompeius meanwhile, the conscious or unconscious object of so many schemes, pursued his path of conquest in apparent or real indifference.

Catiline.—At the head of the anarchists stood a ruined and dissolute patrician, L. Sergius Catilina, whose character, superfluously blackened by all parties, it is equally superfluous to whitewash. A partisan of Sulla who had shared in Sulla's atrocities, he had passed through the ordinary career of office, as quaestor, praetor, and propraetor (of Africa). Accused, in ordinary course, of extortion, he exhausted his plunder in procuring the ordinary acquittal in a trial at which Cicero certainly thought of acting as his counsel. He had managed to retain his place in the Senate in spite of the censors, but had been considered sufficiently dangerous to ensure a steady resistance, under various pretexts, to every candidature for the consulship from 66 B.C. downwards. Though the fouler charges levelled against him may be dismissed as calumnies of the regular electioneering and partisan description, it remains clear that he was a bad specimen of a bad type; a man, it is true, of no ordinary talent and qualities, personally brave, physically powerful, socially attractive, but at the same time an unscrupulous, needy, and daring adventurer, who lacked only patience and political gifts to be dangerous. His restless energy and desperate courage qualified him to lead the extreme section. Bankrupt debauchees of rank, attracted by his evil fascination, gathered round the passed-master of social vice. Ruined gamblers, forfeited senators, and discredited statesmen sighed for the stirring times of Cinna and Sulla. In the background lay a wealth of revolutionary matter ready to the hand: the idle proletariat, gaping for change; the veterans of Sulla, sick of labour; the Italian yeomen whom those veterans had dispossessed; the children of the outlawed Marians. Still farther in the background lay the agricultural slaves and the herdsmen of South Italy. The centre of discontent was already perhaps to be found in Etruria. Later on it was hoped that the excited Transpadanes and distressed

provincials might rally round the standard of revolt. For finance, they might rely on the secret contributions of silent partners in high quarters and the subsidies of intriguing and abandoned women. The material was plentiful, but Catiline lacked the power to organise it.

The First Conspiracy.—An obscure affair is related in 66 B.C. The two consuls-designate, P. Cornelius Sulla and P. Autronius Pætus, had been unseated for bribery, while Cotta and Torquatus were declared duly elected in their place. The disappointed and degraded candidates, with the assistance of Catiline, whose name the presiding officer had refused to receive, apparently conspired to murder their triumphant competitors, and possibly to massacre the oligarchs who had quashed their election. In this rather dubious plot a later version implicated Cæsar and Crassus, who had probably supported Sulla and Pætus as democratic representatives, while another story emphasises the activity of Catiline. This last account is a part of a systematic exaggeration caused on the one hand by a desire to throw the intrigues of Cæsar into the shade, on the other by the exigencies of the Ciceronian party, who sheltered themselves by blackening the character of their adversary. The version implicating Cæsar and Crassus maintained that Crassus was to be dictator, and Cæsar his Master of the Horse, with power to levy an army; that young Cn. Piso was to secure Spain; and that the *coup d'état* was only frustrated once by the hesitation of Crassus, and again by the precipitancy of his bandmaster Catiline. It derives credence only from the acknowledged and open intrigues of the populares; it rests on the mere assertion of aristocratic pamphleteers, and is discredited by analysis of the evidence.

Censorship of Crassus.—In 65 B.C. M. Crassus was censor, and used his position to forward two daring schemes in the interests of the populares. Egypt had long been a Roman dependency, which the corrupt and suspicious policy of the Senate had allowed to remain in the weak hands of its actual rulers. Crassus proposed to take the opportunity of a rebellion, in which King Ptolemy Auletes had been driven from his capital, to convert the valley of the Nile into a Roman province. The tribunes proposed to send Cæsar to govern the only country in the Eastern Mediterranean as yet unoccupied by Pompey's armies. The democratic leader, once established on Pompey's flank, intervening between him and Italy, and able to thrust a fleet across his communications, occupying a land of boundless fertility whose financial system concen-

trated power in the hands of the master of Alexandria, could have played the part of a second Sertorius, if Pompey should prove a second Sulla. The attempt to secure a refuge for the democrats and the basis of a counter-revolution miscarried; nor was the second scheme more successful. In pursuance of the standing policy of the democrats to favour the extension of the franchise, Crassus, zealously supported by Caesar, proposed to enrol as full citizens the inhabitants of Transpadane Gaul. Both attempts failed in face of the opposition of his colleague, the aristocratic Catulus, and both censors resigned office; but the Transpadane franchise remained a burning question, and the democratic leaders secured an active support in the northern district.

Elections of 64 B.C. The elections of 64 B.C., at which five candidates appeared, resolved themselves into a bitter party struggle between optimates and populares, and a bitter personal struggle between Catiline, who had been unable to stand in 65,¹ and M. Tullius Cicero, standing for the first time. The gold and influence of the democrats supported the joint candidature of Catiline and Gaius Antonius Ilybrida, uncle of the triumvir, a weak and corrupt noble, who willingly lent himself to their designs. There were no principles at stake. It was the purpose of the populares to use the consulate as a lever of revolution, to seize the reins of power, and then to arm Italy and the West against Pompey. Cn. Piso, whom the Senate, possibly at Crassus' instigation, had already sent to Hither Spain as *quaestor pro praetore*, would counteract Pompey's interest in that country; the Transpadanes would receive the franchise, and all the forces of disorder would be combined in resistance at once to the Senate and the army of Asia. These far-reaching designs were signally frustrated. The dread of the suspected conspiracy produced a coalition of respectable men in defence of law and order, and in support of the moderate candidate, Cicero. That eloquent and successful advocate, whose birth at the provincial town of Arpinum had made him at once a representative of Italian ideas and an anti-Sullan politician, whose legal studies had made him a constitutionalist seeking his ideal in the great days of Republican Rome, whose social status as an *eques* and *novus homo* threw him into opposition, and whose bent of mind and special capacities rendered him an opportunist and a parliamentary tactician, had won his spurs by attacking a Sullan freedman, by exposing the corruption of the narrow Sullan oligarchy, in particular

¹ Owing to the impeachment for extortion in Africa.

by denouncing Verres for his shameless oppression of Sicily. He had taken his chances to win distinction as an advocate and promotion as a magistrate; in a critical period his policy had wavered. An eques and a patriot, he had supported strong action in the East and the appointments granted to Pompey, to whom he was drawn by personal and political sympathies. As the democratic movement developed he naturally grew out of his



BUST OF CICERO.

“popular” notions, and now, in 64 B.C., definitely passed over to the optimate side, to which he remained attached, though never an extreme conservative. As a politician and a statesman alike his chance came with the election of 64 B.C. Despite the obscurity of his birth, the nobles were grudgingly compelled to accept the brilliant parvenu who commanded the support of so many sections. He could now realise his ideal scheme of uniting the respectable classes in defence of constitutional government, in which

he hoped to secure the co-operation of Pompey. Pompey's friends remembered his support of the *Lex Manilia*; the moneyed interest, led by his friend Atticus, and the moderates, backed the champion of order. The country voters, profoundly indifferent to urban squabbles, eagerly supported the municipal whom the patrician Catiline sneered at as the *inquilinus civis*, the man with the lodger franchise. Personal popularity and assiduous canvassing placed Cicero easily at the head of the poll. Antonius, however, was returned as the other consul, defeating Catiline by the vote of a few centuries. One string of the plot was thus broken; another cracked when Cicero bought up his needy colleague by ceding to him the lucrative province of Macedonia. Piso had already fallen by assassination in Spain. But the danger was not yet over. Antonius, the double-dyed traitor, remained a constant anxiety. The game of intrigue recommenced. The persistent Catiline prepared to renew his candidature, and an attempt to condemn him also, along with some other of the Sullan ruffians brought to justice by Caesar, had been frustrated by that cynical president of the court of murder. Nor was he dismayed by the severe penalties of the later *Lex Tullia de Ambitu*, probably made and provided for his benefit (63 B.C.).

Sullan Law.—Again, at the close of 64 B.C., on the very day the new tribunes took office, P. Servilius Rullus, one of their number, proposed an agrarian law obviously meant to make the democratic leaders masters of the Roman state. By this Bill all the public lands acquired since 88 B.C. mainly by the arms of Pompey, were to be sold, and with the proceeds, at the cost of the public funds, lands were to be purchased in Italy for colonisation. The execution of the measure was vested in ten commissioners enjoying military and judicial authority (*imperium*) for five years. A clause requiring the presence of candidates at Rome was expressly devised to exclude Pompeius, to whose power this new decemvirate (*decem reges*) was obviously intended to be a counterpoise. On the first day of his consulate (63 B.C.) Cicero, as Pompey's friend, took up the challenge, and harangued the people against the insulting Bill. He found no difficulty in persuading the city rabble to reject the bribe of land and labour, and keep their dole of corn and seats at games. In view of inevitable defeat, the Bill was withdrawn.

Cicero's Position.—These speeches definitely committed the new consul. He stood for Pompey and the *status quo*. He hoped to save the Republic by combining the respectable classes in support of senatorial government as he understood it. He relied on

the conservative instincts of the Italian middle class ; he would use the bugbear of anarchy to secure the equites ; Pompeius should become the Scipio, the figurehead, of the restored commonwealth, to whom Cicero himself would play the part of friend and adviser. For a moment he attained a striking success. The country and the capitalists rallied to the cause of order, and Pompey, resentful of the attacks on his position, inclined to the side of the Senate. But the policy of republican concentration, the one hope of saving the constitution, was predestined to failure. Equites and Senate were equally selfish and equally suspicious of each other ; the Senate jealous for its privileges, the equites looking to material interests alone. There was no cohesion in the new alliance, and no power to regenerate society in this hollow agreement of the comfortable classes to preserve their persons and purses. Italy was unorganised and Pompeius a broken reed.

Trial of Rabirius.—Cæsar, thwarted in his wider designs, had at least forced the hand of the “popular” consul and disposed of a possible rival. He now returned with unabated vigour to more direct attacks on the aristocracy. He had already ventured to display the bust of Marius at the funeral of Julia, his widow, and to restore the Cimbrian trophies thrown down by Sulla (65 B.C.). He had agitated for the restoration of the children of the proscribed, and procured the condemnation of some Sullan butchers. He now came forward to vindicate once for all the two palladia of the democracy, the personal inviolability of the tribune and the right of the people to try capital cases. At his instigation the tribune Labienus impeached Rabirius, an obscure old man, who was believed to have killed Saturninus in the riot of B.C. 100. Rabirius had acted in obedience to the summons of consul and Senate, but the real aim of the impeachment was to contest the right assumed by the Senate of declaring a citizen a public enemy, and proclaiming martial law in virtue of the so-called *ultimum decretum*. The accused, condemned by the irregularly appointed *duumviri perduellionis*, Cæsar and his uncle, appealed in form to the people, but was only saved from condemnation by a device more obsolete than the rusty machinery of the prosecution. The prætor dissolved the Comitia by striking the flag on Janiculum, a warning of danger from the Etruscan foe (p. 59). The trial served its purpose as a vindication of popular rights and a warning to the Senate not to attempt a *coup d'état* at the expense of popular leaders. A greater triumph attended the co-operation of Labienus with his future chief in Gaul. The office of Pontifex Maximus was

now vacant by the death of Metellus Pius. Caesar was a candidate for this great prize, but without prospect of success, so long as the election lay with the college of priests. Labienus promptly carried the repeal of the ordinance restored by Sulla (*cf.* p. 451), and re-established the form of popular election provided by the *Lex Domitia* (104 B.C.). The noble demagogue, so aided, easily distanced his distinguished competitors, Catulus and Servilius Isauricus, and earned the undying enmity of Catulus, who had offered contemptuously to buy him off by paying his debts. Those debts, largely due to the magnificent games he had given as ædile, 65 B.C., and swollen by the expenses of this candidature and by the prætorian elections, in which he was again successful, of the present year, were partly liquidated by Crassus, partly wiped out by the proceeds of his prætorship in Spain.

Second Conspiracy of Catiline.—But these apparent triumphs, wrested from a baffled aristocracy, were more than counterbalanced by the failure of all the attacks on Pompey's power. The democratic leaders seemed like the pigmies of fable vanquished by Hercules without an effort. Their desperate situation financially and politically, their acknowledged coquetries with the forces of disorder, the hesitation of the government in dealing with the conspirators, and suspicious points in their own conduct and character, have lent probability to the view largely entertained in ancient as well as modern times, that Caesar and Crassus were not merely conscious of coming troubles, but were active supporters of an armed rebellion—that last throw of desperate gamblers. What is clear is this, that Catiline, weary of parliamentary intrigues, resolved, after one last effort to secure the consulship by force or fraud, to make a bold bid for power by calling to arms the discontented and oppressed, and leading the "headless masses" against the government of noble senators and capitalists. It is clear that he was outmanœuvred and defeated at every point by the consul Cicero. It is clear that his defeat redounded to the infinite credit of consul and Senate, and the infinite discredit of the suspected democrats. It is probable that, for party purposes, the character of the danger has been exaggerated; it is evident that information was skilfully manufactured, and that the government adroitly turned the whole business to good political account. That Caesar and Crassus knew that trouble was brewing is certain, but a criticism of the evidence makes it improbable that Caesar shared in so shallow and ill-organised a venture, or that the Rothschild of Rome, for all his crooked policy, proposed to cancel

his own debts and burn his own houses. It was even asserted, that Caesar gave important evidence, while Crassus played the part of Lord Monteagle to this prototype of Guido Fawkes. The attempt to storm the consulship, supported or not by the populares, was disconcerted by lavish bribery and the vigilance of Cicero. Kept well posted by his spies, he denounced the plans of the conspirators on the very day they had hoped to carry the election (Oct. 21, 63), secured a vote of exceptional powers, got the Comitia postponed, and on the actual day, arrayed in a breastplate, bore down intimidation by an armed bodyguard and a theatrical appeal to popular sentiment. The result of the elections (October 28) was the return of the government candidates, Silanus and Murena. Yet Catiline remained in Rome, frankly sustaining the thunders of the consul, and offering himself for arrest when menaced with prosecution. Even when the war began in Etruria, and the old centurion Manlius, at Fæsulæ, raised the standard of revolt and demanded relief for the oppressed debtors, there was no movement at Rome. Catiline was not yet ready, and Cicero obviously had not adequate information. The usual omens appeared; troops were raised and measures of security taken. The object of the consul was clearly to drive Catiline into overt action, thus anticipating the expected treachery of Antonius and avoiding the dangers of an illegal decree of exile. On November 5 or 6 there was a meeting at the house of Porcius Laeca, and an alleged plot was formed to murder Cicero, foiled once more by the watchfulness of his friends. No arrest followed. With incredible effrontery, Catiline reappeared in the Senate which met under guard at the temple of Jupiter Stator. But even his audacity quailed before the torrent of invective with which the indignant orator assailed him. All men shrank away from the detected assassin. He made one useless effort at defence, then burst from the House, assumed the proconsular insignia, and hurried off to lead the levies of Manlius, flinging down the gage of social revolution. The Senate declared the two leaders outlaws, and offered amnesties to their followers; but the decrees fell flat. The work of suppression they entrusted, strangely enough, to the justly suspected Antonius.

The Arrests at Rome.—The rising at Rome was left in the hands of the remaining conspirators. It was their aim, we are told, to assassinate the consul and set fire to the city—aims of which no evidence was subsequently offered. But the cowardly and incapable prætor, the consular Lentulus Sura, whose rank placed him at the head of the conspirators, shrank from adopting

the bold counsels of Cethegus. Instead of striking at once, he fell into the trap prepared for him by Cicero, who now executed his master-stroke. Deputies from a broken and bankrupt clan, the once powerful Allobroges, had come to press their grievances at Rome. Lentulus negotiated with these hopeful allies, who, after consulting their patronus, Fabius Sanga, sold their information to Cicero. The consul was furnished at once with the crushing evidence he needed. Utilising the deputies to secure autograph evidence sealed with the conspirators' seal, he had his agents arrested as they left the city (December 2 or 3). Confronted with the Allobroges and the documents, the baffled blunderers confessed their guilt before the Senate (December 3). The letter of Lentulus hinted at a servile revolt, and the atrocious project of a Gallic rising gave credence to the dark rumours of massacre and incendiariism. The sympathies of the masses swung round to the side of the government, and in the storm of fury raised by the revelations of Cicero vigorous action became possible. Five men only, however, were arrested.

The Execution.—But panic betrayed the partisans of order into needless and dangerous violence. On December 5 Cicero consulted the Senate on the fate of his prisoners, whose custody, by a clever stroke of policy, had been partly entrusted to the leading democrats. The chief speakers one and all supported the motion of the consul-elect, Silanus, for the extreme penalty, till Cæsar, who himself proposed a severe sentence, with open protests and obscure menaces shook their resolution, fearlessly maintaining to the end, at some risk to himself, the right of the citizen to public trial, and hinting at the vengeance which would fall on the authors of violent measures. Silanus himself prevaricated; the consulars wavered; it was even proposed to adjourn the debate, in spite of the unconcealed anxiety of Cicero for a definite sentence, when the young tribune-elect, M. Porcius Cato, sprang to his feet, unveiled the menaces and retorted the protests of Cæsar, and shamed the waverers into courage. The Catilinarians, he urged, were criminals caught in the act, enemies of the state, and liable as such to summary punishment. The legal quibble, exactly suited to the Roman mind, satisfied the scruples of constitutionalists. The motion for immediate execution, carried by a large majority, was at once put into effect. Cicero himself conducted the prisoners to the dungeon by the Capitol, caused them to be there strangled, and announced their death to the assembled crowds by the ominous word "*vixerunt*."

Defeat and Death of Catiline.—The stroke succeeded for the moment. At Rome the frightened masses hailed the consul as saviour of the country; in Etruria the rebel forces wasted away. But the execution, emphatically illegal in face of the successive charters of appeal, was a confession of miserable weakness. Five criminals were refused a legal trial, for the decision of the Senate had no legal force, because the executive dared not trust its prisons for a week. The sole justification must lie in the dangerous nature of the crisis, not in a quibble about citizens and public foes. And the government could scarcely find a serious danger in an ill-organised rebellion of half-armed bankrupts. Catiline met a death more honourable. He had mustered to his standard a motley crew of 10,000 ill-equipped men, whose numbers sank rapidly when the news from Rome leaked out. At length he found himself near Pistoja, at the head of a poor 6000 followers, cooped up between the armies of Q. Metellus Celer on his line of retreat to Gaul, and C. Antonius pressing on his rear. In a narrow mountain valley he turned to bay. Antonius had the grace to shirk the execution of his former allies, and gave up the command to his lieutenant, M. Petreius. A fierce struggle ensued; quarter was neither given nor taken. At last Petreius with his guard broke through the enemy's centre and decided the battle. The rebels fell in their ranks as they had fought, and Catiline, who had shown the gifts of a general, sought and found a soldier's death (63 B.C.).

Result.—The conspiracy of Catiline remains an historical riddle. It is hard to resist the impression that its character and importance have been grossly magnified. The designs of the associates, like the villainies of their leader, have been to some extent exaggerated and distorted. Stripped of rhetorical ornament, it is the attempt of an angry and vindictive Italian, foiled in the pursuit of power, to avenge himself on his enemies and secure his ends at the cost of social ruin and anarchy. Destitute of genuine aims, or of any true democratic sympathy, he was equally destitute of organising power. Catiline was never truly formidable, and his attempt might be relegated to obscurity with the efforts of Lepidus, except for the part it played in the tactics and movements of greater men. In the hand of Cicero its collapse was a trump card. In their fall the anarchists dragged down the democrats; whom public feeling accused of complicity, and who were, if not guilty of this attempt, yet tarred with the same brush. Cicero wisely resisted the attempt to implicate them by false or true evidence. It was enough to have baffled them. Their desperate efforts to

seize the reins of power had ended in discomfiture and disgrace; the politicians who had aspired to measure swords with the conqueror of the East had been defeated by the advocate of Arpinum. The result of their intrigues had been to consolidate the moderates under the leadership of Cicero, by driving the propertied classes into the arms of the government, and to discredit the party of reform by its supposed alliance with the party of revolution. Pompey, exasperated but not weakened by their treacherous attacks, was on his way home at the head of his conquering veterans.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THE FORMATION OF THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Pompey lands in Italy and disbands his Army	62	692
Pompey in Rome--Caesar Pro-prætor in Farther Spain . . .	61	693
Breach between Pompey and the Senate Union of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus	60	694
Cæsar, as Consul, carries an Agrarian Law, and is given the Governorship of Gaul for Five Years	59	695
Clo dius Tribune--Banishment of Cicero	58	696

Position of Pompey.—The whole Roman world lay at the mercy of Pompey. In the East he had already received regal honours from the provinces he had conquered; in Italy all was prepared for the erection of his throne. The pitiful weakness of the Senate and the base intrigues of the democrats had fatally discredited the republican form of government. Men saw at last that they had to choose between monarchy and anarchy, and were ready to accept the great conqueror as the ruler of the world. His agent, Metellus Nepos, reached Rome in time to be elected tribune in December 63 B.C. He had come to claim for Pompey the command against Catiline and the consulship for the year 61 B.C. But the coteries of his personal enemies, Lucullus and Metellus Creticus, were strong enough to ensure the opposition of the Senate to these demands, and thus forced Nepos to ally himself with the democrats.

The leader of the populares, making a virtue of necessity, executed a prompt and skilful change of front. On the first day of his prætorship (January 1, 62 B.C.) Caesar proposed to transfer the rebuilding and dedication of the Capitoline temple from Catulus to Pompey, and by this stroke of policy at once set Pompey and the


aristocrats at variance. To inscribe his name on Rome's proudest temple was just the kind of honour to delight the great soldier, and to bring him back to the side of his ancient allies. On the same day Metellus Nepos, as tribune, silenced Cicero when he wished to address the people on the glories of his consulship, saying that he who had condemned citizens unheard should not himself have a hearing. Nepos also was supported by Cæsar in pressing his Bill appointing Pompey to a military command in Italy. The measure was brought before the people, but vetoed by Cato, and after a scene of riot and disorder the assembly broke up. The Senate replied by proclaiming martial law and suspending Cæsar and Nepos from their offices. Both protested against this illegal step, Nepos taking refuge in his patron's camp, while Cæsar retired to his own house till the Senate withdrew its interdict.

In the autumn Pompey landed at Brundisium. He at once disbanded his veterans, and by so doing proclaimed his loyalty to the Republic and effaced himself. Pompey had no mind to found a military monarchy. He aimed at the position of universal referee, in power if not in office, the protector of the Roman commonwealth. He wished to be the first citizen in a free state, and to find in the goodwill of the citizens, not the swords of the legionaries, the foundations of his power. But unfortunately he was unfitted both by nature and training to play the part of Pericles. He was far too unskilful to retain as a statesman the influence he had won as a soldier. His policy was weak and hesitating, his speeches cold and unmeaning; his plans miscarried and his agents blundered. His first manifesto fell flat upon disappointed ears, an omen of his future career. Within twelve months of his triumphant return Pompey stood almost alone, helpless in the face of the paltry opposition of senatorial factions.

Trial of Clodius.—When Pompey arrived in Rome the struggle between the Senate and democrats was being fought out in the law courts. During the celebration of the mysteries of the *Bona Dea*, which only women might attend, P. Clodius, who was suspected of an intrigue with Cæsar's wife, entered the forbidden precincts in Cæsar's house. Though disguised in woman's attire, he was detected and identified. His presence was not only a stain on Cæsar's honour, but a serious act of sacrilege. For this he was tried; but though his defence—an *alibi*—broke down through the evidence of Cicero, profuse bribery secured an acquittal from the jury. Cæsar professed ignorance of the culprit's guilt, but divorced his wife, because "Cæsar's wife must be above suspicion." The

course and result of the trial demonstrated the weakness of the aristocratic party, sowed the seeds of disunion between the Senate and the knights, and clinched the hatred of Clodius for Cicero.

Quarrel between Pompey and the Senate.--Caesar, who had been detained in Rome partly by the trial of Clodius and partly



SACRARIUM (IN A HOUSE AT POMPEII).

by his debts, was now enabled by Crassus' help to satisfy his pressing creditors and depart in due course to his governorship in Spain. While he was gaining there military experience by campaigns against the hill tribes, and reputation by the justice of his government, Pompey at Rome was drifting towards a coalition with his future rival. The Senate had only itself to thank for

this disastrous trend of affairs. Instigated by Pompey's opponents, it had refused to ratify *en bloc* his arrangements in the East; it failed to furnish his veterans with the lands promised them by their general; it discouraged his expectations of a second consulship. This folly it crowned by provoking a rupture with the knights. Following the honest but stupid guidance of Cato, it refused to revise in the interest of the tax-gatherers the contracts for the taxes of Asia. At the same time it attempted to make knights as well as senators amenable to penalties for judicial corruption. The union of the orders, on which Cicero rested his policy, had vanished like a dream. Pompey turned from the Senate to the people; but, as usual, he was badly served by his agents. Though he courted the favour of the masses by the abolition of the Italian harbour dues, a measure carried by the prætor Metellus Nepos in 60 B.C., the people showed no eagerness to pass the proposal of L. Flavius to assign lands to Pompey's veterans. The Bill was first amended, and then dropped by its author, who found that persistence in face of the Senate's opposition would only lead to defeat.

Coalition of Pompey, Cæsar, and Crassus.—When Cæsar returned from Spain he found Pompey fretting under an opposition he could not quell, and ready to snatch eagerly at any means of escape from an intolerable position. He at once abandoned the empty honour of a triumph, in order to present himself as a candidate for the consulship. He then made terms with Pompey, offering to secure for him the ratification of his settlement of Asia and a grant of land to his veterans in return for his support. Crassus and his friends the tax-gatherers were included in the bargain, and became partners in the new alliance. Cæsar was the chief gainer by the coalition known to history by the irregular title of the First Triumvirate. By it he obtained not merely the consulship, but the province and army, which were necessary for the further development of his plans. Pompey, by permitting this, sacrificed his position as the only general of Rome, to purchase release from his deep embarrassments and the satisfaction of his immediate needs. He was probably unaware of the sacrifice. Perhaps no one, till 59 B.C., thoroughly realised the aims and gifts of the intriguing demagogue and man of fashion, which were only beginning to be clear to Cæsar himself in that atmosphere of paltry ambition and petty manoeuvres in which the Roman politician lived.


Cæsar's Laws.—The coalition easily carried Cæsar's election to the consulship. All the aristocrats could effect by a gigantic

system of bribery was to give him, as his colleague, a rancorous and obstructive opponent, M. Bibulus (59 B.C.). As consul, Cæsar at once proceeded to fulfil his pledges to his allies. But he acted with moderation, and a due regard to tradition, in laying his measures in the first instance before the Senate. He proposed to buy land in Italy with the revenue and resources derived from Pompey's conquests in the East, and distribute it among the veterans and other poor citizens, to confirm Pompey's arrangements in Asia, and to remit a third of the sum payable by the aggrieved tax-farmers. Only when the Senate refused even to discuss the measures laid before it, and took refuge in simple negation or barefaced obstruction, did Cæsar fall back on a direct appeal to the people. Such an appeal was perfectly legal; but the inconvenience of bringing complicated measures before the assembly, where discussion and amendment were alike impossible, might well make a statesman pause. Yet Cæsar had no alternative, and he was not the man to turn back when once he had put his hand to the plough. In vain did a tribune interpose his veto; in vain did Bibulus attempt to interfere with the actions of his colleague. He was driven from the Forum by Pompey's veterans, and his proclamations that he would watch the heavens for omens, and thus prevent the holding of any assembly, were treated with contempt. Bibulus shut himself up in his house for eight months, and employed his time in composing scathing lampoons on his colleague, to which we are probably indebted for some of the stories against the great dictator. Cæsar went on his way unmoved. He added to his original agrarian law a proposal for the distribution in allotments of the Campanian domain¹ land and for the foundation of a colony at Capua. An appended clause compelled all senators and candidates for office to swear to treat its provisions as valid, and so secured it for a time from attack in the Senate.

The confirmation of Pompey's regulations in the East followed as a matter of course, and the alliance between the two most powerful men in Rome was sealed by Pompey's marriage to Cæsar's daughter Julia. What Crassus got from the bargain is not so evident; perhaps he was contented with the remission of one-third of the price which the tax-farmers had agreed to pay for the right of collecting the tithes in Asia. This sacrifice of financial probity to political expediency is a blot on Cæsar's fame.

¹ This rich corn-land had been leased out to small tenants since the destruction of Capua (211 B.C.), and brought in a considerable revenue to the treasury.

But his other provincial measure, the famous law against extortion, redeems him from the charge of indifference to the interests of the subject peoples. This law attempted to meet all the numerous devices of unjust governors ; it forbade the levying of illegal taxes and the acceptance of presents ; it applied not only to the governor,



BUST OF JULIUS CÆSAR (NAPLES).

but to his retinue also, and it punished transgressions severely. Expulsion from the Senate and restitution of four times the amount extorted were the mildest penalties inflicted. Exile was reserved for the worst cases. Another decree passed at the instigation of Cæsar was nothing more than a device for extorting money. For two-and-twenty years Rome had hesitated whether to assert her

claims under the will of Alexander and annex Egypt or not. The triumvirs now received a bribe of 6000 talents for procuring the recognition of Ptolemy Auletes as king.

Cesar's whole work would have been futile had he not secured an important province. The Senate, guessing the successful candidates before their election, had proposed to give the outgoing consuls the charge of the roads, woods, and forests of Italy. But the people voted, on the motion of the tribune Vatinius, that Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with a force of three legions and ten legates of propraetorian rank, should be entrusted to Caesar for five years. The Senate found itself compelled by disturbances in Farther Gaul to add the province of Narbo and an additional legion. Caesar was now in a position to realise the imperial destiny of Rome in the West, and to extend her dominion from the Rhone to the Atlantic, while at the same time he could keep, from his Italian province, a close watch on the course of affairs at Rome.

Exile of Cicero. - Before Caesar finally departed to Gaul and left Pompey in charge of the home government, he thought it better to remove the two chief opponents of the coalition. He would willingly have enlisted Cicero on the side of the triumvirate, but the orator refused to abandon the cause of the Republic; nor would he purchase security by accepting a place on the agrarian commission or on Caesar's staff, for he was determined at all hazards to maintain his political independence. As he could not be cajoled into submission, the triumvirs determined to use violence. Clodius had never forgiven Cicero for bearing witness against him, and was now able to gratify his malice. With the support of Caesar and the connivance of the ungrateful Pompey, he had gone through the form of adoption into a plebeian family, and subsequently secured his election to the tribunate. The policy of this notorious demagogue was a parody of that of the Gracchi. He made the largesses of corn gratuitous, he forbade the censors to degrade senators or knights except after a formal accusation, and prohibited the magistrates from obstructing the holding of assemblies on religious grounds. Finally, he made himself master of the streets, by re-establishing the clubs or guilds, suppressed in 68 B.C., and thus giving the proletariat a semi-military organisation. In his proceedings against Cicero, Clodius kept within the letter of the law though he violated its spirit. He proposed in the tribal assembly a measure in general terms interdicting fire and water to any man who had put a citizen to death without trial before the people. The Bill was obviously aimed at

the consul who had, on the advice of the Senate, executed the accomplices of Catiline. Cicero and his friends went into mourning, and appealed to the compassion of the people. The senators and knights showed their sympathy for the unfortunate orator, who had, so unwisely, fixed the cap on his own head. But Clodius had at his back the mob of the Forum, and boasted that he was but the agent of the triumvirs. Cicero was not prepared to fight a pitched battle, and after a last piteous appeal to Pompey, to whose promises he had vainly trusted, he left Rome in a panic. On the very day of his departure Clodius' measure was carried, and by a later resolution declared to apply to Cicero, whose flight was treated as a confession of guilt (58 B.C.).

The triumvirs made use of the same serviceable tool in the removal of Cato. On the proposal of Clodius, Cato was entrusted by the people with a delicate financial mission. He was sent to Cyprus to depose the reigning Ptolemy, who had neglected to purchase recognition of his title from the triumvirs, to annex the island, and secure the royal treasure for the people of Rome. Cato did not dare to decline the invidious honour, and embarked for Cyprus without delay. The last champions of the Republic against the new three-headed despotism were frightened or lured away, and Cæsar could turn from the punishment of political opponents to the defence of Gaul.

CHAPTER XLIX

THE CONQUEST OF GAUL

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Defeat of the Helvetii at Bibracte, and of Ariovistus and the Germans near the Rhine	58	696
Subjugation of the Belgæ—Defeat of the Nervii	57	697
Subjugation of the Veneti and the Aquitani	56	698
First Expeditions to Germany and Britain	55	699
Second Expedition to Britain—Revolt of the Eburones under Ambiorix	54	700
Great Revolt of Gaul headed by Vercingetorix and the Arverni—Cæsar storms Avaricum, but fails at Gergovia—Victory of Alesia, and Surrender of Vercingetorix	52	702
Subjugation of remaining Rebels	51	703

Gaul: The Roman Province.—The Roman province beyond the Alps was but a small part of Gaul. Little change had been made in its boundaries since the days of Marius. The Rhone formed its frontier on the north from Geneva to Vienne, the

Cevennes and the fortress of Tolosa (Toulouse) guarded it to the west, while the great Domitian road that led along the coast to Spain was secured by the colony of Narbo Martius. Massilia, now the most powerful Greek state under Roman protection, had, in the days of her independence, spread the elements of culture, the use of writing and of coinage, the cultivation of the vine and olive, in this part of Gaul. The whole district swarmed with Roman merchants and money-lenders, farmers and graziers. The national language and habits were giving way before this tide of immigration.

Condition of Gaul.--Caesar saw in this fertile region a new heritage for his fellow-countrymen, but he looked far beyond the narrow boundaries of his province. In the Romanisation of that one small district he saw the future destiny of the entire land from the Pyrenees to the Rhine. He saw that the whole race of the Celts in Gaul, in Britain, as well as in Italy might be won for the empire of Rome. The condition of the Celts in Gaul was that of a nation which has paused half-way between barbarism and civilisation. Though they had made some advance in agriculture, they still preferred the breeding of horses and cattle to the labour of the plough. Again, they had some skill and practice in mining and the working of metals, but the designs on their coins are but deformed imitations of Greek originals, and their ornaments are barbaric in character.

The political state of the country presents the same features. Though the Southern Gauls at least had walled towns, the city never superseded the clan as the basis of the state.¹ The cantons in the north still preserved the old form of constitution, the chief, the council of elders, the assembly of freemen; but in the south the nobility had set aside monarchy and usurped the powers of the people. Like the barons of the Middle Ages, they surrounded themselves with retainers, and by marriages and alliances among themselves they made themselves strong enough to defy the law and the constituted authorities. But this order of nobles, though it broke up the old tribal states, favoured the formation of wider leagues. The other great order, the Druids or priests, was yet more distinctly national. Throughout Gaul it spread schools; from all Gaul, and even from Britain, representa-

¹ The persistent vitality of the tribe in Gaul even under Roman rule is illustrated by the modern names for the towns; *e.g.*, Paris recalls the Parisii, not Lutetia; Bourges, the Bituriges, not Avaricum; Beauvais, the Bellovaci; Rheims, the Remi.

*tried to propitiate Ariovistus by styling him "ally of Rome." Cæsar saw that such an attitude encouraged aggression, and went to his province determined to drive the Germans back and assert the supremacy of Rome.

The Helvetii.—A yet more pressing danger claimed his attention. The Helvetii, a Celtic tribe inhabiting Switzerland, weary of German raids, determined to desert their country and seek a new home in Southern Gaul. They proposed to burn their towns and villages, concentrate on Genava, and so march down the Rhone into Gaul. As the road along the northern bank is narrow, they asked permission of Cæsar to cross over and march along the Roman side. Cæsar, who had but one legion on the spot, gained time by negotiating, broke down the bridge at Genava, and set to work to fortify the bank for some ten miles south of that point. Farther down, rapids in the stream and rocks on the banks forbid a passage; for these ten miles the river is here and there fordable. When his works were ready he forbade the Helvetii to cross, and beat back their assaults on his lines. But by the mediation of Dumnorix, the leader of the anti-Roman party among the Ædui, the Helvetii persuaded the Sequani to let them pass through the narrow defile between the Jura and the Rhone. Cæsar hurried back to Italy to bring up reinforcements, and returned at the head of six legions in all, to find the Helvetii slowly crossing the Arar. He destroyed their rear-guard, which was still on the left bank, and then crossing the river, pushed the main body northward. For fifteen days Cæsar hung on the enemy's rear, but the untrustworthiness of his Gallic horse and the failure of supplies forced him to turn aside to Bibracte, the capital of the Ædui. This emboldened the tribesmen to attack in their turn, and Cæsar, drawing up his legions in three lines, accepted battle in a strong position. The furious charge of the Helvetii was broken by the firm stand of the Roman infantry, but as the legions pushed the enemy down to the plain their flank was attacked by the Helvetian rear-guard, to meet which Cæsar had to form a new line with his reserves. The battle raged till far into the night, yet at length the barricade of waggons round the enemy's camp was taken, and their whole host took to flight. After their defeat the fugitives could get no succour in Gaul, and were soon obliged to surrender at discretion. Cæsar sent the survivors back to their old homes to defend the frontier against the Germans (58 B.C.).

Cæsar and Ariovistus.—By his victory over the Helvetii, Cæsar strengthened the hands of the partisans of Rome among all the

Gallic tribes. At their general council he listened to the complaints brought by the Ædui and Sequani against the tyranny of Ariovistus. But when he demanded from the German chief the restoration of the Æduan hostages and a promise that no more Germans should cross the Rhine, Ariovistus haughtily refused compliance. Cæsar saw that arms alone could put a stop to German immigration, and moved at once against the enemy. By forced marches he reached Vesontio (Besançon), the chief town of the Sequani, before Ariovistus could seize it, and by its occupation secured abundant supplies for his troops. There he had to rally the fainting spirits of his followers, who were in deadly terror of the hardy and gigantic Germans. The carpet-knights who had come with him from Rome sought leave of absence or bewailed their expected fate in their tents. The common soldiers were making their wills for fear of the worst, and were expected to mutiny if ordered to advance. Cæsar summoned his officers and centurions to a council of war, and by telling them that, if no one else would follow, he would go on with the tenth legion alone, shamed them into fresh courage. He then advanced rapidly through the plain between the Vosges and the Jura towards the Rhine. Ariovistus, after a fruitless conference, marched along the spurs of the Vosges past Cæsar's camp, and so cut off the Romans from their base. Cæsar in vain offered battle, and at length was obliged to imitate the crafty movements of the enemy, and formed a small camp for two legions beyond their position. At last he forced battle by posting his light-armed troops, drawn up to resemble two legions of regulars, in front of this smaller camp, and advancing with all the rest of his forces against the enemy's lines. On the right wing Cæsar drove the Germans back, but on the left the Romans were only saved from defeat by young Crassus, who brought up the reserve at the decisive moment. The foe fled in confusion across the Rhine, but few, among whom was Ariovistus, escaped the pursuit of the Roman cavalry. Thus in a single summer Cæsar broke the two powers that threatened the peace of Gaul, and first brought the Roman legions to the great river that he was to make once for all the boundary of the empire (58 B.C.).

The Conquest of the Belgæ.—Cæsar showed that he did not intend to relinquish the ground that he had won, by leaving his legions in winter quarters among the Sequani. The great confederacy of the Belgæ, which reached from the Seine to the Rhine, considered themselves threatened by this advance, and gathered

early in the spring to resist any attack on their frontiers. But Cæsar, with his usual rapidity, had already reached the land of the Remi (near Rheims), and accepted their offers of friendship. This opened his path up to the Axona, where he was met by the whole force of the Belgæ. Though he had now eight legions, he did not dare to engage 300,000 men, but took up a strong defensive position, and defeating an attempt to cut his communications, waited for discontent and dissensions to break up the confederated tribes. After a time the Belgic chiefs were persuaded by the Bellovaci, whose land was being ravaged by the Ædui, to order their clansmen to return to their homes. Their retreat was turned into a disorderly flight by the hot pursuit of the cavalry and three legions under Labienus. Cæsar took full advantage of his bloodless victory. He fell suddenly, first on the Suessiones, and then on the Bellovaci, and compelled them to disarm and give hostages as pledges of submission. But the Nervii (in Hainault) were made of sterner stuff. Gathering their clients and allies, they laid an ambush for Cæsar on the Upper Sambre. As Cæsar's six veteran legions were pitching their camp on one bank, and the cavalry and light-armed were exploring the woods on the farther side, the whole force of the enemy swept down the slope, brushed aside the cavalry, crossed the stream, and fell on the infantry. On the left the famous tenth legion, with the ninth, soon drove the enemy back across the river, but the cavalry took to flight, and the two legions on the right wing were rolled up in confusion. Cæsar threw himself into their ranks, and by voice and example encouraged the faltering troops. Back to back the two legions stubbornly held their ground, till Labienus sent the fighting tenth to their aid, and the cavalry returned to the charge. The Nervii, who resisted to the last, were surrounded and almost annihilated. The defeat and surrender of this tribe and their allies secured the supremacy of Rome among the Belgic clans. The winter camps of the legions were on the Upper Loire, in the heart of Gaul (57 B.C.).

The Veneti.—During the winter Cæsar learnt that the Veneti and the kindred tribes on the coasts from the Loire to the Seine had repented of their submission to P. Crassus, and seized the Roman envoys sent to requisition corn from them. In the spring Labienus was ordered to keep the Belgæ quiet, Sabinus to hold the Upper Loire, P. Crassus to advance into Aquitaine, while Cæsar himself led an army against the chief offenders. The Veneti, a hardy seafaring people, defended themselves with suc-

cess on the cliffs and islets round the mouth of the Loire. At length Decimus Brutus brought up the fleet which Cæsar had ordered to be built in the winter. By cutting the rigging of the sailing-ships of the Veneti he made them a helpless prey to the oared Roman galleys, and utterly destroyed their fleet. Cæsar punished their defection and the seizure of his envoys by putting the chiefs to death and selling the whole tribe as slaves. Mean-



FIGURE-HEAD OF ROMAN SHIP.

while his lieutenants were equally successful in the performance of their appointed tasks, P. Crassus subduing the whole land of Aquitaine up to the Pyrenees (56 B.C.).

Encounters with German Tribes.—Cæsar had now established the suzerain power of Rome throughout Gaul, but he had yet to secure his new conquests. The discontented Celts might call in the assistance of their kinsmen in Britain, or of the Germans across the Rhine. The latter danger had to be faced at once. Two

tribes, the Usipetes and Tencteri, dislodged by the Suebi from their old homes, had, with the connivance of the Menapii, crossed the Rhine and settled in their land. Cæsar marched rapidly down the Meuse to prevent their further advance, and met their request for lands on the Gallic side of the Rhine with a curt refusal. Their attempts to negotiate he treated as subterfuges to gain time for the return of the bulk of their horsemen. Finally, enraged at a treacherous attack on his cavalry, he seized the chiefs who came to apologise for the breach of the truce, and fell upon the leaderless tribes. Helpless masses of Germans were slaughtered or driven into the Rhine. Cæsar determined to complete the terror caused by this massacre by crossing the river. In twelve days he built a bridge of piles, and then led his legions across it to the help of the Ubii. Their oppressors, the formidable Suebi, withdrew into their trackless forests, and Cæsar contenting himself with laying waste the lands of the Sugambri, after eighteen days recrossed the Rhine and broke down the bridge (55 B.C.).

First Landing in Britain.—In the autumn a similar demonstration was made against Britain. Cæsar gathered eighty ships at Portus Itius (Wissant), placed two legions on board, and set sail across the Channel. Next morning he came in sight of the white cliffs of Britain, and sailing west, reached at last a low shore, probably that of Romney marsh, where it was possible to land. But the soldiers feared to leap into the water in face of the Britons on the beach, till the standard-bearer of the tenth set them an example, which was speedily followed. Directly they reached firm ground the enemy fled. Soon afterwards the Britons sent envoys to offer their submission, but on learning that a storm had destroyed many of Cæsar's vessels and driven back the fleet carrying his cavalry, they returned to the attack. Cæsar, who easily repulsed their assaults, was yet glad to regain the Gallic coast without further misadventure (55 B.C.).

Second Expedition to Britain.—Next summer Cæsar repeated his expedition to Britain, and took with him a much larger force. The natives did not dare to oppose the landing of his five legions. Again a storm compelled him to repair his disabled ships and delayed his advance. When at length he marched inland, Cassivellaunus, the leader of the Britons, retreated, but harassed the Romans by sudden attacks with his war-chariots. Cæsar crossed the Thames and took the fortified camp of the enemy, but found the conquest of the country a task beyond his powers. He was satisfied to return to Gaul after receiving from

Cassivellaunus a promise to pay tribute and to abstain from attacking the Trinobantes, a friendly tribe. No Roman army set foot on British soil for nearly another century; the country was wild, and offered no prospect of booty to tempt the greed of invaders.

Revolts headed by Ambiorix.—Within Gaul itself there were dangerous signs of discontent, fostered doubtless by this injudicious dissipation of strength. The Æduan, Dumnorix, had refused to go with Cæsar to Britain, and had been cut down as a deserter on his way home. While Cæsar was in Britain the Gallic nobles organised a widespread insurrection. Unfortunately for him scarcity of supplies compelled Cæsar to station his legions in six separate and distant camps for the winter. He himself remained at Samarobriva (Amiens), having one legion with him and three within call. He stationed Labienus in the land of the Treveri, and Q. Cicero among the Nervii. In the most distant camp at Aduatuca, Sabinus and Cotta had a legion of recruits and five cohorts of veterans. This corps was furiously assailed in its new winter quarters by the Eburones under Ambiorix, but might easily have held its entrenchments. In a weak moment Sabinus listened to the treacherous tale told by Ambiorix of a general assault on the scattered legions, and accepted his offer of a safe conduct for his soldiers to the camp of Labienus. The little force was decoyed into a trap by the wily chief, and Sabinus, who attempted to make terms, murdered with many of his officers. Cotta fought bravely to the last, till the unequal struggle ended in the total annihilation of the Roman division (54 B.C.).

Q. Cicero relieved by Cæsar.—Flushed with victory and reinforced from the neighbouring cantons, the insurgents flung themselves on the camp of Q. Cicero. But that officer met their attack with coolness, and doggedly refused to treat with an armed enemy. Messenger after messenger was seized on his way to Cæsar, yet at length a Gallic horseman reached Amiens. Cæsar started next morning with but two legions to rescue his lieutenant. Within five days the smoke of burning villages announced his coming and drew off the hosts of the enemy. Cæsar kept within his camp as though in fear, and then by a sudden sally dispersed the Gauls in confusion. But the insurrection could not be stamped out in winter. As spring drew on, Indutiomarus, the chief of the Treveri, attacked Labienus, but fell in a cavalry skirmish. His tribesmen summoned the Germans to their aid, but a feigned retreat drew them into a hot pursuit after Labienus, and led to their destruction


before their German allies had come up. Cæsar, who had already reduced to subjection, besides the Senones and Carnutes, the fierce Nervii and the hitherto unconquered Menapii, now followed up the easy victory of his lieutenant by a second military promenade across the Rhine. The only task left was the punishment of the guilty Eburones, who were hunted down with merciless severity. By the end of the summer Northern Gaul had been terrified into the peace of despair (53 B.C.).

Vercingetorix raises Southern Gaul in Revolt.—Worse was yet to come. While Cæsar was in North Italy the patriots of Southern Gaul made a final effort to rouse the nation to resistance. At their head was a young Arvernian chief, Vercingetorix, who speedily won over, first his own tribe, and then the clans of Western Gaul. His plan was to cut off Cæsar from his legions by preventing his return from the province. While Vercingetorix was engaged in the Ædunan district his friend Lucterius threatened the province itself. But Cæsar defeated their manœuvres by his extraordinary rapidity. Cutting his way through the snows of the Cevennes in the depth of winter, he drew Vercingetorix off to the defence of his own clansmen, and then with a handful of cavalry dashed through the land of the Ædui to the camps of his legions. Vercingetorix fell back on the plan of starving out the enemy. The country was to be laid waste, the towns and stores burnt, and the Romans prevented from foraging by the fine Gallic cavalry. Only Avaricum (Bourges), the chief town of the Bituriges, was spared. Round that devoted city the war now centred. The Gallic infantry lay secure in impassable morasses; the cavalry cut off Cæsar's communications. Still his famished legions refused to raise the siege, and at length triumphed over the heroic garrison. The town was stormed and the inhabitants massacred by the maddened soldiery (52 B.C.).

Cæsar repulsed at Gergovia.—Cæsar now despatched Labienus with four legions northwards to hold the Carnutes and Senones in check, while he himself turned south against the Arverni. Labienus, however, made little progress on the Seine, and Cæsar found his advance arrested by the impregnable fortress of Gergovia. He had not troops enough to blockade a hill a mile long and half as broad, and was compelled to try to storm the defences. The legions penetrated into the Gallic camp, but fell into confusion by a rash assault on the wall of the city, and were driven down the hill with considerable loss. Their commander for the first time was compelled to beat a retreat, and that retreat was the signal

for the defection of the Ædui and risings among the Belgæ. Timid counsellors advised Cæsar to retire into the old province now threatened by the enemy, but he would not desert Labienus. That able general fought his way out of the country of the Seine and joined Cæsar at Agedincum.

Siege and Capture of Alesia.—The united army now moved southward to protect the province. On the borders of the Sequani, Vercingetorix, fresh from his election as general of all Gaul, came




PLAN OF ALESIA.

up with the Roman army. The Gallic cavalry was met, and, to its surprise, vanquished by Cæsar's newly raised German horse. Despairing of success in the open field, Vercingetorix shut himself up in a fortified camp on the steep isolated hill of Alesia. But now Cæsar had all his forces united, and was enabled to draw his lines right round the town. In vain the Celtic cavalry tried to keep the communications open; they were beaten back by Cæsar's Germans, and had to be sent away before they were completely

hemmed in. The indefatigable legionaries, warring, as often, with the spade, carried a double line of entrenchments ten miles long, right round Alesia, and so guarded themselves not only against the beleaguered garrison, but also against the expected army of relief. When the besieged had come to the verge of famine, a vast host, gathered from all Gaul, appeared before Cæsar's lines. Two sharp combats led up to the final struggle that was to decide the fate of Gaul. At one point the Gauls were repulsed only by the arrival of Cæsar with the reserve; at another the lines were actually forced; but Labienus threw himself on the enemy with every man he could collect, and with one mighty effort hurled back the Celtic host. The cavalry sent by Cæsar fell on their rear and completed the rout (52 B.C.).

The Fate of Vercingetorix and of Gaul.—Vercingetorix determined to resign the hopeless struggle and offer himself as a victim for the nation. A true knight to the last, he rode full armed to Cæsar's camp, and there surrendered himself to the mercy of the conqueror. Cæsar reserved him to grace his triumph, and to suffer death at the foot of the Capitol. A Roman never forgot and never forgave the deadly foes of his country; and though Gaul was now utterly prostrate, and had proved her degradation by surrendering her only hero to purchase her own safety, Vercingetorix was the greatest enemy Rome had met since the days of Hannibal. Gaul was now subdued. Though the Bellovaci attempted again to assert their independence and the remnants of the rebels held out stoutly in Uxellodunum, there was no hope that these isolated risings could stem the tide of Roman conquest. After their failure Cæsar devoted the last year of his governorship to conciliating and organising the wide territories he had won. The establishment of the full provincial system was interrupted by the outbreak of the civil war, and not carried out till the days of Augustus. But Cæsar's heir worked on the lines which Cæsar had laid down, and in the new Romanised Gaul of the early empire we may see the fruit of Cæsar's labours. Finally, the conquest and the reorganisation of Gaul prepared him for the career before him, for the military glories of the civil war, and the unique position of first emperor of Rome. In Gaul Cæsar learnt to look at the narrow politics of the Forum from outside, and to estimate aright their pettiness and folly. Trained in the hard school of toil and anxiety, and breathing the free air of a provincial command, he rose above the shibboleths of a partisan creed, and kept his mind fixed on the duties of Rome to her empire. Gradually the conviction was forced

upon him that the sovereign state would never make the welfare of her subjects her first object until her own constitution was remodelled. Cæsar was not selfishly anxious to force on this necessary reform; but he possessed naturally the power of inspiring



ROMAN ARCH AT S. RÉMY (FRANCE).

devotion in his followers, and had acquired the insight, the patience, and the perseverance needed for the proper use of this power. The man was ready to take up the great task of reconstruction, when the destined hour came.

CHAPTER I.

THE RULE OF THE TRIUMVIRATE AND ITS DISSOLUTION

	B.C.	A.U.C.
Recall of Cicero	57	697
Conference of Luca	56	698
Consulship of Pompey and Crassus—The Triumvirs given Provinces for Five Years—Cæsar, Gaul; Pompey, Spain Crassus, Syria	55	699
Departure of Crassus—Death of Julia	54	700
Battle of Carrhæ—Death of Crassus	53	701
Murder of Clodius—Pompey sole Consul	52	702
Question of Cæsar's Resignation of his Province.	50	704

Disorder at Rome.—While Cæsar in Gaul was winning fame and power, Pompey was left at home to rule the capital. But to keep order in a city still seething with revolution required what Pompey had not—the iron hand in the velvet glove. He was without police or soldiers to suppress by force the bands of blackguards, led by noble adventurers, whose type and chief was to be seen in the tribune P. Clodius. The mob under his leadership ran riot in the streets of Rome, murder and arson became crimes of daily occurrence, and anarchy arrogated to herself the sacred name of liberty. Pompey attempted to meet Clodius with his own weapons, but in this warfare of the street the triumvir was no match for the tribune, and after a time he shut himself up in his house, in fear of assassination. At length the insolence and violence of Clodius drove Pompey to retaliate by promoting the recall of Cicero. Clodius retorted by trying to set up Crassus against Pompey, and by forming an unnatural alliance with Bibulus and the extreme senatorials, who still questioned the validity of Cæsar's measures. But when his tribunate was over, Clodius was reduced to fighting with his old weapons. In T. Annius Milo, now tribune, his enemies found a champion to meet him on his own ground, who would repel the ruffians of Clodius with hired swordsmen. For months Rome was the scene of violent encounters between the rival mobs, but at length, in August 57 B.C., the centuries were formally assembled, and recalled Cicero with acclamation. Immense crowds from all parts of Italy flocked to the capital to vote for the great orator's restoration to his country, and made his journey homeward a triumphal progress.

Deceived by his reception, Cicero dreamed that the state might yet be rescued from the domination of the triumvirs and Pompey

recalled to the path of political virtue. There was much in the state of affairs to favour the illusion. Now that the true nature of the coalition was seen, the triumvirate was unpopular with all classes at Rome. The people as well as the Senate deplored their lost independence, and clamoured against the three men who set themselves above the law. Pompey himself was supposed to be discontented with his position; he felt that, while he had secured the shadow, Cæsar had the substance of power. He saw with alarm and surprise the glories of his past career pale before the fresh lustre of Cæsar's Gallic victories. In fine, he felt it necessary to secure a new command, and in his perplexity turned to the Senate for help.

Intrigues of Pompey.—The scarcity of corn at Rome formed the excuse for a Bill brought forward by an obsequious tribune, Messius (57 B.C.), which would have given Pompey control of the corn-supply throughout the empire. The free disposal of the state treasure, the command of an army and a fleet, and a power in every province superior to that of the actual governor (*maius imperium*) were included in the functions assigned to the commissioner in this improved edition of the Gabinian law. But the Senate dared not trust him again with power so vast, and withheld the authority over other officials, and the army and fleet, which he coveted in secret, but would not openly demand. It gave, on Cicero's proposal, only proconsular power and the management of the corn-supply for five years, which provided Pompey with an honourable and popular employment, but did not confer any substantial power. Accordingly, in the very next year (56 B.C.) Pompey is again a candidate, by indirect methods, for an important commission. He desired to be entrusted with an army to restore Ptolemy Auletes to his throne, but the Senate unearthed an oracle which declared it impious to send an army to Egypt, and by playing off the rival candidates for this lucrative mission against each other, succeeded in shelving the whole business. Once more, as in 62 B.C., the incompatibility of Pompey's pretensions with republican equality was demonstrated; once more the Senate rejected the overtures of the man whom they should have enlisted on their side.

Conference of Luca.—At the moment the repulse of Pompey seemed like the triumph of the Senate over the coalition. The consular and prætorian elections (September 57 B.C.), and, above all, the failure of Cæsar's tool, Vatinius, to attain the ædileship (January 56 B.C.), confirmed the view that there was a republican reaction. The trial of P. Sestius, who (March) was accused by Clodius of rioting

gave Cicero the opportunity of recounting the exertions of Sestius in promoting his recall, and at the same time putting forth a political manifesto. Encouraged by the unanimous acquittal of his client, and reckoning on the mutual jealousy of Pompey and Cæsar, the orator was bold enough to give notice (April) that he would call in question the validity of the Julian law, under which the Campanian land had been distributed in allotments. But he had miscalculated once more his own strength, and failed to grasp the drift of events. The challenge, which was meant to rally the republicans, in effect healed the divisions between the triumvirs. Cæsar, who had already summoned Crassus to Ravenna to consult over the state of affairs, now arranged a conference with Pompey at Luca. The meeting of the three potentates was attended by many provincial governors and two hundred senators. Its result was the re-establishment of the coalition on a firmer basis. Pompey and Crassus were to be given the power and the official position which they coveted. After holding the consulship together for the second time, Pompey was to receive Spain and Crassus Syria for five years, by decree of the people, while Cæsar secured the renewal of his own command for the same period, and the reversion of the consulate at its close. Historians have wondered why Cæsar granted such favourable terms to his discredited rival. But the army assigned to Crassus for the invasion of Parthia formed a counterpoise to the Spanish legions of Pompey, and neither Cæsar nor his soldiers were yet prepared to march on Italy. Cæsar was not a deliberate schemer aiming at despotism, but a man whose heart was set on doing the work of the hour, confident in his own ability to rise to the height of future emergencies. With the true spirit of a statesman and soldier, he concentrated himself on the immediate problem to the momentary neglect of other issues. His present purpose was to complete the conquest of Gaul, and for that end he chose to run the risk of strengthening Pompey. The time was not yet ripe for revolution, and Cæsar would not bid his army turn its weapons against fellow-citizens while there remained a chance of a peaceable reformation of the government.

The renewed Triumvirate.—The conference of Luca placed the government of the world in the hands of the triumvirs. All the chief provinces and armies were dutifully placed at their disposal by the assembly of the tribes, but Pompey illegally left to lieutenants the care of Spain, and stayed himself in Rome to watch over the interests of the coalition. The aristocrats submitted to superior force, and accepted the position of dependence to which

they were reduced. Cicero, who frankly confesses the futility of his attempt to assert his independence, quietly withdrew his obnoxious motion, and atoned for it by his eloquent praises of the conqueror of Gaul (56 B.C.). He had found the nobility a broken reed, and was now content to be the mouthpiece of the triumvirs. He felt the shame of defending his old enemies, Gabinius and Vatinius, bitterly, but bowed to the dictates of necessity (54 B.C.). Only the uncompromising Cato, whose action showed more zeal than discretion, maintained the cause of liberty. Riotous obstruction to the measure of Trebonius, which gave Pompey and Crassus their provinces, and a motion in the Senate to hand over Cæsar to the survivors of the murdered Usipetes and Tencteri, were the chief demonstrations attempted by the remnant of the republicans.

Republican Opposition.—Yet an unceasing warfare was maintained at the elections and in the law courts. The elections were at this period the scene of the most open and shameful bribery. The numerous opportunities afforded by the complicated and old-fashioned system of polling were used both by the constitutionalists and the triumvirs to the full. But we may note that, whereas in 55 B.C. Pompey and Crassus were easily elected consuls, and Vatinius, Cæsar's ready tool, distanced Cato for the prætorship, next year Cato was successful, and the aristocrat Domitius gained the consulship. Again, in the law courts the tools of the triumvirs, Vatinius and Gabinius, were attacked with envenomed animosity by the constitutionalists. Vatinius was saved only by the intervention of Cæsar. Pompey, with his usual maladroitness, suffered Gabinius to fall a victim to the resentment of Crassus and the capitalists.

The East and Egypt.—While disorder reigned at Rome, in the East there arose a cloud which was the herald of the coming storm. Already a Parthian attack on Armenia and civil strife between two pretenders to the Parthian crown had given the active governor of Syria, A. Gabinius, grounds for interference. But before he could intervene with effect he was called away to restore Ptolemy to the throne of Egypt. The Roman army twice defeated the insurgents, at Pelusium and on the Nile, and easily re-established the oppressive rule of the legitimate king. Gabinius had acted without authority from the Senate, but in accordance with the wishes of the triumvirs (55 B.C.).

Crassus invades Parthia: Battle of Carrhæ.—On his return he found Crassus ready to take over the command of the army destined to invade Parthia. Crassus, who was burning to emulate

the military glories of Cæsar and Pompey, thought himself a second Alexander. A reconnaissance in force confirmed him in an ill-judged preference for a march direct across the desert over the circuitous but safer route through the Armenian mountains. He would not even move down the Euphrates, but plunged headlong into the trackless wastes of sand known as the Mesopotamian desert. The faithless sheik Abgarus, who guided the Romans, led them to their ruin. Suddenly the legions found themselves surrounded by thousands of mail-clad lancers and tens of thousands of mounted archers. With wise discretion, the Parthian vizier had sent all the infantry, under King Orodes, against Armenia, and kept only cavalry for this service (53 B.C.).

The legionaries, whose crowded ranks made them an easy mark for archers, could not close with the swiftly moving enemy on the boundless desert. In vain young P. Crassus, Cæsar's brave legate, led his Gallic horsemen and picked light infantry to the attack. The Parthians let him separate himself from the main army, and then enveloped him in clouds of cavalry. Young Crassus and his officers slew themselves, and of his 6000 men none escaped death or captivity. The attack on the main body, which had slackened for a time, was renewed with vigour till night fell. Then the Parthians rode off, and the Romans, leaving their sick and wounded to be massacred by the enemy, fled to Carrhæ. Hence the beaten army made a push for Sinnaca, hoping to find shelter in the Armenian hills. Fearing that the prey might yet escape him, the vizier proposed a conference, to which Crassus was forced by his troops to consent. The Roman officers suspected the Parthians of attempting to seize the person of their chief, and made a vain resistance. In the fray that followed the general and his staff were cut down, and their leaderless troops were captured or dispersed. Of the army which invaded Parthia, half had perished, a quarter with many eagles fell into the hands of the conquerors, and but a quarter returned to tell how misplaced confidence had led to ruin and disgrace. The disaster of Carrhæ was the inevitable consequence of exposing a large force of infantry, armed with javelins of short range, to the attacks of overwhelming cavalry in an open plain, and one more example of the permanent inadequacy of the cavalry arm in the Roman service. Their African experiences had failed to drive the obvious lesson home.

Cassius repulses the Parthians.—The Parthians failed to follow up their success with energy. C. Cassius, who alone of the officers under Crassus had behaved with resolution in the hour of defeat,

easily checked the raids of their roving horsemen. At last a great invading army, under the prince Pacorus, overran Syria and shut up Cassius in Antioch. But with two weak legions formed from the remnants of Crassus' army, he beat off their assaults, and by entrapping them into an ambush as they retreated along the Orontes, inflicted upon them a severe loss. The new governor of Syria, the stubborn and incompetent M. Bibulus, was saved from danger merely by the fact that Pacorus, making a truce with Rome, turned his arms against his father, Orodes (51 B.C.).

The Rift in the Triumvirate.—The death of Crassus left his colleagues open rivals. Pompey's beloved wife Julia, who might have softened the differences between her husband and her father, had died a year before, in the flower of her age. Though there was as yet no open breach between them, and in 53 B.C. Cæsar could still borrow a legion from Pompey to meet an emergency, the whole current of events tended to carry Pompey away from Cæsar and towards the Senate. At the beginning of 52 B.C. the faction-fights between Clodius and Milo, who was now standing for office against the interest of the triumvirs, ended in the murder of the former after a chance scuffle on the Appian Way. The dregs of the Roman populace were gathered together by his surviving lieutenants to weep over their lost leader's body. After some wild speeches in the Forum a riot broke out, and the venerable Senate-house of Rome was used as the funeral pile of the dead demagogue. Milo was besieged in his house and Pompey saluted as dictator by the excited mob. Pompey was indeed prepared to accept dictatorial power, but only from the Senate. Accordingly, on the proposal of Cato, he was made sole consul,¹ and acted with energy in his new part of saviour of society. Electioneering intrigues and oratorical license in the law courts were strictly repressed.

A special commission nominated by Pompey inquired into the late disorders. With rare impartiality, it condemned alike Milo and the tribunes Plancus and Rufus, who had incited the riot in the Forum. Cicero was bound by every tie of honour and gratitude to undertake the defence of Milo. But the drawn swords of the troops with which Pompey had lined the Forum and the excitement of the crowd shook the orator's nerves, and he delivered, not the magnificent published defence, but a poor and halting speech. When Milo, in exile, received a copy of the oration in its perfected

¹ A consul without a colleague is a contradiction in terms; that the same man should be both consul and proconsul—that is, his own substitute—is a yet greater absurdity.

form, he sarcastically observed, "It is just as well Cicero did not deliver it, or I should never have known the taste of these excellent mullets of Massilia." Cicero had his revenge by procuring the conviction of Plancus, in spite of Pompey's efforts on his behalf.

Throughout the year 52 B.C. Pompey busied himself with securing his own supremacy, and, perhaps unconsciously, with paving the way for a reconciliation with the aristocrats. He summoned Italy to arms, and caused the levies to take the oath of military allegiance to himself. On August 1 he chose as his colleague in the consulship his new father-in-law, Metellus Scipio, and at the same time procured a prolongation of his own command in Spain for five more years. By enforcing an interval of five years between office in the city and a command in the provinces, he enabled the Senate to fill all the vacant governorships for the next four years with its own nominees.¹

Alliance of Pompey and the Senate. — For the moment had come for an alliance between Pompey and the republican majority in the Senate. The republicans needed a leader of more weight than the impracticable Cato, and an army to fight against the Gallic legions. Their lamentable failure in 56 B.C. had taught them that they must use Pompey to destroy Cæsar. They trusted that his known indecision would prevent him from using his victory to overthrow the Republic. Pompey on his side needed an excuse for a rupture with Cæsar, and meant to find it in the defence of the constitution against revolutionary designs. But the new allies were not ready to strike at once. Pompey was hampered by his obligations to Cæsar, and the senatorial majority by a remnant of regard for the forms of the constitution. Before the meshes of

¹ The principal measures passed by Pompey were:—

1. A general law "*de ambitu*," which limited forensic oratory, shortened procedure, and checked the activity of political clubs by imposing severe penalties for bribery.

2. A law "*de vi*," with similar provisions, but directed specially against the recent riots.

3. A law "*de iure magistratuum*," providing that—

a. Candidates for office must come to Rome and canvass in person.

b. Magistrates should receive provinces, not immediately on leaving office, but after the lapse of five years.

This law he broke himself by the continuance of his Spanish governorship, and by dispensing in Cæsar's case with the necessity of a personal canvass, just as, despite the other laws, he intervened in favour of Plancus and Scipio (*cf.* Tac. Ann. iii. 28). It was a consequence of this law that Cicero became proconsul of Cilicia.

the net in which Cæsar was to be entangled were all woven, Cæsar had surmounted his greatest danger in Gaul, the revolt of Vercingetorix.

The Question between Cæsar and the Senate.—The question at issue between Cæsar and the Senate was by no means simple. For Cæsar the vital point was the retention of his provincial command until he assumed the consulate on January 1, 48 B.C. If he resigned the one before he was invested with the other office, he became liable to the impeachment threatened by Cato, which might well have entailed on him political extinction. On the other hand, once at the head of the state, he hoped to out-manceuvre his opponents and carry the reforms peacefully which he afterwards effected by force. But there were two legal obstacles in Cæsar's path. In the first place, the date at which his command expired was March 1, 49, and the consular elections were never held before the summer; and, secondly, the law prescribed a personal canvass for the consulship, and by presenting himself in Rome as a candidate Cæsar would, by the Sullan law, forfeit his command. Cæsar had, of course, foreseen both these dangers. But since it was the rule for magistrates to proceed at once to their province on laying down office at Rome, no one could be sent to succeed Cæsar before January 1, 48. The consuls of 50 B.C. were bound to take up provincial commands in January 49 B.C., and Gaul was not vacant till March. But the consuls of 49, by Sulla's arrangements, could not leave Rome till January 1, 48 B.C., so that Cæsar could reckon on the customary extension of his command till that date. But all this was altered by Pompey's law enforcing an interval between the consulship and proconsulate. The Senate could now send out a governor at any time in the year, and thus acquired the power to supersede Cæsar on March 1, 49 B.C. Cæsar's reasonable expectation of an extension till the end of the year was frustrated by the political trickery of his opponents. The second obstacle, the necessity of a personal canvass in Rome, Cæsar had cleared away by a tribunician law which absolved him from this obligation. This law Pompey supported, but with characteristic inconsistency he cancelled the privilege thus granted by a general law which expressly declared the necessity of a candidate presenting himself in person for election. Lastly, in response to Cæsar's complaints against this injustice, Pompey appended a clause declaring that this law did not apply to those exempted from its provisions by the people. But this supplement apparently was never brought before the people at all, and though morally it bound Pompey,

on whose authority it was added, technically it was null and void. According to the letter of the law the Senate was justified in demanding from Cæsar the resignation of his province in March 49 B.C., and a personal canvass in Rome before election to the consulship, but their ends had been compassed by twisting the laws to suit their own purposes.

Course of the Quarrel.—The aristocratic consul, M. Claudius Marcellus, first attempted to bring forward the question of superseding Cæsar in the middle of 51 B.C., but on Pompey's suggestion the discussion was eventually postponed till March 50 B.C. In the meantime Cæsar had purchased the aid of two valuable allies, one of the new consuls (50 B.C.), Æmilius Paullus, and a renegade aristocrat, C. Curio. This leader in the fashionable world of the day now, as tribune, aspired to be accounted a statesman, and showed a talent for intrigue and oratorical powers, which made him at least a most serviceable tool in the hands of a master. He detected the weak point in the armour of his opponents, and met the demand for Cæsar's resignation with the reply that Cæsar and Pompey should retire simultaneously. The bewildered Senate fell into the trap. After passing a resolution that Cæsar should resign his command, and rejecting a similar proposal about Pompey, it assented by an overwhelming majority to Curio's motion that both should retire at once. Beaten on their own ground, the extreme aristocrats were yet determined to push the Senate into war. To form the nucleus of an army, they had demanded a legion from both Cæsar and Pompey for the expected Parthian war. As Pompey now requested Cæsar to return the legion lent him a few years before, the Gallic army was weakened by the loss of both legions. Nor was this force sent to Syria, but kept at Capua to be used against its old chief.

In October, C. Marcellus, on the strength of a lying report that Cæsar had transferred four legions to Cisalpine Gaul, moved that he be declared a public enemy, and that Pompey be ordered to march against him with the legions at Capua. Curio proved the report groundless and vetoed the proposal; the Senate refused to approve the motion; yet the consul, accompanied by the consuls designate, hurried to Pompey, entreated him to save the country, and authorised him to take the command of the troops at Capua and raise further levies. With this informal commission Pompey had to be content: civil war was precipitated by the passionate haste of a few bitter aristocrats.

Cæsar's Ultimatum.—Cæsar knew how to turn the violence

and illegality of his opponents to the best account by acting himself with studied moderation. He offered to give up his Transalpine province and eight of his legions, if he were allowed to retain Cisalpine Gaul and two legions up to the time of the consular elections. He conceded, in fact, all that his more moderate opponents demanded. Probably he saw that the extreme party had gone too far to recede, but he may have learnt from Curio, who had now joined him at Ravenna, that his party was strong enough to baffle the schemes of the aristocrats, should they accept his terms. At all events he determined that the Senate should have his case properly laid before them. On the first day of the new year, when the consuls entered on office, Curio reappeared in the Senate with a letter from Cæsar. The consuls refused him a hearing, but his friends, the tribunes M. Antonius and Q. Cassius, insisted that the letter should be read. The terms of compromise were those already offered, with the difference that in his ultimatum Cæsar proposed as an alternative that he and Pompey should disarm simultaneously, and distinctly threatened to march on Rome if his offers were rejected. The consuls C. Marcellus and Lentulus Crus, dogged aristocrats, refused to allow a division to be taken on any of Cæsar's proposals. Pompey let it be known through his usual mouthpiece, Metellus Scipio, that he would fight for the Senate now or never. At last the intimidated majority voted that Cæsar must give up his provinces and army before a fixed day or be proclaimed a traitor. Antonius and Cassius vetoed the decree, but their opposition only embittered the passions of the oligarchs. A few days later the Senate formally declared the country in danger in customary form, and called on all loyal magistrates to provide for its defence. The Cæsarean tribunes, accompanied by Cælius and Curio, fled in disguise to Cæsar's camp: their expulsion gave him an admirable pretext for an appeal to arms. At Ravenna he addressed the only legion he had with him. He spoke of the violation of the sacred office of the tribunes, he recalled the glories of the Gallic war, and bade his veterans avenge the injuries and insults heaped upon their general, and so turn the plots of his enemies to their own confusion. When he had assured himself of their unswerving fidelity, Cæsar sent orders to hasten the march of the legions left in Farther Gaul, and crossed the Rubicon to invade Italy.

Cicero.—While these great events were taking place in Italy, the consular Cicero, who had never taken a province, found himself compelled, under the new arrangements made by Pompey and

the Senate, to accept the governorship of Cilicia. In this unwilling exile he gained a high reputation for clemency and justice to the provincials and a deeper insight into the ways of his optimate and equestrian allies. A considerable sum of ready money honestly saved from his legal allowance was a welcome relief to the impoverished statesman; but the title of imperator and laurelled fasces, earned by a success over a robber tribe in Mount Amanus, proved a troublesome honour on his return to Italy.

CHAPTER LI

THE CIVIL WAR

	B. C.	A. U. C.
Outbreak of Civil War—Pompey evacuates Italy—Capitulation of Afranius and Petreius at Ilerda—Submission of Massilia—Defeat and Death of Curio in Africa . . .	49	705
Battle of Pharsalus—Death of Pompey—Cæsar shut up in Alexandria	48	706
Cæsar crushes the Alexandrine Insurrection and defeats Pharnaces	47	707
African Campaign—Battle of Thapsus—Death of Cato . . .	46	708
Victory of Munda	45	709

Cæsar's Resources.—When Cæsar crossed the Rubicon the odds seemed all against him in the coming conflict. The field of his power was limited to the provinces he ruled, and while Cisalpine Gaul espoused his cause with enthusiasm, many of the Transalpine Celts were lukewarm or secretly hostile to their conqueror. Among the soldiers and statesmen of Rome none supported him but his own lieutenants and personal adherents, chiefly young men of ability bought with Gallic gold; and so, when the ablest of his marshals, Labienus, deserted to the enemy, he was left without an officer fit to be entrusted with an important separate command. But this disadvantage was more than compensated by the absolute supremacy of Cæsar in his own camp, which gave an unity to his plans and a swiftness to his movements that utterly paralysed his enemies. Cæsar stood so far above his adjutants as to be beyond all thought of rivalry; he was the idol of the veterans he had led so often to victory, and who would now go anywhere and do anything for their beloved commander. His nine veteran legions were the backbone of his power, and the levies of Cisalpine Gaul were ready to fill the gaps which war might make in their ranks.

Power of the Coalition.—All the pomp and show of power lay with his opponents. The Senate was the legitimate government of Rome, and the Senate had allied itself with Pompey. Old quarrels between the confederates led still to mutual distrust, but their alliance, though weakened by secret jealousies, was not broken by open discord. The possession of the capital placed in Pompey's hands the machinery of government and enabled him to pose as a loyal patriot, forced to repel an unprovoked assault on his country. The financiers, fearing confiscations, and the small landholders, dreading anarchy, saw in Pompey the saviour of society. But this apparent unanimity in Italy was deceptive. The Senate was torn by internal faction, and secretly distrusted the champion it had called to arms. Noble lords wasted time and energy in quarrelling with one another and discussing the conduct of their commander, just as if there had been no enemy at the gates. The capitalists and yeomen would not sacrifice a single coin or acre for the good cause, and soon saw reason to idolise the moderation and uprightness of the man whom they had suspected of anarchical designs. The support of Italy proved a broken reed in the hour of danger.

There remained the provinces and client princes. The provincial commands had been recently filled up with ardent supporters of the Senate; the Eastern dynasts for the most part owed their crowns to Pompey. Juba of Numidia feared to lose his kingdom if Cæsar triumphed. Nor were the forces at the disposal of the general of the Senate inconsiderable. Greece and the East supplied a formidable fleet; Spain was guarded by seven warlike legions; Italy was rapidly arming. If Cæsar delayed to strike, he would be crushed between the army of Spain and the levies now being raised in Italy. Their numbers, amounting to some 60,000 men, justified the proud boast of Pompey that he had only to stamp with his foot to cover the land with soldiers. But Italy was not yet prepared for war. The only troops ready for action were the two legions filched from Cæsar, which could not be trusted to oppose their old general. The rest of the bands gathering there had not yet been mobilised or consolidated into an army.

Cæsar advances and takes Corfinium (49 B.C.).—Cæsar, though he had but a single legion at his back, pushed on at once to Ariminum. A last offer of peace, on condition of both sides disarming at once, met with the reply that Cæsar must first retire to his province and dismiss his army, and then Pompey would go to Spain. Such an answer provoked instant action. Cæsar ordered

M. Antonius to occupy Arretium and protect his flank while he advanced by the Flaminian road along the east coast. Town after town opened its gates. The levies of Picenum, devoted as ever to Pompey, were scattered like chaff before the wind and the whole district lost. The panic caused by the terrible swiftness and activity of the monster, as Cicero styles Cæsar, spread to the capital itself. The consuls fled in such haste that they failed even to secure the money in the treasury. Pompey himself hurried to the camp at Luceria, in Apulia, and sent Vibullius Rufus to dispute Picenum. He still hoped that district might be held till he could come to the support of his lieutenant, but it was already too late, and Vibullius could but lead the faithful remnant of its levies to join L. Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium. Pompey had selected Apulia as the rallying-point for his troops to cover an evacuation of Italy, should that be necessary, perceiving clearly that to attempt mobilisation in front of Rome would be, in the actual state of his forces, to court disaster. Accordingly he now ordered Domitius to retire on Luceria. But that headstrong aristocrat, believing himself able to check the advance of Cæsar, and to compel his own commander to come to his rescue, disregarded the judicious orders of his chief. He was shut up in Corfinium, and, after a seven days' defence, was at last convinced that Pompey dare not attempt to relieve him. He then resolved to desert his post and make his escape by night with his officers, but the soldiery, suspecting his treachery, mutinied and surrendered to Cæsar. That general, with his wonted clemency, released all the prisoners unconditionally, and enlisted the common soldiers in his ranks. This conduct did much to reconcile Italy to his victory.


Retreat of Pompey.—Disappointed in the hope of maintaining himself in Italy, Pompey effected a masterly evacuation, as a preliminary to a larger scheme of operations. He now rested his chief hopes on his fleet. With its help he could baffle the pursuit of Cæsar and defend the eastern provinces from assault. By cutting off the supplies of corn he thought to starve Italy into submission; and, finally, when he had disciplined and organised his motley forces, covered by his fleet, he could resume the offensive at pleasure. As a first step he retired to Brundisium, and sent half his forces over to Epirus, before the enemy could come up with him. Nor could Cæsar, when he reached Brundisium, shut up his rival in that town. With more than his accustomed activity and skill, Pompey defeated all efforts to block the harbour by means of moles, and made good his escape to Dyrrhachium without

serious loss. The want of a fleet made further pursuit impossible. Once more Cæsar was placed between two hostile forces, the armies in Spain and Epirus, which, if allowed to combine, might crush him in Italy, and once more he disconcerted the tedious strategy of his opponents by a rapid attack. But first he had to regulate affairs at Rome.

Provisional Arrangements of Cæsar.—Already his humanity and moderation had dispelled the apprehensions of proscription and confiscation. His spendthrift followers grumbled at the uprightness of his measures, but the mass of the Italian people welcomed with enthusiasm a conqueror whose victory was not stained by pillage and murder. The senseless threats of the noble *émigrés* in Pompey's camp completed the work begun by Cæsar's clemency. Italy accepted with thankfulness the blessings secured for her by his firm and just administration. But he was compelled to work alone, and in defiance of the forms of the constitution. The rump of the Senate convoked by the tribunes at Rome would not help him to conduct the government, and dared not carry his offers of peace to Pompey. Eventually he was forced to break open the doors of the treasury in defiance of the tribune Metellus, and to make provision for the government of Italy by appointing the prætor Æmilius Lepidus prefect of the city, and committing the command of all the troops in the country to the tribune M. Antonius. To secure the corn-supply, Sicily and Sardinia were occupied, almost without a blow.

The Campaign in Spain.—Cæsar now hurried away to meet his rival's officers in Spain. "I go," he said, "to encounter an army without a general; I shall return to attack a general without an army." He was delayed for a moment, but not diverted, by the revolt of Massilia, which was encouraged to declare itself for Pompey by the arrival of Domitius. Leaving Trebonius to besiege the city, and Decimus Brutus, his trusted admiral, to meet the Massiliots on the sea, he hastened to join the six legions which, under Fabius, had already crossed the Pyrenees. Afranius and Petreius, who had assembled their five legions and numerous auxiliaries too late to hold the mountain passes, determined to defend the line of the Ebro. But the position they occupied at Ilerda was twenty miles north of their true line of defence. However, by holding the town, with its stone bridge over the river Sicoris (Segres), they kept command of both banks of that stream and secured abundant supplies. Cæsar, so soon as his own bridges were ready, at once forced a battle. He attempted to seize a hill

which lay between the town and the Pompeian camp, but was repulsed with loss, and only saved from disaster by the staunchness of his troops. To complete his misfortunes, a flood carried away his bridges, while that at Ilerda escaped damage ; so that Cæsar was cooped up in a narrow strip of exhausted country, while the Pom-




peians could operate on both sides the Sicoris. Undaunted by defeat and famine, Cæsar set his men to build light boats covered with skins (like the coracles he had seen in Britain), crossed the river twenty miles above his camp, and secured a fortified post on the other side. He built a bridge in two days, and completely turned


the tables on the Pompeians, whose light troops, instead of cutting off his convoys, were now themselves at the mercy of his cavalry. Afranius and Petreius resolved to retreat across the Ebro into Celtiberia, where Pompey's name was still a power. But from the moment they left Ilerda, Cæsar's cavalry hung upon their rear, and before night came his infantry had got over the Sicoris by a dangerous ford and overtaken the retreating Pompeians. Both armies pushed on for the rocky ground near the Ebro, Cæsar over the hills, the Pompeians across the plain; but Cæsar won the race and closed the defiles against the enemy. In despair, Afranius and Petreius tried to retrace their steps to Ilerda, but again were caught and surrounded. As they had neither provisions nor water, they were glad to obtain quarter for their soldiers by promising to disband their army. Varro, who was in Farther Spain with two legions, was obliged by the provincials to submit to the conqueror. The peninsula which had so often resisted invasion for years was won in three months by a brilliant campaign, and by the generous clemency of the conqueror (49 B.C.).

Defeat of Curio in Africa.—Cæsar, on his way back to Italy, received the submission of Massilia, and in the few days he spent in Rome did much to restore order and credit in Italy. He had now secured the western half of the empire, and was eager to bring on a decisive conflict. In two points only had his plans miscarried. Curio, after seizing Sicily, had passed over to Africa. With inexcusable rashness he pressed forward to the plains of the Bagradas, and was surrounded and cut to pieces with his whole force by the Libyan cavalry of King Juba; and on the Illyrian coast Pompey's admirals, Octavius and Libo, destroyed Cæsar's squadrons and compelled the legions which had landed there to lay down their arms.

Cæsar lands in Epirus.—During the respite afforded him by the Spanish campaign Pompey had organised the forces of the East. From the troops he had gathered in the West he had formed five legions, and had summoned three more to his aid from Syria and Cilicia. The kings of the East furnished him with a fine body of horsemen, the best contingents being supplied from Galatia, Thrace, and Numidia. His fleet held undisputed sway in the Adriatic. Despite all this, Cæsar resolved to cross at once to Epirus. Pompey was moving but slowly along the great high-road from Thessalonica to Dyrrhachium, and his Syrian legions were still in Asia. His admiral, Bibulus, expected nothing less than so rash an enterprise. But Cæsar, though he could only find



transport for half his army, landed on the coast with 20,000 men and secured the seaports of Oricum and Apollonia. Pompey arrived in time to save his arsenal and stores at Dyrrhachium, and reduced Cæsar to inaction till reinforcements should arrive from Italy. At last Antony eluded the now unsleeping vigilance of the Pompeian admirals, and fleeing before their galleys, reached



the port of Lissus barely in time to escape the storm which scattered his pursuers (48 B.C.).

Pompey repulses Cæsar near Dyrrhachium.—Even now Pompey might have prevented Antony's junction with Cæsar, but he allowed himself to be out-manœuvred, and retired to a strong position near Asparagium. By a sudden dash Cæsar cut him off from Dyrrhachium, but Pompey, who could trust to his fleet for supplies,

quietly entrenched himself on the hill of Petra, just south of that town. With incredible audacity Cæsar attempted to blockade him in his entrenchments, but Pompey extended his lines till the task of circumvallation was beyond the powers of Cæsar's small forces. At length Pompey found that want of fodder and water was decimating the horses of his cavalry, and by a great effort forced his way out through the unfinished lines at their southern end. On the same day Cæsar made an attack with his full strength on an outlying camp of the Pompeians, but met with a severe defeat. His men got entangled in the enemy's entrenchments, and fled in confusion before the troops sent by Pompey to the rescue.

Retreat of Cæsar.—Pompey was victorious, but he failed to reap the fruits of victory. Cæsar retreated to Apollonia so swiftly as to baffle his pursuers, and then passed into Thessaly. His object was to draw Pompey away from his base on the sea, by threatening to fall upon Scipio, who was coming from the east with reinforcements. Pompey marched eastwards in the hope of crushing Cæsar's lieutenant, Domitius Calvinus, between his own army and that of Scipio, whose advance Domitius had been detached to check. Calvinus had but just time to escape over the mountains into Thessaly; there he rejoined Cæsar, and the united armies encamped near Pharsalus.

Battle of Pharsalus.—Pompey pursued with his whole force, 45,000 foot and 7000 horse, and encamped first at Larissa, and then in face of Cæsar's position. Before the great struggle which was to decide the fate of the Roman world there was a pause of suspense. Pompey still clung to his cautious tactics, but the noble lords in his camp clamoured for immediate action. For some days Pompey would not move from the hill on which his camp stood, but at length he was emboldened to offer battle, his right wing resting on the river Enipeus and his left flanked by his cavalry and archers. Cæsar, whose infantry was but half as strong as Pompey's, nevertheless at once accepted the challenge. He saw that Pompey intended to overwhelm his weak division of horse and roll up his right wing; at the post of danger he stationed the famous tenth legion, supported by a reserve of picked troops. When the battle began Pompey's infantry met with firm front the charge of Cæsar's veterans, while his clouds of horsemen and archers swept away the opposing cavalry. But as they swooped on the flanks of the infantry they were met by the picked cohorts of the reserve, who, instead of throwing their javelins as they

charged, used them as spears to thrust with, and by this unexpected method of attack utterly discomfited the Pompeian horsemen. As the victorious infantry wheeled round upon the enemies' legions in the centre, Cæsar ordered his whole third line to advance, and by this movement decided the battle. The Pompeians broke and fled in confusion to their camp, but hardly had they reached its shelter when Cæsar led his men to the assault and stormed their lines. Not staying to plunder, the conquerors pursued the main body of the fugitives, and catching them at night-fall, compelled them to surrender by threatening their water supply. The struggle between East and West, between the old Republic and the new monarchy, ended in the complete triumph of the disciplined levies of the West over the motley hosts of the East, and of the new spirit of obedience and loyalty over the dissensions of the worn-out Republic.

Flight, Death, and Character of Pompey.—The fallen leader fled on horseback to Larissa. Had he possessed the energy to renew the struggle, he might have found in Africa an almost impregnable base of operations for his unbeaten navy. But Pompey the fortunate, unnerved by his first disaster, fled eastward in the vain hope that his past triumphs would secure him a refuge. Repulsed by Cyprus and Syria, he sought an asylum from young Ptolemy of Egypt. But as he landed at Pelusium he was treacherously murdered by Achillas, the king's general, and Septimius, once a centurion of his own. The tragedy of his death and the splendour of his achievements have made Pompey a great figure in history. A true Roman in his faults and virtues alike, Pompey was a better man and an abler soldier than his detractors allow. In an age of lax morality and of unblushing speculation, he was a good husband and father, and upright in his dealings. In war he proved himself a respectable strategist, an able tactician, and a great organiser of victory, though even there he lacked the penetration to divine the plans of his opponent and the genius to inspire his followers with devotion. In politics he was a man of second-rate capacity in a first-rate position. Splendidly adapted for the part devised for him by the quick wit of Cicero, that of ornamental chief of an optimate Republic, the irony of fate placed him in a position with which there was no paltering, where he must be king or nothing. It was his misfortune to be born too late or too early, and to serve as a foil for a more brilliant rival.

Cæsar at Alexandria.—Cæsar, following quickly on the track of his fallen foe, was deeply moved when he learnt his fate.

Though he had but four thousand men with him, he at once took upon himself, as consul, the settlement of the disputed succession to the Egyptian throne. Yet it may be that the charms of Cleopatra had more effect in prolonging Cæsar's stay in Egypt than a political question of second-rate importance. Cæsar in his youth had been the darling of the greatest ladies in Rome, and though never the slave of any woman, may well have fallen under the spell of Cleopatra's fascinating personality. Whatever was his motive, the result of his intervention in Egyptian affairs was, that he was detained in that country when his presence was sorely needed elsewhere. The turbulent mob of Alexandria was moved to fury by the sight of a Roman calmly awarding the crown of Egypt, and even the half-Roman army of Ptolemy was stung into resistance by the disdainful pride of Cæsar's handful of legionaries. For months Cæsar was besieged in the eastern quarter of the town, and kept his communications open only by the desperate tenacity with which he clung to the lighthouse island and its eastern harbour. At last Mithradates of Pergamum brought up an army of relief through Pelusium and Memphis. Ptolemy, who had put himself at the head of the insurgents directly Cæsar released him from the palace, marched off to meet him, but failing to prevent his junction with Cæsar, was utterly defeated on the Nile, and drowned in the river. Cæsar assigned the throne to Cleopatra and her younger brother, but left a garrison of two legions, to ensure the obedience of monarch and people alike to Roman rule. After dallying three months more in Egypt with Cleopatra, Cæsar passed through Syria and Cilicia, regulating the affairs of cities and of princes with all his usual speed. In his absence Pharnaces had dared to claim his father's kingdoms of Pontus and Lesser Armenia. He had defeated the Galatian and Pontic levies of Cæsar's lieutenant, Domitius Calvinus, and now ventured to negotiate with Cæsar himself. Cæsar demanded instant submission, and with such troops as were at hand, defeated and destroyed the king's army at Zicla after a five days' campaign (47 B.C.). This speedy success Cæsar recorded in the three famous words, "*Veni, vidi, vici.*"

The Republicans rally in Africa.—Further troubles were gathering thickly in the West. After the battle of Pharsalus the chief republicans met together in council at Corcyra. Cicero, who had wavered long before joining Pompey in Epirus, and while in his camp had vented his disgust at the hesitation of the general and the bloodthirsty threats of his aristocratic followers

in bitter sarcasms, now resolved to make his submission to the conqueror. Cato, agreeing that resistance was hopeless, preferred to fall himself with the falling Republic. Gradually all the men who clung to the lost cause, Cato and Scipio, Labienus and the younger Pompeys, drew together in Africa. Cato was the life and soul of this revival of the republican cause, but, with his usual formalism, he insisted that Scipio should be the nominal general. No attempt was made to molest them. Cæsar's lieutenant in Far-



HEAD OF CLEOPATRA.

ther Spain, Q. Cassius Longinus, who had orders to invade Africa, made himself so unpopular in his province that C. Trebonius had to be sent in all haste to supersede him and restore order. Even when Cæsar arrived in Italy, he was delayed by press of urgent business and by a military mutiny. His veterans, enervated by a year's ease in Campania, refused to embark for Africa, and marching to Rome, tumultuously demanded their discharge. Cæsar at once granted their request, and promised that they should nevertheless share in the substantial rewards, though not the

honours, of his coming triumph; and when he addressed them no longer as comrades, but as mere citizens, the veterans broke down and begged to be received again into his service. After a politic delay Cæsar granted their prayer, and at once set out for Africa.

Battle of Thapsus.—On the voyage his fleet was dispersed by a storm, and he was compelled to entrench himself near Ruspina with but 3000 infantry and 150 horsemen. Even after the arrival of more of his transports, the legions could make no headway against the African cavalry and archers led against them by Labienus. Not till he had been joined by his veterans, and had accustomed his troops in two months' skirmishing to the enemy's mode of warfare, did Cæsar determine to force an engagement. With this aim he marched on Thapsus, and so induced the incompetent Scipio to risk a battle to relieve the garrison. Cæsar's men for once got out of hand. They flew upon the enemy without waiting for his orders, drove their elephants back into their ranks to add to the general confusion, and butchered the crowd of fugitives without mercy. The battle of Thapsus was the death-knell of the Pompeian cause. Of the leaders, only Labienus and the two Pompeys escaped. Afranius was murdered by Cæsar's soldiers; Scipio, Petreius, King Juba, and Cato chose to die rather than fall alive into the hands of the conqueror (46 B.C.).

Character of Cato.—Cato alone is of interest to the historian. In Cato he finds the true champion of the Republic. The inflexible stoic who would not bow to the opportunism of the empire has left a name respected even by his enemies. Not his ideal, which was narrow. nor his policy, which was too often pedantic, have won him his niche in the temple of fame, but that faithfulness unto death which made him the martyr of a lost cause. The suicide of Cato was an undying protest against the hollow pretence of constitutional liberty with which the new monarchy sought to clothe its despotism. It inspired the stoics of the empire, and in a sense enabled the vanquished Republic to triumph over its conqueror; for the spirit of Cato lived again in Marcus Aurelius.

Battle of Munda: Triumph of Cæsar.—After the victory of Thapsus, Cæsar was able to give some months to the work of reorganising the empire. He celebrated a well-earned triumph, in which Gaul and Egypt, Pontus and Numidia, attested the world-wide prowess of the conqueror, but no single captive Roman was

led behind his chariot. Cæsar only triumphed over the foes of Rome, not over personal opponents. Soon a rising in Spain under Labienus forced him to hurry thither in the depth of winter. After a brief but fierce campaign, Cæsar, at Munda, crushed the army of desperate men who fought to the last against him, and slew their leaders, Labienus and young Gnæus Pompeius (45 B.C.). Private animosity, not true patriotism, inspired this last revolt against his rule; it could not stay his hand, but only make the task of restoring order amidst all this turmoil, and calling forth peace from all this deadly strife, more and more difficult. Monarchy could not now be averted, but its temper might well have been softened by timely submission.

CHAPTER LII

THE RULE OF CÆSAR

The New Monarchy.—In the few short intervals of peace allowed him by the unrelenting hatred of his enemies Cæsar took in hand the reorganisation of the Roman state. The work



DENARIUS 44 B.C.—(1) HEAD OF CÆSAR; (2) VENUS WITH VICTORY.

of reform was cut short by his death, but was eventually carried out on Cæsar's lines by his heir, Augustus. Often we cannot tell how much that adroit statesman inherited from his predecessor, and how far he altered and transformed the political ideas of Cæsar. But enough remains of the undoubted work of the earlier and more original genius to show that the ideas on which the Roman Empire rested were conceived by that master-

mind, even if the details of the design were left incomplete. For good and for evil Cæsar was the founder of the new monarchy at Rome.

Cæsar's Moderation.—The first measures of Cæsar were directed to the immediate restoration of order and the reconciliation of the factions whose discord had led to the civil war. Throughout Cæsar refused to follow the evil precedent set by Sulla in proscribing his opponents; but this was not all. When his victory was assured he used his power, not for the furtherance of party ends or measures, but for the reasonable and moderate settlement of the difficulties of the hour. When the prætor, Cælius Rufus, an out-at-elbows man of fashion, passionate in his hates and loves, cynical and unscrupulous in his political changes, attempted to cancel debts by law, he was deposed from office. Thereupon Cælius endeavoured to raise Italy against Cæsar by promising release from their debts to the impoverished and liberty to slaves; but the attempted revolution was a fiasco, and ended with the fall of its leaders, Cælius and Milo. Next year the tribune Dolabella tried to revive the agitation against the creditors, but Cæsar's return from the East put an end at once and for ever to these anarchical proposals (47 B.C.).

Amnesty and Attempt to reconcile Republicans to New Régime.

—While he thus disappointed the hopes of his own extreme partisans, Cæsar strove hard to calm the fears of his opponents. All common soldiers, except those who had taken service under the alien Juba, were let off scot free. The officers and senators of the Pompeian party who fought against Cæsar after the capitulation of Ilerda were liable to banishment and the loss of their property and political rights, but in many cases the full penalty was not imposed. Only those who rejoined the enemy after accepting a pardon from Cæsar were sentenced to death. At last a general amnesty was issued in B.C. 44. But no amnesty could reconcile the republicans to the new government. Open opposition was impossible, though showers of pamphlets and epigrams harassed and annoyed the ruler of the world. Neither the answers of Cæsar and his pamphleteers nor the arbitrary censorship of the press were able to stifle the chorus of praise in honour of Cato. But while this literary opposition might well be disregarded, it was more dangerous to despise the underground plots of the defeated party. Yet Cæsar refused to retain his bodyguard, and insisted on the younger members of the constitutional party accepting honours and offices under the new administration.

Like William III., he tried to absorb and unite in the government all the healthy elements in the commonwealth, and by this truly statesmanlike policy earned the hatred of all parties. Cæsar might prefer the welfare of his country to the programme of a party, but neither his followers nor his opponents had the breadth of mind to comprehend the principles which guided his conduct.

Political Problem : Centralisation of Power in the Hands of an Individual.—The problems which Cæsar set himself to solve were of two kinds—political and social. The most obvious political necessity of the time was, that the central government should be radically changed. Instead of the weak and vacillating control of a selfish oligarchy, there was crying need of a firm and stable power to rule and guide the empire; and this power must of necessity be given to a single person. Such a despotism could only be justified by the utter demoralisation of the ancient world. It was not a blessing, but a stern necessity; it could not give new life to a worn-out society, but it mitigated the evils caused by the reckless misgovernment of a slave-holding aristocracy. Nothing could raise from the dead the lost spirit of national freedom, but a beneficent despotism might secure for the world some centuries of peace and order. Cæsar is justified in the view of history, because by establishing a despotism he saved the world from anarchy.

The centralisation of executive powers in the hands of an individual was the cardinal principle of Cæsar's new constitution, but the precise form which he intended this autocracy ultimately to take cannot be determined. Among the many offices and honours showered upon him by a subservient majority, it is impossible to distinguish the permanent from the temporary elements in the new order of things. Provisionally, Cæsar assumed an almost absolute authority, but he may well have purposed to resign some of his powers when he had carried out the most urgent and pressing reforms. From the character of his provisional government it is clear that the new constitution was to be a despotism, not the premiership of a Pericles, but it is not clear whether the coming monarchy was to be open and avowed, or clothed and veiled by republican forms, like the principate established by Augustus.

Cæsar's Offices and Titles.—The office which Cæsar himself chose to express his absolute power after Pharsalia—the dictatorship—was essentially temporary. This magistracy, which he had

held for eleven days in B.C. 49, was given him for indefinite time in B.C. 48. Like Sulla, it was as dictator that he undertook the reorganisation of the state. This dictatorship was understood to be the means of reconstructing the government, and not itself a permanent part of the constitution. When, after the battle of Munda, it was declared perpetual, it aroused the slumbering animosity of all republicans, because such a dictatorship rendered constitutional liberty impossible. The fact that Cæsar now styled himself "imperator" expressed in another way the absolute and unlimited character of his power. With the title he assumed the laurel wreath, the triumphal dress, and the sceptre of a conquering general. But Cæsar refused to rest his authority on mere force; he disbanded his veterans and settled them on Italian farms, and tried to neutralise the military associations of the word "imperator" by assuming also more popular civil titles. He held the consulship often, in B.C. 48 accepted the tribunician power for life, and in 46 B.C. a censorship of manners (*præfectura morum*) for three years.

Impatience of Constitutional Forms.—Yet Cæsar could not prevent his contempt for forms and ceremonies from becoming unpleasantly evident to the constitutional party. He treated the election of magistrates as subject to the pleasure of the dictator. At one time Rome would be without magistrates, left, like a mere country town, in charge of the dictator's præfects; at another she was overrun with men designated for office by his command many years beforehand. He raised the number of the Senate to nine hundred by the admission of sons of freedmen and provincials from Gaul and Spain.¹ The Senate is henceforth to be the council of the emperor, not the stronghold of the Roman oligarchy. In fine, Rome is no longer to be the mistress of the world, but only the first city in the empire. Her magistrates, her Senate, and her assemblies are to be confined more and more to municipal business, and in imperial affairs are to be entirely subordinate to the supreme authority of Cæsar.

Cæsar perhaps aimed at founding a Dynasty.—It is probable, though by no means certain, that Cæsar contemplated the transmission of his despotic powers to his natural heir, C. Octavius. In favour of the view that he aimed at founding an hereditary monarchy, we may cite the fact that he placed his statue with those of the

¹ The wits of the town put up notices begging that no one would show the new senators the way to the Senate-house.

seven old Roman kings on the Capitol, and, like the monarchs of the East, stamped his image on the coinage. The oracles which foretold that only a king could conquer the Parthians, and Antony's famous proffer of the diadem at the Lupercalia, are straws which show which way the wind was blowing. The purple robe and



BUST OF C. OCTAVIUS, AFTERWARDS AUGUSTUS.

golden seat seem symbols chosen to connect the new monarchy with the old, just as Napoleon tried to represent himself as the successor of Charlemagne. But whether Cæsar intended to found a dynasty or not, undoubtedly he was determined to retain his powers for life. His perpetual dictatorship and tribunate, which

enabled him to control legislation and the elections, were supplemented by numerous special powers. He alone could make war and peace, he could appoint praetors to provincial commands, he could summon before him such offenders as he chose ; in a word, in all departments of political activity Caesar is supreme.

Elevation and Extension of Local Self-Government.—This autocracy was plainly inconsistent with the political ideal of antiquity, the free and self-governing city-state. But for half a century at least the true city-state had ceased to exist. Rome, by admitting all Italians to the franchise, had grown to a size which made such a government an absurdity. The Italians had lost their patriotic devotion to their own cities, and not acquired much influence or interest in the government of Rome. The provincials, even where they were permitted to play at autonomy, felt themselves slaves in the presence of the Roman governor. The old independent city had everywhere become an anachronism, and had been absorbed in larger political unions. But Caesar was not minded to sacrifice the remnants of local patriotism. He could not, indeed, restore the old civic liberty, for that would have destroyed the peace, order, and unity of the empire. The monarch must be placed above its jarring races, creeds, and customs, as an impartial arbiter between them. But, so far as was consistent with this central despotism, Caesar was for the fullest development of local self-government. He reorganised the municipalities of Italy and Cisalpine Gaul on the pattern of Rome, and strove to elevate the political life of these country towns, that in municipal patriotism he might provide a substitute for the lost ideal of civic liberty. He foreshadowed the great work of the empire, the gradual extension of this municipal organisation throughout the West, by the foundation of burgess colonies at Arles (Arles), Arausio (Orange), and Forum Julii (Frejus), and the resettlement of Narbo in Southern Gaul ; by the bestowal of the full franchise, an unprecedented boon, on a provincial community, Gades, in Spain ; and by the projected colonisation of the sites of Carthage and of Corinth. Further, Latin rights, the natural stepping-stone to the full franchise, were to be given to Sicily and to many communities in Narbonese Gaul. Wherever either franchise was bestowed, municipal organisation and local self-government accompanied the gift. It is not, therefore, fanciful to see in Caesar's uncompleted schemes the germs of the system of imperial days. In the East, Rome is still the protectress of the Greek civic life, which the genius of Alexander and the policy of the Seleucid

kings had naturalised in Asia ; in the West she has a yet higher mission. As she brought its rude tribes within the charmed circle of civilisation, she endowed them with those forms of civic self-government which she herself had developed in the days of liberty.

The Condition of Rome : Cæsar's Treatment of its Evils.—The political reforms of Cæsar were not the most difficult part of the work before him. Moral decay and social disintegration were the most deadly of the diseases which were ruining the commonwealth. The city of Rome, which was utterly without free and healthy industries, was nevertheless inhabited by a vast population. Thither had flocked the dispossessed Italian yeomen, thither came a motley crowd of slaves, orientals from Syria and Phrygia, barbarians from Gaul and Spain, who, when enfranchised, went to swell the ranks of the proletariat. This rabble of beggars and idlers, who were attracted to Rome by the shows and games, lived on the doles of corn distributed by the government. Their clubs and guilds became, under Clodius' direction, unions for the promotion of riot and murder in the streets of Rome. Police there was none, and disorder reigned unchallenged in the capital. Cæsar could not, of course, do more than mitigate these gigantic evils. But, despite his democratic sympathies and traditions, he dealt firmly with the city mob. He broke up the clubs formed by Clodius, and placed all similar societies under strict supervision. He transformed the demoralising system of doles instituted by Gracchus into a more reasonable system of relief by confining the distribution to the poor, and thus reducing the number of recipients from 320,000 to 150,000. He provided employment in Rome by constructing new buildings for the assemblies in the Campus Martius, and for the law courts in the Forum Julium. But he relied most of all on emigration to thin the ranks of the proletariat. By reviving the great designs of transmarine colonisation originated by C. Gracchus, he endeavoured to provide the unemployed with a decent livelihood, and to re-establish in Greece and Africa industries which Rome had destroyed.

The State of Italy.—The condition of Italy was to the eye of the statesman no less grave than that of Rome. The yeomen of Italy, once the backbone of her armies, had now almost disappeared. Their little farms had been swallowed up in the large estates of the slave-owning capitalist. The hills of Samnium and the plains of Apulia had always been pasture, but now grazing and stock-farming had superseded corn-growing in the greater

part of the peninsula. There was no sound and healthy middle class left. Over against the mass of slaves and paupers there stood a tiny knot of capitalists, who devoted their energies, not to the encouragement of trade and manufactures, but to cultivation of vast estates by means of slaves, and, above all, to the business of money-lending on a large scale. Naturally in such a society there was the sharpest contrast between rich and poor. But among the oligarchs as well as the populace debt was prevalent. The boundless and tasteless extravagance of the wealthy classes, which showed itself in palaces crowded with costly furniture and ornaments, in parks, in fish-ponds, and in aviaries, but above all in the luxury of the table, brought many nobles to poverty. The expenses of a political career, the games, the shows, and largesses necessary to win the favour of the populace, ruined others. In fine, the world of quality was deep in debt, as is shown by the power of the financier Crassus and by the frequent insurrections, whose cry was for a "clear sheet" (*novæ tabulæ*). Meanwhile the growth of egotism and the decay of family life led in the upper classes to a laxer morality among women and an increasing aversion to the responsibilities of marriage. In the lower orders the same features may be traced. It is no wonder, then, that Italy suffered more and more from depopulation, or that her once crowded cities, as Varro says, stood desolate.

Cæsar's Laws on Debt.—This moral and social decay of the nation, for which the capitalist slave-holding oligarchs were primarily responsible, was essentially incurable. Even Cæsar could only deal with the worst symptoms of the deep-seated disease. Luxury he sought to restrain by the old ineffectual curb of direct sumptuary legislation, and, with more prospect of success, by the reimposition of custom duties at the Italian ports, whose weight fell chiefly on Eastern goods. Debt was a yet more rampant evil. To meet the crisis caused by the civil war, Cæsar ordered that debtors should be entitled to deduct from the capital of the debt all interest already paid, and in repaying the residue to make over their real and personal property at its estimated value before the outbreak of the war. The justification of such exceptional measures is to be found in their acceptance by all moderate men, and in the necessity of delivering the unfortunate debtors from the grinding tyranny of the capitalists. Cæsar's permanent legislation is of unimpeachable soundness, socially and economically. His chief measure was a law of bankruptcy. By it an

insolvent debtor escaped imprisonment by becoming a bankrupt and giving up his property to his creditors. The great maxim that liberty should be forfeited by the criminal only, and not also by the unfortunate, was clearly enunciated. Cæsar also attempted to discourage usury and revive Italian agriculture by compelling capitalists to invest half their money in land.

Encouragement of Agriculture.—Indeed the encouragement of agriculture was a prominent feature in Cæsar's reforms, as it must be in the programme of every Italian statesman. Besides attempting to breathe new spirit into municipal government, he laboured more directly for that end. In his distribution of land to his veterans he avoided the mistakes of Sulla. He did not make a clean sweep of existing holders and settle whole battalions of veterans together on the soil, but scattered them about among the agricultural population. He thus contrived to respect private rights and to infuse a new and healthy element into Italian country life. Further, he compelled stock-farmers to give employment to poor freemen, by enacting that at least a third of their herdsmen must be free citizens. And, lastly, the programme of public works planned by Cæsar included the draining of the Fucine lake and the construction of a great high-road through the Apennines, necessary for the transport of the produce of Central Italy.

The Provinces.—The provinces groaned under a yet worse load of misgovernment than Rome and Italy. In the Western provinces, Spain and Gaul, there were still vigorous races left whose union with Rome was destined to produce new forms of culture. But most of the countries round the Mediterranean had long lost their liberty and become the willing slaves of foreign or domestic tyrants. Yet it may be doubted if any Western government has ever laid on its subjects a heavier yoke than did the Roman oligarchy at this period. The taxes imposed by the central government were not heavy, but the illegal exactions of its agents swelled the total paid by the provincial to an incredible amount. It was admitted that a town on which Roman troops were quartered suffered nearly as much as one stormed by an enemy. The proconsul hoped to make three fortunes out of his province: one to pay his debts, another to bribe the jury if he were brought to trial, and a third for himself; his retinue expected to be maintained in luxury, and his friends at home demanded presents of money, or wild beasts for the sports of the amphitheatre. Often the Roman officials were little better than a gang of robbers let loose

on the provincials. Sheer despair drove the Sicilians under Verres to leave half their farms fallow.

Yet the governor was a less evil than the tax-farmer and the usurer. The virtuous Brutus lent money to the town of Salamis, in Cyprus, at 48 per cent., and his energetic agent, Scaptius, besieged the municipal Senate in the council-house till five of their number were starved to death. The smaller land-owners in Illyricum and Asia were in point of fact the bondsmen of their creditors. These usurers made the Roman name a byword, and brought on their own heads the massacres by which the conquests of Mithradates were sullied.

Cæsar's System.—Both governor and tax-gatherer were sternly checked by Cæsar. Asia was delivered altogether from the tithe-system and its attendant evils; the other provinces were relieved from the arbitrary exactions of the governor and his suite. For these governors were no longer independent potentates acting in contemptuous disregard of the wishes and orders of the home government, but mere functionaries under the control of a strict and powerful master. The deeper-seated evils of usury could not be so promptly checked, but at least a new spirit was infused into the provincial administration. The magistrate became, not a ringleader of the strong who trampled on the weak, but a refuge for the oppressed, a protector of the helpless.

Practical Character of Cæsar's Measures.—No account of Cæsar's measures would be satisfactory which failed to emphasise the practical character of his genius. Like Napoleon, he was filled with a passion for order and organisation—government is to Cæsar a science. The days of haphazard finance and hand-to-mouth legislation are over. Cæsar was the first of Roman statesmen to conceive the idea of a budget, of a regular estimate of the income and expenditure. Like Alexander, he established an imperial gold coinage, current throughout the empire. The existing coinage was either entirely superseded or retained but a local and limited currency. The same spirit is shown in his reform of the calendar. Miscalculation and mismanagement had brought the old calendar to anticipate the true time by sixty-seven days. Cæsar substituted for the old year of 355 days with irregular intercalations the Julian system, which is the basis of our present calendar.

Conspiracy to assassinate Cæsar.—Yet the projects which Cæsar was able to carry out were but a portion of his scheme. Had time been allowed him he would have forestalled Augustus

in the rectification of the frontiers of the empire, and Justinian in the codification of Roman law. But the work of centuries was not thus to be compressed within the narrow limits of a single life. Admirable as were Cæsar's administrative reforms, the new



BUST OF M. BRUTUS.

order of things was utterly opposed to the ideas and sentiments of the Roman nobility. Despotism, which might be endured as a temporary expedient, was intolerable as a permanent principle of government. . While the tide of popular adulation rose high,

and flatterers pressed on Cæsar divine as well as regal honours, the old republicans were plotting his assassination. C. Cassius, who had surrendered the Pompeian fleet after Pharsalia, had been pardoned and received into favour. But he felt slighted when M. Brutus, a younger and less distinguished man, was placed above him on the list of prætors. M. Brutus himself was a narrow-minded student, who saw in Cæsar nothing more than a Greek tyrant, but who gave dignity to the conspiracy by his honest enthusiasm. Among the other conspirators were Cæsar's trusted lieutenants, D. Brutus and Trebonius, as well as Casca and Cimber, on whom he had bestowed offices. The day finally chosen for the murder was the Ides of March, when Cæsar was to announce to the Senate his resignation of the consulship in consequence of his approaching expedition against Parthia. When the time came Cæsar was kept at home by the warnings and entreaties of his wife, till the traitor D. Brutus lured him into the snare. When Cæsar had entered the Senate and taken his seat, Tillius Cimber pressed on him a petition for his brother's pardon. The other conspirators crowded round, till Cimber seized his hands and robes as if entreating grace. Meanwhile Casca crept behind Cæsar and smote him an ill-aimed blow as he rose and called for aid. The signal once given, the conspirators fell upon their victim with reckless haste; Cæsar staggered beneath a shower of blows to the base of Pompey's statue, and there fell dead at the feet of the rival thus horribly avenged.

The Greatness of Cæsar.—The assassination of Cæsar could not prevent the empire. It only plunged the world into renewed strife and confusion, till the man on whom Cæsar's mantle fell restored peace and order. It left the great work conceived by Cæsar to be completed by smaller men in a less noble way. But though his career was cut short and his work unfinished, Cæsar stands out as the one original genius in Roman history. We may justly admire the unaffected simplicity of his history of the Gallic wars, we may wonder at the transcendent military ability which saw in rapidity of movement the surest means of victory, but above all we must recognise in Cæsar a man who studied the problems of politics in a scientific spirit, and amid the chaos and confusion of a worn-out world laid the foundations of a new, harmonious, and enduring order. His work must be judged impartially by the standards of his own age, and the possibilities of the time. To glorify his vigorous application of force is as needless, as it is idle to condemn him from the standpoint of modern con-

ditions and ideas. The administrative problems before him he grasped with comprehensive insight, and solved with unexampled rapidity and success. It was rather his misfortune than his fault that he failed to give a permanent shape to his institutions, and to satisfy public opinion by reconciling the new régime with the forms and traditions of the past.



PARODY OF A SCENE IN SCHOOL.

APPENDIX I

ASSEMBLIES AT ROME

COMITIA are assemblies of the whole people (*p. pulus*); a concilium, though loosely used of any meeting, means strictly an assembly of a part only of the people. There are three ordinary forms of Comitia, Curiata, Centuriata, and Tributa, and one important concilium, that of the plebs.

I. The Comitia Curiata, in which the people, meeting in the comitium, voted by curies (*cf.* pp. 44, 45), was in the regal period the only form of assembly, but in later times its functions were purely formal (p. 50), *e.g.*, the *lex curiata de imperio*.

II. The Comitia Centuriata, in which the people voted by centuries, met under the presidency of a magistrate *cum imperio* in the Campus Martius outside the city. (For its original form, *cf.* pp. 27, 28, 45, 46; and for its reform in 241 B.C., pp. 293-296.) Its principal functions were—

1. The election of the higher magistrates, whether ordinary, as consuls, prætors, and censors, or extraordinary, as decemvirs and consular tribunes.

2. Judicially it is the highest court of appeal in all cases affecting the "caput" of a citizen (*cf.* pp. 48, 71, 352).

3. In legislation it always retains the right of declaring war. In early times all laws proposed by consuls came before it, but from the time of the Punic Wars consuls often preferred to make use of the more convenient Comitia Tributa (*cf.* pp. 450, 451).

III. The Comitia Tributa, in which the people voted by tribes, met under the presidency of a curule magistrate in the forum (*cf.* pp. 71, 72, 294, 295, 451 n.). Its principal functions were—

1. The election of curule ædiles, quæstors, and other minor magistrates of the *populus*, as well as of some among the *tribuni militum*.

2. Judicial appeals against penalties imposed by the curule ædiles or pontifex maximus.

3. Legislative. From the first all laws proposed by prætors, later most of those proposed by consuls were brought before the Comitia Tributa.

4. A special form of this assembly (Comitia Sacerdotum), in which only seventeen tribes taken by lot took part, elected the priests (*cf.* pp. 288, 289, 385, 451, 492).

IV. The concilium plebis, meeting in the forum under the presidency of a tribune or ædile of the plebs, voted originally by curies, but after 472 B.C., always by tribes (*cf.* pp. 55, 72). Legally this assembly was confined to plebeians, but this restriction was not enforced in practice. Its principal functions were—

1. The election of plebeian tribunes and ædiles.

2. Judicial appeals against fines imposed by these officials.

3. Legislative. It could never pass laws (*leges*), but at least after the lex Hortensia, 287 B.C., its resolutions (*plebiscita*), proposed by plebeian tribunes and ædiles, had the force of law, and in fact most important statutes are passed by it (*cf.* pp. 96, 294, 450, 451).

APPENDIX II

LIST OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ROMAN ROADS OF REPUBLICAN TIMES

Via Appia.—To Capua, 312 B.C. ; to Venusia, 291 B.C. ; to Brundisium, circ. 268 B.C.

Via Latina.—To Anagnia, Fregellæ, and Casilinum, where it joined the Via Appia.

Via Salaria.—To Reate, Asculum, and the Adriatic.

Via Valeria.—To Carsoli and Alba Fucens, circ. 299 B.C., extended later to Corfinium.

Via Flaminia.—To Narnia, 299 B.C. ; to Fanum and Ariminum, 220 B.C.

Via Æmilia.—From Ariminum to Bononia, Mutina, Parma, and Placentia, 187 B.C. ; with a cross road from Bononia by Florentia to Arretium, circ. 187 B.C.

Via Cassia.—To Sutrium, Clusium, and Arretium ; reconstructed and continued to Luca and Luna, 171 B.C. or later.

Via Aurelia.—The coast-road to Pisæ and Luna after 180 B.C. ; continued by the *Via Æmilia* (Scauri), to Genua, 109 B.C.

Via Postumia.—From Genua by Dertona to Placentia ; thence by Cremona and Verona to Aquileia, 148 B.C.

Via Popillia.—From Capua by Nola to Salernum, and thence by Consentia to Regium, 132 B.C. (*vide* Inscription, p. 339). To the same period (and in part, *i.e.*, from Ariminum to Atria to the same Consul, Popilius Lænas), were due the roads from Ariminum to Aquileia and from Fanum southwards to Brundisium.

Via Egnatia.—From Apollonia and Dyrrhachium to Thessalonica, circ. 146 B.C., continued later to the Hebrus.

Via Domitia.—From the Rhone to the Pyrenees, circ. 121 B.C., connected with Genua by the Massiliot coast-road.

INDEX

R. C. = Roman Colony, L. C. = Latin Colony. In distinguishing members of a family, "his son," &c., refers to the name immediately preceding.

- ABDERA, 429.
 Abelux, 214.
 Abgarus, 520.
 Abydos, 257, 260, 269.
 Acarnania, 213, 257, 261, 280.
 Accensi, 103, 138.
 Accoræ, 202, 405, 407.
 Achæus, 327.
 Achæan League, 165, 212, 213, 254; constitution and power of, 257-9, 261, 264-8, 272, 276; leaders exiled, 280, released, 283; war with, 284-7.
 Achaia, settlement of, 286, 287, 428, 429.
 Achilles, 535.
 Achradina (Syracuse), 210, 211.
 Acilius. *See* Glabrio.
 Addua (Adda) R., 8, 85.
 Adherbal, 361, 362.
 Adoption (*adrogatio*), 45, 502.
 Aduatua, 511.
 Aduatici, 381, 505.
 Æacides, 124.
 Ææ, 191.
 Æclanum, 402, 409.
 Ædiles, 300, 305, 349, 452; curule, 92, 94; plebeian, 55, 71; *cf.* Appendix I.
 Ædii, 373, 505, 507, 508, 512, 513.
 Ægates Insulæ, battle of, 161.
 Ægium, 258, 284.
 Æmilianus. *See* Scipio and Fabius.*
 Æmilius. *See* Barbula, Lepidus, Papus, Paullus, Regillus, Scaurus.
 Æmilius, M., 185.
 Æneas, 20, 37.
 Æqui, 16, 59, 61, 62, 77, 78, 98, 115.
 Ævatrium, 138. *See also* Quæstores.
 Æsernia, L. C., 164 n., 201 n., 404, 405, 410, 443.
 Æsis R., 121.
 Æsium or Æsis, R. C., 164 n.
 Ætolians, 165, 212, 213, 254; constitution and power of League, 257, 258, 259-64, 267, 268, 272, 280. *See also* Cavalry.
 Afranius, L., 529-31, 538.
 Africa, wars in, 155-7, 224-31, 245-53, 360-71, 531, 536-8.
 Africa, province of, 253, 359, 417, 437, 438.
 Africanus. *See* Scipio.
 Agatha, 372.
 Agathocles, 111, 120, 125, 127, 148, 150, 155.
 Agedincum, 513.
 Agelaus, 259.
 Ager Campanus, 210, 306, 335, 347, 359, 456, 500, 518.
 Ager publicus, 53, 56, 91, 92, 164, 166, 209, 279, 306, 335 f., 347, 359, 389, 500. *See also* Assignatio, Leges Agrariae.
 Agis of Tarentum, 124.
 Agis of Sparta, 337.
 Agriculture, Italian, 306, 316-8, 334-6, 372 n., 545-7.
 Agrigentum (Acragas), 18, 151, 211, 212, 327.
 Agron, 165.
 Ahala, C. Servilius, 76, 77 n.
 Ahenobarbus, Cn. Domitius, 373.
 Ahenobarbus, Cn. Domitius (his son), 385.
 Ahenobarbus, Cn. Domitius (his s n), 443.
 Ahenobarbus, L. Domitius (his brother), 519, 528, 529.
 Ala, 139.
 Alba Fucens, 16; L. C., 115, 209, 279, 373, 405, 406.
 Alba Longa, 16, 20, 21, 24, 25.
 Alban Lake, 8, 80, 81, 84 n.; Mount, 16.
 Albani (in the Caucasus), 480.
 Albinus, A. Postumius, 365.
 Albinus, L. Postumius, 165, 194, 199, 204.
 Albinus, Sp. Postumius (cos. 321 B.C.), 108-110.
 Albinus, Sp. Postumius (cos. 110 B.C.), 365, 366.
 Aleria, 154.
 Alesia, siege of, 513, 514.
 Aletrium, 115.
 Alexander the Great, 124, 125, 330, 544.
 Alexander the Molossian, 105, 106, 124, 125.
 Alexander, pseudo-, 283, 326.
 Alexandria, 488, 536.
 Algidus, Mount, 59, 61, 62, 78.
 Allia (R.), battle of, 12, 85, 86, 108.
 Allies (*socii*) in army, 137, 139, 261; man feet, 142, 152, 155. *See* Italians and Latins.
 Allifæ, 192, 209.
 Allobroges, 178, 313, 373, 377, 494.
 Alps, Mountains, 3, 5; passes of, 178-82, 372.
 Alstun, R. C., 164 n.
 Amanus, Mount, 526.
 Amastris, 426.
 Ambiorix, 511.

- Ambracia, 124, 272.
 -Ambrones, 375, 381, 382.
 Amisus, 424, 475, 482.
 Amphipolis, 279, 280.
 Anagnia, 16, 114.
 Anapaz R., 211.
 Anares, 166.
 Auconia, 4, 85, 166, 439.
 -Ancus Marcius, 25, 34.
 Andriacus, 282.
 Anicius, L., 278.
 Anicius, M., 202.
 Anio R., 6, 38, 90, 115, 209.
 -Antigonos Doson, 163, 254.
 Antigonos Gonatas, 130.
 Antioch, 254, 483, 521.
 Antiochus III. (the Great), 254; attacks
 Egypt, 260-2 eastern wars, 265, 266;
 war with Rome, 266-71; peace with,
 271, 272.
 Antiochus IV. (Epiphanes), 281, 329.
 Antipolis (Antibes), 372.
 Antium, L. C., 58; R. C., 104, 110.
 Antonius, C. (Hybrida), 488, 490, 493, 495.
 Antonius, M. (orator), 387, 390, 393, 395,
 399, 437.
 Antonius, M. (son of the last), 472.
 Antonius, M. (Mark Antony), 1, 525, 523,
 529, 533, 543.
 Antullius, Q., 354.
 Anxur, R. C. See Tarracina.
 Aous R., 262.
 Appennines, Mountains, 3, 4, 188, 317, 403.
 Apollonia, 142, 165, 212, 261, 267, 276,
 282, 533, 534.
 Appian, 92, 246.
 Apsus R., 262.
 Apulia, 4, 7, 8, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 191,
 206, 207, 221, 222, 335, 409, 410, 436, 440,
 528, 545.
 Aquæ Sextiæ, 373, 381, 382.
 Aquileia, 5; L. C., 239, 275, 309.
 Aquilius, M. (cos. 129 B.C.), 328, 329, 346,
 420, 421.
 Aquilius, M. (cos. 101 B.C.), 393, 395, 425-7.
 Aquilonia, battle of, 119.
 Aquitania, 508, 509.
 Arar (Saône) R., 506.
 Aratus, 254, 258.
 Arausio, 377, 378, 387, 544.
 Archelaus, 426, 428-33.
 Archidamus, 105.
 Archimedes, 211.
 Ardea, 30, 40, 84, 87.
 Arelate, 544.
 Aretas, 482.
 Arevaci, 242, 244.
 Argos, 130, 258, 262, 264, 284, 285, 359.
 Ariarathes IV., 255, 271.
 Ariarathes VI., 424.
 Ariarathes VII., 424.
 Ariarathes (son of Mithradates), 428.
 Aricia, 104.
 Ariminum, L. C., 164 n., 166-8, 185, 187,
 221, 225, 436, 439, 440-2, 527.
 Ariminum, *ms* of, 309.
 Ariobarzanes, 425.
 Ariovistus, 505-7.
 Aristæus, 262.
 Aristion, 428-30.
 Aristobulus, 482.
 Aristonicus, 328, 329, 421.
 Aristotle, 1, 434.
 Armenia, 238, 271, 330, 420, 425, 426, 471,
 472, 476, 477, 479, 480, 519, 520.
 Armenia Minor, 424, 482, 536.
 Army of Carthage, 148; under Hamilcar,
 170; under Hannibal, 176, 191, 231, 232.
 Army, Greek. See Phalanx.
 Army, Roman, of Romulus, 23; Servian,
 45, 46; manipular, 102, 135-41; re-
 organised by Marius, 369, 379-81; pay
 of, 80, 138; service in, 101, 136, 349,
 350 n.; minimum census for, 46, 293,
 369; arms and tactics of, 102, 139, 140,
 196, 230, 263, 264, 279, 534, 535; pro-
 fessionalism in, 224, 243, 314, 379, 538;
 decay of, 245, 313, 411, 416. See also
 Allies, Cavalry, Legion, Phalanx,
 Veterans.
 Arnus (Arno) R., 6; marshes of, 12, 188.
 Arpi, 192, 201, 206.
 Arpinum, 114, 115, 366, 367, 488.
 Arretium, 112, 115, 121, 166, 167, 187, 220,
 224, 225, 528.
 Arsa, C. Terentilius, 66.
 Arsacids, 329, 425.
 Artaxata, 477, 480.
 Artaxiadæ, 271, 420.
 Arverni, 218, 373, 374, 378, 505, 512.
 Asculum, 400, 405-9.
 Ascellio, A. Sempronius, 411, 413.
 Asia, state of, 253 f., 271, 272, 329 f.,
 420 f., 472, 473, 482-4.
 Asia Minor, 320, 327, 428.
 Asia (province), 328, 396, 420, 427, 434,
 475; taxes of, 351, 454 n., 499, 500, 548.
 Asparagium, 533.
 Aspendus, battle of, 270.
 Assembly. See Appendix I., *Comitia*,
 Concilium plebis.
 Assignatio (allotment), 57, 82, 306, 335,
 336, 338, 343, 359.
 Astapa, 219.
 Atella, 110.
 Aternus R., 7, 403.
 Athamanes, 261, 268.
 Athenio, 392, 393.
 Athens, 1, 19, 261, 264, 280, 283, 428; siege
 of, 429, 430.
 Athesis (Adige) R., 5, 332.
 Attilius, C., 182.
 Attilius. See also Calatinus, Regulus,
 Serranus.
 Atria, 5, 12.
 Attalids, 257, 328.
 Attalus I., 257, 261.
 Attalus III., 328, 329, 338.
 Attica, 327, 392.
 Atticus, T. Pomponius, 490.
 Aufidius R., 7, 195.
 Augurs, 95, 222. See Priests.
 Augustus (C. Octavius), 1, 3, 5, 79 n., 245,
 326, 514, 539, 541, 542, 546.
 Aurelius. See Cotta, Orestes, and Securus.
 Ausculum, battle of, 128.
 Ausonians, 111.
 Auspicia, 291-3.

- Autaritus, 163.
 Avaricum, 504 *n.*, 512.
 Aventine, Mount, 21, 25, 27, 38, 58, 66, 355.
 Axona (Aisne) R., 508.
- BACCHANALIA, 291, 292, 321.
 Bactria, 330.
 Bæcula, battles of, 217, 218.
 Bætis R., 214, 240, 464.
 Bagradas R., 229, 247, 367, 531.
 Baliaric Isles, 146, 218, 219, 245, 330;
 slingers, 148, 190, 197, 379.
 Ballot. *See* Lex tabellaria.
 Barbula, L. Æmilius, 124.
 Bastarnæ, 275, 424.
 Belgæ, 373, 381, 505, 507, 508, 513.
 Bellowach, 504 *n.*, 508, 514.
 Beneventum, battle of, 130, 131; L. C.
 164 *n.*, 192, 201 *n.*, 206, 404.
 Bestia, L. Calpurnius Piso, 364, 365, 399.
 Betutius, 373.
 Bibracte, 373, 506.
 Bibulus, M. Calpurnius, 500, 516, 521, 531.
 Bithyas, 251.
 Bithynia, 267, 269, 271, 275, 276, 278, 320,
 392, 424-7; 433, 444; 473, 474; province,
 482.
 Bituriges, 85, 504 *n.*, 512.
 Blossius, C., 337.
 Bocchus, 364, 367, 369, 371, 416.
 Bœotia, 257, 261, 265, 267, 428, 429, 431,
 432.
 Boii (Bohemian), 374.
 Boii (Cisalpine), 85, 122, 166, 168, 175,
 238, 239.
 Botorix, 378, 383.
 Bolæ, 77, 78.
 Bomilcar (Punic), 204, 211.
 Bomilcar (Numidian), 365, 367.
 Bononia (Felsina), 12, 79; L. C., 239.
 Bosphorus, kingdom of, 424, 473, 480.
 Bovianum, 15, 111, 114, 207, 409, 410.
 Brennus, 86, 87.
 Britain, 504, 510, 511, 530.
 Britomaris, 121.
 Brixia, 85, 166.
 Brundisium, 4, 95; L. C., 164 *n.*, 201, 203,
 207, 347, 439, 440, 497, 528.
 Brutii, 16, 17, 127, 129, 130, 200, 201, 209,
 220, 223-5, 231, 335, 347, 410, 419, 467.
 Brutulus, Papius, 108.
 Brutus, D. Junius (cos. 138 B.C.), 244, 245,
 355, 372, 375.
 Brutus, D. Junius (Cæsar's lieutenant),
 509, 529, 550.
 Brutus, L. Junius, 30-2.
 Brutus, L. Junius Damasippus, 441, 442.
 Brutus, M. Junius (Lepidus' lieutenant),
 464.
 Brutus, M. Junius (Cæsar's murderer),
 548-50.
 Byrsa (Carthage), 145, 249, 252.
 Byzantium, 257, 260, 267, 276, 282, 432.
- CABIRA, 475, 483.
 Cæcilius. *See* Metellus.
- Cælius, Mount, 25, 38.
 Cælius, M. Rufus, 525, 540.
 Cæpio, Q. Servilius (cos. 140 B.C.), 243.
 Cæpio, Q. Servilius (cos. 106 B.C.), 377,
 378, 384, 385, 387, 392.
 Cæpio, Q. Servilius (his son), 388, 396,
 397, 406.
 Cære, 79, 85, 86, 88, 89, 141.
 Cærte franchise, 89, 90, 104, 114.
 Cæsar, C. Julius (ædile), 413, 437.
 Cæsar, C. Julius, 85, 86, 325, 373, 408,
 429; and Sulla, 445, 446, 448, 449, 460;
 a democrat, 460, 464, 468, 491; and
 Catiline, 485-7, 490, 492-3; pontifex
 maximus, 491, 496, 497; coalition with
 Pompey and Crassus, 499; laws as consul,
 499-502; in Gaul, 503-15; in Britain,
 510, 511; at Luca, 517, 518, 519, 521,
 522; and the Senate, 523-4; in civil war,
 525-39; rule of, 539-51; offices and
 titles, 541, 542; reforms, 544-8; assassi-
 nation, 549-51.
 Cæsar, L. Julius, 404, 405, 407, 437.
 Cæsar, Sext. Julius, 284.
 Cæsarism, 133, 323, 325, 326, 356, 357, 449,
 470, 539-40.
 Calatia, 110, 114. (*See* Errata.)
 Calatinus (Caiatius), A. Attilius, 159, 160.
 Calavii (Capua), 111, 201.
 Calendar, Roman, 181 *n.*, 291, 548.
 Cales, L. C., 104, 109, 192, 203, 206, 405.
 Callicinus, 277.
 Callicrates, 272, 280, 283.
 Callicula, Mount, 192.
 Callidromos, Mount, 268.
 Calor R., 7, 404.
 Calpurnius. *See* Bestia, Bibulus, Piso.
 Calvinus, Cn. Domitius, 534, 536.
 Cannæ, 409; battle of, 7, 194-8, 200.
 Canuleius, C., 73.
 Canusium, 7, 110, 198, 223, 405.
 Camillus, M. Furius, 80-4, 87, 88, 92,
 138.
 Camp, Roman, 140.
 Campania, 8, 13, 16, 17, 79, 100-4, 109-11,
 114, 116, 118, 119, 192, 193, 201-2, 309,
 317, 340, 402-5, 407, 409, 410, 440, 448.
 Campus Martius, 39, 46, 59, 459, 545.
 Capena, 80, 82, 88.
 Capite Censi (proletarii), 28, 136, 295,
 343, 369, 379.
 Capitol, 21, 22, 38, 86, 87, 354, 543.
 Cappadocia, 255; 271, 329, 424-7, 433,
 434, 445, 472-6, 482.
 Capsa, 369.
 Capua, Samnite, 79, 95, 100, 107; status,
 104, 110, 111, 210, 309; in 2nd Punic
 war, 192, 201-2, 207-10; proposed colony,
 347, 358, 500; Sulla at, 414, 416, 440;
 risings at, 392, 466; Pompey at, 524.
 Carbo, C. Papirius (Gracchan), 343, 344,
 358, 395.
 Carbo, Cn. Papirius (his brother), 377.
 Carbo, Cn. Papirius (Marian), 435, 439-43
 Caria, 254, 260, 427.
 Carneades, 283.
 Carnutes, 512.
 Carpetani, 172.
 Carrhæ, battle of, 484, 520.

- Carrinas, C., 442.
 Carsoli, 16; L. C., 115, 405.
 Carcia, 314.
 Carthage, 19; treaties with, 99, 129, 142, 149; and Pyrrhus, 125, 127-31; people and power of, 135, 141, 142, 143-9; city of, 143-5, 249; 1st Punic war, 150-162; mercenary war and Rome, 161, 164; and Barcids, 169-71; and Hannibal, 173, 175, 176, 200, 201-6, 211, 213, 224-31; and Syphax, 214; parties at, 169, 170, 228, 229, 247; peace with, 231, 232, 240; 3rd Punic war, 245-53;—201, 207, 315, 318, 322, 337, 417; revival of, 347, 348, 351, 356, 359, 544.
 Carthago, Nova, 171, 176, 217, 219.
 Carthalo, 157.
 Carvilius, Sp. (cos. 203 B.C.), 110.
 Carvilius, Sp. (his son), 302, 310, 315.
 Casca, P. Servilius, 550.
 Casilinum, 7, 192, 202, 206, 207, 105.
 Casinum, 192.
 Cassander, 124.
 Cassius, C. Longinus, 520, 521, 550.
 Cas-jus, L. Longinus (cos. 107 B.C.), 377.
 Cassius, L. Longinus (Ravilla), 325.
 Cassius, Q. Longinus, 525, 537.
 Cassius, L., 426, 427.
 Cassius, Spurius, 57, 58 n., 63, 64, 97, 306.
 Cassivellaunus, 510, 511.
 Castrum Novum, R. C., 119.
 Castulo, 219.
 Catilina, L. Sergius, conspirator, 486-90, 492-5.
 Cato, C. Porcius (cos. 114 B.C.), 365, 375.
 Cato, L. Porcius (cos. 89 B.C.), 407, 408.
 Cato, M. Porcius (censor), in Spain, 241; and Carthage, 247, 248, 251; at Thermopylae, 268; sayings of, 283; as a politician, 302-6, 320, 331; author, 40, 335.
 Cato, M. Porcius Uticensis, optimiate leader, 486, 494, 497, 499, 510, 521-3; in Cyprus, 503; character and death, 537, 538, 540.
 Catulus, C. Lutatius (cos. 242 B.C.), 160-2, 172.
 Catulus, Q. Lutatius (cos. 102 B.C.), 382-4, 437, 404.
 Catulus, Q. Lutatius (his son), 446, 462, 464, 478, 479, 486, 492, 496.
 Cauca, 242.
 Caucasus, Mount, 426, 480.
 Caudine Forks, 108-10, 112, 119, 243, 244.
 Caulonia, 220.
 Cavalry, Roman, 136, 139, 175, 313, 520; Campanian, 118; auxiliary, 263, 314, 379, 513; Pompeian, 531 f.; Eastern, 254, 476, 520; Gallic, 513.
 Celts. See Gauls and Galatians.
 Celtiberia, 240, 372, 531.
 Cenomani, 85, 166-8, 185, 186, 238.
 Censors appointed, 74-6; admission of plebeians, 94, 133, 346; under Sulla, 454, 455; revived, 468, 469; limited, 502; functions—census, 74; financial, 211; moral, 346, 386, 387; selecting Senate, 74, 299-301, 469; review knights, 470; term of, 74, 95, 96.
 Censorinus, C. Marcius, 442.
 Censorinus, L. Marcius, 248, 249.
 Census, 28, 74, 291-6, 379, 451; minimum census, 203, 369; census equester, 350.
 Centenius, M., 207.
 Centumalus, Cn. Fulvius (cos. 298 B.C.), 116.
 Centumalus, Cn. Fulvius (cos. 229 B.C.), 167.
 Centumalus, Cn. Fulvius (cos. 211 B.C.), 219.
 Centuriis, 23, 28, 291-6, 199; *praenotata*, 205, 340.
 Cephalonia, 272.
 Cephissus R., 431.
 Cephia, 417.
 Cerretanus, Q. Aulius, 111.
 Cethegus, C. Cornelius, 404.
 Cethegus, M. Cornelius, 206.
 Cevenna, Mount, 374, 504, 512.
 Chaeonea, battle of, 471, 432.
 Chalcedon, 260, 471, 474.
 Chalcis, 251, 261, 202, 207, 276, 285, 428-31.
 Chalcians, 301.
 Chariots in war, 270, 271, 510.
 Charops, 262, 263.
 Chersonesus, Thracian, 271; Tauric, 424, city of, 424, 435.
 Chios, 260, 268, 432.
 Chrysogonus, 460.
 Cicero, M. Tullius, birth, 384; and Sulla, 460, 461; in Verrem, 469; and Catiline, 485, 486; character, 488, 489; policy, 325, 480-91, 499; crushes Catiline, 492-6, and Clodius, 497, 498; exile, 502, 503; recall, 516; and Pompey, 463, 517, 525; and triumvirs, 518, 519; defends Milo, 521, 522; in Cilicia, 523, 526; in civil war, 528, 536, 537; quoted, 63, 313, 388, 415.
 Cicero, Q. Tullius, 511.
 Cilicia, 254, 255, 271, 330; province, 393, 394, 420, 482, 483, 522 n., 525, 526; pirates, 471, 472, 477-9.
 Cimber, L. Titius, 550.
 Cimbri, 364, 372, 375-8, 381-3.
 Ciminian lake and hills, 8, 13, 82, 88, 112.
 Cincinnatus, L. Quinctius, 61, 62, 65 n., 77 n.
 Cincius, L. Alimentus (annalist), 180, 212.
 Cineas, 124, 127, 128.
 Cina, L. Cornelius, 479, 473-9, 460.
 Cineii, 78, 417.
 Cirta, 227, 247, 361, 362, 366, 367, 369.
 Cissis, battle of, 213.
 Citizenship. See *Civitas* and Franchise.
 Cius, 260.
Civitas sine suffragio, 90, 94, 104, 115, 119, 135, 137 n., 296, 309.
Classis, 27, 28, 46, 294-6.
 Clastidium, 185, 186.
 Claudius (emperor), 8, 40.
 Cludius, Appius (cos. 495 B.C.), 54.
 Claudius, Appius (decemvir), 67-9.
 Claudius, Appius Caeus (censor), 94, 95, 111, 116, 128.
 Claudius, Appius Caudex, 151.
 Claudius, Appius Pulcher (cos. 212 B.C.), 200, 207, 210.
 Claudius, Appius Pulcher (192 B.C.), 267.

- Claudius, Appius Pulcher (170 B.C.), 277.
 Claudius, Appius Pulcher (Sullan), 419.
 Claudius, Appius Pulcher (lieutenant of Lucullus), 476.
 Claudius, Appius Pulcher (cos. 143 B.C.), 326, 337, 341, 543, 372.
 Claudius, C., 150.
 Claudius, C. Cento, 261.
 Claudius, C. Nero, 207, 215, 218, 221; at the Metaurus, 222, 223; censor, 228.
 Claudius, P. Pulcher (cos. 249 B.C.), 159, 321.
 Claudius. *See* Clodius and Marcellus.
 Clazomenæ, 471.
 Cleomenes III. of Sparta, 254, 257, 337.
 Cleon (bandit), 327, 393.
 Cleonymus, 112.
 Cleopatra, Syrian, 266, 281.
 Cleopatra, Pontic, 424.
 Cleopatra of Egypt, 536.
 Clients, 23, 41, 305, 313, 318.
 Cloacæ, 26, 38.
 Clodius (Claudius), P. Pulcher, 497, 498, 502, 503, 516, 517, 521, 545.
 Cluentius, L., 409.
 Clusium, 6, 8, 85, 117, 167, 442.
 Cnidos, 432, 471.
 Coele-Syria, 255, 281.
Coemptio, 70.
Cohors praetoria, 245, 380.
 Cohorts, 138, 139, 379.
 Coinage, debasement of, 160, 294, 296, 397; Italian, 403; Gallic, 504; of Cæsar, 548.
 Colchis, 424, 445.
Collegia (clubs), 71, 502, 522 n., 545.
 Colline gate, battle, 443.
 Colonies, Greek, 18, 424.
 Colonies, Latin, 57, 88, 99, 104, 111, 115, 135, 164 n., 220, 239, 309, 345, 404, 405, 408, 411.
 Colonies, Roman, 57, 104, 134, 142, 164 n., 239, 309, 345; founded by Gracchus, 347, 348, 354, 357; after Gracchus, 353, 354, 358, 373, 380, 397; Sulla's, 448; Pompey's, 433; Cæsar's, 500, 544.
 Colophon, 270, 432, 471.
 Comitia, 133, 224, 287, 288, 292, 298, 299, 304, 305, 317, 308, 324, 325, 331, 332, 339, 342, 412, 500, 502.
 Comitia Curiata. *See* Appendix I — *calata*, 70.
 Comitia Centuriata, 50, 51, 67, 74, 94, 261, 349, 418, 450, 451, 491. *See* also Appendix I.
 Comitia Tributa, 94, 98, 417, 418, 450-2, 455, 502. *See* also Appendix I. and Concilium plebis.
 Comitium, 39, 44.
 Comum, 168, 238.
 Concilium plebis, 65 n., 167, 287, 293, 340, 417, 418, 478, 502. *See* also Appendix I.
Confarreatio, 70.
 Consentia, 105, 203.
 Consulship created, 37, 47, 48, 66; opened to plebeians, 92, 94; re-election to, 94, 300, 371 f.; deposition from, 435; of Pompey, 468, 521 n., and Cæsar, 522-4, 542. *See* also Magistracy.
 Coracesium, battle of, 478.
 Corcyra, 124, 165, 261, 536.
 Corduba, 243.
 Corduene, 472.
 Corinium, 7, 403, 409, 528.
 Corinth, 254, 258, 262, 263; fall of, 284, 285, 315; revivals of, 547, 359, 544.
 Coriolanus, Cn. Marcius, 59-61, 64 n., 65 n.
 Corioli, 59, 60.
 Cornelia (mother of the Gracchi), 336, 353.
 Corneli, 450.
 Cornelius. *See* Cethegus, Cinna, Cossus, Dolabella, Lentulus, Merula, Scipio, Sulla.
 Corsica, 13, 19, 154, 164, 239.
 Cortona, 13, 112, 188.
 Coruncanus, L., 165.
Corvus, 152 n., 154, 156.
 Corvus, M. Valerius, 90, 100, 101, 378.
 Corycus (Cyssus), 268.
 Cosa, L. C., 164 n., 201, 214.
 Cosconius, C., 409, 410.
 Cossus, A. Cornelius, 79, 80 n.
 Cossyra, 443.
 Cothon (Carthage), 145, 249, 251, 252.
 Cotta, C. Aurelius (cos. 75 B.C.), 399, 466.
 Cotta, L. Aurelius (cos. 65 B.C.), 469, 487.
 Cotta, L. Aurelius (cos. 119 B.C.), 375.
 Cotta, M. Aurelius (cos. 74 B.C.), 474.
 Cotta, L. Aurunculeius, 511.
 Cotys, 275, 277.
 Crassus, C. Licinius, 385.
 Crassus, L. Licinius (orator), 387, 395-7.
 Crassus, M. Licinius Dives, in civil war, 440-3; wealth of, 447, 463, 546; character, 462; conquers gladiators, 466-8; consul, 468-70, 519; and Catiline, 485, 487, 488, 492, 493; first triumvirate, 498-500, 516, 518; at Carrhæ, 520, 521.
 Crassus, P. Licinius Dives (his son), 508, 509, 520.
 Crassus, P. Licinius (cos. 171 B.C.), 276, 277.
 Crassus, P. Licinius Dives (cos. 97 B.C.), 372, 404, 405, 437.
 Crassus, P. Licinius Mucianus (cos. 131 B.C.), 328, 337, 343.
 Cremera R., 62.
 Cremona, 85, 166; L. C., 168, 177, 183, 238.
 Crete, 264; and pirates, 330, 471, 472, 478; province, 482.
 Crispinus, T. Quinctius, 211, 220, 221.
 Critolaus (Athenian philosopher), 283.
 Critolaus (Achæan strategus), 285.
 Crixus, 466.
 Croton, 18, 122, 129, 131, 204, 228.
 Cumæ, 13, 18, 37, 100, 104, 202, 204, 458.
 Curia Hostilia (Senate House), 39, 354, 391, 521, 542.
Curia, 23, 44, 45.
 Curio, C. Scribonius, 524, 525, 531.
 Curius, M'. Dentatus, 6, 95, 96, 119, 130.
 Cursor, L. Papirius (dictator), 107, 112, 113.
 Cursor, L. Papirius (his son), 119, 130.
 Curule. *See* Ediles, Magistracy.
 Cybele (*magna mater*), 226, 291, 321.
 Cydonia, 472.
 Cynoscephalæ, 263, 276, 281.

Cyprus, 255, 329, 473; occupied, 503, 548.
Cyrene, 145, 255, 329; Roman, 393, 394.
Cyzicus, 257, 474, 482.

DALMATIA, 165, 239, 275, 374, 375
Damocritus, 284.
Danala, 479.
Danube (Ister) R., 375, 424.
Dardani, 261, 262, 275, 375.
Dardanus, 433.
Debt, laws of, 53, 70, 91, 96, 101, 411, 418,
438, 546, 547. *See* Interest.
Decemvirate, 66 f.
Decemviri litibus indicandis, 55, 71.
Decius P. Mus (cos. 340 B.C.), 100, 102,
103.
Decius P. Mus (his son), 116-18.
Decius Magius, 201.
Decuma (provincial), 164, 311, 351, 454,
499, 500, 548.
Deiotarus, 474, 482.
Delium, conference of, 433.
Delminium, 374.
Delos, 280, 281, 285, 327, 359, 428, 430.
Delphi, 258, 374; Apollo of, 30, 37, 80, 81,
84, 431.
Demetrius, 254, 267, 428, 430.
Demetrius Poliorcetes, 124, 125.
Demetrius of Pharos, 165, 166, 193, 205.
Demetrius, son of Philip V., 274.
Demetrius Soter, 282, 329.
Democrats. *See* Populares.
Diaeus, 283, 285.
Dictator, in Latin towns, 98.
Dictator, early, 49, 50, 71 n.; elected, 190,
191; two at once, 193; chooses Senate,
203; dictatorship, decay of, 297, 298; of
Sulla, 448, 449; of Caesar, 541-3.
Didius, M., 375.
Didius, T., 372, 394, 404, 409.
Diodorus Siculus (historian), 85, 88.
Diogenes, 283.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (historian), 35,
53, 57, 68, 77.
Dionysius I. of Syracuse, 65 n., 79, 125,
210.
Diophanes, 337.
Dioscuria, 424.
Dium, 277.
Divico, 377.
Dolabella, P. Cornelius (cos. 283 B.C.), 121,
122.
Dolabella, P. Cornelius (cos. 44 B.C.), 540.
Domitius, Cn., 270.
Domitius. *See* Ahenobarbus and Calvinus.
Dorylaeus, 432.
Drepana, 154, 159, 160.
Dromichætes, 430.
Druids, 504, 505.
Drusus, M. Livius, 353, 354, 358, 359, 375.
Drusus, M. Livius (his son), 395-8, 400,
413, 436.
Dulcius, C., 153-4.
Dumnorix, 506, 511.
Druentia (Durance R.), 176, 179, 180.
Duria (R.), 326.
Durius (Douro R.), 242, 244-5.
Dyrrhachium, 282, 434, 528, 531-4.

EBURONES, 511, 512.
Ecnomus, battle of, 155, 156.
Egypt and Ptolemy, 124, 130; early rela-
tions with Rome, 131, 194, 195, 219, 230;
position and power of, 254, 255, 259;
and Syria, 264, 265-7, 281; pro-
tected by Rome, 261, 473, 497; feuds in,
329, 394, 419, 502, 517, 519; Caesar in,
535, 536.
Elephants in war, 126-8, 151, 157, 186,
187, 248, 263, 270, 271.
Eleusis, mysteries of, 165.
Ellis, 212, 256, 268, 272.
Elpius R., 278.
Emporia, the, 220, 247.
Emporiae, 171, 213, 241.
Enipeus R., 534.
Euna, 211, 233, 327, 328, 392.
Ennius, 35, 230.
Ephesus, 255, 266, 268, 269, 328, 427.
Epicycles, 204, 210.
Epidaunus, 165, 232.
Epirus, 105, 124, 125, 257, 267, 268, 277,
280-2, 374, 428, 528, 529, 531-4.
Eporedia, R. C., 372.
Equester Ordo, 143; growth of, 315, 316,
412, 461; policy of, 332, 389-91, 435,
438, 461, 491; and C. Gracchus, 350,
351, 357, 358; and Senate, 395 f., 499;
and Sulla, 446, 447, 454, 455; restora-
tion of, 460; in civil war, 527.
Equites equo publico, centuries of, six
patrician, 23, 26, 28, 45, 51; eighteen,
28, 45, 51, 139, 294-6, 300, 315, 316, 333,
388, 390, 470.
Erbesius, 151.
Ercte, Mount, 160.
Ergastula (slave-barracks), 327, 436.
Erysine, 243.
Eryx, 160.
Eshmun, temple of, 252.
Esquiline, Mount, 27, 38.
Icturia (Roman) in Hannibalic war, 167,
194, 207, 220, 224, 225, 231; agriculture
in, 217, 327, 334, 337; in social and
civil war, 402, 407, 410, 411-3, 447, 448;
and Catiline, 486, 493, 495.
Etruscan (Rasenna), 12-15; and Falii, 62,
63; decline of, 10, 78, 79, 112, 115, 141;
disasters of, 79-85, 88-90, 100, 112, 116,
117, 120, 121; architecture, 12, 39, 40;
soothsaying, 14, 80, 84.
Etruscan kings at Rome, 26, 39, 40, 84 n.
Euboea, 267, 285, 428.
Eudamus, 270.
Euganei, 374.
Euhemerism, 35, 321.
Eumenes I., 257.
Eumenes II., 270, 271, 276, 278, 280, 281,
328.
Eunus (Antiochus), 327, 328.
Euphrates R., 420, 425, 472, 476, 482, 484,
520.
Euxine Sea, 421, 424, 425, 474.
Exile, 352, 501-3.

FABII, legend of, 62, 63, 65 n.
Fabius, C. (legate of Caesar), 529.

- Fabius, M. Buteo, 203.
 Fabius, C. Hadrianus, 440.
 Fabius, Q. Maximus Rullianus, censor, 95;
Magister equitum, 107, 108; dictator,
 111; conquers Etruria, 12, 112; in Sam-
 nium, 113, 116, 117; at Sentinum, 118,
 119.
 Fabius, Q. Maximus Gurgus (his son), 119.
 Fabius, Q. Maximus (cunctator), 174;
 dictator, 190, 191; tactics of, 191-4; in
 Hannibalic war, 200, 202, 203, 206, 219,
 220, 225, 228, 229.
 Fabius, Q. Maximus Æmilianus, 243.
 Fabius, Q. Maximus Servilianus, 243.
 Fabius, Q. Maximus Allobrogicus (son of
 Æmilianus), 373.
 Fabius, Q. Sanga (Maximus Allobrogicus),
 494.
 Fabius, Q. Pictor (annalist), 59, 112, 200.
 Fabrateria, 104; R. C., 345, 405.
 Fabricius, C. Lucius, 96, 122, 128, 129.
 Fabulae, 167, 188, 464, 493.
 Falerii, 80, 82, 88, 89, 121, 164.
 Falernus ager, 9, 192.
 Falto, P. Valerius, 161.
 Familia, 40.
 Fannius, C., 353.
 Fannius, L., 477.
 Fances, 26, 31, 49, 50, 526.
 Faustulus (Faunus), 21, 36.
 Faventia, 442.
 Felsina. *See* Bononia.
 Feentina, spring of, 60, 65 n.
 Ferentinum, 115.
 Ferie Latinae, 16, 398.
 Fetiales, 24, 109.
 Fidenae, 38, 79.
 Fimbria, C. Flavius, 432-4, 441, 474, 476.
 Finance (Roman), 160, 203, 205, 206, 219,
 314, 315, 318, 410, 411, 447, 546, 548.
 Firmum, L. C., 164 n., 405, 407.
 Flaccus, Cn. Fulvius, 207.
 Flaccus, L. Fulvius, 108.
 Flaccus, M. Fulvius (cos. 125 B.C.), 343,
 345, 353-5, 373.
 Flaccus, Q. Fulvius, 202, 207-10, 219.
 Flaccus, Q. Fulvius (his son), 241.
 Flaccus, L. Valerius (cos. 195 B.C.), 268,
 304.
 Flaccus, L. Valerius (cos. 100 B.C.), 389,
 439, 448.
 Flaccus, L. Valerius (cos. 86 B.C.), 431, 432,
 438.
 Flammia, 24, 86, 95, 321.
 Flamininus, T. Quinctius, 262-5, 268, 273,
 274, 302.
 Flamininus, C., agrarian law, 166, 167, 305-8;
 democrat, 187, 296 n., 342; in Cisalpine
 Gaul, 168; at Lake Trasimene, 188-90.
 Flavius, Cn., 94.
 Flavius, L., 499.
 Fonteius, T., 215.
 Formia, 104.
 Forum, 26, 39, 113, 354, 521; Boarium,
 167; Julium, 545.
 Forum Julii (Fregius), 544.
 Fossa Cluvia, 24, 38, 60.
 Franchise, use of, by Rome, 134, 401, 402;
 extension of, 94, 104, 108, 115, 345, 346,
 353, 357, 396, 397, 407, 408, 411; restric-
 tion of, 95, 309, 310, 412-14, removed,
 438; Sulla's settlement, 450; Trans-
 padane, 488, 544. *See* also Cærite,
Civitas, Italians.
 Freedmen, 41, 94, 95, 136, 293, 295, 296,
 305, 316, 318, 336, 406, 413, 414, 435,
 450, 461, 542.
 Fregellæ, L. C., 7, 104, 106, 109-11, 200,
 220, 345, 346.
 Fregene, R. C., 164 n.
 Frentani, 15, 110, 403.
 Frusino, 115.
 Fucinus Lacus, 7, 8, 15, 408, 547.
 Fulvidius, L., 464.
 Fulvius. *See* Centumalus, Flaccus, and
 Nobilior.
 Fundi, 104.
 GARI, 29, 30, 37, 209.
 Gabinus, A., 410.
 Gabinus, A. (cos. 58 B.C.), 477, 478, 510.
 Gades, 146, 170, 217, 219, 242, 544.
 Gætare, 167, 168.
 Gæstuli, 367, 369, 371.
 Galatians, 255-7, 281, 374, 421, 174, 482.
 Galba, C. Sulpicius, 265.
 Galba, P. Sulpicius (cos. 200 B.C.), 261,
 262.
 Galba, S. Sulpicius, 242, 243, 304.
 Gallæci, 245.
 Games, Isthmian, 165, 264; Roman, 233,
 320.
 Garganus, Mount, 4, 7, 466.
 Gauda, 371.
 Gaul, Cisalpine, 3, 5, 12, 166, 168, 175,
 188, 204, 225, 231, 238, 239, 317, 408, 441,
 442; province, 412, 453, 502, 523-6;
 Transpadane, 309, 374, 461, 486, 488.
 Gaul (Narbonensis), province, 373-4, 438,
 443, 502-4, 544.
 Gaul, Transalpine, Hannibal in, 176-8;
 wars in, 239, 345, 372 ff., 465; Cæsar
 in, 504 ff.; province, 514, 523-6, 547.
 Gauls, in Italy, 11, 12, 79; tribes of, 84,
 85, 166; character of, 84, 85; attack
 Rome, 85-8, 90; wars with Rome, 115-
 118, 121, 122, 166-8, 177, 190; in Cartha-
 ginian army, 148, 186-8, 196, 197, 221,
 223; in Greece, 254, 278; in Balkan
 Peninsula, 374, Transalpine, 377, 504,
 505.
 Gellius, Egnatius, 116-8.
 Gelo of Syracuse, 65 n., 125.
 Genava, 503, 506.
 Gens, 41, 42.
 Genthius, 276, 278.
 Genua, 3, 225.
 Genucius, Cn., tribune (472 B.C.), 58.
 Genucius, L., tribune (339 B.C.), 101.
 Gereonium, 192, 194.
 Gergovia, 512.
 Germans, 375 f., 505-7, 509, 510.
 Glabrio, M. Acilius (cos. 191 B.C.), 268.
 Glabrio, M. Acilius (cos. 67 B.C.), 477,
 479.
 Gladiators, 14, 100, 233, 320, 379; war
 with, 466-8.

- Glaucia, C. Servilius, 388-91.
 Gordius, 424-6.
 Gracchus, the, 187: ideas of, 320, 338, 373, 385, 389, 417, 440, 502; failure of, 325, 357, 359, 397.
 Gracchus, Claudius, 61.
 Gracchus, C. Sempronius, character, 327, 346; agrarian law, 341, 343, 347; and Italians, 346, 353; colonies, 347, 318, 354, 545, *lex frumentaria*, 343, 349; and equites, 350, 351, 304, 420, 454; other reforms, 351, 353, 451; fall of, 353-6; criticism of, 350, 357.
 Gracchus, Ti. Sempronius (238 B.C.), 164.
 Gracchus, Ti. Sempronius (cos. 215 B.C.), 202-4, 206, 207.
 Gracchus, Ti. Sempronius (cos. 177 B.C.), 239, 241, 242, 245, 303, 336.
 Gracchus, Ti. Sempronius (trib. 133 B.C.), at Numantia, 244; character, 336, 337; agrarian law, 337-40, 343, 347; fall of, 341, 342, 346, 352.
 Gracchus, pseudo-, 390.
 Gracia, Magna, 18, 100, 120, 126.
 Greece, contrast with Italy, 2, 3; factions of, 212, 258, 262, 265, 280; decay of, 265, 276, 283; and Rome, 257-60, 264, 265; conquest of, 284-7; Mithradatic war, 428, 429. *See also* Achaia and Hellenism.
 Grumentum, 204, 222, 405.
 Gulussa, 250, 365.

 HADRUMETUM, 228-30.
 Halys R., 271, 422, 475.
 Hamæ, 204.
 Hamilcar, Punic general, 154, 156.
 Hamilcar, officer of Mago, 238.
 Hamilcar Barca, 147; in Sicily, 160-2; in mercenary war, 163, 164; statesman, 169; in Spain, 170, 171.
 Hannibal, son of Gisgo, 150, 151, 154.
 Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, 158.
 Hannibal, son of Hamilcar Barca, 168, 170; character, 171, 172; plans, 175; takes Saguntum, 172-4; march to the Rhone, 176-8; crosses the Alps, 178-82; victories of the Ticinus, 183; the Trebia, 185; 7; crosses Apennines and Arno, 187, 188; at Trasimene, 189, 190; and Fabius, 191-3; at Cannæ, 194-8; at Capua, 201, 202, and Macedon, 205, 212, 213; takes Tarentum, 206; falls at Capua, 207-10; march on Rome, 208, 209; and Sicily, 210-12; in South Italy, 210-25; recalled to Carthage, 228; at Zama, 229-231; makes peace, 231, 232; exile of, 247; and Antiochus, 266-70; death of, 273.
 Hannibal the Rhodian, 153.
 Hanno, Punic admiral (264 B.C.), 150.
 Hanno, son of Hannibal, 151.
 Hanno, Punic general (262 B.C.), 151, 156.
 Hanno in Corsica, 154.
 Hanno, Admiral, at Lilybæum, 161.
 Hanno "the Great," 160, 171.
 Hanno in Spain (218 B.C.), 176, 213.
 Hanno, son of Bomilcar, 178.
 Hanno, officer of Hannibal, 204, 206, 207.
 Hanno in Sicily (211 B.C.), 212.
 Hanno in Spain (208 B.C.), 218.
 Hasdrubal, officer of Hannibal, 197, 198.
 Hasdrubal, grandson of Massinissa, 249.
 Hasdrubal Calvus, 205.
 Hasdrubal the Fat, 240-53.
 Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, 214, 215, 218, 219, 225-7.
 Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar Barca, in Spain, 176, 213-5, 217, 218; march to Italy, 221; at the Metaurus, 224, 223.
 Hasdrubal, son-in-law of Hamilcar Barca, 170, 171.
 Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, 156, 157.
Hastati, 138, 230.
 Hatria (Hadria), L. C., 119, 122.
 Hellenism at Rome, 234, 264, 265, 303, 304, 309, 321, 333, 337, 350; in the East, 422, 424.
 Hellespont, 258, 268-70, 428, 432, 433.
 Helvetii, 230, 374, 377, 500.
 Heraclea, 129, 135, 200, 309, 411; battle of, 126, 127.
 Heraclea Pontica, 475; Heraclea Trachinia, 285.
 Herculaneum, 107, 409.
 Herdonea, 201; battles of, 207, 219.
 Herman, Cape, battle of, 157.
 Herminius, T., 32, 33.
 Hernici, 16, 78, 80, 90, 99, 102, 113, 114; league with, 64.
 Herodotus, 12 n., 37.
 Hiarbas, 443.
 Hiempsal I., 361.
 Hiempsal II., 417, 443.
 Hiero I., 13, 78, 79, 125.
 Hiero II., policy and position of, 18, 163, 164, 204, 210, 247; finance of, 311; ally of Rome, 151, 159, 185, 187; and Mamertines, 150, 151; death, 204.
 Hieronymus (his son), 204, 210.
 Himera, 157; battles of, 146, 212.
 Himilco (at Lilybæum), 158.
 Himilco (2nd Punic war), 211, 214.
 Himilco Phameus, 249, 251.
 Hippocrates, 204, 210, 211.
 Hirpini, 15, 17 n., 201, 409, 410.
 Hirtuleius, L., 464, 465.
 Horatius, M. Barbatus, 69.
 Horatii, legend of, 24, 25, 37.
 Horatius, M., 32.
 Horatius Cocles, 32, 59.
 Hortensius, Q., 479.
 Hortensius, L., 429-31.
 Human sacrifice, 200, 385.
 Hypsæus, L. Plautius, 328.

 IAPYDES, 374, 375.
 Iapygians, 16, 17.
 Iassus, 471.
 Ibera, battle of, 214.
 Iberus (Ebro) R., 171, 213-5, 464, 465, 529, 531.
 Ilerda, campaign of, 529-31, 540.
 Ilturgi, 214, 210.

- Ilium, 433.
 Illyria, 4, 17, 165, 166, 168, 213, 277, 278, 280, 326, 375, 377.
 Illyricum, 453, 502.
Imagines, 73, 300, 369.
Imperium, of king, 42, 46; of consul, 47, 49, 54; of dictator, 50, 54; *domi et militiae*, 49, 452-4.
Imperium proconsulare, 107, 297, 311-3, 325, 452-4, 472 *n.*, 517; conferred by people, 478, 479; irregular, 464; taken away, 378, 385.
 Indutiomarus, 511.
 Insubres, 85, 166, 168, 175, 183, 238.
 Interamna, Lirinas, 7; L. C., 111, 118.
 Interamna (Terni), 6.
 Intercatia, 242.
Intercessio, of a consul, 47; of tribune, 54, 72, 298, 340, 341, 352, 353, 364, 451, 452, 478, 525.
 Interest, rate of, fixed by law, 70, 101, 411; high rates, 317, 475, 548.
Inter-rex, 42, 95, 109, 448.
 Intibilli, 214.
 Ipsus, battle of, 124.
 Isara (Isère) R., 178-80, 373.
 Isauri, 472, 474, 482.
 Issa, 165.
 Istria, 168, 239, 374.
 Italia (Corinthium), 403.
 Italica (in Spain), 240, 314, 465.
 Italians, relation of communities to Rome, 133-5, 308-10, 401, 402, 411, 412, 450; misgovernment of, 302, 309, 310, 401, 402; expelled from Rome, 309, 345, 353; franchise of, 345, 346, 353, 357, 389, 395, 397-9, 407, 408; and agrarian laws, 340, 343-5, 347, 359; in social war, 399-412; and Sulla, 447, 448, 461; and Cicero, 516; and Cæsar, 525-9, 531, 544-7.
 Italy, and Rome, 1, 19, 20; geographical position, 2, 142, 143; mountains of, 3-5; rivers of, 5-7; lakes of, 8; races, 11-18; climate and products, 8-11; agriculture in, 316-18, 334-6, 347, 545-7; extension to the Padus, 408, 475; contrast with Greece, 2, 3, 11; contrast with provinces, 310, 311, 453.
 Ithius, Portus, 510.
 JANICULUM, Mount, 19, 24, 25, 38, 59, 86, 36, 491.
 Jannaus, Alexander, 482.
 Jerusalem, 482.
 Jews, 329, 480-2.
 Julia I., 527, 531, 533, 540.
 Judacilius, C., 405, 406, 408.
 Judices, 297, 359, 397, 408, 455, 461, 469. *See also Equester Ordo*, *Lex iudiciaria*, and *Questiones*.
 Jugurtha, character, 361; war with Adherbal, 361, 362; at Rome, 364, 365; war with, 364-71; capture and death, 371, 379.
 Julia, wife of Marius, 368, 491.
 Julia, daughter of Cæsar, 500, 521.
 Julius. *See Cæsar*.
 Junius. *See Brutus*, Pennus, Pera, Pullus, and Silanus.
 Junonia (Carthage), 348.
 Jupiter, Juno, &c. *See Temple*.
 Jura Mountain, 506.
Jus Ariminii, 309.
Jus auspiciorum, 291.
Jus conubii et commercii, 98, 103, 134 *n.*
Jus gentium, 297.
 KARNI, 362, 374, 375.
 Kings at Rome, powers of, 42-4; compared with consul and dictator, 47-50; dominion of, 58, 59; kingship revived by Cæsar, 542-4.
 Knights. *See Equester Ordo*, *Equites*.
 LABICI, 77, 78.
 Labienus, T., 491, 492, 508, 511-4, 526, 537-9.
 Laconians, 264, 428.
 Lade, 260.
 Læca, M. Porcius, 493.
 Lælius, C. (cos. 190 B.C.), 216, 225, 227, 230.
 Lælius, C. Sapiens (his son), 243, 252, 336, 345.
 Lænas, C. Popillius (cos. 172 B.C.), 276, 281.
 Lænas, M. Popillius (cos. 173 B.C.), 276.
 Lænas, M. Popillius (cos. 139 B.C.), 243, 244.
 Lænas, P. Popillius (cos. 132 B.C.), 339, 342, 352, 358.
 Lævinius, M. Valerius (cos. 210 B.C.), 203, 204, 212, 220, 225.
 Lævinius, P. Valerius (cos. 280 B.C.), 126, 127.
 Lamponius, M., 405, 410, 442.
 Lampsacus, 474.
 Lanuvium, 104.
 Laodicea, 427.
 Larissa, 263, 267, 268, 276, 277, 534, 535.
 Lartius, Sp., 32.
 Lartius, T., 33.
 Latins, magistrates of, 98; rights of, 98; demands of, 101; war with, 102, 103; help Rome, 80, 127. *See also Italians*.
 Latin league, 16; allied with Rome, 63, 64, 97, 98; closing of, 99; dissolution of, 103; reorganised under Rome, 103, 104, 135 *n.*
Latitius, 103, 104, 135, 309, 310, 353, 401; extended outside Italia, 408, 544. *See Franchise and Colonies*.
 Latium, 14, 16, 142, 145.
 Latulæ, pass of, 95, 101, 111.
 Law, primitive Roman, 66; twelve tables, 70, 71, 352; formulas published, 95; connected with religion, 290-2; administration of, 297; equity, 297; code of Sulla, 455. *See also Lex and Questions*.
 Lebanon, Mount, 480.
 Lectum, 433.
 Legends, of the kings, 20-31; sources of, 34-7; of the early Republic, 31-4, 59-63; criticism, 59, 64, 65 *n.*; of decemvirate, 68, 69; of Mælius, 76, 77; of Camillus and the Gauls, 80-90.

- Legion, development of, 102, 137-9, 379;
contrasted with phalanx, 125, 126, 128,
263, 264, 279. *See* Army and Phalanx.
- Legiones Cannenses*, 198, 200, 203, 207,
224, 230.
- Lemnos, 250.
- Lentulus, Cn. Cornelius (cos. 201 B.C.),
231.
- Lentulus, L. Cornelius (cos. 275 B.C.),
130.
- Lentulus, L. Cornelius, Crus. (cos. 49 B.C.),
525.
- Lentulus, P. Cornelius, 231.
- Lentulus, P. Cornelius Sura, 491, 494.
- Leontini, 210; land of, 211, 325, 335.
- Lepidus, M. Æmilius (cos. 187 B.C.), 260.
- Lepidus, M. Æmilius (Porcina), (cos. 137
B.C.), 244.
- Lepidus, M. Æmilius (cos. 78 B.C.), 459,
463-5.
- Lepidus, M. Æmilius (his son), triumvir,
529.
- Leucas, 280.
- Lex Ælia Fufia, 293.
- Leges agrariae, 57, 58, 95, 359; Licinia,
91, 92, 336, 338; Flaminia, 166, 167,
306-8; Sempronia, 338, 341, 343-5, 347;
Livia, 353, 354; Thoria, 359; Appuleia,
387, 389, 391; Servilia, 490; Julia, 500.
- Leges Appuleiae, 387, 391.
- Lex Aurelia iudiciaria, 469.
- Lex Cæcilia Didia, 394.
- Lex Calpurnia de Repetundis, 313, 333,
453.
- Lex Canuleia, 73.
- Lex Claudia, 315, 317.
- Lex Domitia, 289, 385, 492.
- Leges Frumentariae, Sempronia, 348, 349;
various, 360, 388, 390, 396, 451, 456, 464,
502; Julia, 545.
- Lex Gabinia, 472 n., 477, 478.
- Lex Hortensia, 96, 417.
- Lex Icilia, 55.
- Leges iudiciariae. *See* Lex Aurelia, Cal-
purnia, Cornelia, Livia, Sempronia,
Servilia.
- Lex Julia (90 B.C.), 407.
- Leges Juliae (59 B.C.), 499-501. (49-44
B.C.), 544-8.
- Lex Junia de peregrinis, 345, 346.
- Leges Liciniae Sextiae, 91, 92, 336, 338.
- Lex Licinia Mucia, 395.
- Leges Liviae (122 B.C.), 353, 354.
- Leges Liviae (91 B.C.), 396, 397.
- Lex Manilia, 479.
- Lex Ogulnia, 96, 133, 455.
- Lex Peducea, 385.
- Lex Plautia Papiria, 407, 413.
- Lex Poetelia, 96.
- Lex Pompeia (9 B.C.), 408.
- Leges Pompeiae (52 B.C.), 522-5.
- Lex Publilia Voleronis, 55.
- Leges Publiliae Philonis, 94.
- Lex Roscia, 470.
- Lex Sacrata, 55, 56.
- Leges Semproniae of Ti. Gracchus, 337-
341; of C. Gracchus, 346-54.
- Leges Serviliae iudiciariae, 300, 384, 388.
- Leges Sulpiciae, 413, 414, 417.
- Leges sumptuariae, 260, 320, 456, 546.
- Leges tabellariae, 333, 344, 377.
- Lex Valeria, 48, 71.
- Leges Valeriae Horatiae, 71.
- Lex Villia Annalis, 300, 452.
- Libo, L. Scribonius, 531.
- Lilyans, 145, 146, 230.
- Licinii. *See* Crassus, Lucullus, Macer,
Murena, Nerva, Stolo.
- Liger (Loire) R., 500, 509.
- Ligurians, 11, 166, 225; troops, 148, 211,
379; wars with, 164, 230, 271, 372, 373.
- Lilybaeum, 129, 157-62, 176, 185, 203,
393.
- Lingones, 85, 166, 178.
- Lipara, 154, 157, 185.
- Liris (R.), 7, 16, 95, 99, 104, 110, 114, 345,
405, 417.
- Lissus, 165.
- Literum, 203.
- Livius, C., 268, 269.
- Livius. *See* Drusus and Salinator.
- Livy (L. Livius), 53, 57, 59, 63, 64 n., 68,
69, 78, 79 n., 85 n., 87, 88, 90, 116, 177,
179, 180, 185, 190.
- Locri, 122, 129, 130, 204, 220, 221, 225.
- Longus, Ti. Sempronius, 177, 182 n., 185,
186.
- Luca (Volscian), 104.
- Luca (Lucca), 187; conference at, 518.
- Lucania, 116, 124, 130, 207, 219, 222, 223,
405, 410, 419, 466, 467.
- Lucanians, 16, 17, 100, 105, 106, 112, 116,
120, 126, 127, 129, 130, 201, 231, 402,
403, 435, 441, 442, 447.
- Luceria, 108, 110; L. C., 111, 118, 127,
201, 204, 206, 528.
- Luceres, 23, 44.
- Lucilius, C., 345.
- Lucretia, legend of, 31.
- Lucretius, C., 276, 277.
- Lucterius, 512.
- Lucilius, L. Licinius (cos. 151 B.C.), 242.
- Lucullus, L. Licinius (his son), 393.
- Lucullus, L. Licinius (his son), admiral of
Sulla, 430, 432, 433; war with Mithra-
dates, 474, 475; with Tigranes, 475,
476; retreats, 477; recalled, 479; in his
province, 328, 475, 482; at Rome, 462,
496.
- Lucullus, M. Licinius (his brother), 442,
471.
- Luerius, 373.
- Luna, 187; R. C., 230, 372.
- Lupercus, 21, 36; Luperci, 38; Lupen-
calia, 543.
- Lupus. *See* Rutillius.
- Lusitanians, 242-4, 304, 372, 457, 464.
- Lutatius. *See* Catulus.
- Lycia, 255, 427, 472, 478.
- Lyciscus, 276, 280.
- Lycortas, 258, 273.
- Lysimachia, 260, 266.
- Lysimachus of Thrace, 124, 125.

- MACCABEES, 329, 482.
Macedon, kingdom of, and Pyrrhus, 124, 125, 130; and Rome, 164, 165; and Hannibal, 175, 191, 200, 204, 205; wars with, 212, 213, 261-5, 276-9; power and policy of, 254, 257-60, 272; settlement of, 279-80; revolts, 282; made a province, 282, 283.
Macedonia, province, 282, 283, 286, 311, 326, 372, 374, 428, 429, 432, 433, 471, 490.
Macer, C. Licinius, 468.
Machanidas, 213.
Machares, 480.
Mælius, Sp., 76, 77.
Mænius, 104, 111.
Magalia (Megara), 249, 251.
Magister equitum, 48, 50.
Magistracy, collegiate character of, 47, 48, 76, 141; division of, 76, 96, 175, 298, 299; control of, by Senate, 97, 133, 298, 299; annual tenure, 47, 48, 141, 175; order of (*cursus honorum*), 300, 301; reorganised by Sulla, 452-4, and Pompey, 522, and Caesar, 542.
Mægius Minatius, 402, 409.
Magnesia, under Mount Sipylus, 427; battle, 270, 271, 272, 281, 420.
Mago, son of Hamilcar Barca, under Hannibal, 175, 183, 200; at the Trebia, 186; in Spain, 214, 215, 218, 219; in Liguria, 225; dies, 226.
Mago, Punic author, 318.
Maharbal, 173, 175, 190, 197, 200.
Maiestas, 357, 398, 408, 453.
Mallius, Cn. Maximus, 377, 378.
Mamertines, 127, 129, 131, 150.
Mamertine prison. *See* Tullianum.
Mamilius, C. Limetanus, 365.
Mancinus, A. Hostilius (cos. 170 B.C.), 277.
Mancinus, C. Hostilius (cos. 137 B.C.), 244, 337.
Mancinus, L. Hostilius (cos. 145 B.C.), 251.
Manilius, C., 479.
Manilius, M., 243, 249.
Manlius, C., 493.
Manlius, M. (Capitolinus), 87, 88, 91 *n*.
Manlius. *See* Torquatus and Volso.
Mantineæ, battle of (207 B.C.), 213.
Marcellus, C. Claudius (cos. 50 B.C.), 524.
Marcellus, C. Claudius (cos. 49 B.C.), 525.
Marcellus, M. Claudius, wins *spolia opima*, 168; in Campania, 202-4, 206; in Sicily, 210; takes Syracuse, 211, 219; death, 220, 221.
Marcellus, M. Claudius, his son (cos. 196 B.C.), 238.
Marcellus, M. Claudius (cos. 51 B.C.), 524.
Marcus, C., 215.
Marcus, Q. Tremulus, 114.
Marcus. *See* Censorinus, Coriolanus, Rex, Philippus, Rutilus.
Marius, C., tribune, 360, 361; in Spain, 245, 372; legate of Metellus, 366, 367; character and consulate, 367, 368; commands in Africa, 369-71; reorganises army, 314, 325, 378-81; at Aquæ Sextiæ, 381, 382; at Raudii Campi, 382-4; in politics, 384, 388, 389; and Saturninus, 389-91; fall, 391; in Social war, 404, 406, 408; and Sulpicius, 412-4, 416; flight, 417; return, 436; massacres and death, 437, 438, 446; and Caesar, 460, 503.
Marius, C. (the younger), 417, 435, 440-3, 447.
Marius, Egnatius, 405, 409.
Marius, M. Gratidianus, 446.
Marriage. *See* *Confarreatio*, *Coemptio*, *Usus*, *Ius conubii*.
Marrucini, 15, 403, 406, 408.
Mars, 15, 21, 35.
Marsi, 7, 15, 113, 115, 220, 403, 406, 408.
Massilia, 141, 142, 145, 177, 178, 239, 286, 300, 359, 372, 373, 504, 522, 529, 531.
Massinissa, 214, 219, 225-7, 229-31, 247-9, 360, 361.
Massiva, 365.
Mastanabal, 250, 361.
Matho, 163.
Mauretania, 247, 360, 364.
Meddix Tuticus, 201.
Mediolanum, 85, 166, 168.
Megellus, L. Postumius, 114 (*see* Errata), 118, 123.
Melita I., 145, 185.
Melpum, 12, 79, 84.
Memmius, C., 364, 389-91.
Menapii, 510, 512.
Menenius Agrippa, 54.
Mercenaries, at Carthage, 148; war with, 162, 163, 169.
Merula, L. Cornelius, 435, 437.
Mesopotamia, 420, 472, 484, 520.
Messalla, M. Valerius Maximus, 151.
Messana, 18, 127, 129, 131, 150, 151, 164, 327.
Messene, 258, 254, 268, 272, 273.
Messius, C., 517.
Metapontum, 112, 206, 223.
Metaurus R., 7; battle of, 222, 223.
Metella, Cæcilia, 458.
Metellus, L. Cæcilius (cos. 251 B.C.), 157, 158.
Metellus, Q. Cæcilius Baliaricus (cos. 123 B.C.), 245, 330.
Metellus, Q. Cæcilius Celer (cos. 60 B.C.), 495.
Metellus, Q. Cæcilius Creticus (cos. 69 B.C.), 472, 478, 496.
Metellus, L. Cæcilius Creticus (trib. 49 B.C.), 520.
Metellus, L. Cæcilius Dalmaticus (cos. 119 B.C.), 375.
Metellus, Q. Cæcilius Macedonicus, 244, 282, 285, 337, 345, 346, 355.
Metellus, Q. Cæcilius Nepos (cos. 98 B.C.), 394.
Metellus, Q. Cæcilius Nepos (cos. 57 B.C.), 496, 497, 499.
Metellus, Q. Cæcilius Numidicus (cos. 109 B.C.), in Numidia, 366-9, 371; censor, 388; exiled, 390; returns, 391.
Metellus, Q. Cæcilius Pius (cos. 80 B.C.), in social and civil war, 410, 419, 436, 437, 440-2; and Sulla, 446, 458; politician, 462, 486; in Spain, 454, 465; dies, 492.

- Metellus, Q. Cæcilius Scipio, 522, 525, 534, 537, 538.
 Metellus, M., 193.
 Mevania, battle of, 113.
 Merentius, 20, 40.
 Micipsa, 250, 301.
 Miletus, 260.
 Milo (Pipiro), 124, 129, 130.
 Milo, T. Annius, 516, 521, 522, 540.
 Mincius R., 5, 8, 11, 12, 238.
 Minervia, 347.
 Minturnæ, 7; R. C., 110, 417.
 Minucius, L. (Augurinus, cos. 458 B.C.), 61.
 Minucius, L. (? C.) (Augurinus), 76.
 Minucius, Ti., 114.
 Minucius, M. Rufus, *magister equitum*, 191; co-dictator, 193, 198, 305.
 Minucius, M. (? Q.) Rufus (cos. 110 B.C.), 375.
 Mithradates I., of Parthia (Arsaces), 329.
 Mithradates V., of Pontus, 329, 420, 421.
 Mithradates VI., of Pontus, the Great, accession of, 329, 421; intrigues, 388, 391, 410; and Sulla, 394; and Sertorius, 466; aggressions of, 412, 424-6; character of, 421, 422; 1st war with, 426-33; and war with, 445, 460; 3rd war with, 471, 473-7, 479, 480; death, 480.
 Mithradates, of Pergamum, 536.
 Mitylene (Mitylene), 427, 445, 460, 483.
 Molochath R., 360, 369.
 Mommsen, Prof. Th., 58 n., 64, 65 n., 69, 77 n., 85 n., 91 n., 99 n., 103 n., 122 n., 295 n., 463.
 Morgantia, 392.
 Mosæ (Meuse) R., 510.
 Motye, 145.
 Mucius. *See* Scaevola.
 Mulvius, Pons, 464.
 Mummius, L., 242, 285, 286.
 Munatius, 429, 430.
 Munda, 539, 542.
 Municipal system, 134, 135, 408, 411, 412, 450, 544, 545, cf. 482, 483. *See also* Latin league.
 Municipia, 135, 309, 411. *See* Carite franchise, *Civitas sine suffragio*.
 Munychia, 430.
 Murena, L. Licinius, 430, 434, 445, 493.
 Muthul R., 366.
 Mutilus, C. Papius, 404, 405, 409, 410.
 Mutina, R. C., 168, 239, 464.
 Mutines, 212.
 Mylæ, battle of, 154.
 Myonnesus, battle of, 270.
 Mytilene. *See* Mitylene.
- NABATEANS, 480, 482.
 Nabis, 257, 262, 264, 267.
 Nar R., 6, 15.
 Naraggara, 229.
 Narbo Martius, R. C., 348, 358, 373, 504, 544.
 Narbonensis. *See* Gaul.
 Narnia (Nequinum), L. C., 15, 115, 168, 222, 296 n., 405.
- Nasica. *See* Stipio.
 Naupactus, 251, 252, 279, 268.
 Navy of Carthage, 142 B., 152, 156, 175, 176, 271, 272.
 Navy of Mithradates, 428 f., 474, 475.
 Navy, Roman, weakness of, 141-3, 149, 152, 165; inactivity of, 23; creation of, 152, 153, 157, 158, 160; allies in, 153; decay of, 302, 314, 429, 471; drawn from allies, 201, 202, 265-70, 282, 430, 432, 433; under Pompey, 475, 527 f.
 Neapolis, 18, 106, 107, 135, 193, 202, 203, 379, 402, 411, 443.
 Nemo-sus, 373.
 Nepete, 82; L. C., 88, 405.
 Nephelis, 252.
 Neptunia (Tarentum), 347.
 Nero. *See* Claudius.
 Nerva, P. Licinius, 392.
 Nervii, 508, 511, 512.
 Nicæa (Nice), 372.
 Nicanor, 263.
 Nicomedes II., 392, 420, 434, 425.
 Nicomedes III., 425, 426, 473.
 Nicomedia, 475.
 Nicopolis, 479, 483.
 Nile R., 519, 539.
 Nisibis, 477.
 Nobiles, rise of, 66, 287, 290-302.
 Nobilior, M. Fulvius (189 B.C.), 272.
 Nobilior, Q. Fulvius (153 B.C.), 425.
 Nola, 107, 110, 111, 202-4, 206, 309, 405, 409, 414, 419, 435, 443.
 Nomentum, 104.
 Nonius (Nunnius), Q., 389.
 Noria, 443.
 Norbanus, C., 378, 387, 391, 413, 419, 440, 442.
 Noreia, 374, 377.
 Norici, 374, 375.
Novæ Tabulæ, 411, 540, 546.
Novus homo, 233, 300, 304, 394, 488.
 Nuceria, 107, 110, 113, 202, 392, 405.
 Numa Pompilius, 24, 25, 34, 37.
 Numantia, 242, 244, 245, 326, 342, 361.
 Numidia, chiefs of, 214, 218-19, 225-9; kingdom of, 247-8, 250, 251, 253, 360-1, 377, 443, 527; wars in, 364-71, 443, 531, 538.
 Numidian cavalry, in Punic army, 146, 148, 177, 186, 196-8, 220, 277, 230-1, 249; in Roman army, 251, 314, 379, 405.
- Obnuntiatio*, 293.
Occupatio, 56, 57, 306, 317, 335, 346, 338, 340, 343, 359.
 Oculis, 242.
 Oculiculum, 113, 115.
 Octavius (Octavianus), C. *See* Augustus.
 Octavius, Cn., 329.
 Octavius, Cn. (cos. 87 B.C.), 410, 435-7.
 Octavius, M. (tribune, 133 B.C.), 340, 341, 353.
 Octavius, M. (admiral), 531.
 Enomæus, 466.
 Ofella, Q. Lucretius, 441, 442, 457.
 Oleades, 172.
 Oligarchy at Rome, 287, 288, 299-302; re

- stored, 357, 358, 462; overthrown, 469, 541. *See Optimates and Parties.*
- Opimius, L. (cos. 121 B.C.), 345, 354, 356, 358, 361, 362, 365.
- Opimius, Q. (cos. 154 B.C.), 239, 372.
- Oppius, Q., 426, 427.
- Optimates*, 343, 412, 417, 485, 486, 488, 522-5. *See also Oligarchy and Parties.*
- Orchomenus, battle of, 432.
- Orestes, L. Aurelius (cos. 157 B.C.), 284.
- Orestes, L. Aurelius (cos. 126 B.C.), 346.
- Orestis, 264.
- Oricum, 533.
- Oringis, 218.
- Orodes, 520, 521.
- Oropus, 283.
- Ortygia, 210, 211.
- Oscæ, 465, 466.
- Oscanæ, 14, 16, 17, 106, 107.
- Ossa Mountain, 277.
- Ostia, 6; R. C., 25, 38, 191, 202, 349, 387, 417, 436, 472.
- Otacilius, T. Crassus, 194.
- Oxyntas, 405.
- PACORUS, 521.
- Padus (Po) R., 5, 383; plain of, 11, 13, 85, 166, 442, 464. *See also Gaul, Cisalpine.*
- Pæligni, 15, 113, 278, 403, 406, 408.
- Pæstum, 7, 11, 105; L. C., 164*n.*, 193, 201.
- Pætus, P. Antonius, 487.
- Palæopolis, 106, 107.
- Palatine, Mount, 21, 22, 27, 37, 38.
- Palestine, 281, 480.
- Pallantia, 242, 244.
- Palma, 330.
- Pamphylia, 255, 281, 472, 482.
- Panætius, 320, 345.
- Panium, Mount, battle of, 266.
- Panormus, 145, 154, 157, 160; battle of, 157, 158.
- Panticapæum, 424, 480.
- Paphlagonia, 424-7, 433.
- Papirius. *See Carbo, Cursor.*
- Papius. *See Brutulus and Mutilus.*
- Papus, L. Æmilius, 167.
- Parma, R. C., 239.
- Parthia, rise of, 238, 254, 255, 329, 330, 420; and Sulla, 394, 425; and Tigranes, 472, 476, 479; and Pompey, 484; and Crassus, 518-21; and Caesar, 543, 550.
- Parties at Rome, beginnings of, 187, 193, 194; nullity of, 235, 287, 304, 324, 332, 358; struggles of, 284, 391, 434*f.*, 460*f.*, 485, 486, 497, 498, 519.
- Patara, 472.
- Patris potestas*, 40, 70.
- Patricians, government of, 51, 52; exclusiveness of, 73, 74; power broken, 96.
- Patrum auctoritas*, 44, 50, 51, 94.
- Paulus, L. Æmilius (cos. 219 B.C.), 166, 194, 196, 198.
- Paulus, L. Æmilius (Macedonicus, cos. 181 B.C.), in Spain, 241, 251; at Pydna, 278, 279, 281, 282; Hellenist, 320.
- Paulus, L. Æmilius (Lepidus, cos. 50 B.C.), 524.
- Pedum, 104.
- Pella, 278.
- Peloponnesus, 258, 264, 268, 272, 276, 283.
- Pelusium, 281, 519, 535, 536.
- Pennus, M. Junius, 345.
- Pera, M. Junius, 202, 298.
- Perduellio*, 377, 453, 491.
- Pergamum, kingdom of, 255-7; policy of, 259, 260; and Antiochus, 262, 267, 270, 271; and Rome, 212, 232, 264, 271, 272, 280, 281; left to Rome, 328; town of, 427, 428, 432.
- Pericles, 1, 356, 357, 497, 541.
- Perperna, C., 406.
- Perperna, M. (cos. 130 B.C.), 328.
- Perperna, M. (Marian), 443, 464, 466.
- Perseus, 274-9, 282.
- Perusia, 13, 112, 118, 188.
- Pessinus, 226, 291.
- Petelia, 203, 220.
- Petra (Arabia), 480.
- Petra (Epius), 534.
- Petreius, M., 495, 529-31, 538.
- Phalanna, 277.
- Phalanx, Greek, 125, 126, 128, 130, 254, 263, 264, 270, 271, 278, 279; Italian, 468, 137, 294.
- Phanagoria, 424.
- Pharisees, 482.
- Pharnaces, 480, 536.
- Pharos, 165, 166.
- Pharsalus, battle of, 534, 535.
- Phasis R., 480.
- Philetærus, 257.
- Philippi, 429.
- Philip V. of Macedon, 266; and Hannibal, 200, 202, 205, 235; 1st war with Rome, 212, 213; power of, 254; character, 259; and Antiochus, 260, 261, 265-3, 272; 2nd war with Rome, 261-5; last years, 273-5.
- Philippus, L. Marcus (cos. 91 B.C.), 396, 397, 438, 440, 443.
- Philippus, Q. Marcus (cos. 186 B.C.), 276-8, 280.
- Philip, pseudo-, 251, 282.
- Philo. *See Publius.*
- Philocharis, 122.
- Philocles, 262.
- Philopœmen, 213, 258, 261, 267, 272, 273.
- Phœceans, 19, 145.
- Phœnicia, 255, 268; Phœnicians (in Sicily), 18, 125, 143, 146, 149.
- Phrates, 476, 479, 484.
- Phrygia, 254, 320, 420, 421, 473.
- Picentines, 15, 115, 403.
- Picenum, 166, 191, 204, 220, 400, 405-8, 440, 441, 528.
- Pilum*, 102, 139.
- Pinna, 402.
- Piræus, 267, 428, 430, 431.
- Pirates (Baliaric), 245, (Illyrian) 165, 278, 280, 374, (Cretan, &c.), 314, 327, (Cilician) 393, 426, 466, 467, 473; power of, 471; war with, 472; ended by Pompey, 478, 483.
- Pisæ, 166, 167, 182, 187, 372.
- Pisaurum, R. C., 239.

- Piso, C. Calpurnius (cos. 180 B.C.), 241.
 Piso, Cn. Calpurnius (Cutilianus), 487, 488, 490.
 Piso, L. Calpurnius (Frugi, cos. 133 B.C.), 333.
 Piso, L. Calpurnius (Cæsonius), cos. 112 B.C.), 377.
 PISO. *See also* Bestia.
 Placentia, L. C., 5, 168, 177, 183, 105-7, 221, 238, 239, 442.
 Plancus, T. Munatius Bursa, 521, 522.
 Plautius, M. Silvanus, 408.
Plæbs origin of, 41, 42, 44; secessions of, 54, 69, 96; admitted to the Senate, 50; to decemvirate, 67; to consular tribunate, 73, 74, 76; to quaestorship, 76; to consulate, 92, *cf.* 296; to other offices, 94, *cf.* 346; to priesthood, 95, 288, 291, 292; grievances of, 52 *f.*, 72, 73, 82; and the *ius comitii*, 71, 73; later meaning of, 349. *See also* Concilium and Tribunes.
Plebiscitum, 55, 96, 294, 450. *See also* Appendix I.
 Pleminius, Q., 225.
 Plotius, A., 407.
 Plutarch (author), 59.
 Pollentia, 330.
 Polybius (historian), 6, 9, 12, 87, 90, 122 *n.*, 179, 180, 185 *n.*, 190, 198 *n.*, 209 *n.*, 251, 253, 305; (statesman), 280, 283, 286, 320, 345.
 Polyxenidas, 268-70.
 Pomerium, 37, 416, 453.
 Pompeii, 107, 409.
 Pompeius, Q. (cos. 141 B.C.), 244.
 Pompeius, Q. Rufus, his son (?) (cos. 88 B.C.), 414, 416, 419, 435.
 Pompeius, Q. Rufus, his grandson (trib. 52 B.C.), 521.
 Pompeius, Cn. Strabo (cos. 89 B.C.), 399, 404, 406-8, 410, 419, 435, 436, 440.
 Pompeius, Cn. Magnus (his son, Pompey), born, 384; in civil war, 440-5; and Sulla, 444, 445, 457; character of, 388, 389, 463, 535; and Lepidus, 463, 464; in Spain, 465, 466; first consulate, 468, 469; retires, 470; conquers pirates, 477, 478; war with Mithradates and Tigranes, 479, 480; reorganises the East, 480-4; and Roman parties, 485-7, 489-91, 496; returns, 497; triumvirate, 498-503; intrigues, 516, 517; at Luca, 517, 518; second consulate, 519; sole consul, 521, 522; alliance with the Senate, 522-3; war with Caesar, 527-35; defeat and death, 534, 535; sets precedents for Caesarism, 323, 325, 449, 478, 479, 521.
 Pompeius, Cn. Magnus (his son), 537-9.
 Pompeius, Sext. Magnus (also his son), 537-9.
 Pomptine marshes, 16, 95.
 Pontiae Insulae, L. C., 111.
 Pontifex Maximus, 288, 328, 385, 491.
 Pontifices, 24, 49, 95, 291, 292.
 Pontius, Gavius, 108-10, 119.
 Pontius Telesinus, 442.
 Pontus, kingdom of, rise of, 238, 255, 329, 330, 420, 421; extent of, 422-4; wars with, 426-33, 445, 473 *f.*, 520.
 Popillius, C., 377.
 Popilius. *See* Laenas.
Populares, 324, 356, 364, 366, 391, 417, 438, 460, 468, 470, 476, 485-8, 490 *f.*, 499, 497.
 Population of Italy, 137; decline of, 288, 317, 318, 336, 546; increase in, 343.
 Populonia, battle of, 122.
 Porcius, L., 221.
 Porcius. *See* Cato.
 Porsenna, Lars, 32, 33, 40.
Portoria, abolished, 499; re-imposed, 546.
Possessio. *See* *Occupatio*, *Ager publicus*.
 Postumius, M. Pyrgensis, 207.
 Postumius. *See* Albinus, Megellus, Regillus.
 Potentia, R. C., 279.
 Potitus, L. Valerius, 69.
Prefectura (*Praefectus iuri diuino*), 90, 110, 135, 210, 495, 411.
Praefectus urbi, 48, 579.
 Praeneste, 16, 63, 69, 104, 309, 441-3.
 Praetor, old name for consul, 98; special office instituted, 92; open to plebs, 94; increase of, 207, by Sulla, 432; functions of, 207, 313, 453, 454.
 Priests, colleges of, 49, 74, 95, 290-2; election of, 288, 289, 333, 385, abolished, 451, restored, 492. *See also* Appendix I.
Principes, 138, 230.
 Privernum, 104, 108.
 Proconsul and propraetor, 107, 311-13, 452-454, 547.
 Proscriptions, 417, 418, 445-6, 461, 486, 491.
 Provinces, government of, 310-13, 547; law of C. Gracchus, 351, 352; Sulla's law, 452, 453, 523; Pompey's law, 522, 523; Caesar's reforms, 501, 548; Sicily, 164, 232; Sardinia, 164; two *Spaius*, 232, 240, 464, 465; Macedonia, 282; Africa, 253; Asia, 328, 329; Gallia Narbonensis, 323; Cilicia, 393, 482; Gallia Cisalpina, 412, 453; Crete, Syria, Bithynia, 482; Gallia Comata, 514.
Provincia, 310, 351, 412, 452, 502.
Provocatio, 32, 48, 66, 71, 352, 449, 491, 494, 502, 503.
 Prusias I., 255, 260, 270, 271, 273.
 Prusias II., 255, 261.
 Ptolemæus, 304.
 Ptolemy I., Soter son of Lagus, 124.
 Ptolemy II. Philadelphus, 105, 225.
 Ptolemy III. Euergetes I., 255.
 Ptolemy IV. Philopator, 255, 260.
 Ptolemy V. Epiphanes, 255, 260, 266.
 Ptolemy VI. (VII.) Philometor, 281, 320.
 Ptolemy VII. (IX.) Euergetes II. Physcon, 281, 320, 323, 419.
 Ptolemy X. (XII.) Alexander II., 473, 502.
 Ptolemy XI. (XIII.) Auletes, 487, 502, 517, 519.
 Ptolemy XII. (XIV.), 535, 536.
 Ptolemy XIII. (XV.), 536.
 Ptolemy Apion of Cyrene, 393.
 Ptolemy of Cyprus, 503.

Publicani (tax-farmers), 311, 312, 315, 327, 350, 351, 392, 420, 454, 461, 475, 479, 499, 500, 548. *See* *Equester Ordo* and *Taxation*.
Publicola, P. Valerius, 31, 32, 48
Publius, Q. Philo, 94, 107.
Publius, Volero, 55.
Pullus, L. Junius, 160.
Punic wars, 1st, 149-162; 2nd, 174-234; 3rd, 245-53.
Punicus, 242.
Puteoli, 206, 207, 349, 458, 459.
Pydna, battle of, 278-9.
Pylæmenes, 424.
Pyrenees Mountains, 2, 176, 213, 372, 529.
Pyrgi, 79.
Pyrrhus, and Tarentum, 123; early life, 124, 125; schemes of, 106, 125; victories of, 126, 128; and Sicily, 18, 120, 131, 143, 149, 150; defeat of, 130; death, 130.
Pythium, pass of, 278.

Quæstiones special, ordered by Senate, 291, 342, 356, forbidden by Gracchus, 352; ordered by people, 305, 368, 387, 398, 399, 408, abolished by Sulla, 455; *cf.* however 477, 521.
Quæstiones perpetuæ (standing), Calpurnian de Repetundis, 313, 333, 352; Sempronian, 350, 352, 353; Cornelian, 455, 456. *See* also *Leges iudiciariæ*.
Quæstores, paritidii et ararii, 48, 72; for military chest, 76; classici, 142; in provinces, 297, 311, 315, 346; Ostian, 349, 387; prætoræ, 488; number increased by Sulla, 452; elected by tribes, 76; right to sit in Senate, 454-5.
Quinctius, 243. *See* Cincinnatus, Crispinus, Flamininus.
Quirinal, Mount, 22, 27, 38, 62.
Quirinus, 23, 24, 35, 86.

RABIRIUS, C., 491.
Ræti, 12 n., 374.
Ramnes, 23, 44.
Raphia, battle of, 265.
Rasenna. *See* Etruscanæ.
Raudii Campi, battle of, 383.
Ravenna, 5, 525.
Regia, 39.
Regillensis, A. Postumius, 33, 34.
Regillensis, M. Postumius, 77.
Regillus, Lake, battle of, 33, 59.
Regillus, L. Atilius, 269.
Regulus, C. Atilius (cos. 225 B.C.), 167.
Regulus, M. Atilius (cos. 294 B.C.), 118.
Regulus, M. Atilius (cos. 256 B.C.), 148, 155-7, 158, 200.
Regulus, M. Atilius (cos. 217 B.C.), 193.
Religion, Roman, compared with Greek, 35, 290; character of, 288-93; and politics, 187, 291-3; foreign worship, 226, 290, 291, 321; decay of, 320, 321; superstition, 385, 386; sacrilege, 385, 497.
Remi, 504 n., 508.
Remus, 21, 35, 36.

Repetundæ, 242, 313, 333, 352, 453, 501.
Rex, Q. Marcius (cos. 118 B.C.), 375.
Rex, Q. Marcius (cos. 68 B.C.), 477, 479.
Rex sacrorum, or *sacrificulus*, 47, 95.
Rhægium (Regium), 4, 18, 122, 146, 402; seized by Campanians, 127, 129, 150; retaken by Rome, 131, 150; in 2nd Punic war, 203, 209, 210, 220.
Rhenus (Rhine) R., 504, 507, 510, 512.
Rhodanus (Rhône) R., 11, 176-8, 182, 373, 374, 503, 506.
Rhodes, power and policy, 255, 257, 259; and Philip, 260, 264; and Antiochus, 266-8, 270, 272; and Perseus, 276, 278; humiliation of, 280, 281, 304, 315; and Mithradates, 427, 430; refuge, 442, 461.
Rome, position of, 1, 19; trading centre, 6, 19, 42, 141, 142; original settlements, 37, 38; unification, 38-40; sack and rebuilding of, 86-8; threatened by Hannibal, 208, 209; by Samnites, 442, 443; under Cæsar, 545.
Romulus, 21-3, 54-7.
Roscius, Sext., 460.
Rostri, 104, 417, 437.
Rulicon R., 5, 408, 453, 525, 526.
Rufus. *See* Cælius, Minucius, Rutilius Sulpicius, Vibullius.
Rullus, P. Servilius, 490.
Rupilius, P., 328.
Ruspina, 538.
Rutilius, P. Lupus, 404, 406.
Rutilius, P. Rufus, 366, 379, 396.
Rutilus, C. Marcius (dict. 356 B.C.), 94, 101.
Rutilus, C. Marcius (Censorinus, cos. 310 B.C.), 112.
SABELLIANS, 14, 15, 78, 107, 191, 231.
Sabines, 14, 15, 167; rape of, 22, 36; and *civitas*, 119, 305.
Sabinus, Q. Titurius, 508, 511.
Sabis (Sambre) R., 508.
Sacer Mons, 54.
Sacramentum, 77, 139, 380.
Sacriportus, battle of, 441.
Sacro-sancti, 54, 71, 452.
Sadducees, 482.
Saguntum, 171-4, 177, 191, 214, 242.
Salamis in Cyprus, 548.
Salapia, 201, 219, 409.
Salassi, 166, 180, 326, 372.
Salii, 24, 38.
Salinator, M. Iulius, 166, 221-3, 225, 228.
Sallustius, C. Crispus (Sallust), 360, 361, 365, 368.
Salluvii, 373.
Salonæ, 375.
Salvius (Tryphon), 392.
Samarobriua, 511.
Samnites, tribes of, 15-17, 118; attack Volsci, 78, 99; seize Campania, 79, 100; 1st war with, 100; alliance with, 101, 102; and war with, 106-14; 3rd war with, 115-19; and Pyrrhus, 120, 123, 126, 127, 129, 130; and Hannibal, 201; in Social war, 402-5, 408-10, 419; in civil war, 435, 436, 438, 441-3.

- Samnium, 4, 130, 206, 209, 239, 448, 545.
 Samos, 255, 268, 269, 471.
 Sardinia, 11, 19; and Carthage, 13, 146, 154; province, 163, 164, 346, 351; rebellions in, 205, 239, 336; in civil wars, 438, 440, 443, 464, 529.
 Saticula, L. C., 111.
 Satricum (near Antium), 78, 99.
 Satricum (near Arpinum), 110.
 Saturninus, L. Appuleius, 378, 381, 387, 389-91, 491.
 Scævola, C. Mucius, 33, 59.
 Scævola, P. Mucius (cos. 133 B.C.), 337, 343.
 Scævola, Q. Mucius (augur, cos. 117 B.C.), 391, 396.
 Scævola, Q. Mucius (pontif. max., cos. 95 B.C.), 395, 396, 441.
 Scaptius, 548.
 Scarphæa, battle of, 285.
 Scato, P. Vettius, 405, 406.
 Scaurus, M. Æmilius (cos. 115 B.C.), 360-2, 364, 365, 375, 387, 391, 396, 399.
 Scaurus, M. Aurelius, 378.
 Sciathus, 428.
 Scipio, L. Cornelius Barbatus (cos. 298 B.C.), 116, 117.
 Scipio, Cn. Cornelius Asina, his son (cos. 260 B.C.), 154, 157.
 Scipio, L. Cornelius, his brother (cos. 259 B.C.), 154.
 Scipio, Cn. Cornelius Calvus, his son (cos. 222 B.C.), 158, 178, 213-5.
 Scipio, P. Cornelius, his brother (cos. 218 B.C.), against Hannibal, 177-9, 182-7; in Spain, 193, 213-5.
 Scipio, P. Cornelius Africanus (his son), at the Ticinus, 183; at Cannæ, 200; character of, 215, 216; commands in Spain, 216-9; consul, 224, 225; in Africa, 226-231; at Zama, 229, 230; in Asia, 268-271; death, 273; and politics, 300-5; and Caesarism, 133, 323.
 Scipio, L. Cornelius Asiaticus (his brother), 218, 268, 273, 393.
 Scipio, P. Cornelius Æmilianus Africanus, in Spain, 242, 244, 245, 248, 313, 361, 367; at siege of Carthage, 248-53, 313; in the East, 330; censor, 331, 346; character of, 332, 333; policy of, 337, 342-4; Hellenist, 320, 337; death of, 345.
 Scipio, L. Cornelius Asiaticus (cos. 83 B.C.), 439, 440.
 Scipio, P. Cornelius Nasica Corculum (cos. 162 B.C.), 248, 331, 374.
 Scipio, P. Cornelius Nasica Serapio (cos. 138 B.C.), 347, 348.
 Scipio. *See also* Metellus.
 Scirrhæa, battle of, 393.
 Scodra, 165, 264, 270, 374.
 Scordisci, 326, 374, 375.
 Scoliacium (Scolacium), R. C., 347.
 Scythians, 329, 330, 424, 425, 480.
 Segesta, siege of, 154.
 Segovia, 465.
 Seleucia, 483.
 Seleucids, 254, 472, 544.
 Seleucus I. Nicator, 124.
 Selinus, 145.
 Sellasia, battle of, 195, 175, 254.
 Sempronius. *See* Asellio, Gracchus, Longus, Tuditanus.
 Sena Gallica, R. C., 122, 221.
 Senate, of the kings, 23, 47, 44; of the early republic, 50-53; resists reforms, 53, 66, 74, 92; patricio-plebeian, ascendancy of, 96, 97, 128, 133, 287, 288, 297-9, 304; controls army, 136, 137; controls religion, 207, 291; controls administration of provinces, 218, 271, 279, 311-13, 351; struggles with consuls, 224, 276; with comitia, 261, 307, 308, 339-42, 347-77, 390, 414; foreign policy of, 228, 234-7, 262-265, 271, 272, 280-2, 322, 321, 330, 331, 393, 394, 471-3; failure to govern, 325, 326, 331-3, 357, 358, 360, 365; number increased, 455, 542; and Drusus, 395-7; restored by Sulla, 418, 449 C.; overthrown, 469, 470, 478, 479; and triumphs, 497-500; and Pompey, 522, 523, 527; of Cæsar, 529, 547.
Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus, 291-2; *ultimum*, 298, 357, 435, 491, 493, 497, 525.
 Senones, 15, 85, 121, 122, 166; in Gaul, 512.
 Sentinum, battle of, 118, 119.
 Sentius, C., 428.
 Septimius, L., 535.
Septimontium, 37, 38.
 Septumleuis, L., 350.
 Sequana (Seine) R., 507, 508, 572, 573.
 Sequani, 505, 507, 513.
 Serranus, A. Atilius, 267.
 Sertorius, Q., in civil war, 435-8; in Spain, 372, 440, 445, 457, 464-6, 472, 473.
 Servilius, C. (in Sicily), 393.
 Servilius, C. (prætor, 91 B.C.), 400.
 Servilius, Cn. Geminus (cos. 217 B.C.), 190, 191, 193, 197, 198, 214.
 Servilius, P. Vatia Isauricus (cos. 79 B.C.), 472, 492.
 Servius Tullius, 26-9; wall of, 27, 38, 39; constitution of, 27-9, 45-7.
 Sestius, P., 517, 518.
 Sestos, 260.
 Sextus, C. Calvinus, 373.
 Sextus, L. Latranus, 91, 92.
 Sibylline books, 30, 292.
 Sicily, 2, 18, 19; and Pyrrhus, 125, 129-131; and Carthage, 143, 145, 146, 169; in 1st Punic war, 149-62; province, 164; tithes of, 311, 317, 351; in 2nd Punic war, 185, 200, 203-6, 210-12, 224, 225; slave wars in, 326-8, 392, 393; in civil wars, 438, 443, 529, 531; and Verres, 469, 481.
 Sicoris (Segres) R., 529-31.
 Sicyon, 258, 262.
 Silanus, D. Junius (cos. 62 B.C.), 493-494.
 Silanus, M. Junius (prætor, 212 B.C.), 216, 218.
 Silanus, M. Junius (cos. 109 B.C.), 377.
 Silo, Q. Pompeius, 404-6, 410.
 Silva Litana, 200.
 Sinnaca, 520.
 Sinope, 421, 424, 425, 475, 482.
 Sinuessa, R. C., 119.

- Siris R., 126.
 • *Ischia*, 374, 375.
 Slavery, forms and influence of, 316 *f.*, 327, 546; in Sicily, 164, 212, 326-8, 392, 393.
 • Slaves in army, 202-5; tax on manumission of, 220.
 Smyrna, 268, 270, 396.
 Social war, causes of, 395, 400-2; importance of, 399; course of, 405-10; results of, 410-12.
 • *Socii*. See Allies, Italians, Latins.
 Socrates of Lithynia, 425, 426.
 Soli (Pompeiiopolis), 483.
 Solon, 66, 337.
 Solus, 145.
 Sophene, 329, 476, 482.
 Sophonisba, 218, 219, 225, 227.
 Sora, 104, 111, 114; L. C., 115.
 Sosis, 211.
 Spain, 2, 3; conquered by Carthage, 145, 169, 170-5, 178; in 2nd Punic war, 202, 205, 210, 213-19; ceded to Rome, 231; provinces, 232, 240, 242, 311, 312; war in, 240-5, 368, 371, 372, 392; and Scitorius, 449, 445, 457, 414-6; and Piso, 487, 490; Caesar in, 492, 498, 509-31, 537, 539; under Pompey, 518, 522, 537; under Caesar, 544, 547.
 Spanish sword, 130, 217.
 Spanish troops, 137, 148, 190, 196, 214, 218, 223, 225, 227.
 • Sparta, 165, 212, 213, 254, 258, 267, 272, 273, 283-5.
 Spartacus, 466-8.
 Spendius, 163.
 Spina, 5.
 Spoletium, L. C., 15, 164 *n.*, 168, 191, 296 *n.*, 405, 441, 442.
 • *Spolia opima*, 22, 79, 80 *n.*, 168.
 Stabiae, 400.
 Statius Gellius, 114.
 Sthenius Statilius, 120, 122.
 • *Stipendium* (provincial), 253, 311. See Taxation.
 Steni, 375.
 Stoics, 297, 321, 387.
 Stolo, C. Licinius, 91, 92, 306.
 Subura, 27, 38.
 • Suero R., 465.
 Suebi, 505, 510.
 • Suessa Aurunca, L. C., 111, 192, 209.
 Suessiones, 373, 508.
 Suessula, 203, 204, 206, 207.
 • Suetonius (biographer), 87.
 Sugambri, 510.
 Sulla, Faustus Cornelius, 458.
 Sulla, L. Cornelius Felix, 9, 17; captures Jugurtha, 369-71; in Cilicia, 394, 425; in Social war, 404-6, 409, 410; character of, 414-16; march on Rome, 416; first legislation, 417, 418; and Mithradates, 429-34, 471; in civil war, 439-45; proscriptions, 417, 445-8, 486; colonies, 448; dictator, 448, 449; constitution of, 325, 411, 412, 449-58, overthrown, 461-4, 466, 470, 492; resignation and death of, 458, 459; and Caesar, 445, 446, 460, 491, 540, 542, 547; and Pompey, 440, 443-5, 485.
 Sulla, P. Cornelius (Catilinarian), 487.
 Sulpicius, P. Rufus (trib. 88 B.C.), 396, 413, 414, 417.
 Sulpicius, Servius (in Social war), 406, 407.
 • Sura, Bruttius, 428.
 Suthul, 365.
 Sutrium, 82; L. C., 88, 112, 405.
 Sybaris, 18.
 Syphax, 214, 218, 225-7, 247.
 Syracuse, 9, 18; naval power of, 79, 165; and Pyrrhus, 125, 128, 129, 131; and Carthage, 141, 142, 146, 163; in 1st Punic war, 149 *f.*; allied with Rome, 151; with Carthage, 204; subdued by Marcellus, 210-12, 219; Roman, 349, 392.
 Syria, and Pyrrhus, 124, 130; position and power of, 212, 254, 255, 259; war with, 265-72; and Perseus, 275, 276, 278; Roman Protectorate, 281; decay of, 320, 330, 420; under Tigranes, 472, 475, 476; and Pompey, 480-2; province, 482, 518, 519, 521, 535, 536.
 T. FENIA, the, at Carthage, 249, 251.
 Tagus R., 210.
 Tamesis (Thames) R., 510.
 Tannetum, 177.
 Tarentum, 17, 18, 98; and Lucanians, 101, 105-7, 111, 112, 119, 120; treaty with, 122, 142; war with, 122-30; and Carthage, 131, 135, 146, 150; in 2nd Punic war, 203, 206, 207, 210-12, 219, 221, 222; Neptunia, 347.
 Tarquinii, 88, 89, 99, 112.
 Tarquinius Collatinus, 30, 31.
 Tarquinius, L. Priscus, 25, 26, 38, 40.
 Tarquinius, L. Superbus, 29-34, 38, 40.
 Tarquinius, Sextus, 29-31, 37.
 Tarracina (Anxur), 78, 95; R. C., 104.
 Tarraco, 213, 218, 219, 242, 372.
 Tartessus (Tarshish), 170.
 Tatius, T., 22, 23, 35.
 Taurini, 166, 180, 183.
 Taurisci, 374, 377.
 Tauromenium, 328.
 Taurus, Mount, 270, 271, 472.
 Tautamus, 244.
 Taxation in Italy: *Tributum*, 46, 82, 135, 138, 295, 315; *vicesima manumissionum*, 220, 315; extraordinary, 205, 206; *portoria*, 499, 546; in provinces: *decumae*, 164, 311, 351, 454, 499, 500, 548; *stipendium* or *tributum*, 242, 279, 280, 311; methods of, 311, 314, 315.
 Textiles, 431.
 Teanum, Appulum, 110.
 Teanum, Sidicinum, 100, 192, 202, 209, 405, 440, 441, 446.
 Tectosages, in Galatia, 257; in Gaul, 381.
 Tegea, 285.
 Telamon, battle of, 167, 168, 188, 436.
 Tempe, pass of, 262, 263, 277, 278.
 Temple, at Jerusalem, 482; of Persephone, at Locri, 130; of Juno Lacinia, 228; Juno at Veii, 81, 82, 84 *n.*
 Temples at Rome, of Bellona, 443; of Castor and Pollux, 34; of Concord, 92, 356; of Diana, 27; of Fides, 24, 341;

- of Janus, 24; of Juno on the Aventine, 82; of Jupiter Capitolinus, 26, 30, 32, 40, 341; burnt, 441; restored, 496, 497; of Jupiter Feretrius, 22, 79 *n*; of Jupiter Stator, 22, 314, 373, 493; of Kediculatus Tutanus, 209; of Vestia, 341, 42, 43.
- Tencteli, 510, 519.
- Tenedos, 433.
- Terentius, 1. Afer (Terence), 345.
- Terentius. *See* Varro.
- Teres, 282.
- Termantia, 244.
- Terminus (a god), 24, 30.
- Teuta, Queen, 165.
- Teutoboduus, 381.
- Teutones, 381, 382.
- Thala, 367, 369.
- Thapsus, battle of, 538.
- Thasos, 260.
- Thebes, 263, 285, 429, 431.
- Themiscyra, 475.
- Thenæ, 253.
- Theodosia, 424.
- Thermæ, 157.
- Thermon, 258.
- Thermopylæ, 258, 263, 268, 285.
- Thespiæ, 428.
- Thessalonica, 282, 531.
- Thessaly, 254, 262, 264, 267, 268, 274, 277, 282, 429, 432, 534, 535.
- Thrace, 266, 268, 270, 274, 374, 428, 432, 471.
- Thurii, 120, 122, 123, 203, 206, 225.
- Tiber R., 6, 15, 19, 32, 33, 85 *n*., 86, 115.
- Tibur (Tivoli), 6, 16, 98, 99, 104, 209, 309.
- Ticinus R., 5, 8; battle of, 183.
- Tifata, Mount, 100, 203, 208, 440.
- Tigranes, king of Armenia, 420, 424-6, 471-3, 475-7, 479, 480.
- Tigranes (his son), 479.
- Tigranocerta, 473, 476, 477.
- Tigurini, 377, 381.
- Tilphossium, Mount, 429.
- Tingis (Tangiers), 464.
- Tities, 23, 35, 44; Titii, 35.
- Titius, Sext., 391.
- Tolenus R., 406.
- Tolistoboi, 257.
- Tolosa, 374, 377, 504.
- Tolumnius, Lars, 79.
- Torquatus, L. Manlius (cos. 65 B.C.), 487.
- Torquatus, T. Manlius, Imperiosus (cos. 340 B.C.), 90, 101-3.
- Torquatus, T. Manlius (cos. 235 B.C.), 164, 202, 205.
- Tougeni, 377, 381.
- Transpadanes. *See* Franchise and Gaul.
- Trapezus, 424.
- Trasimene, Lake of, 8; battle at, 189, 190.
- Trebellius, L., 478.
- Trebia R., 5; battle of, 183-7.
- Trebonius, C., 529, 537, 550.
- Trebula, 115.
- Tremellius, L., 283.
- Trerus R., 7, 16, 64, 78, 110, 114.
- Treveri, 511.
- Triarii, 103, 138.
- Triarius, C. Valerius, 477.
- Tribuni ærarii*, 465 *n*.
- Tribuni militum*, 130, 139, 300, 380.
- Tribuni militum consulari potestate*, 73, 74.
- Tribuni plebis*, origin of, 54-6; sacrosanct, 54, 71, 72, 452, 491, 525; number increased, 66; powers increased, 72, 97; instruments of Senate, 97, 224, 296, 308; again popular leaders, 308, 338 *f*., 341, 342, 349 *f*., 357 *f*., 413, 114; powers limited, 417, 418, 450-2, restored, 468-70; office of suspended, 66, 67, deposition from, 340, 341, *cf.* 478, re-election to, 341, 344, 346, 353.
- Triumvira potestas*, 512, 543.
- Tribus* of Romulus, 21, 44; Servian, 27, 46, 47; number increased, 83, 104, 108, 115, 134; number completed, 203; and centuries, 295, 296; size of, 305. *See* also *Comitia tributa*, *Concilium plebis*, and *Franchiæ*.
- Tributum* (Roman), 41, 82, 135, 138, 205, 315; (provincial), *see* *Stipendium* and *Taxation*.
- Trifanum, battle of, 103.
- Trinobantes, 511.
- Triunvudinum*, 394.
- Triocla, 391.
- "Triumvirate, First," formed, 499 *f*.; renewed, 518-20; breach in, 521 *f*.
- Triumviri mensarii*, 203.
- Trocmi, 257.
- Troy, 20, 84.
- Tuditanus, C. Sempionius, 344, 375.
- Tullianum, 25, 38, 370, 371, 494.
- Tullius, Attius, 60.
- Tullus Hostilius, 24, 25, 34.
- Tunes (Tunis), 156, 227, 249.
- Turdetani, 240.
- Turnus, 20, 40.
- Turpilius, T. Silanus, 357.
- Tusca, 247; R., 253.
- Tusculum, 90, 108.
- Twelve Tables, 70, 71.
- Tyndaris, battle of, 155.
- Tyrrhenian = Etruscan, 12, 79; coast and sea, 4, 13.
- UBII, 510.
- Umbria, 116, 118, 191, 204, 222, 224, 402, 405, 407, 408, 442.
- Umbrians, 14, 15, 113, 167.
- Unciarius fenus*, 70.
- Uspetes, 510, 519.
- Usus, 70.
- Usury. *See* Debt and Interest.
- Utica, 143, 146, 163, 226, 227; Roman ally, 248, 253, 359, 362, 368, 394.
- Uxellodunum, 514.
- VACCÆI, 172, 242, 244.
- Vadimo, Lake, first battle of, 112; second battle of, 122, 166.
- Vaga, 366.
- Valentia, 245, 465.
- Valeria, legend of, 60, 61.
- Valeria, wife of Sulla, 458.

Valerius. *See* Corvus, Falto, Flaccus, Lævinus, Messalla, Publicola, Triarius.
 Valerius, L. (admiral), 122, 123.
 Valerius, M. Maximus 54.
 Valerius, 326, 375.
 Varinius, P., 466.
 Varius, Q., 398, 399.
 Varro, C. Terentius (cos. 216 B.C.), 193, 194; at Cannæ, 196-8, 200; 204, 305.
 Varro, M. Terentius (author), 80, 180, 546; in Spain, 531.
 Varus, P. Quintilius, 226.
 Vatinius, P., 502, 517, 519.
 Vectigal. *See* Ager Campanus and Ager publicus.
 Veii, 59, 62, 63, 79-82, 84, 86, 88.
 Velabrum, 37, 39.
 Velia, 32, 38.
 Velites, 138, 139, 379.
 Vellitra, 40, 59, 78, 104, 108.
 Venafrum, 405.
 Veneti (in Italy), 12, 87, 166, 167, 374.
 Veneti (in Gaul), 508, 509.
 Venusia, L. C., 119, 126, 127, 201, 220, 404, 405, 407, 410.
 Vercellæ, battle of, 383, 389.
 Vercingetorix, 512-4, 523.
 Vermina, 231.
 Verona, 5, 375, 382.
 Verres, C., 469, 489, 548.
 Verulæ, 115.
 Vesontio, 507.
 • Vestal Virgins, 24, 35, 49, 85, 86, 385, 386.
 Vestini, 15, 403, 408.
 Vesuvius, Mount, 5, 466; battle of, 103.
 Veterans, Scipio's, 224, 240, 314; Marius', 369, 379, 390; Sulla's, 448, 462, 483; Pompey's, 486, 499, 500; Cæsar's, 537, 538, 542, 547.
 Vetilius, C., 243.
 Vettius, T., 392.
 Vetteses, 242.
 Veturia, 60, 61.
 Veturius, T., 108.
 Vix. *See* Appendix II.
 Via Arnica, 239.
 Via Appia, 7, 95, 111, 114, 119, 192, 207, 209, 404, 440, 521.
 Via Aurelia, 348.
 Via Domitia, 348, 374, 504.

Via Egnatia, 282, 531.
 Via Flaminia, 15, 115, 168, 188, 296 n., 405, 528; *nova*, 239.
 Via Gabinia, 375.
 Via Latina, 7, 192, 202, 203, 208, 405, 443.
 Via Valeria, 115, 209, 405, 406; *Clautia-Valeria*, 7.
 Vibullius, L. Rufus, 528.
 Vicesima manumissionum, 220, 315.
 Vici sceleratus, 29.
 Viminal, Mount, 27, 38.
 Vindalium, battle of, 373.
 Virginia, legend of, 68, 69.
 Viriathus, 243, 244.
 Viridomarus, 168.
 Vocontii, 180, 373.
 Volaterræ, 13, 110, 443.
 Volci, 40, 126.
 Volsci, 16, 40, 59-61, 65 n., 78, 98, 99, 104.
 Volturnus, 82, 118, 126; lake of, 8.
 Volso, Cn. Manlius (cos. 189 B.C.), 271.
 Volso, L. Manlius (cos. 256 B.C.), 156.
 Volso, L. Manlius (prætor, 218 B.C.), 177, 182.
 Voltumnus R., 7, 95, 105, 192, 201, 208, 204, 415.
 Volumina, 60, 61.
 Voluminus, L., 116.
 WALL of Romulus, 37; of Servius Tullius 27, 38, 39.
 Wills, Roman, 45, 70.
 Women, old position of, 41, 65 n.; emancipation of, 320.
 XANTHIPPIUS, 157.
 YROMANRY, decay of, 233, 317, 318, 334, 335, 545.
 Yoke, passing under, 62, 109, 365.
 ZACYNTHUS, 268, 272, 432.
 Zama Regia, 367; battle of, 178, 229, 230, 273.
 Ziela, 477, 483, 536.